



THE NATIONS OF TO-DAY

A New History of the World

EDITED BY JOHN BUCHAN

THE BALTIC AND
CAUCASIAN STATES

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OF TO-DAY**

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A New History of the World

EDITED BY JOHN BUCHAN

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THIS series has been undertaken to provide for the ordinary citizen a popular account of the history of his own and other nations, a chronicle of those movements of the past of which the effect is not yet exhausted, and which are still potent for the peace and comfort of the present. The writers conceive history as a living thing of the most urgent consequence to the men of to-day ; they regard the world around us as an organic growth dependent upon a long historic ancestry. The modern view of history—apart from the pedantry of certain specialists—is a large view, subordinating the mere vicissitudes of dynasties and parliaments to those more fateful events which are the true milestones of civilisation. Clio has become an active goddess and her eyes range far. History is, of course, like all sciences, the quest for a particular kind of truth, but that word “ truth ” has been given a generous interpretation. The older type of historian was apt to interest himself chiefly in the doings of kings and statesmen, the campaigns of generals and the contests of parties. These no doubt are important, but they are not the whole, and to insist upon them to the exclusion of all else is to make the past an unfeathered wilderness, where the only personalities are generals on horseback, judges in ermine and monarchs in purple. Nowadays, whatever we may lack in art, we have gained in science. The plain man has come to his own, and, as Lord Acton has put it, “ The true historian must now take his meals in the kitchen.”

The War brought the meaning of history home to the world. Events which befell long ago suddenly became disruptive forces to shatter a man's ease, and he realised that what had seemed only a phrase in the textbooks might be a thing to die for. The Armistice left an infinity of problems, no one of which could be settled without tracing its roots into the past. Both time and space seemed to have “ closed up.” Whether we like it or not, our isolation is shattered, and not the remotest nation can now draw in its skirts from its neighbours. The consequence must be that even those who are averse to science, and prefer to settle everything by rule of thumb, will be forced

to reconsider their views. Foreign politics have become again, as they were in the age of Pitt and Castlereagh, of Palmerston and Disraeli, urgent matters for every electorate. The average citizen recognises that the popular neglect of the subject contributed in no small degree to the War, and that problems in foreign affairs are as vital to him as questions of tariff and income tax. Once it used to be believed that a country might be rich while its neighbours were poor; now even the dullest is aware that economically the whole world is tightly bound together, and that the poverty of a part lessens the prosperity of the whole. A merchant finds his profits shrinking because of the rate of exchange in a land which was his chief market; he finds his necessary raw material costly and scarce because of the dislocation of industry in some far-away country. He recognises that no nation is commercially sufficient to itself, and he finds himself crippled, not by the success, but by the failure of his foreign colleagues. It is the same in other matters than commerce. Peace is every man's chief interest, but a partial peace is impossible. The world is so closely linked that one recalcitrant unit may penalise all the others.

In these circumstances it is inevitable that interest in foreign countries, often an unwilling and angry interest, should be compulsory for large classes which up to now have scarcely given the matter a thought. An understanding of foreign conditions—though at first it may not be a very sympathetic understanding—is forced upon us by the needs of our daily life. This understanding, if it is to be of the slightest value, must be based upon some knowledge of history, and Clio will be compelled to descend from the schools to the market-place. Of all the movements of the day none is more hopeful than the spread through all classes of a real, though often incoherent, desire for education. Partly it is a fruit of the War. Men realise that battles were not won by muddling through; that as long as we muddled we stuck fast, and that when we won it was because we used our brains to better purpose than our opponents. Partly it is the consequence of the long movement towards self-conscious citizenship, which some call democracy. Most thinking people to-day believe that knowledge spread in the widest commonalty is the only cure for many ills. They believe that education in the most real sense does not stop with school or college; indeed, that true education may only begin when the orthodox curriculum is finished. They believe, further, that this fuller training comes by a man's own efforts and is not necessarily dependent

upon certain advantages in his early years. Finally, they are assured that true education cannot be merely technical or professional instruction; that it must deal in the larger sense with what are called the "humanities." If this diagnosis is correct, then the study of history must play a major part in the equipment of the citizen of the future.

I propose in these few pages to suggest certain reasons why the cultivation of the historical sense is of special value at this moment. The utilitarian arguments are obvious enough, but I would add to them certain considerations of another kind.

Man, as we know, is long-descended, and so are human society and the State. That society is a complex thing, the result of a slow organic growth and no mere artificial machine. In a living thing such as the State growth must be continuous, like the growth of a plant. Every gardener knows that in the tending of plants you cannot make violent changes, that you cannot transplant a well-grown tree at your pleasure from a wooded valley to the bare summit of a hill, that you cannot teach rhododendrons to love lime, or grow plants which need sun and dry soil in a shady bog. A new machine-made thing is simple, but the organic is always subtle and complex. Now, half the mischiefs in politics come from a foolish simplification. Take two familiar conceptions, the "political man" and the "economic man." Those who regard the citizen purely as a political animal, divorce him from all other aspects, moral and spiritual, in framing their theory of the State. In the same way the "economic man" is isolated from all other relations, and, if he is allowed to escape from the cage of economic science into political theory, will work havoc in that delicate sphere. Both are false conceptions, if our problem is to find out the best way to make actual human beings live together in happiness and prosperity. Neither, as a matter of fact, ever existed or could exist, and any polity based upon either would have the harshness and rigidity and weakness of a machine.

We have seen two creeds grow up rooted in these abstractions, and the error of both lies in the fact that they are utterly unhistorical, that they have been framed without any sense of the continuity of history. In what we call Prussianism a citizen was regarded as a cog in a vast machine called the State, to which he surrendered his liberty of judgment and his standard of morals. He had no rights against it and no personality distinct from it. The machine admitted no ethical principles which might interfere with its success, and the

citizen, whatever his private virtues, was compelled to conform to this inverted anarchy. Moreover, the directors of the machine regarded the world as if it were a smooth, flat high-road. If there were hollows and hills created by time, they must be flattened out to make the progress of the machine smoother and swifter. The past had no meaning; all problems were considered on the supposition that human nature was like a mathematical quantity, and that solutions could be obtained by an austere mathematical process. The result was tyranny, a highly efficient tyranny, which nevertheless was bound to break its head upon the complexities of human nature. Such was Prussianism, against which we fought for four years, and which for the time is out of fashion. Bolshevism, to use the convenient word, started with exactly the same view. It believed that you could wipe the slate quite clean and write on it what you pleased, that you could build a new world with human beings as if they were little square blocks in a child's box of bricks. Karl Marx, from whom it derived much of its dogma, interpreted history as only the result of economic forces; he isolated the economic aspect of man from every other aspect and desired to re-create society on a purely economic basis. Bolshevism, though it wandered very far from Marx's doctrine, had a similar point of view. It sought with one sweep of the sponge to blot out all past history, and imagined that it could build its castles of bricks without troubling about foundations. It also was a tyranny, the worse tyranny of the two, perhaps because it was the stupider. It has had its triumphs and its failures, and would now appear to be declining; but it, or something of the sort, will come again, since it represents the eternal instinct of theorists who disregard history, and who would mechanise and unduly simplify human life.

There will always be much rootless stuff in the world. In almost every age the creed which lies at the back of Bolshevism and Prussianism is preached in some form or other. The revolutionary and the reactionary are alike devotees of the mechanical. The safeguard against experiments which can only end in chaos is the wide diffusion of the historical sense, and the recognition that "counsels to which Time hath not been called, Time will not ratify."

The second reason is that a sense of history is a safeguard against another form of abstraction. Ever since the War the world has indulged in a debauch of theorising, and the consequence has been an orgy of catchwords and formulas, which,

unless they are critically examined, are bound to turn political discussion into a desert. The weakening of the substance of many accepted creeds seems to have disposed men to cling more feverishly to their shibboleths. Take any of our contemporary phrases—"self-determination," "liberty," "the right to work," "the right to maintenance," "the proletariat," "class consciousness," "international solidarity," and so forth. They all have a kind of dim meaning, but as they are currently used they have many very different meanings, and these meanings are often contradictory. I think it was Lord Acton who once said he had counted two hundred definitions of "liberty." Abraham Lincoln's words are worth remembering: "The world has never yet had a good definition of the word 'liberty,' and the American people just now are much in want of one. We are all declaring for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing. We assume the word 'liberty' to mean that each worker can do as he pleases with himself and the product of his labour, while, on the other hand, it may mean that some man can do as he pleases with other men and the product of other men's labour." Are we not in the same difficulty to-day? Perhaps the worst sinner in this respect is the word "democracy." As commonly used, it has a dozen quite distinct meanings, when it has any meaning at all, and we are all familiar in political discussions with the circular argument—that such and such a measure is good for the people because it is democratic; and if it be asked why it is democratic, the answer is, "Because it is good for the people." "Democratic" really describes that form of government in which the policy of the State is determined and its business conducted by the will of the majority of its citizens, expressed through some regular channel. It is a word which denotes machinery, not purpose. "Popular," often used as an equivalent, means merely that the bulk of the people approve of a particular mode of government. "Liberal," the other assumed equivalent, implies those notions of freedom, toleration and pacific progress which lie at the roots of Western civilisation. The words are clearly not interchangeable. A policy or a government may be popular without being liberal or democratic; there have been highly popular tyrannies; the German policy of 1914 was popular, but it was not liberal, nor was Germany a democracy. America is a democracy, but it is not always liberal; the French Republic has at various times in its history been both liberal and democratic without being popular. Accurately employed, "democratic" describes a

particular method, "popular" an historical fact, "liberal" a quality and an ideal. The study of history will make us chary about the loud, vague use of formulas. It will make us anxious to see catchwords in their historical relations, and will help us to realise the maleficent effect of phrases which have a fine rhetorical appeal, but very little concrete meaning. If political science is to be anything but a vicious form of casuistry it is very necessary to give its terms an exact interpretation, for their slipshod use will tend to create false oppositions and conceal fundamental agreements, and thereby waste the energy of mankind in empty disputation.

The third reason for the study of history is that it enables a man to take a balanced view of current problems, for a memory stored with historical parallels is the best preventive both against panic and over-confidence. Such a view does not imply the hard-and-fast deduction of so-called laws, which was a habit of many of the historians of the nineteenth century. Exact parallels with the past are hard to find, and nothing is easier than to draw false conclusions. A facile philosophy of history is, as Stubbs once said, "in nine cases out of ten a generalisation founded rather on the ignorance of points in which particulars differ, than in any strong grasp of one in which they agree." Precedents from the past have often been used with disastrous results. In our own Civil War the dubious behaviour of the Israelites on various occasions was made an argument for countless blunders and tyrannies. In the same way the French Revolution has been used as a kind of arsenal for bogus parallels, both by revolutionaries and conservatives, and the most innocent reformers have been identified with Robespierre and St. Just. During the Great War the air was thick with these false precedents. In the Gallipoli Expedition, for example, it was possible to draw an ingenious parallel between that affair and the Athenian Expedition to Syracuse, and much needless depression was the consequence. At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution there were many who saw in it an exact equivalent to the Revolution of 1788 and imagined that the new Russian revolutionary armies would be as invincible as those which repelled the invaders of France. There have been eminent teachers in recent years whose mind has been so obsessed with certain superficial resemblances between the third century of the Christian era and our own times that they have prophesied an impending twilight of civilisation. Those of us who have been engaged in arguing the

case for the League of Nations are confronted by its opponents with a dozen inaccurate parallels from history, and the famous plea of the "thin edge of the wedge" is usually based upon a mistaken use of the same armoury.

A wise man will be chary of drawing dapper parallels and interpreting an historical lesson too rigidly. At the same time there are certain general deductions which are sound and helpful. For example, we all talk too glibly of revolution, and many imagine that, whether they like it or not, a clean cut can be made, and the course of national life turned suddenly and violently in a different direction. But history gives no warrant for such a view. There have been many thousands of revolutions since the world began; nearly all have been the work of minorities, often small minorities; and nearly all, after a shorter or longer period of success, have utterly failed. The French Revolution altered the face of the world, but only when it had ceased to be a revolution and had developed into an absolute monarchy. So with the various outbreaks of 1848. So conspicuously with the Russian Revolution of to-day, which has developed principles the exact opposite of those with which it started. The exception proves the rule, as we see in the case of our own English Revolution of 1688. Properly considered, that was not a revolution, but a reaction. The revolution had been against the personal and unlimited monarchy of the Stuarts. In 1688 there was a return to the normal development of English society, which had been violently broken. It may fairly be said that a revolution to be successful must be a reaction—that is, it must be a return to an organic historical sequence, which for some reason or other has been interrupted.

Parallels are not to be trusted, if it is attempted to elaborate them in detail, but a sober and scientific generalisation may be of high practical value. At the close of the Great War many people indulged in roseate forecasts of a new world—a land fit for heroes to live in, a land inspired with the spirit of the trenches, a land of co-operation and national and international goodwill. Such hasty idealists were curiously blind to the lessons of the past, and had they considered what happened after the Napoleonic wars they might have found a juster perspective. With a curious exactness the history of the three years after Waterloo has repeated itself to-day. There were the same economic troubles—the same rise in the cost of living, with which wages could not keep pace; the same shrinking of foreign exports owing to difficulties of

exchange ; the same cataclysmic descent of agricultural prices from the high levels of the war ; the same hostility to profiteers ; the same revolt against high taxation, and the same impossibility of balancing budgets without it. The Property tax then was the equivalent of our Excess Profits tax, and it is interesting to note that it was abolished in spite of the Government because the commercial community rose against it. There was the same dread of revolution, and the same blunders in the handling of labour, and there was relatively far greater suffering. Yet the land, in spite of countless mistakes, passed through the crisis and emerged into the sunlight of prosperity. In this case historic precedent is not without its warrant for hope.

One charge has been brought against the study of history—that it may kill reforming zeal. This has been well put by Lord Morley: “The study of all the successive stages and beliefs, institutions, laws, forms of art, only too soon grows into a substitute for practical criticism of all these things upon their merits and in themselves. Too exclusive attention to dynamic aspects weakens the energetic duties of the static. The method of history is used merely like any other scientific instrument. There is no more conscience in your comparative history than there is in comparative anatomy. You arrange ideals in classes and series ; but the classified ideal loses its vital spark and halo.” There is justice in the warning, for a man may easily fall into the mood in which he sees everything as a repetition of the past, and the world bound on the iron bed of necessity, and may therefore lose his vitality and zest in the practical work of to-day. It is a danger to be guarded against, but to me it seems a far less urgent menace than its opposite—the tendency to forget the past and to adventure in a raw new world without any chart to guide us. History gives us a kind of chart, and we dare not surrender even a small rushlight in the darkness. The hasty reformer who does not remember the past will find himself condemned to repeat it.

There is little to sympathise with in the type of mind which is always inculcating a lack-lustre moderation, and which has attained to such a pitch of abstraction that it finds nothing worth doing and prefers to stagnate in ironic contemplation. Nor is there more to be said for the temper which is always halving differences in a problem and trying to find a middle course. The middle course, mechanically defined, may be the wrong course. The business of a man steering up a difficult estuary is to keep to the deep-water channel, and that channel

may at one hour take him near the left shore and at another hour close to the right shore. The path of false moderation sticks to the exact middle of the channel, and will almost certainly land the pilot on a sandbank. These are the vices that spring from a narrow study of history and the remedy is a broader and juster interpretation. At one season it may be necessary to be a violent innovator, and at another to be a conservative; but the point is that a clear objective must be there, and some chart of the course to steer by. History does not provide a perfect chart, but it gives us something better than guess-work. It is a bridle on crude haste, but it is not less a spur for timidity and false moderation. Above all it is a guide and a comforter to sane idealism. "The true Past departs not," Carlyle wrote, "nothing that was worthy in the Past departs; no Truth or Goodness realised by man ever dies, or can die; but all is still here, and, recognised or not, lives and works through endless change."

JOHN BUCHAN.

FOREWORD

The Baltic and Caucasian States have here been united into one volume as having formed, prior to the Great War, outlying provinces of the same country—Russia.

To a definite extent, indeed, Georgia, after a brief spell of crippled independence, has again fallen under Russian rule; and it is not unlikely that Azerbaijan will also, within measurable time, be absorbed by her great neighbour. Whether Soviet Russia will however be able to keep, and develop, what Imperial Russia lost, is a question that only the future can solve.

But a happier fate apparently awaits the North-Western Provinces, which after so many desperate struggles for freedom succeeded at last in proclaiming their independence. Lithuania, it is true, is not yet free of the Polish incubus; but Latvia and Estonia seem shaping well, and Finland, sound-based on the capacity of her sturdy sons, is already proving herself a worthy member of the comity of European nations.

NOTE

THE section on Finland is the work of Mr. T. L. Gilmour, Barrister-at-Law (Commander of the Order of the White Rose of Finland); that on the Baltic Provinces is by Mr. W. F. Reddaway, M.A., F.R.Hist.Soc., Censor, Fitzwilliam Hall, Cambridge. The History of Lithuania is by Mr. T. F. Tallents, and its Economics are described by Mr. Geoffrey Drage, M.A., Vice-President, Royal Statistical Society. The Caucasus and Caucasian Azerbaijan are by Mr. W. E. D. Allen, author of *The Turks in Europe*.

[Of the above, Mr. Allen wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the persons mentioned in his Bibliography (pp. 264-265); Mr. Reddaway to the Estonian and Latvian Legations; Mr. Tallents to Mr. Narushevich and Mr. R. Harrison of the Lithuanian Legation; and Mr. Gilmour to H.E. the Finnish Minister in London, Mr. Ossian Donner.]

The whole volume has been prepared under the care of Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen.

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FINLAND

INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL

AMONG the independent States which have emerged from the World-war Finland is one of the most interesting, and one of the least known. In the popular mind of Western and Southern Europe the Finns and the Lapps were not infrequently confounded as a primitive race, thinly scattered over an inhospitable land of lake, forest, and tundra, and leading a nomadic life in the neighbourhood of the Arctic Circle. For this confusion there is now no excuse, since from its geographical situation between the great Russian State on the east and the Scandinavian peninsula to the west Finland has acquired in the eyes of Europe a political importance to which it is no less entitled by its economic possibilities and the character of its people.

Finland—or Suomi, as the Finns themselves call their land—is a country of low general elevation in Northern Europe with an area of 125,689 square miles, of which nearly 11 per cent. is covered by the innumerable lakes which form one of its most characteristic features. It is bounded on the west and the south by two great arms of the Baltic, the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland, the western frontier north of the Gulf of Bothnia marching with Sweden. To the north a strip of Norwegian territory lies between Finland and the Arctic Ocean, while to the east the frontier with Russia cuts across the centre of the great inland sea, Lake Ladoga, and passing northwards through Karelia, a district mainly inhabited by a people of Finnish race and speech, follows no clearly defined geographical features, being drawn more or less arbitrarily through sparsely populated forest lands.

Surface Features.—Broadly speaking, Finland is a plateau rising gradually from south to north with no great outstanding physical features, but relieved from monotony by very considerable variations in local features. The underlying basic rock, granite, gneiss, and crystalline slate is nowhere at any great depth below the surface, which consists partly of gravels deposited by the diluvian ice and, in the low-lying coastal areas, of clays. The country may be roughly divided into

three zones : (a) the low coastal plains, (b) the central or lake plateau, and (c) the northern plateau, which comprises the greater part of Finnish Lapland.

Numerous rivers, for the most part of no great importance or economic value, descend from the central lake plateau to the sea. The low-lying coastal belt traversed by these rivers varies considerably in width, being in some parts no more than twenty miles, and in others some ninety miles across. It is for the most part devoted to agriculture, though in parts well wooded, and is remarkable for the fringe of islands which protect it from the sea along the greater part of its southern and western coast-line. These islands form one of the most striking features of Finnish scenery. Finland has sometimes been called "The Land of a Thousand Islands"—at others, "The Land of a Thousand Lakes." In both cases the description is more picturesque than accurate. Of both lakes and islands Finland possesses not a thousand, but tens of thousands. The islands nearest to the coast are frequently of considerable size and, as regards vegetation, differ in no material respect from the mainland. But as they retreat towards the open water the islands grow smaller in size, until the outer fringe consists of barren rocks protruding from the sea and at times completely submerged by its waves. The navigation of the channels through this maze of islands is so difficult that pilotage becomes traditional in certain families, although the Government—whether Russian or Finnish—has for many years endeavoured to reduce these difficulties by an elaborate system of buoys, lights, and beacons. With a local pilot on board, the Finnish "skärgård" is a paradise for the yachtsman of modest means, who is attracted by an endless change of scene and scenery.

The main group of islands along the south-western corner of the mainland is known as the Åbo Archipelago and extends in a practically unbroken series to the Åland Islands, which lie across the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia and have formed part of the Grand Duchy since Finland passed from Swedish to Russian rule in 1809. The Åland Islands, of which Mariehamn, a small town of 1,500 inhabitants, is the principal port, cover an area of about 550 square miles and are distant only some ten miles from the nearest Swedish islands, from which, however, they are separated by a deep channel ; so that geologically the Åland Islands are continuous with the Finnish mainland.

Some idea of the indented nature of the coast of Finland may be gathered from the fact that while the distance round

the coast from the Swedish frontier at the northern end of the Gulf of Bothnia to the Russian frontier at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland is about 1,000 miles, this, if the actual contour of the coast is followed, would extend to something like 3,000 miles. The coastal area is the most thickly populated, and it is there that the bulk of the Swedish element in the country is to be found.

In many ways the central plateau is the most interesting part of Finland. The average elevation is about 300 feet. It is a land of isolated lakes and of groups of lakes linked together by a chain of rivers, along the navigable sections of which small but admirably-equipped passenger steamers are constantly plying, and huge timber rafts are floated down from the forests to the factories and timber-yards in the coastal region; here they are broken up, and in one form or another they constitute one of the main Finnish exports. Much has been done by canalising existing waterways or by creating new canals to improve and extend water-transport. Advantage has also been taken of the numerous waterfalls for power and light, many up-to-date factories having been constructed in the immediate neighbourhood of some of the more important rapids. The best-known—though not actually the largest—rapids in the country are those of Imatra on the Vuokina River in the south-east corner of Finland, which it is calculated have a horse-power of over 140,000. It is estimated that in her rapids Finland possesses something like 2,500,000 horse-power, of which a fraction only is as yet utilised.

There are three principal lake-groups in the central plateau, their order in point of size being—the Saima group in the south-east, the Kymmene or Päijänne group in the centre, and the Kumo group in the west.

The inland lakes and waterways are frozen over for the winter months, as indeed are the coastal waters, the mainland ports having, with the exception of Hangö, to be kept open by ice-breakers.

The northern section of the country answers more nearly to the pre-war conception of Finland than do the other sections. The average elevation is about 500 feet, but in the north the land rises to 1,000 feet, and there are isolated peaks over 4,000 feet above sea-level. Although no part of Finland lies actually within the Arctic Circle, the conditions in this section are sub-Arctic. The population consists largely of nomadic Lapps, and travelling facilities are still somewhat primitive; but to those who are in search of health and sport, and who do not

mind roughing it, northern Finland offers in the summer months many attractions—attended by at least one drawback, the mosquitoes which fasten with avidity on the intruding stranger. In this northern section the lakes are smaller and less numerous, the forests less dense than in the central section, and its economic value is less than that of either of the other sections of the country.

Climate.—Of the climate of Finland the following account is derived from an authoritative source:

“Notwithstanding the fact that Finland is situated comparatively far north, the climate is not so cold as that of other countries in the same latitude. This is chiefly due to the mitigating influence of the Gulf Stream and the south-west winds. Situated on the one hand on the border of the largest continent in the world, and on the other hand not far from the Atlantic, the climate is intermediate between that of mainland and coast, and more closely approaches the latter. The Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland, together with the countless lakes, chief among them Ladoga, are also important climatic factors. The coldest month is generally February, the warmest July. The difference in temperature between the coldest and warmest months is generally about 25° – 27° Cent. (45° – 49° F.), but in North Lapland and East Karelia it is about 28° (50° F.), and in Åland only 19° (34° F.). Such severe cold as to freeze quicksilver is rare in the southern parts of the country, but in the north and north-east it occurs almost every winter. The monthly mean temperature in the south can sometimes rise to 22° Cent. (72° F.) and in the north it can fall to 25° or 27° Cent. below zero (-14° F.).”

Population.—In 1920 the population of Finland was returned as 3,366,507, of whom 1,661,140 were males and 1,705,367 females. The bulk of the population is found in the coastal plain region, but only a little over 15 per cent. are urban dwellers, though the growth of industrialism in recent years tends in Finland, as elsewhere, to drain the countryside into the towns. Finland is still, however, occupied by a more distinctly rural population than any other European country with the single exception of Russia. Helsingfors, the capital (197,848 in 1920), is the only town with over 100,000 inhabitants, and there are only five other towns with over 20,000 inhabitants: Åbo (58,367), Tammerfors (47,830), Viborg (30,071), Vasa (23,957) and Uleåborg (21,332).

From the earliest times Finland has been inhabited by two races, which, notwithstanding their long association and an

inevitable amount of intermarriage, remain quite distinct to the present day. It is believed that Scandinavian settlements were established on the western and south-western shores of Finland in the early centuries of our era—probably before Asiatic tribes of the Finno-Ugrian family began to find their way across the Baltic from Estonia or wandered northwards through what is now known as Karelia. In all probability however these early Scandinavian settlements were absorbed by the much more numerous ancestors of the modern Finns, for it is generally accepted that the Swedish element, which at the present time represents about 11 per cent. of the population, is derived from stocks which came from Sweden in the Middle Ages and settled in the islands and along the southern and western coast-lines to which they are still practically confined to-day.

To distinguish between the two races it is perhaps advisable to refer to them, when necessary, as Swedish Finlanders and Finnish Finlanders. The latter are numerically overwhelmingly the predominant race, representing some 88 per cent. of the population, the remaining one per cent. being foreigners settled in the country. But though so much more numerous than the Swedish Finlanders, it is only within comparatively recent times that the Finnish Finlanders have vigorously asserted their race-consciousness and claimed a rapidly increasing share in the political, economic and cultural life of their country. The long centuries of association with Sweden and Swedish civilisation have, however, left indelible marks on the classes which have now climbed to power, notwithstanding more than a century of subsequent close association with Russia, and notwithstanding a certain "dourness" in the character of the Finnish element which tends to preserve their own strongly-marked racial characteristics, even when they are brought into intimate relations with another race. It remains to be seen how far the recent change in the form of Government, the growth of socialistic ideals and the bitter animosities which have unhappily emerged from the conflict between the "Whites" and the "Reds" will affect the Swedish elements in the composite civilisation Finland has so far evolved.

A. HISTORY

I

THE SWEDISH PERIOD TO 1809

THE mists which obscure life in Northern Europe during the early centuries of our era are nowhere more dense than in the peninsula which is now known as Finland. The ancestors of the modern Finn appear to have belonged to the same ethnic stock as the Lithuanians and the Magyars, and to have arrived in the peninsula as part of the Great Asiatic wave which swept over Europe, overwhelming in the south the great Mediterranean civilisation and spreading northwards almost to the verge of the Arctic Circle. There appear to have developed two main branches of the original Finnish settlers, the Tavastlanders or westerners and the Karelians or eastlanders, the customs and language of the former showing traces of modification by contact with their Scandinavian neighbours to the west, and of the latter equally strong traces of modification by contact with their Slav neighbours to the east. Of the life in Finland in these remote centuries we can only make a conjectural reconstruction. There are no records before the twelfth century, but in 1157 King Eric of Sweden, accompanied by an Englishman, Bishop Henry of Uppsala, undertook, at the request of the Pope, an expedition to Finland to convert the inhabitants to Christianity. A settlement was made at Åbo, on the south-western corner of the peninsula, and the intercourse thus begun resulted a century later in Finland becoming a province of Sweden.

From its geographical position Finland became inevitably during the Middle Ages the cockpit of Northern Europe—the meeting-place for the powerful Scandinavian States to the west and the colossal Slav Power to the east. With varying frontiers and brief intervals of alien rule, Finland remained for more than five and a half centuries an integral part of the Swedish State, though in the latter part of that period the Finlanders secured for themselves a measure of semi-independ-

ence which they were able to maintain when Alexander I began the interesting experiment of combining the functions of an autocratic Tsar with those of a constitutional Grand Duke.

Although religious zeal was the motive power which induced the Swedish Kings to undertake the crusades into Finland, we have seen that the establishment of Christianity was quickly followed by the incorporation of Finland in the dominions of the Swedish sovereigns. It is doubtful if even at that time much more than the coastal plain and the river-valleys leading into the central lake region had been settled by the Finnish immigrants, and for some considerable time after the occupation of the country by the Swedes the relations between the Swedish King and his new subjects were somewhat informal and undefined. A race of Prince Bishops wielded the thunders of the Church and much temporal authority from their castle at Åbo, while there is evidence that for some considerable time—until indeed as late as the fifteenth century—the Swedish sovereigns left the local administration of Finland largely in the hands of “Birkarlar”—guilds of traders residing in the coast-towns and paying some agreed-on tax in recognition of their dependence on Sweden. But as trade expanded, as the population increased, and as the territory subject to Sweden was extended, the inhabitants of the country acquired a more defined position as Swedish subjects.

In one respect indeed the Finns were singularly fortunate. “The conversion of the Finns,” Professor Frederiksen points out, “like all other conversions in those days, was chiefly effected by the sword; but there was one great difference between this conquest and those made by the Crusaders in the east, or in north-eastern Germany, or in the Baltic provinces of Russia. This difference lay in the fact that the Swedes were a nation composed of free men only; like the Danes in Northern England three centuries earlier, they were all free cultivators of the soil, and the freedom of the peasants or agricultural population was from the first the basis of the social system in Finland, as it was in the Scandinavian countries.”

This cardinal fact must never be forgotten if we are to understand the national psychology of Finland, for it is the ultimate explanation of the failure of Russia to absorb the Grand Duchy into the Russian autocratic system and of the passionate resistance of the entire Finnish population to the attempt to do so.

The third crusade, undertaken by the Stadholder Torgils

Knutsson of Sweden in 1293, had resulted in the inclusion of territory as far east as Karelia on the Finnish frontier, but the Russians of Novgorod disputed the ownership with the Swedes, and the struggle which ensued—one of an extended series—was only concluded by the Peace of Nöteborg in 1323, which divided Karelia between the disputants. The frontiers of Finland being thus fixed for the time being, the country was brought into closer relations with Sweden. In 1362 the Finns for the first time voted through their representatives for the election of a Swedish King, their right to full citizenship thus being acknowledged. The Swedish common law was administered by local judges, taxes were collected by Crown bailiffs, all waste or unoccupied lands were declared the property of the Crown; but simultaneously rudimentary representative institutions were established and, owing to the distance from the centre of Government, there tended to grow up a certain qualified independence towards Sweden. The Swedes, however, constituted the ruling caste and, as in other parts of Europe, a feudal aristocracy was established which, on the one hand, at times proved troublesome to the Swedish Kings and, on the other, sought to curtail the individual liberty of the peasant and trader.

In the fifteenth century the great Russian War (1473–97) devastated the country, but in the following century considerable advances were made in various directions. In 1527 the “Estates” were constituted in their final form by the addition of the “House of the Bourgeois” and the “House of the Peasantry” to the “House of Nobles” and the “House of the Clergy”—these four Houses constituting the Diet.

The Reformation found a warm welcome in the settled parts of the country, though there were districts in the far north where paganism had not yet been entirely eradicated. Finland however became strongly Lutheran, and the Bible, the Catechism and Luther’s Hymn-book were exempted from the decree prohibiting the printing of any books in the Finnish language. The reign of Gustavus (1523–1560) was further distinguished by many useful reforms in the local administration. Corruption, which had become rife, was strongly repressed, the power of the Hanseatic League was broken, and considerable areas of unoccupied land were brought into cultivation.

It was in this century too that Finland was elevated to the status of a Grand Duchy. In 1556, during a war with Russia, Gustavus Vasa visited Finland and created his second son, John, Grand Duke of Finland, in vassalage to the Swedish

Crown. On the death of Gustavus Vasa a dispute arose between the newly-created Grand Duke and his elder brother Eric XIV, which resulted in Finland being reconstituted a province of Sweden. But later in the century—in 1581—King John III, during another war with Russia, in which the Finnish soldiers greatly distinguished themselves, restored Finland to the dignity of a Grand Duchy, but attached the Grand Dukedom to the Swedish Crown. This did not, however, constitute Finland a separate independent State, Finnish representatives continuing to attend the Swedish Diet as before.

In the following century, during the reign of the great Gustavus Adolphus (1611–1632), Sweden reached the zenith of her greatness. The Peace of Stolbova, in 1617, added the provinces of Kexholm and Ingrea to the Swedish Dominions, thus forming a buffer between Finland and Russia. The commercial and judicial systems were reorganised, and an impetus was given to the advancement of learning by the foundation of the University of Åbo in 1640. During the Governorship of Per Brahe charters of incorporation were granted to many Finnish towns, and reforms were introduced into the administration. But the greatness of Sweden was not all gain for Finland. The huge grants of land made to victorious generals created widespread discontent among the peasantry, and it is stated that “by the end of Queen Christina’s reign (1654) two-thirds of the land and half the ordinary revenue had been alienated from the State as gifts.” To add to the misery caused by the constant wars in which Sweden was engaged, several severe famines ravaged the country. Notwithstanding the progress made in many directions, Finland was still a poor country of agriculturists, and in three fatal years (1695–7) a third of the population succumbed to famine and its attendant diseases. Plague and famine continued to take their toll of the people, and when in 1721 the Swedish King was compelled to sign the Peace of Nystad with Peter the Great, not only re-ceding to Russia the Provinces of Kexholm and Ingrea, but ceding to his powerful neighbour the Viborg district which had always belonged to Sweden, the population of Finland is said to have been reduced by a half, and to have numbered only between two hundred and two hundred and fifty thousand souls.

Twenty years after the Peace of Nystad was signed war with Russia again broke out, and in 1743 the Russian frontier was advanced by the Treaty of Åbo to the Kymmene River.

These repeated defeats and loss of territory raised doubts in the minds of a certain section of the Finnish population, in view of the growing power of their great Russian neighbour, as to the future of their country. It was while the war was still raging—in 1742—that the Empress Elizabeth sought to intensify this feeling of doubt by issuing a proclamation to the Finns urging them to separate from Sweden and constitute themselves a buffer State between Sweden and Russia. But the bulk of the population was not ready for any such dangerous adventure, although certain sections were tempted by the proposal; and it is perhaps from this time that may be reckoned the beginning of the dream of an independent Finland, realised a century and a half later as one of the unforeseen results of the Great War.

The period that followed the signature of the Treaty of Åbo afforded evidence of the recuperative power of Finland. The population increased rapidly and the economic resources of the country were considerably developed. It was during the reign of Gustavus III (1771–1792) that two Acts were passed by the Swedish Diet which subsequently came to be regarded by the Finlanders as the foundation of their case in their dispute with Russia at the beginning of the present century. These were the Form of Government (*Regerings Formen*) of 1772 and the Act of Union and Security (*Förenings-och-Säkerhets-Akt*) of 1789. When the latter Act, which modified the earlier Act in favour of the Crown, was passed, Sweden was again at war with Russia, but it was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Gustavus Adolphus IV occupied the Swedish throne, that the conflict which finally deprived the Swedish monarchs of the Grand Duchy occurred.

In February 1808 the Russian Army crossed the Finnish frontier, and in September of the same year the defeat of the Swedish-Finnish forces at Oravais finally decided the prolonged contest for Finland in favour of Russia. Alexander I did not, however, at once incorporate Finland into the Russian Empire. He was still at war with Sweden, but recognising that the Grand Duchy might be detached from the Swedish Crown with the consent of the people, he wisely decided to negotiate with the Finnish leaders, whom he invited to a conference at St. Petersburg in October 1808. Acting on the advice given to him by the Finnish deputation, the Emperor summoned the Diet to meet at Borgå in March 1809.

II

THE RUSSIAN PERIOD 1809-1917

THE Diet of Borgå is one of the pivotal points in Finnish history. Although an autocrat within his own wide-flung dominions, Alexander I was a sufficiently enlightened ruler to recognise that a people accustomed for centuries to the forms and practice of self-government would not tamely acquiesce in the loss of their traditional and cherished liberties. He accordingly decided on the far-seeing if difficult policy of assuming in Finland the rôle of a constitutional sovereign, while retaining his position as an autocratic ruler in Russia.

He attended in person the opening of the Diet, and his first act was to publish the following proclamation to the inhabitants of Finland :

“ Providence having placed Us in possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, We have desired by the present Act to confirm and ratify the Religion and fundamental Laws of the Land, as well as the privileges and the rights which each class in the said Grand Duchy, in particular, and all the inhabitants in general, be their position high or low, have hitherto enjoyed according to the Constitution : We promise to maintain all these benefits and laws firm and unbroken in their full force.”

In response to this solemn declaration the Estates of the Finnish Diet acknowledged Alexander I as Grand Duke of Finland, and took the oath of fealty to their new ruler. There does not appear to be any ground for doubting the sincerity of Alexander's intention to rule in Finland as a constitutional sovereign. In his closing speech to the Diet he declared : “ The Finnish people is henceforth raised to the circle of the Nations.” In 1816 he issued a Rescript binding his descendants to rule in Finland according to the Constitution, and his settled policy was clearly defined in a communication made at the time of this Rescript to one of his Ministers :

“ As regards the condition of Finland, my intention has been to give this people a political existence, so that they may not feel themselves conquered by Russia but united to her for their own clear advantage ; therefore not only their civil but their political laws have been maintained.”

The position thus created by the transfer of the sovereign power from the King of Sweden to the Emperor of Russia

involved a number of important changes in the administration of the Grand Duchy. The situation was recognised by Sweden in the Treaty of Fredrikshamn signed in September 1809, but the Finns had not waited for this formal recognition before proceeding to frame, with the consent of their new sovereign, administrative machinery based on the fundamental laws and designed to meet the new conditions created by the separation of Finland from a constitutionally-governed Sweden. Finland had now to create her own autonomous institutions to replace the local Swedish institutions under which she had hitherto existed.

A Governor-General was appointed to represent the Grand Duke in Finland, and Statutes establishing a State Council, presided over by the Governor-General, were sanctioned. Two years later a Committee for Finnish affairs was instituted at St. Petersburg, a Finnish "Secretary of State" reporting to the Emperor questions reserved for his decision. The State Council was composed of the heads of the various Departments of Government and in 1816 the Emperor-Grand Duke decreed that it should thereafter be known as the Imperial Senate. It was, in fact, what is commonly described in Western Europe as "the Cabinet." In 1826 the Committee for Finnish Affairs was abolished and the Secretary of State became the medium for communication on Finnish affairs with the Sovereign.

In one important respect the hopes of the Finnish people were doomed to disappointment. Neither Alexander I nor his successor Nicholas I summoned the Diet to fulfil the legislative functions attributed to it. Repeated requests that the Estates might be called together were refused or ignored, until Alexander II finally yielded, and in September 1863 a legally constituted General Diet assembled at Helsingfors, which had superseded Åbo as the capital in 1819.

In his address at the official opening Alexander II, after reviewing the legislative and financial proposals to be submitted to the Estates, made an important declaration to which frequent reference was made in the embittered controversy between Alexander's grandson and the Finnish people at the close of the century :

"Many provisions of the fundamental laws of the Grand Duchy are," he declared, "no longer applicable to the state of affairs existing since its union with the Empire; others lack clearness and precision. Desirous of remedying these imperfections, it is My ambition to have a measure carefully

prepared which shall contain explanatory and supplemental provisions. These will be submitted to the consideration of the Estates at the next Diet, which I propose convoking three years hence. Whilst maintaining the principle of a constitutional monarchy agreeably to the ancient customs of the Finnish people, and of which principle all their laws and institutions bear the impress, I wish to include in this projected measure a more extended right than that which the Estates now possess as to the adjustment of taxation, as also the right of motion which they formerly possessed, reserving to Myself, however, the initiative in all quarters which affect the alteration of the fundamental laws."

The reassembling of the Diet marked an epoch in the constitutional history of Finland. The changes foreshadowed by Alexander II were accepted by the Diet, and the "Constitution of 1863" was warmly welcomed by the Finnish people. In 1869 periodical meetings of the Diet were sanctioned, and in the same decade many other important changes were effected. On its union with Russia the silver rouble had been accepted as the legal unit of currency, but in 1865 a separate coinage, with the Finnish mark as the unit, was instituted. Two years earlier the use of the Finnish language had been admitted in official business.

Except for the comparatively brief interlude of the Crimean War, when the fortress of Sveaborg was bombarded by the British fleet, Finland during the nineteenth century enjoyed practical immunity from external troubles. It was a period of great material progress for Finland as for the rest of the world. At the beginning of the century the population was estimated to be less than a million; at its close this number had increased to two and a half millions. This long period of peace not only gave the Finns the opportunity of developing the natural resources of their country but permitted them to evolve a national consciousness. Notwithstanding their long association with Sweden, the bulk of the population had retained their essential national characteristics, although it is at the same time true that they had been profoundly influenced by their centuries of contact with Scandinavian ideas and ideals. With their new associates to the east they had, however, singularly little in common. Shortly after the union with Russia Alexander had restored the province of Viborg to the Grand Duchy, which thus regained its territorial integrity. The policy of the Emperor-Grand Duke to raise Finland "to the circle of the Nations" did in fact succeed, notwithstanding

spasmodic periodic attempts on the part of Pan-Russian elements in St. Petersburg to absorb Finland into the Empire. This success was in no small measure due to the fact that, from the first moment of her association with Russia, Finland secured her fiscal independence. Russian statesmen had raised no objection to financial arrangements which relieved Russia of any responsibility for a country impoverished by war and famine, but as the Finns grew in numbers, and as their material prosperity increased, it became apparent that Finland was heavily the gainer by the entire separation of her finances from those of her powerful but lethargic senior partner. Even the Customs barrier which the Russian Government erected against Finnish imports—justified among other grounds on the cynical plea that the Russian workman was less sober than his Finnish competitor and must accordingly be protected—contributed to the creation of that sense of nationality which was the peculiar growth of the nineteenth century.

It is impossible to retrace in detail the great and far-reaching changes which the nineteenth century witnessed in Finland. But all these changes tended to emphasise the disparity between Finland and Russia rather than to draw them into closer relationship. Finland was a constitutional monarchy—Russia an autocracy. Finland was Lutheran, Russia Greek Orthodox. The Finnish Government favoured low tariffs, the Russian Government high. The typical Finn was more competent than attractive. Hard-working, sober, “dour,” he offered a striking contrast to the Russian peasant, dirty, ignorant, incompetent when judged by Western standards, but with something in him which attracted the affection if not the admiration of other human beings. Further, while the Russian drank tea in enormous quantities, the Finns were equally addicted to the drinking of coffee.

The astonishing thing is not that a conflict arose between two partners so unequally yoked, but that the relationship was able to exist for so long. That it did so exist is a remarkable testimony to the vitality of the Finnish people. The constitution of 1863 was very far from being a perfect instrument of Government. It left large numbers of the people unrepresented; it perpetuated class distinctions; it left the nomination of the Executive—the Senate—in the hands of the Emperor-Grand Duke; but it worked, and when in 1899 Nicholas II decreed its suspension the whole body of the people, irrespective of the parties into which they had grouped themselves, joined in a passionate demand for its restoration.

But this united front against Russian aggression was perfectly compatible with serious internal differences. During the Swedish period it was natural that the Swedish element in the population should constitute the ruling class. Swedish was the official language, and even the educated Finnish Finns looked to the west for their political ideas and their culture. Finnish was the language of the peasants, many of whom spoke no other language, while the Swedish Finns were obliged to have some acquaintance at least with Finnish. The growth of a national Finnish consciousness received its greatest impetus when Lönnrot, a "Swedish" physician, collected from the lips of the peasants the traditional stories which he first published in 1835. The epic of the *Kalevala* now forms part of the literary heritage of Europe. Its publication in Finland reinforced a movement, which had already gained many adherents among the younger generation, to make Finnish the national language. The cry was that to make a Finnish nation the educated classes and the peasantry must coalesce, and that the outward sign of the existence of a Finnish nation was the use of a Finnish language. "Swedish we are not, Russians we do not want to become, therefore we must be Finnish," exclaimed one ardent advocate of the change.

To these passionate appeals many of the Swedish Finns were the first to respond. Johan Ludvig Runeberg (1804-1877), by the magnificent lyric and epic poems which he wrote in Swedish, materially contributed to the creation of a Finnish national spirit, as also did Zachris Topelius (1808-1898) and others, among whom none exercised greater influence than Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806-1881), who found his most determined opponents among the official classes, but succeeded in winning many adherents in other directions. It was not however until 1863 that Alexander II, at the suggestion of Snellman, decreed that Finnish should be put on a footing of equality with Swedish in certain legal matters, and that Finnish was allowed to be used by lecturers at the University. To-day the two languages are on a footing of absolute equality, but in the prolonged struggle to which the language question gave rise the participants found themselves drifting more and more into well-defined political camps—the Svecomans or Swedish party and the Fennomans or Finnish party. Numerically much the stronger, the Fennoman party, following the law of political associations, split up into "Old Fennomans" and "Young Fennomans"—distinctions which existed until the great growth of the Social Democratic party in the present century

reduced the older political parties to a condition of secondary importance.

Simultaneously with the growth of new political ideas and of the discovery and creation of a national literature, the material prosperity of the country was advancing rapidly and steadily. One of the earliest acts of the new Government after the union with Russia was to establish a Bank, and, while Finland still remains in the main an agricultural country, the banking system which the Finns have gradually evolved has been one of the main factors in promoting the rapid development of industry and commerce, more especially in the coastal regions. Improvements in the waterways were taken in hand, the Saima Canal being constructed between the years 1845 and 1856. Later railways were built, lines of steamships established, the forest wealth of the country was exploited, and in the last decades of the nineteenth century ambitious schemes for utilising the water-power of the principal rivers as they flowed over the edge of the central plateau to the coastal regions were successfully carried out. Up-to-date factories equipped with the latest American machinery were established, and Finland was rapidly becoming known to neighbouring nations as the home of a people which had established for itself a high standard in education and in the industrial arts.

In the midst of this material prosperity there came with apparent suddenness a political bombshell. In February 1899 Nicholas II suspended the Constitution, and appointed a rude soldier, General Bobrikov, Governor-General with practically autocratic powers. This strong action by a weak sovereign was not, however, so sudden as it seemed to be to the world outside Finland and Russia. In reality it marked the triumph, after a prolonged struggle, of those reactionary elements in Russia which had never ceased to regret the "magnanimous" action of Alexander I in not at once annexing Finland to the Russian Empire. The struggle had continued with fluctuating fortune through the reigns of successive Emperors. Measures had been taken during the reign of Nicholas I to restrict some of the liberties claimed by Finland; a strict censorship was established, and no books but those dealing with religion and economics could be printed in Finnish. But Nicholas did not undo the settlement made by his predecessor, and his successor, Alexander II, deservedly earned the gratitude, if not indeed the affection, of the Finnish people. In the reign of the next sovereign, Alexander III (1881-1894), the Pan-Russian party made a series of concerted attacks on the Finnish Constitution,

which by its liberal institutions offered a standing example, at the very doors of Russia, of the possibility of combining a constitutional monarchy with material prosperity and a contented population. Various minor alterations were made in the laws to the detriment of Finland, and a Committee, on which Russians were nominated as members, was appointed to revise the Finnish Constitution. Before the Committee had reported, Nicholas II (1894-1917) had come to the throne, and the forces of reaction gathered fresh strength. In 1898 the then Secretary of State for Finland was dismissed, and the decree suspending the Constitution and appointing General Bobrikov Military Dictator quickly followed.

The Finns met this final attack in characteristic fashion. They adopted and maintained an attitude of almost meticulous legality. They appealed to the Grand Duke to observe the oath which he had taken on his accession, and they appealed to the enlightened conscience of the civilised world. Although stirred to the depths of their nature, they refrained for a long time from any individual act of violence and did not offer to their oppressors, by futile acts of rebellion, any excuse for violence.

The campaign conducted in almost every European country and in the United States by representatives of the Constitutional party in Finland was admirably organised and remarkably effective in enlisting the sympathy of those to whom the appeal was made. But it failed lamentably in what was its ultimate and most important object. The Emperor-Grand Duke remained obdurate. A deputation from the West was refused an audience. Nor was a deputation representative of European literature and science more successful.

Meanwhile Bobrikov found his task one of endless difficulty. He was confronted by a nation of passive resisters. He banished many of the leading men in every walk of life, arrested others, dismissed judges and officials, replacing them by Russians, or if possible by Russianised Finns. Von Plehve, the Russian Minister of the Interior, was illegally appointed Secretary of State for Finland. The Finnish army was abolished and measures taken to secure recruits for the Russian Army; but in view of the universal refusal to put into force the new army regulations the attempt failed. Many Finns did not deny that the changed conditions necessitated a revision of the relations between the Russian Empire and the Grand Duchy, but they took their stand on the ground that any such change must be effected in accordance with the Constitution. No-

thing could shake the fierce determination of the great majority of the people to maintain their liberties, but the prolongation of the struggle induced a certain section of the Old Fennomans to question the wisdom of continuing a struggle which appeared to be hopeless. On certain individuals this apparent failure of constitutional methods had an opposite effect. In June 1904 a young Finnish official of good family, Eugen Schauman, assassinated General Bobrikov, and then committed suicide. The act was represented as the outcome of the decision of the Swedish Revolutionary party "to adopt the methods of terrorism." There was, in fact, no Swedish Revolutionary party, and the letter which Schauman had addressed to the Emperor, and of which he had taken the precaution to entrust a copy to a friend in a sealed packet, was opened after his death. It so aptly summarises the situation as it presented itself to the great majority of the Finnish people that it may well be put on record here. It ran as follows :

" Most Powerful, Most Gracious Emperor-Grand Duke !

" Your Majesty !

" With the assistance of the Procurator-General and Your Majesty's Senate for Finland, who, without regard for the precepts of law and justice, blindly comply with General Bobrikov's commands, the Governor-General has succeeded in bringing about a state of complete confusion and lawlessness in this country. The laws are being openly disregarded and violated. By means of lies and false representations the Governor-General and the Minister Secretary of State, M. von Plehve, have succeeded in inducing Your Majesty to issue ordinances and take measures violating the laws which Your Majesty promised on Your accession to the Throne to preserve steadfastly and in full force.

" The law-abiding and ablest officials of the country are being dismissed without legal trial and sentence, and in their place are nominated all sorts of incompetent individuals, as well as persons who have no right to occupy public posts. The most intelligent and loyal citizens are subjected to arrest and exile. There is no safety as to personal freedom.

" Since the Minister Secretary of State, whose duty it is to report to Your Majesty on matters concerning the Grand Duchy of Finland, is not a Finnish man, is not familiar with the laws and customs of the country, and has common interests with General Bobrikov, Your Majesty is not informed as to the actual situation, nor as to what the laws of the land pre-

scribe. Since there is no prospect of a truthful representation of the real state of things reaching Your Majesty within a measurable period, and of General Bobrikov being in consequence thereof recalled, the only thing that remains is to act in self-defence and make him innocuous. This method is violent, but there is no other.

"Your Majesty! on the same occasion I sacrifice my own life by my own hand, in order to convince Your Majesty yet more fully that grave evils prevail in the Grand Duchy of Finland, as well as in Poland and the Baltic Provinces and in the whole Russian Empire.

"I have taken my decision alone, after mature deliberation. Your Majesty! in the face of death, I swear by God that no conspiracy is connected with this. Alone have I taken my decision, and alone I proceed to action.

"Knowing Your Majesty's good heart and noble intentions I only pray Your Majesty to be pleased to investigate the real conditions of the Empire—including Finland, Poland, and the Baltic Provinces.

"I remain with profound veneration, Most Powerful, Most Gracious Emperor and Grand Duke, Your Imperial Majesty's most humble and obedient subject,

"EUGEN SCHAUMAN."

Within a few weeks Mr. von Plehve was assassinated in St. Petersburg, and in February of 1905 the Procurator-General, Mr. E. Johnsson, a Finlander who, by his subserviency to the new régime, was probably the most hated man in Finland, was shot dead by Karl Lennart Hohenthal, a former student of Helsingfors University.

Meanwhile Russia had not only found herself at war with Japan, but was realising the astounding fact that she was being beaten by the enemy she had so woefully underrated. It was not a time to provoke further trouble in Europe. The assassination of his leading advisers in Finnish affairs was not, however, the only warning which reached the Emperor-Grand Duke that it would be wise to reconsider his policy towards Finland. Almost simultaneously with the adoption of a policy of open Russification there had emerged in Finland a new political party the elements of which had long been in formation, which was destined to play an increasing part in the future of the country.

On the inauguration of the policy of Russification in 1899 the old party distinctions had yielded to the general opposition

that policy aroused. The "Svecoman" party and the Young Fennomans had for the time being coalesced in a new party known as the Constitutional party. The bulk of the Old Fennomans however accepted Russification as to some extent inevitable and professed to believe that the wisest policy was to acquiesce in the new régime, and by so doing to save as many of the distinctively Finnish institutions as possible. Those who accepted this view became known as the Moderate party.

But while the old parties were thus regrouping themselves a new ferment had been at work among the labouring classes—particularly in the towns. In 1899 a Conference of Trade Unionists at Åbo had founded a party of Social Democracy, and all during the troubled years of the first half-decade of the new century this party had been adding to its adherents and growing in political importance. It had made adult suffrage one of the main planks of its platform. In December 1904 the Emperor-Grand Duke had sanctioned the reassembling of the Diet, but the Estates when presented with a legislative programme had insisted first on the redress of grievances. On the last day of the year a great Petition of Rights was addressed to the Emperor-Grand Duke, the demand of the Estates being summed up in the final prayer :

"That it may please Your Imperial Majesty graciously to take measures for the re-establishment of a Government in accordance with the fundamental laws and for the restoration of legal order in Finland."

While granting certain specific alleviations of the régime established by General Bobrikov, the Emperor-Grand Duke referred the petition to the Senate, from which by this time the bulk of the original members had resigned, their places having been taken by representatives of the Moderate party. A request that the Diet should reassemble in the autumn was refused, and the Estates separated after voting supplies for one year only, notwithstanding the intimation that they would not be summoned again until 1907.

But meanwhile the domestic troubles which had arisen in Russia were having their repercussion in Finland, and in October 1905 a crisis was reached which brought the Social Democratic party into unexpected prominence. The great strike of that month brought the whole life of the country to a standstill for several days. In the capital and in some of the larger towns the Social Democrats assumed control of affairs and replaced the civil authorities, order being maintained by the Red Guards—an organised body of Socialists who had

undergone training to prepare for such a contingency. Early in November the Tsar capitulated to the demands addressed to him and issued a manifesto granting universal suffrage, but making no revolutionary change in the machinery of administration.

Events now moved with some rapidity. The old Diet was reassembled, and a Bill was passed and sanctioned by the Emperor, making arrangements for the elections on the new basis. This was in June 1906, and shortly afterwards a mutiny of Russian sailors in Sveaborg Harbour, involving the Red Guards, led to the disbanding of that dangerous body. The bourgeois parties were thoroughly alarmed at the growth of the Socialist movement, and their anxiety was not allayed when the elections held in April 1907 resulted in the return of 80 Social Democrats, 50 Old Fennomans, 26 Young Fennomans, 25 Swedish party, 7 Agrarians and 2 "Christian Labourers."

A period of great confusion in the internal politics of the country followed, but the outstanding fact of general importance which emerged was that Russia had not, in temporarily restoring the Constitution upon an enlarged franchise, definitely abandoned the idea of bringing the Grand Duchy within the orbit of the Russian State. The Diet took up the task of passing new laws of a definitely radical character; but as all legislation still required the assent of the Emperor-Grand Duke, the measures adopted by the Diet remained for the most part a dead letter, since Nicholas II, again under the influence of reactionary Ministers, withheld the necessary consent. In June 1908 it was made abundantly clear that a further attempt was to be made to deprive the Finlanders of their constitutional rights and liberties. It was decreed that all Bills submitted to the Emperor-Grand Duke for his approval were first to be approved by the Imperial Council of Ministers. This attempt to subordinate the Government of Finland to the St. Petersburg authorities was a direct violation of the Finnish Constitution, and it inaugurated the second period of conflict which, after many vicissitudes, ended in the declaration of Finnish independence and the complete severance of the connection of Finland with the Russian Empire.

The establishment in Russia in 1905 of a modified form of Constitutionalism had raised hopes that the Constitutional régime in Finland would secure a measure of popular support in Russia. But these hopes were doomed to disappointment. Indeed the rulers of Russia made the creation of representative

institutions in Russia a further argument for the absorption of Finland into the general body of the Russian State, and in pursuance of this end measures of the harshest and most arbitrary character were adopted, culminating in the early part of 1910 in the promulgation of a Bill for Imperial Legislation, the avowed object of which was to bring under unified Imperial control all those matters which should be declared to be common to the interests of Finland and of the rest of the Russian Empire.

The publication of the text of this comprehensive measure excited widespread indignation and alarm in Finland. It subjected to Imperial legislation such vital matters as taxation, military service, education, penal laws, the right of public meetings, the press, customs, the monetary system, railways and all means of communication, commercial navigation in Finnish waters and the rights of foreigners in Finland, and gave extensive powers to Russian institutions and authorities within the Grand Duchy—in short, it reduced Finland to the position of a Russian Province. It was not denied in Finland that, arising out of the peculiar relationship existing between the Grand Duchy and the Empire of Russia, there were many matters requiring adjustment, but the Russian contention that these matters could be settled by other means than those provided by the Constitution was strenuously denied by the vast majority of the Finnish people.

Once more the Finlanders girded up their loins for an appeal to the civilised world, and once more they attracted the support of a large body of instructed public opinion in many lands. Memorials addressed to the Duma were signed by Members of the British Houses of Parliament, by French Senators and Deputies, by Members of the Reichstag and by representative legislators in Italy, Holland and Belgium. Chambers of Commerce, recognising the injury to trade which would follow the substitution for the low customs duties imposed by Finland of the high Russian tariffs, moved their own Governments to protest. Moreover, on the suggestion of a group of Dutch jurists, a meeting attended by a number of leading European jurisconsults was held in London “to examine the arguments addressed on both sides,” and “being impressed by the conviction that a collective study of the Russo-Finnish differences might not under present circumstances be without its value in bringing about a solution of a conflict between two parties in a great Empire,” unanimously reported in favour of the Finnish contention. They placed on record that all jurisconsults,

Russian included, were agreed "that Finland has the right to demand that the Russian Empire should respect her Constitution."

On the new Russian contention they reported as follows :

"The introduction in Russia of a constitutional system could not modify the position of Finland. It cannot be said from a practical point of view that the autonomy of Finland, arising from a difference of governmental systems—autocratic in Russia, constitutional in Finland—has no longer any reason for its existence, now that absolutism has ceased in Russia. Finland, whose political education is more ancient, and whose national civilisation is different from that of Russia, requires her liberty, already greater and always 'inherent in her customs'; moreover Alexander I and his successors have not merely guaranteed in perpetuity to the Finlanders their individual liberties, but in order to sustain and vivify these they have guaranteed to Finland the liberty of her people.

"Again, it cannot be said *de jure* that after the new Russian Fundamental Laws of 1906 (Art. 1) Finland, instead of being a part of the Russian Empire (Finland and Russia) is only a part of the Empire of Russia; that in virtue of these same laws (Art. 2) the Diet has not the right to legislate on all internal questions that do not touch the interests of Russia—interests of which Russia is the sole judge; and that in the case of a conflict between the new Constitution of Sovereign Russia and the old Constitution of non-Sovereign Finland, it is the first which ought to prevail. The Tsar, in limiting his rights as regards Russia, could not increase them as regards Finland; no one can create a right for himself; being unable to withdraw from the Diet the right to legislate, he could not transfer from the Diet to the Duma all, or any part, of this right; no one can give to another more than he himself possesses."

From the principles thus laid down the eminent jurists, representing Great Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Belgium and Denmark, who lent the weight of their authority to the report, arrived at the following conclusions :

"Being unable, by direct means, to withdraw either from the Diet or from the Finnish administrative organs all or any part of their powers, Russia cannot do so by indirect means, through reserving to herself the right to determine the scope of this competence.

“ If the superior interests of the Empire demand the establishment of a common procedure for dealing with certain internal affairs, it pertains to the Diet either itself to determine those affairs or to consent to the creation of a body charged with determining them.”

But to the solemn declarations of the jurisconsults, to the appeals of the legislators and to the protests of the commercial classes, the Russian Government paid not the slightest heed. Russia had improved her relations with the Western European Powers since 1905, and the Finlanders, even if they could count on the sympathy of large classes of Western opinion, could not rely on any active intervention or help from their Governments. This was perfectly understood in St. Petersburg. The Finnish problem was to be settled by Russia as a domestic question. And it was so settled, for in July 1910 the Duma passed the Bill for Imperial Legislation, which the Emperor-Grand Duke was graciously pleased to send to the Finnish Diet “ for consultation.”

Naturally the Diet would have nothing to do with the Bill, and then began what may be described as the intensive phase of that second period of struggle between Russia and the Finnish people which played so momentous a part in determining the attitude of Finland during the catastrophe of the World-war. It is not necessary to follow in detail the practical measures adopted by the Russian authorities to give effect to the Bill. But one of the earliest measures admirably illustrates the difficulties which attend the efforts of an alien administration to impose its will on a hostile and determined people. Navigation along the Finnish coast among the countless islands of the “ skärgård ” is a business of extreme difficulty and requires not only technical skill but the inherited experience of generations. The control of the Finnish pilot service was transferred to the Russian Admiralty. At once all the Finnish pilots resigned, whereupon the Russian Admiralty promptly intimated that it could not accept responsibility for the service. There was no alternative but to yield, and the Finnish pilots resumed their duties.

But in other directions the measures adopted by the Governor-General were more effective. Judges who declined to recognise in their Courts a “ law ” which they regarded as having no legal validity could be and were dismissed, and were replaced either by Russians or by representatives of that unattractive class of citizen, to be found in every country, who is pre-

pared to accept personal advancement even at the hands of the enemy of his country. From Provincial Governors downwards officials of all ranks were dismissed and in many cases arrested and sent for trial in Russia. Their fate was a foregone conclusion. Some were sent to Siberia ; others were condemned to long terms of imprisonment in Russia. The Senate was Russianised, the press was subjected to severe censorship, Russians flocked into the country where now they enjoyed equal rights with Finnish citizens, the use of the Russian language was made compulsory in official communications, and Russian soldiers paraded the streets of Helsingfors.

III

FINLAND AND THE WORLD-WAR

To understand the attitude which the Finnish people adopted towards the combatants in the stupendous struggle which rent Europe in twain in August 1914, it must never be forgotten that, when war was declared, Finland had been for years engaged in an embittered contest with the Russian Government. The Allies of Russia in the Great War protested that besides defending themselves against the Imperialistic designs of Germany and her consorts, they were the champions of small and oppressed nationalities, and the upholders of the sacredness of treaties and covenants among the nations. In view of their own bitter experience it is perhaps not surprising that the people of Finland found it somewhat difficult to conceive of Russia in the novel rôle of the protector of small nations and the impassioned defender of the sanctity of international agreements. Nor did the Tsar and his advisers take any great pains to bring themselves into line with their Western Allies. So far from showing any disposition to relax her efforts to break down the obstinate resistance of the Finlanders, Russia regarded the preoccupation of Europe with more pressing matters as affording a favourable opportunity for completing the task of Russifying the Grand Duchy. The Russian garrisons in Finland were increased, the policy of arresting prominent Finlanders was pursued with renewed vigour. Mr. Svinhufvud, a leading member of the Bar, who subsequently became the first Regent of Finland, was condemned to a long period of imprisonment in Siberia. Governor-General Seyn announced that the Diet would not be called together

during the war, additional taxation was imposed, and it was made abundantly clear that the process of Russification was to be speeded up. In the early days of the war the Dowager-Empress, on passing through Finland, had exhibited such a gracious attitude towards the Finnish authorities and people that reports of a changed disposition on the part of the Emperor gained wide currency, but these were quickly laid at rest by the stern announcement that the Finnish people would be well advised "not to build any false hopes of restored liberty" on such a foundation.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that no great popular enthusiasm for the success of Russia was aroused in Finland. Yet it would appear to be equally true that there was no great popular sentiment in favour of Germany and the Central Powers. The bulk of the population was probably ignorant of, or indifferent to, the great issues which were being decided on so many bloodstained fields. But among the educated classes there was a sharp division of opinion. There was a minority, but by no means a negligible minority which, notwithstanding their antipathy for Russia, sympathised with the Western Powers and continued to believe in the ultimate triumph of the cause for which they were fighting. But it does not appear to be open to doubt that the predominant feeling among the educated classes was favourable to Germany.

Nor is the fact that, in fighting Russia, Germany might in a sense be regarded as fighting the enemy of Finland, at all an exhaustive or adequate explanation of the pro-German sympathies which undoubtedly existed to a large extent among the upper classes. The real explanation is to be found in the intimate educational and commercial relations which had grown up during recent years between the two peoples. From its geographical position, Finland had been brought into much closer financial and trading association with Germany than with any other European country. Hamburg was the principal centre through which the Finnish banks did their business with the outer world. There was genuine admiration for the efficiency of German business methods and a realisation, based on a constant exchange of visits between the business communities, of the immense strides in material progress which Germany had made since the King of Prussia had been proclaimed Emperor at Versailles.

But even more potent than this community of material interests was the intellectual dependence of Finland on Germany. Finnish students in the Arts and Sciences turned not

to Sweden or to France and England; the great majority found their "intellectual home" in Germany. The memories of their student days were strengthened by the subsequent intercourse for which such easy facilities existed, and it was not therefore surprising that impassioned appeals on behalf of German "Kultur" found an echo in the hearts of a considerable section of the professional and literary classes in Finland. All educated Finlanders speak at least one other language besides Swedish and Finnish, and even those who are acquainted with English and French for the most part also speak German.

It will be readily understood that, in marshalling her forces to meet the powerful enemies ranged against her, Germany did not neglect to organise her friends in Finland. The majority of those who pinned their faith to Germany and her Allies were not prepared to subordinate the interests of their own country to those of any other Power. There existed however a small but influential group of men in Finland who, in their devotion to Germany, were more Royalist than the King, and it was with the assistance of these men that Germany contrived, almost to the end of the war, to prevent the bulk of the Finnish people from receiving regular news from any other than German sources.

The divergence of views led naturally to a certain divergence in action. Notwithstanding the anti-Russian sentiments which prevailed, some 2,000 Finlanders volunteered to serve in the Russian Army, while an equal number managed to find their way to Germany and enrolled themselves in the German Armies fighting on the Russian front. No attempt was, however, made to conscript soldiers for service with the Russian Army, and, notwithstanding the measures of Russification to which reference has already been made, the early years of the war saw an extraordinary development in the economic life of the country. As part of the Russian Empire Finland was at war with Germany and did not therefore share with the other Scandinavian countries the economic blessings of neutrality. But the fact that her labour-supply was practically intact and that Russia offered an inexhaustible market for all the goods she could produce not only gave the Finnish manufacturers the opportunity of making large profits but, by attracting labour from the country districts into the industrial centres, profoundly modified the economic organisation of the country and prepared the way for the shortage of food-stuffs which, in the tragic year of 1918, brought the country to the verge of ruin. The influx of labourers into the towns and the rapid rise in

wages gave the Social Democrats an opportunity, of which they availed themselves to the full, to spread their doctrines. These found many adherents not only among the town labourers but among the *torpare*—the “landless men,” who in exchange for the right to cultivate their little patches of land gave of their labour and produce to the landowners. The existence of this class had long been recognised as a source of danger to the State, but, for very different reasons, none of the political parties had taken any practical measures to alleviate their lot.

Meanwhile events had been maturing in Russia which were destined to exercise a far-reaching influence on the fortunes of Finland. The revolution so eagerly hoped for, so greatly feared, had at last occurred. On March 15, 1917 the Emperor Nicholas abdicated, and the Provisional Government under Kerenski was later established.

In no other country, outside Russia proper, had the revolution such immediate and far-reaching consequences as in Finland. The illegal régime was swept away and the Finnish Constitution was restored. Governor-General Seyn disappeared, as did the Russianised Senate. The Diet reassembled, and the exiled and imprisoned officials made their way back from Siberian and Russian prisons amidst the affectionate acclamations of their countrymen. Mr. Stakhovich was appointed Governor-General by the Kerenski Provisional Government, and Mr. Rodichev Secretary of State for Finland. Under the revised Constitution the executive power resided in the Senate—or rather in that section which was known as the Economic Department of the Finnish Senate—the full Senate including also the Department of Justice, which acted as the Supreme Tribunal. To make provision for the administration of the country a temporary body was appointed, on which each of the two great political parties was equally represented. The course of events in Russia leading up to the revolution had had their repercussion in Finland, where the Social Democrats had not only increased the number of their adherents but had widened the scope of their demands and enlarged their ambitions. For the moment however, exhibiting a moderation not unrelated to their historic training in self-government, the Social Democrats were content to share power during the transition period with representatives of the bourgeois parties. They claimed and obtained the Presidency of the Senate—that is the Premiership—and Mr. Tokoi, the former Speaker of the Diet, was appointed.

Early in April 1917 the Diet which had been elected during

the previous year assembled. In composition it was predominantly Social Democrat, the other parties combined only numbering some 97 members out of a total of 200. When the elections had taken place large numbers of the electors had not apparently thought it worth while to take part in the choice of an Assembly whose labours, as they considered, were predestined to sterility, and whose maintenance merely served to furnish the autocrats of St. Petersburg with a pretence of respecting Finnish constitutional rights. The unexpected turn of events had, however, changed all this and the bourgeois parties felt and said that the Diet as constituted was not really representative of the country.

From this point onwards it becomes increasingly difficult to analyse the conflicting currents of interests and sentiments which produced the events of the next twelve months, or even to separate local influences from those which affected Finland equally with the rest of Europe. But what is abundantly clear is that, from the moment when discussion began in the Diet, the fundamental differences which divided the country into two hostile camps, and ultimately led to a civil war of unexampled brutality, became accentuated and more clearly defined.

In Finland the antithesis between the so-called Bourgeois parties, standing for the maintenance of law and of the existing social order, and the Socialists dreaming of a new social order in which the triumph of the "proletariat" would give some future compensation to "wage-slaves" for past wrongs, was complicated by a marked difference of opinion as to the relations which should in future exist between Finland and Russia.

It was obvious that things could not remain as they were. When Nicholas II abdicated he ceased *de facto* to be Grand Duke of Finland, whatever might be argued as to his *de jure* position. Who was to "sanction" measures passed by the Diet?—who was to appoint the Executive? Was it to be the Russian Government—whatever entity might succeed in establishing a claim to that designation? Not even the most socialistic Social Democrat was prepared to replace Nicholas II by Mr. Kerenski; but whilst demanding the fullest autonomy for Finland in the conduct of her internal affairs, the Social Democrats were not in favour of a Finland as wholly independent of Russia as of any other State. It is probable that in adopting this attitude they were influenced by two considerations. The Finnish Social Democrats were opposed to anything in the nature of a standing Army or of a permanent defensive

force of any kind. They were willing to leave the foreign relations of Finland in the hands of the Russian Government if Russia, on her side, would be responsible for the protection of Finland against foreign aggression. In this way the country would avoid both the danger and the expense of a military organisation. The second reason which appears to have influenced the Social Democrats in wishing to maintain a permanent relationship with Russia was the belief they entertained that Russia would become and remain a Socialistic State, alliance with which would naturally strengthen a small Socialist neighbour State whose existence was rendered more precarious by the presence of bourgeois parties better organised, more skilled in the arts of government, relatively more wealthy and more intelligent than the corresponding parties in Russia. Finnish national sentiment, which had hitherto been one of the most powerful factors in the life of the people, was further temporarily weakened by the doctrines of international class solidarity which the cosmopolitan revolutionaries in Russia were spreading throughout Europe.

On the other hand, the Russian Revolution had opened up new vistas of hope to those classes which had not abandoned the aspiration of "Finland a nation." Almost a century had elapsed since Arvidson in his youthful enthusiasm had exclaimed, "Swedish we are not, Russian we will not be, Finnish we must be." And now the prize was within their grasp—if they had but the courage to be true to themselves and to their past history. Were they not fitted to govern themselves?—had they not in fact governed themselves for centuries, and had they not refused to submit to an alien yoke when refusal meant exile, imprisonment, death?

To men inspired by these ideas it was intolerable that they should be robbed of their birthright by windy Socialists prating of a new social order and dictatorship of the Proletariat. Moreover, the same arguments which induced the Socialists to cling to some link with the new Russia urged them to sever the connection. Finland was prosperous; her wealth had apparently increased, and it would be madness to link her fortunes with those of the colossus to the east which was heading fast towards national bankruptcy in the vain endeavour to create a new world on the unstable foundation of Marxian theories and a total disregard of the motives which animate the masses of mankind.

It is not surprising that with ideas and aims so fundamentally divergent the rift between the Bourgeois and the Socialists

tended to widen. But in the meantime the Socialists were in command both in the Senate and in the Diet. Kerenski paid two hasty visits to Finland—in March and in May. In the latter month the Swedish party in Congress assembled had passed a formal resolution in favour of the complete severance of the Grand Duchy from Russia. In the following month the Social Democrats declared that “As an independent Republic, free side by side with the free Russia, Finland may have its rightful place. The Finnish people,” the resolution proceeded, “is, of course, not trying to isolate itself economically from Russia and cannot disregard the just interests of the Russian people. By voluntary agreement the economic relations of Finland to Russia may be organised as in other countries.”

Meanwhile the Provisional Government in St. Petersburg, amidst its manifest distractions, failed to enunciate any clear policy towards Finland. To the request of the Senate that it would confirm the various measures which had received the assent of previous Diets, but had failed to receive the sanction of the Grand Duke, the Kerenski Government made an equivocal reply. Russian troops were still quartered in Finland, and the situation became somewhat tense.

Then in July the Diet, after a prolonged discussion, took the momentous step, without reference to the Provisional Government, of deciding the question of the future status of Finland for itself. By a majority of 136 votes against 55 the following Resolution was adopted :

“The powers of the Monarch having ceased, the following Statutes are declared to be in force by the Finnish Diet :

“(1) The Diet of Finland alone passes, sanctions and proclaims all Finnish laws, including those which concern the State Budget, taxation and customs. The Diet decides ultimately all questions which, according to the Statutes, hitherto were decided by the Emperor-Grand Duke. The regulations of this law do not apply to foreign policy or to military legislation and military administration.

“(2) The Finnish Diet assembles for the legal Session without a special summons, and itself decides its dissolution.

“(3) The Diet has the right to decide the executive power of the country. This power shall be provisionally exercised by the Economic Section of the Finnish Senate, the members of which the Diet shall nominate and dismiss.”

Although it was decided by a formal vote not to ask the assent of the Russian Government to this assumption of the supreme authority, the new Statutes were communicated officially to the Russian Provisional Government for its information, accompanied by an intimation of the desire of the Diet to negotiate terms of the future relations with Russia on the lines indicated. In Russia this declaration was very variously received—in some quarters with approval, in others with the strongest disapproval. The Kerenski Government eventually sent a reply repudiating the right of the Diet to decide the matter without the consent of Russia, declining to agree to the separation of the Grand-Duchy from Russia, and ordering the dissolution of the Diet and the holding of fresh elections in the following October.

A period of unrest followed this open declaration of conflict. The Diet refused to accept dissolution at the hands of the Kerenski Government. Conferences between the Finnish leaders and the Governor-General ended fruitlessly, and popular discontent took alarming forms. There was talk of a general strike, and sporadic attempts were made to carry out the threats. But the inherited instincts of centuries prevailed, and no serious disturbances occurred, even when the Governor-General threatened to prevent the reassembling of the dissolved Diet by force. Meanwhile Russia was in the throes of constitution-making, and attempts were being made to lay down the lines on which there would be formed a Federal Republic of which Finland would form one of the component parts.

The fact that the Diet which had been prohibited from holding any further meetings had been elected in circumstances already referred to, and could not therefore be regarded as fully representative of the people, and the further fact that it was obviously desirable to ascertain the views of the country on the new issues which had arisen, led to the acquiescence of all parties in the holding of the new elections. But while these political issues were being hotly debated, the country found itself faced with a crisis of a totally different character.

It is doubtful if Finland has ever at any time produced food-stuffs in sufficient quantities to satisfy wholly the needs of her growing population. In certain years the cereal crops have been almost wholly destroyed by severe early frosts. This happened in 1856, in 1862 and again in 1867, and resulted in the death of tens of thousands from famine. No such irremediable disaster overtook the country in 1917; but the exodus from the country to the towns, when the industrial

boom took place in the early years of the war, had so decreased the workers on the land as to create a serious shortage at the very moment when the extensive submarine campaign of the Germans and the Allies' blockade made it practically impossible to import food-stuffs from overseas, and the disturbed state of Russia cut off overland supplies from the east. To make matters worse, thousands of Russians had sought either temporary or permanent refuge in Finland, and as they belonged for the most part to the classes which had been well off and still retained not only something of their former habits but also considerable resources, they became keen competitors for the rapidly diminishing store of food-stuffs available.

The elections held on October 2 revealed a considerable set-back to the Social Democratic party. Although still numerically the most important party, the Social Democrats with 92 seats were in a minority when compared with the combined forces of the other parties who gained 108 seats, of which the Old and Young Finns held 61, the Agrarians 26, and the Swedes 21. The Diet assembled on the first day of November and found itself immediately concerned with the pressing problem of the food-supply and the equally pressing problem of the future government of the country.

As regards the food-supply Mr. Tokoi, who had retained the Presidency of the Senate even after some of his Socialist colleagues had resigned, had succeeded in making a contract for the purchase of 45,000 tons of wheat in the United States, for which the purchase-money had been provided. But it was one thing to buy the wheat in America; it was another to transport it to Europe. At first transport difficulties only had to be encountered, but later when, in the spring of the following year, the assistance of German troops had been invited, political difficulties supervened and prevented the wheat from reaching the starving peasants and workmen. An attempt by the Governor-General to secure supplies from Russia equally failed, and the new Diet found itself confronted with an extremely serious situation.

Nor was any alleviation to be found in the political situation. The chaotic conditions prevailing in Russia were reproduced in Finland. Notwithstanding the repeated demands of the Finnish authorities for the withdrawal of the Russian garrisons, these disorganised and undisciplined hordes remained in the country, where they exercised every kind of terrorism, consorting with the worst elements in the population and helping themselves when their increasing demands were not complied

with. It was amidst these unhappy surroundings that the Diet had to decide on the creation of new organs of government, or rather to which of the existing organs the supreme power should be confided. In the middle of November, on the proposal of the leader of the Agrarian party, it was decided that the Diet should itself be the supreme repository of power, and a fortnight later a Senate consisting of eleven members of the Moderate parties was nominated, with Mr. P. E. Svinhufvud, who had been exiled to Siberia, as President. A measure for establishing an eight-hour working day was carried, and on the first of December the Government proposed the re-establishment of a national army. To this proposal the Socialists offered a determined opposition, and as they were joined by a small number of representatives of the Moderate parties the proposal was rejected. Meanwhile the growing anarchy produced its inevitable result. It became more and more apparent that the difference between the two parties could only be settled by an appeal to force. The second Russian revolution in November had driven Kerenski from power and had sealed the triumph of the Bolsheviki. To these new rulers of Russia the revolutionary elements in Finland turned for advice and for material assistance. Arms and ammunition were sent from Russia into Finland, and the Moderates retorted by obtaining arms from Germany. On the 6th of December 1917—a day destined to be for ever memorable in the annals of Finland—the Moderate members of the Diet proclaimed the complete independence of Finland, and the newly appointed Senate was instructed to take the necessary steps to communicate the momentous decision to the other Governments of the world.

In this declaration the Socialists did not join. Rallying almost their full strength, 88 members voted in favour of the alternative proposition that the independence of Finland “must be realised by means of a mutual understanding with Russia.” They were however outvoted, and Finland, after centuries of association with Sweden and more than a century of association with Russia, thus began her career as a Sovereign State in circumstances which by no stretch of the imagination could be described as anything but ominous.

IV

FINLAND A SOVEREIGN STATE

THE new Government's first act was to proclaim the neutrality of Finland in the World-war. The Senate, in accordance with the instructions of the Diet, immediately sent envoys to Sweden and to Germany and later to Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain and the United States to ask for the recognition of the new State. A Socialist deputation visited Russia and, as the result of the negotiations which ensued, Trotski obtained from the Bolshevik Government on the 4th January 1918 formal recognition of Finland as an independent State. Sweden and Germany had, in the first place, made their recognition dependent upon the acquiescence of the Constituent Assembly which had been summoned to decide on the future government of Russia. But the Bolsheviks did not allow the Assembly to meet, and two days after Sweden had notified its recognition of the new State France followed suit, without waiting for the envoys to visit Paris—an act which at the time created a most favourable impression in Finland and furnished the occasion for considerable comment on the failure of Great Britain and the United States to adopt a similar course. Germany's recognition of the new State was notified on the day following the recognition by France.

The new Government found itself at once embarked on a sea of troubles. Acts of violence were reported from all parts of the country, and at Åbo armed conflicts occurred between the Red Guards and the White Guards—armed bodies representing respectively the Socialists and the Moderates. The Socialists were for a time successful and imprisoned both the local Governor and the Chief of Police. The disturbed state of the country and increasing inflammation of public opinion caused by the news of Bolshevik violence in Russia compelled the Government once more to demand the formation of a central body of armed men to be at the disposal of the authorities for the maintenance of law and order. After prolonged discussion the proposal was finally agreed to by the Diet on January 17. But the measures which the Government took still further infuriated the Socialists, and a proclamation issued by the executive of the party called on all the forces of the proletariat to fight against the Government. On January 26 the Helsingfors Committee of the party appointed an Acting

Committee which was to be the supreme organ of the Revolution and to which implicit obedience was enjoined. On the night of the 27th there was firing from the Peoples' House in Helsingfors, and on the following day the Revolutionary Committee issued a proclamation stating that it had assumed supreme power in the country. Following the Russian precedent, a General Council of Workmen was appointed with the former Socialist Speaker of the Diet, elected in 1916, Kullervo Manner, as Chairman. Civil war had begun.

The Civil War.—The four months during which the fraternal conflict lasted will ever remain the blackest page in the history of Finland. Both parties to the struggle had for some time been making preparations for what they had equally realised to be inevitable. But the forces of law and order were less prepared than their adversaries. Until the November elections the Social Democrats had commanded a majority in the Diet. The Finnish electoral system is the most democratic in the world, but the Social Democrats were not prepared to accept the verdict of the electors and did not hesitate to attempt to reverse the decision of the ballot-box by force of arms. Inspired by Bolshevist successes in Russia and encouraged by Lenin, Trotski and the other Bolshevist leaders, who realised that a Bolshevist Finland would furnish them with an open door into Western Europe, the more violent wing of the Finnish Reds overcame the reluctance of the more moderate elements of the party and proclaimed the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The revolutionary movement broke out in all parts of the country, but its chief strength was naturally in the southern coastal region, where the principal towns are situated. With the assistance of the Russian soldiers the revolutionaries seized on the machinery of government in Helsingfors, proclaimed the members of the "White" Government outlaws, imprisoned such of their opponents as were so unfortunate as to fall into their hands, raided the banks and swelled their ranks from the criminals whom they released from the prisons into which their political enemies were thrown when they were not killed at sight. The arms and ammunition with which the insurgents were so plentifully supplied came from Russia, and the plan of campaign was largely conceived and directed by emissaries of the Russian Bolshevist Government. But it is one thing to seize the machinery of government; it is another to make it function. The Finlanders have had a unique training in the value of passive resistance, and the vast majority of the officials in the different Government Departments re-

fused to remain at their posts under the new Commissaries who spoke in the name, if not with the authority, of the "Proletariat."

Although less fully prepared for the conflict, the "Whites" had adopted certain precautionary measures which furnished them with a basis of resistance. The formation of bodies of Red Guards, originally designated as "Guardians of the Public Peace," had led to the formation in different parts of the country of bodies of "Voluntary Militia," whose avowed object was the protection of the existing social order and the maintenance of a legal form of Government. When the Dictatorship of the Proletariat was proclaimed, some of the members of the Government succeeded in making their way to Vasa, the capital of Ostrobothnia, a town of some 25,000 inhabitants situated on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. Other members of the Government, including the President of the Senate, Mr. Svinhufvud, succeeded in hiding in the capital for a time, and later made their way to Vasa. The members of the Government who escaped lost no time in organising such forces as they were able to secure. The Voluntary Militia in Ostrobothnia succeeded in occupying Vasa and from this centre began a series of vigorous attacks on the Red forces, which in this part of the country were less well organised and less well armed than in the districts bordering on Russia. The supreme command of the White forces was entrusted to General Baron Gustav Mannerheim, a member of a well-known Swedish-Finnish family who had served with great distinction as a cavalry leader in the Russian armies. General Mannerheim acted with equal vigour and foresight. Within a week he had cleared the whole of the province of Ostrobothnia of the Red forces, and had taken 5,000 prisoners and considerable quantities of arms and ammunition.

The call of the Vasa Government for volunteers met with a prompt and gratifying response. Not only did thousands of young Finlanders flock to General Mannerheim's standard from different parts of the country, but others came from abroad; and many of the men who had served with the German armies on the Russian front were enabled to return and to place their military experience at the service of their country. Officers of the old Finnish regiments which had been disbanded by the Russian Government came forward to drill the new recruits and were assisted by others who had been partially trained in a school for officers which had hastily been organised at Vasa some time before the outbreak of the rebellion. The

important station of Vilpula on the railway north of Tammerfors was occupied without delay, and it was here that the Reds offered their first serious resistance in the West.

Meanwhile in Karelia, on the eastern frontier, White resistance was simultaneously being vigorously organised, and within a very short time the whole of the northern section and the greater part of middle Finland had been freed from the revolutionary forces. But in the south the situation was one of extreme gravity. Vigorously supported by their Russian allies, well supplied with arms and the munitions of war, infuriated by the defeats inflicted on their forces in the north, the revolutionary Government established a reign of terror in the regions under their control. It would serve no useful purpose to revive the memory of the deeds of blood accompanied by inconceivable circumstances of brutal cruelty which stained the annals of the Finnish revolution. "The terrible instincts of the wild beast," it has been said, "got the upper hand among these hypnotised masses, and, whenever opportunity offered, their murderous instincts broke out in the celebration of orgies which in their outrageous bestiality are unmatched in the history of insurrection."

After the first rapid operations, a pause took place to enable both combatants to marshal their forces. The military front stretched from Sastmola on the Gulf of Bothnia to the shores of Lake Ladoga on the Karelian isthmus. General Mannerheim and the White Government were not only terribly short of military equipment of all kinds, but realised that, if they were to save the southern area—the richest and most populous part of the country—from complete devastation and irretrievable ruin, it was essential to defeat the revolutionary forces with not a moment's avoidable delay. An appeal to the Swedish Government for arms had been refused, and in their extremity the White Government turned to Germany for assistance.

Germany was at this moment preparing for her supreme effort to break through the Allied forces on the western front, by which she hoped to snatch an eleventh-hour victory from the jaws of defeat. But even at this supreme crisis German statesmen did not overlook the importance of strengthening the hold Germany already possessed over Finland, in anticipation of that hegemony of the Baltic which would have been one of the fruits of a Germanic victory in the World-war. On March 7 a treaty of peace was signed in Berlin, but which provided *inter alia* that "Germany will do what she can to

bring about the recognition of the independence of Finland by all the Powers. On the other hand, Finland will not cede any part of her possessions to any foreign Power or grant a servitude on her sovereign territory to any such Power without first having come to an understanding with Germany on the matter."

On behalf of Finland, the principal plenipotentiary who appended his signature to the treaty was Dr. Edward Immanuel Hjelt, State Councillor, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Helsingfors, whose passionate devotion to the German cause was notorious. Dr. Hjelt acted largely on his own initiative in concluding the treaty, as in the disturbed state of the country it was difficult for him to consult with the Government at Vasa, and many of his countrymen disliked the terms of the treaty even while welcoming the assistance which the German military authorities managed to send to Finland. In addition to supplies of arms and ammunition for the White armies, the Germans despatched a contingent of German soldiers to occupy the Åland islands; and early in April German troops landed at Hangö to co-operate with Mannerheim's forces. In the meantime Mannerheim had begun his southern march. He outflanked the Reds after desperate fighting at Vilpula and attacked the important town of Tammerfors—the Manchester of Finland—which he captured on April 5, taking a large number of prisoners and considerable booty. From this moment the success of the White armies and their German allies was continuous. Helsingfors was entered by the Germans on April 12, and on the same day Åbo was evacuated by the Reds. Viborg, in the extreme south-east, to which town the Red "Government" had fled when they were forced to abandon Helsingfors, was captured on April 28, and the next few weeks saw the complete defeat of the scattered remnants of the Red armies. On May 26—less than four months after the usurpation of power by the proletarian armies—General Mannerheim and his victorious troops made a triumphal entry into Helsingfors, and the civil war was at an end.

Even before the conclusion of the military operations steps had been taken to re-establish the Government which had been driven from power by the revolutionaries. The Diet was again assembled; but its constitution differed widely from what it had been when it first met. The Social Democratic party had ceased to exist. Several of its members had been killed, others were detained in the prison camps which had been formed in different parts of the country, others had fled to Russia. Only two Social Democrats put in an appearance. Pending a deci-

sion as to the future Government of the country it was decided to entrust the supreme authority to a Regent, and Mr. Svinhufvud, the President of the Senate, was appointed. The task of re-establishing normal conditions was one of extraordinary difficulty. The country had been shaken to its foundations. When German troops were thrown into Finland the Allies refused to permit the wheat which had been purchased in the United States to be transported to Europe. The insurgents had everywhere consumed such food-stuffs as fell into their hands, and had even wilfully destroyed what they could neither consume nor remove when forced to abandon their positions. Industrial enterprises had shut down, the banks had closed their doors, agricultural operations had either ceased altogether or had been sadly hampered, and to add to their troubles the Government found themselves with some 80,000 prisoners whom it was necessary not only to guard but to feed.

It is to this period that relate the charges which have been made against the triumphant Whites of establishing a "White Terror" in Finland. It was alleged that many prisoners had been murdered, that the conditions in the prison camps had led to the death of many of those detained, that the sanitary conditions were appalling, and that men suffering from wounds and disease did not receive adequate medical attendance. The insurgents, it was said, had been brutally ill-treated and in many cases executed without any form of trial. It is inevitable that charges of this kind should be made, following an insurrectionary movement in which the worst passions of which human beings are capable had been aroused; it is no less inevitable that violence should breed violence, and there can be no doubt that acts of reprisal were committed which could not be justified when the passions which inspired them had subsided. The representatives of the triumphant Bourgeois parties did not deny that many regrettable incidents had occurred. In a discussion which was subsequently raised in the Diet, after a fresh election, on an interpellation by a member of the Social Democratic party, the then Minister of Justice, Mr. Söderholm, declared that "when the insurrection came to an end, and the numerous prisoners had to be fed, there was little or nothing to eat. Under such circumstances," he continued, "it is not surprising that starvation and want prevailed in the prison camps, when the whole population was suffering from hunger, so that in many districts bark had to be mingled with the scanty ration of flour." In the same discussion he frankly confessed: "There can be no doubt that

during the insurrection itself there were cases when the insurrectionaries were severely handled, as for instance by the troops which, after occupying a locality, saw the unspeakable cruelties which had been practised while the locality was in the hands of the insurrectionaries. One can, however," he added, "understand the feeling aroused in the liberating troops when they found people, often non-combatants, who had been maimed and mutilated while still alive." "It is surely also comprehensible," he declared, "if, as may possibly have happened, individuals took justice into their own hands when they encountered those who had murdered or brutally mishandled their nearest kin."

Apart, however, from such unauthorised reprisals and acts of individual revenge as may have occurred, the Government lost no time in bringing the insurgents who had been taken prisoners to justice. While the military operations were still in progress, General Mannerheim had established a military tribunal at his headquarters, and many prisoners had been condemned and executed after trial by court-martial. But these military tribunals were speedily replaced by special Courts established for the purpose of hearing the charges of various kinds, including high treason, which were preferred against the Red prisoners. An Act establishing these special Courts was passed by the Diet before the end of May. Under this Act there was constituted a High Court of High Treason and a large number of Courts of High Treason which acted as Courts of First Instance. From these subordinate Courts an appeal was allowed to all persons convicted to the High Court of High Treason, either against the conviction or for pardon. By the end of the year 1918 the subordinate Courts had tried over 70,000 prisoners, of whom 379 were condemned to death, 25,415 to various terms of unconditional imprisonment, 37,886 to conditional punishment, and 6,814 were acquitted. Over 27,000 appeals were carried to the High Court of High Treason, and by the middle of March 1919 this Court had confirmed the death-sentences in 245 cases, had sentenced 621 prisoners to imprisonment for life, had imposed sentences of from fifteen years' imprisonment downwards on 26,137 prisoners, and had acquitted 88. Acts of amnesty were twice passed by the Diet under which many of those condemned were either released at once or their sentences reduced, and in only 125 cases were the death-sentences carried out—those executed having in all cases been found guilty of or accessory to murder in addition to other criminal acts. Forty of those

condemned to punishment by the High Court had been members of the Social Democratic party in the Diet before the insurrection, and of these one was sentenced to death for high treason, attempted sedition and instigation to murder. The remaining thirty-nine were sentenced to be imprisoned for terms varying from life to seven years.

The Making of the Constitution.—The task of dealing with the vast number of prisoners and of reconstituting the economic life of the country did not, however, absorb all the energies of the Regent and the Diet. In the declaration of independence of December 6, 1917, reference had been made to Finland as a free and independent Republic, but recent events had created a powerful current of feeling that a strong administration capable of permanently holding in check the disorderly elements in the country and of protecting Finland against the perpetual threats of Bolshevism on her eastern frontier could only be secured under a monarchy. At no time in her long history had Finland ever had a sovereign of her own; but it was equally true that at no time had she ever been a Republic. The Monarchical party was not long in discovering that the reference to a Republic in the Declaration of Independence had no juridical effect. The Declaration, it was contended, was an act of the Diet in its capacity as the repository of the Sovereign power, formerly exercised by the Grand Duke and subsequently for a short time by the Provisional Government in Russia. But it was pointed out that to effect a change in the Constitution an Act of the Legislature was required, an Act which to be of any effect must comply with the provisions of the Form of Government of 1772. Under Article 38 of the old fundamental law, if the dynasty became extinct, the Diet was as soon as possible to elect a new King. The Regent and the restored Government, purged of any Socialist elements, accordingly determined on the election of a King.

This proposal immediately gave rise to a violent difference of opinion in the Diet and in the country. There can be no doubt that the Monarchist party had been considerably strengthened by the attempt to establish a Soviet Republic in Finland, but it is equally certain that the Regent and his advisers were subjected to strong pressure from Germany to support the establishment of a Monarchy. The Finlanders were naturally grateful to Germany for the timely aid they had received in suppressing the rebellion. Nor was Germany at all backward in seeking to turn to her advantage the influence she had thus acquired. The Treaty of March 7 submitted to the

Diet was not the only agreement which Professor Hjelt had entered into, and it soon became known that Germany had gained for herself certain present and prospective advantages which she did not intend to forgo. Immediately after his entry into Helsingfors General Mannerheim, on the refusal of the Regent to give him the free hand he had asked for, resigned the command of the White army, and many of his Finnish officers also resigned. The task of reorganising the Finnish army on a permanent footing was entrusted therefore to a German officer, General von der Goltz, as Chief of the Staff; and the German forces under his command remained in Finland and showed no disposition to leave. Indeed, their continued presence was insisted upon by the Regent, who felt no security that their departure might not be the signal for a fresh Bolshevik attack from Russia, which would revive the fires of discontent among the urban population still smouldering beneath the ashes of the late rebellion. At this period German influence in Finland attained its zenith. The only news which reached the mass of the people came from German sources. A special Wolff service was sent to Finland, and its mendacious record of German triumphs convinced the people that the ultimate victory of the Central Powers was assured. Simultaneously an effective propaganda was maintained, and the fears of the Finlanders that Great Britain was favourable to the re-establishment of Russian rule in Finland were exploited to the full, while the contrast between the assistance which Germany had rendered Finland in her hour of darkest need and the refusal of Great Britain and the United States to permit the delivery to a starving Finland of the wheat her Government had bought and paid for was triumphantly proclaimed.

Even before the rebellion had finally been suppressed a Bill had been drafted for a new form of Government and was submitted to the Diet in June 1918. To enable a new fundamental law to become operative it must be passed by a two-thirds majority and then submitted to a new Diet, unless it is declared "urgent" by a five-sixths majority of the existing Diet. The two-thirds majority was obtained, but even in a Diet in which the Social Democrats were practically unrepresented the five-sixths majority was not forthcoming. Finnish jurists maintained that in these circumstances the old law of 1722 remained in force, and in October a special session of the Diet was summoned to elect a King in accordance with Article 38 of that law. Before, however, proceeding to an election the

Cabinet—as the Senate was now called—endeavoured to placate their opponents by presenting another Bill for a Form of Government materially limiting the powers of the Sovereign. Again the five-sixths majority was not forthcoming, and the Diet then proceeded to elect Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse as King of Finland.

The offer of the throne of Finland to a brother-in-law of the German Emperor naturally created a profound impression throughout Europe. The French Government immediately withdrew its recognition of Finland as an independent State, on the ground that its recognition had been accorded to Finland as a Republic and not as a Monarchy under a Sovereign belonging to a dynasty with which France was at war. Many Finlanders who were, in principle, favourable to the establishment of a Monarchy deplored the election of a German Prince, but Prince Frederick Charles's supporters declared that he had given assurances that on assuming the throne he would become "a true Finnish man," his whole character being apparently to suffer a sea-change as he crossed the Baltic. The events which were happening in Western Europe, however, exercised a profoundly modifying influence on the situation in Finland. The German armies were suffering reverse after reverse, and the truth as to the collapse of Germany on the western front could no longer be concealed from the Finnish people. It is probable that in no European country did the defeat of Germany create such profound astonishment as in Finland. Prince Frederick Charles had not accepted the offer of the throne when it was conveyed to him, but had asked for time to consider it. After the Armistice he signified his inability to accept the offer, and a reaction against Germany set in. Even while recognising the services Germany had rendered them, the Finlanders realised that they had been grossly deceived. Moreover, the presence of German troops in the country had not tended to increase either the respect or the affection of the Finlanders for Germany, and the popular demand for a complete change of policy soon became so insistent that the Regent, Svinhufvud, had no alternative but to yield to it. Accordingly, early in December, he placed his resignation in the hands of the Diet, and General Mannerheim was elected his successor by 73 votes against 27.

The election of General Mannerheim was the outward and visible sign of the defeat of the small but influential pro-German party which had staked everything on the victory of the Central Powers, and of a radical change in the views of that

larger section of the population which have been educated to believe that Germany was the friend to whom Finland must look for support in the future against fresh Russian aggression. The new Regent was personally popular. A soldier of distinction and a man of the highest personal character, he had held high command in the Russian Army during the first years of the war, and had organised the forces of law and order when these were threatened by the Red legions of Bolshevism. He was known to sympathise with the Allies, and as a protest against the pro-German policy of the Svinhufvud Cabinet had resigned his command of the White Guards as soon as his task of liberating the country from the Red peril was accomplished. He had attached himself to no political party and thus stood aloof from those personal jealousies which agitate politicians in every land.

His task was one of immense difficulty. Abroad he had to secure the recognition of Finland as a Sovereign State, to present and defend her case for the retention of the Åland Islands, the inhabitants of which were demanding, on the plea of "self-determination," annexation to Sweden, to secure recognition of Finland's claim to an outlet on the Arctic Ocean at Pechenga and to an extension of her frontier so as to include that portion of Eastern Karelia of which the inhabitants were predominantly Finnish by race. Moreover, the continued triumphs of the Bolshevik leaders in Russia constituted a perpetual menace to Finland, where Social Democracy as a political creed had been scotched but not killed during the rebellion.

At home the form of Government had to be determined, food imported, commerce and industry re-established, the position of the "landless" men ameliorated, and many needed reforms inaugurated. The new Regent's first act was to secure a supply of food-stuffs for the starving country. He obtained from the Allies the promise of 120,000 tons of cereals. This promise was fulfilled to the letter and the spectre of famine was exorcised.

A new Coalition Cabinet with Professor Ingman as Prime Minister was appointed. Many of the above problems—both foreign and domestic—are still awaiting solution, but during his Regency General Mannerheim had the satisfaction of securing formal recognition of Finland's entry into the family of nations by all the great States of the world. He was, however, less successful in securing the formation of a Scandinavian League with Sweden, Norway and Denmark, the primary

object of which would have been the maintenance of their common neutrality and the secondary, but scarcely less important, object their common defence against the westward spread of Bolshevism.

A serious obstacle to the formation of such a League was undoubtedly the dispute on the Åland Islands. This has now been settled, but the League question has fallen into the background. Historically these islands had always formed part of Finland, and geographically they are connected with the Finnish mainland by an unbroken succession of islands and shallow seas, while separated from the Swedish coast by a deep arm of the sea. But the inhabitants are almost wholly of Swedish race and, availing themselves of the modern doctrine of self-determination, they gave unmistakable expression to their desire to be annexed to Sweden. They appealed to the Peace Conference in Paris, and the whole question was referred to the League of Nations, which entrusted to a Commission the task of examining the voluminous and contradictory arguments which the dispute has evoked. In June 1921 the Council recognised Finland's sovereignty over the islands, subject to certain reservations; but subsequently this decision was somewhat modified, and a convention of October 20, 1921, was signed guaranteeing the non-fortification and neutralisation of the islands in peace and war under Finnish sovereignty.

A new military law, establishing conscription, provided the country with the elements of a standing Army, but in view of the fact that a large section of the people was still in sympathy with the extreme social theories which have made such marked headway in every European country and more particularly in those which are limitrophe with Russia, it was decided to maintain the organisation of the White Guards, which is recruited exclusively from the bourgeoisie. Law and order, as represented by that social system which it is the object of the extreme Social Democrats to subvert, appears to be firmly established in Finland, and the country is making rapid strides towards recovery from the shock of the rebellion; but there are still elements of discontent, numerically strong, which would be prepared, in the event of any general European upheaval, to contribute their quota to the cause of revolution.

If evidence of this were required it would be found in the result of the elections for the Diet which were held in March 1919. The passions aroused on the one side by the unspeakable atrocities committed by the Red Guards and their Russian associates, and on the other by the reprisals of the White

Guards and the severe measures adopted by the Svinhufvud Government, led to an embittered struggle at the polls. In Finland every adult, male or female, who has reached his or her twenty-fourth year enjoys the franchise, and as there is proportional representation it is probable that the result of an election affords a more accurate reflection of the opinions of the people than is obtained in any other European country. When the result was declared it was found that the Social Democrats, who had practically been excluded from the Diet since the rebellion, had gained 80 seats, the Agrarians 42, the Finnish Coalition party 28, the Finnish Progressive party 26, the Swedish party 22, and the Christian Labour party 2.

Three years later, the elections held in the beginning of July 1922 resulted in the Agrarians gaining 45 seats, the Finnish Coalition 35, the Swedish party 25, and the Progressives 15, while the Socialists split up into Social Democrats and Communists. The former gained 53 and the latter 27 seats, thus together commanding exactly the same number of votes as previously.

Although the Social Democrats were thus once more the largest party in the Diet of 1919, they could not claim a majority over the other parties combined. But the new Diet was distinctly anti-monarchist, and at last it was possible to find a solution of the question as to the Form of Government which had distracted the country. On June 14, 1919 the new Constitutional Law clearly defining Finland's status as a Republic was adopted, and the period of the Regency came to an end. For the presidency of the New Republic there were only two serious candidates—General Mannerheim and Professor Karl Stahlberg. The friends of the Regent declared that if the election had been by direct popular vote, General Mannerheim would have been elected, but, whatever might have been, the result was a striking victory for Professor Stahlberg, who received the support of the Social Democrats, the Agrarian and Progressive parties obtaining 143 votes against the 50 recorded for General Mannerheim. On his defeat General Mannerheim resigned his command of the Finnish Guards and retired into private life, carrying with him the respect not only of his supporters but of many of those who did not think that his continuance in power was desirable at that particular juncture in their country's affairs.

Under its first President Finland has shared in the agitations, the anxieties, the economic strain, the rapid changes in popular sentiment and public opinion which have marked the history

of every European country in the strenuous years of reconstruction which have followed the close of the World-war. She has, of course, her own special problems arising partly from her geographical position and partly from the fact that within her borders are two races which have never merged, and the relative position of which has undergone a radical change within recent years. The Swedish Finlanders for centuries represented the ruling race. They were not only the governing class, but the wealthiest and more cultured section of the community. By giant strides the Finnish Finlanders have not only claimed and achieved for themselves a position of equality, but by their overwhelming superiority in numbers are threatening to place the Swedish language and Swedish culture in a position not of equality but of inferiority to the Finnish language and culture. These racial differences to some extent cut across, but to some extent coincide with, economic and political cleavages and increase the domestic difficulties with which the Republic has to contend.

But so far as her external relations are concerned the position of Finland would seem to be comparatively secure. Now that the Åland Islands dispute is settled in her favour, her relations with Sweden are good; and by the Treaty concluded with the Russian Soviet Government at Dorpat on October 14, 1920, she has not only established peace with her powerful and menacing neighbour, but has secured a strip of territory on her north-eastern frontier which gives her at last the longed-for access to an ice-free port at Pechenga. Moreover, in December 1920 her application to be admitted as a member of the League of Nations was granted by the first Assembly of the League during its meeting at Geneva, her status as an independent and Sovereign State in the Comity of Nations thus receiving its final recognition.

Finland's relations with foreign Powers are therefore, for the time being, excellent; and, as will be seen from the following chapters, her economic situation and the character of her people foreshadow a rosy future for a country which for so many centuries has lacked the opportunity for complete self-development.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

- 7th Century. Finns occupy the country now known as Finland.
- 1157c. King Eric of Sweden leads a Crusade to Finland.
1249. Birger Jarl leads Second Crusade to Finland; penetrates into Tavastland, and founds fortress of Tavastehus.
1293. Third Crusade to Finland. Torgils Knutsson extends Swedish power eastwards, and founds fortress of Viborg.
1323. Peace of Nöteborg.
- 1495-97. War with Russia.
1528. Reformed religion introduced into Finland by Gustavus Vasa.
1548. First Finnish translation of New Testament by Michael Agricola.
1556. Finland raised to the rank of a Grand Duchy.
1609. War with Russia.
1623. A Court of Appeal for Finland founded in Åbo.
1640. University of Åbo founded by Per Brahe.
1642. Finnish Translation of the Bible published.
1721. Peace of Nystad.
- 1741-43. War with Russia.
1772. Constitution granted by Gustavus III.
1789. Constitution modified by Gustavus III.
- 1788-90. War with Russia.
1792. Assassination of Gustavus III.
- 1808-9. War with Russia.
1808. Russia invades Finland (February 21); captures Svartholm (March 10) and Hangöudd (March 21). Sveaborg surrendered to Russians (May 3). Battle at Oravais (September 29).
1809. Tsar Alexander I convokes Diet of Borgå. Alexander I confirms the Finnish Constitution by Act of Assurance (March 27) and Manifesto (April 4). Treaty of Fredrikshamn (September 17); Sweden cedes Finland to Russia.
1811. Province of Viborg re-united to Finland.
1821. Seat of Government moved from Åbo to Helsingfors.
1827. University moved from Åbo to Helsingfors.
1831. Finnish Literature Society formed.
1835. *Kalevala* published by Lönnrot.
1849. *Kalevala* published in fuller version.
1860. Finland granted a separate coinage.
1863. Diet opened by Tsar Alexander II.
1878. A national Finnish army created.
1883. Swedish and Finnish languages placed on an equality.
1886. French decimal system extended (from coinage) to weights and measures.
1898. Bobrikov appointed Governor-General of Finland.
1899. Imperial Manifesto abrogating Finnish Constitution (February 15).
1904. Assassination of Bobrikov (June 16).
1905. General Strike (October 31—November 6). Tsar suspends Manifesto of February 15, 1899. Finnish Constitution restored.
1906. Parliamentary system reformed. Political franchise granted to women (July 20).
1907. Election of new Diet by universal suffrage.

- 1908. Imperial Ordinance directing all Finnish questions to be laid directly before Russian Ministerial Council (June 2).
- 1910. Appointment of Committee to draft proposals for regulations concerning Imperial legislation.
- 1914. Outbreak of European War.
- 1917. Declaration of Finnish Independence (December 6).
- 1918. Recognition by Russia, Sweden, France and Germany ; Civil War, January —May ; General Mannerheim, Regent.
- 1919. Recognition by other Powers ; Finland declared ■ Republic (June 14) ; Professor Stahlberg, President.
- 1920. Finland joins League of Nations (December).

B. ECONOMICS

V

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

It is at all times difficult to present in broad general outlines the social characteristics of a nation or group of nations ; but the task is rendered infinitely more difficult when the traditions of centuries have been shaken, and when the ferment of new social conceptions is working among the people. To-day social order in Finland is still organised on the capitalistic system which prevails throughout Western Europe and the greater part of the civilised world, and it is, perhaps, not inaccurate to say that in no other country is the present social order more firmly established—for the time being at any rate—than in Finland.

The struggle which the Marxian Socialists, with their following of all the discontented elements in the country, and with the assistance of their Russian comrades, provoked in the spring of 1918 resulted, as we have seen, in their entire discomfiture. But the elections subsequently held, when the Social Democrats proved to be still numerically the strongest party in the country, furnished remarkable evidence of the profound dissatisfaction of an important section of the population with the working of the capitalistic system, and demonstrated the persistence of revolutionary ideas even when the attempt to impose them by physical force on the country had failed.

We must accordingly recognise that the Finland of to-day is passing through a transitional period when the old ideas, if not the old order, have been shaken on their throne, while the new concepts which will eventually emerge from the turmoil have not yet assumed a sufficiently definite shape for there to be any general consensus of opinion as to their nature and meaning.

But a nation, or a people, can never wholly escape from its past ; and there are certain broad features imprinted on the

character of the Finnish people by their history and geographical environment which may be modified but cannot be expunged by the inrush of novel political and economic conceptions. Finland is essentially a country of political democracy. It has been for centuries accustomed to the realities of self-government. Their prolonged struggle against the Russian autocracy has confirmed the people in their already acquired respect for and belief in the forms of Government, and has hardened a natural tenacity of purpose, nurtured in the struggle with the forces of nature in northern latitudes, into something closely resembling obstinacy.

The "dourness" of the Finnish peasant is, indeed, cousin-german to the dourness of the same class in Scotland, while there are other points on which a comparison between the Finnish and Scottish character reveals a not uninteresting similarity. The stout Protestantism of Scotland has its counterpart in Finland, where neither the Greek Orthodox Church nor the Roman Catholic Church has ever been able to obtain any foothold, and the Lutheran clergy during the greater part of the nineteenth century continued to exercise the authority and influence they had acquired during the Swedish period, strengthened as it was by the ascetic revival which marked the early decades of that century. The general decay of late years in the influence of the clergy common to most countries has been hastened in Finland by the fact that, as officials of the State, many of the clergy showed less disposition than did their congregations to take up an attitude of open and avowed opposition to the measures of Russification promoted by their paymaster, and not the least distressing of the features of the insurrection of 1918 was the brutal treatment to which many clergymen were subjected and the deliberate desecration of many of the churches. It is difficult at present to say to what extent the power of the Church has been permanently shaken in the rural areas, but there does not appear to be any room for doubt that the influence of the clergy and the respect for religion have, in Finland as elsewhere, suffered serious diminution in the larger industrial centres.

There is another feature of social life in which there exists a striking similarity between the conditions in Finland and in Scotland—and that is the respect in which education is held and the extent to which it is available to almost every class of the population. It is true that in Finland education is not even yet made compulsory by law, but that is due, not to any unwillingness to adopt such a law, but rather to the phy-

sical impossibility of making it effective. In a country so thinly populated it is not possible to provide schools for the children living in remote hamlets and on scattered farms, but what the State has failed to do by Act of Parliament the Church has practically done by another most effective form of compulsion. By the end of the seventeenth century the Church authorities had decided that all Church members must be able to read, and to ensure compliance it was decreed that no one could be confirmed or married who had not attained at least this minimum of education. The clergy were themselves the teachers in the majority of cases, and the result has been that for many generations the Finnish peasants have been prepared to take advantage for themselves or for their children of the opportunities for acquiring a more advanced education and wider knowledge, which improved communications and the betterment of their economic conditions placed within their reach during the second half of the nineteenth century. To-day the number of illiterates is only one per cent. of the population—a wonderful record for any country, and a marvellous one for a country with such a widely-scattered population as Finland.

The elementary-school system in force in Finland was first established in 1866. According to recent statistics, there were in the rural areas in Finland 3,305 elementary schools, of which 2,858 were Finnish, 436 Swedish and 11 common to the two languages. The attendance at these schools numbered 152,643, whilst in the towns there were 43,500 pupils, of whom 35,000 were attending Finnish, and 8,500 Swedish, schools. Boys and girls were in almost equal numbers. Of State secondary schools and training colleges for teachers there are some 53, whilst in addition over 100 secondary schools have been founded by the municipalities and private enterprise.

Not the least remarkable feature of Finnish education is the number of mixed schools to be found equally in the towns and in the rural areas, while the right of women to share in the advantages of a University education was recognised as far back as 1870. There is only one fully-fledged State University in Finland, but alike by its history, its staff and equipment, and by the part which it plays in the intellectual and social life of the nation, it is entitled to rank among the most distinguished centres of European culture. Founded at Åbo in 1640, it was subsequently removed to Helsingfors, and is now attended by some 3,000 students. The neat student cap, worn alike by students of both sexes, is one of the most familiar

objects encountered by the visitor to Finland in all parts of the country; and the mixture of representatives of all social grades at the same University has undoubtedly strengthened the democratic sentiment in Finnish public life. Many other technical schools, institutions and societies are also in active existence.

Of the growth of a national literature, from its beginning in the earlier decade of the nineteenth century, something has already been said in a preceding chapter, and it is interesting to observe how events have almost completed the full circle; the Finnish language and literature, which in their earliest struggles for recognition received such magnificent support from Swedish Finlanders, now appear to threaten the continuance in Finland of the language which Lönnrot spoke and Runeberg wrote. The Swedish Finlanders have long since abandoned the idea of maintaining the Swedish language in the position of supremacy which it occupied at the beginning of the last century, but notwithstanding their numerical inferiority they claim for it in their common country a position of equality with Finnish. It is a claim to which, officially, no exception can be taken, but the survival of Swedish as a vital element in the life of the Finnish people must depend upon the ability of the Swedish element in the population to contribute its full quota to the building-up of the national existence. What is certain is that after passing through various stages of development in which they were successively influenced by the realistic, the romantic and the symbolic revivals in Western Europe, Finnish writers are now developing a power of expressing a race-consciousness which is evidenced by a continuous stream of plays, novels and poems of a distinctive character, while Sibelius—himself a Swedish Finlander—and other Finnish composers are revealing to Western Europe and the world something of the spirit of their native land through a medium less restricted in its appeal than language.

Notwithstanding the growth of industrialism in recent years, and particularly during the Great War, the Finnish Finlander remains for the most part a country dweller or a sea-wanderer. The Finn is a noted sailor—accepted by the Great Brotherhood of the sea, and freed from the reproach of being a “Dago.” Even the land-dweller, the farmer and the labourer, must in this land of ten thousand lakes be something of an amphibian. For centuries his isolation kept him poor, measured even by contemporary standards, and it is only within relatively recent

times that the increased value of his woodlands and the growth of the dairy industry, coupled with improved means of communication, have brought him a substantial measure of material prosperity. The tenure of land has undergone many changes, but the modern tendency has been to the break-up of large agricultural estates and the multiplication of small owners, though this tendency has been counteracted in the case of timber lands by the large purchases of forests made on behalf of the numerous limited liability companies formed to work in wood and pulp.

More especially in the eastern provinces, which were for a time annexed to Russia, large grants of land had been made by the Emperors, and as recently as 1862 it was estimated that 4,000,000 acres were held by noble families, while thirty-four years later—in 1896—only 900,000 acres were so held. But side by side with the large class of owner-cultivators, ranging from the “gentleman-farmer” to the small-holder, there existed a class of “landless” men estimated to number about 72,000, who held their cottages and the small portion of land they cultivated upon a tenure which compelled them to work for their landlords for certain stated periods each year, or it may be to hand to their landlords a certain proportion of their crops. In some respects these Finnish *torpare* resembled the crofters of the Scottish Highlands, and it was among these landless men that, in the first place, the Russian agents during the Bobrikov régime found their most promising materials for propaganda, the bait offered them being a division of the land, and that, in the second place, the Social Democrats gained their most numerous adherents in the country districts during the rebellion of 1918.

During the long winter nights, when the earth was frost-bound, the ordinary country-dwellers were unable to follow their customary avocations, and in their log huts or wooden houses, painted red and white, they sat around the hearth and told and retold the stories of old days which they had heard from their parents and in their turn were transmitting to their children, stories which the genius and patience of Lönnrot and his successors have preserved for the instruction and delight of a more sophisticated generation. In those long winter days, too, they wove their garments and made their simple furniture, which is now too often replaced by the machine-made product of the modern factory. It was from the ranks of the peasant farmers, the descendants of many generations of these simple folk, that General Mannerheim recruited the

best elements in his White Guards, when he called for volunteers to stem the rising tide of the Red insurrection.

It is in the towns that social conditions have undergone the most violent change. Until quite recent times there were no great accumulations of wealth in few hands to excite the envy of the covetous and to point the moral of the social revolutionary. There were of course many men who by comparison with the bulk of their fellows were well-off, some of whom might properly be described as wealthy. These were mainly to be found in the merchant class, men who had a town-house in Helsingfors, Åbo, Viborg, Tammerfors or Björneborg, and an estate in the country or on the islands where they spent the summer months—manufacturers, bankers, ship-owners. But there was little or no flaunting of their wealth, and their relations with their dependents, whether tenants or work-people, were semi-patriarchal. In Finland, as elsewhere, the growth of industrialism has fostered class-consciousness. The workmen are banded into trades-unions, which in their turn have given birth to the proletarian idea and the party of Social Democracy. The war, which so stimulated industry, brought higher wages to the workers, but also largely increased profits to the employers; and while there is probably less ostentatious display of wealth in Finland than in almost any other country, the knowledge that large fortunes have been made by individuals, more in spite of themselves than by any special effort on their part, cannot be hidden from the workers and tends to exacerbate feeling when the swing of the economic pendulum brings about a condition of things in which unemployment is aggravated by rising prices and a scarcity of the things which the workers have come to regard as their due.

There is, however, one steadying influence, which to a greater extent than in almost any other country is operative in Finland which is pre-eminently the land of co-operation. Within the last twenty years the co-operative movement has made giant strides and has invaded almost every department of the economic life of the country. In 1919 there were the following co-operative organisations in Finland:

Co-operative Credit Societies	614
Co-operative Societies for Consumers	519
Co-operative Dairies	420
Other Agricultural Co-operative Societies	638
Other Rural Co-operative Societies	227

Some of the largest societies have a turnover of over a hundred million marks a year. The "Elanto" Society, for example,

has a turnover of about 12,000,000 marks a month, and one of its main objects is the provision of cheap eating-houses for the working classes. In 1918 the Credit Societies had a membership of 30,727 and a turnover of 26,000,000 marks; the Consumers' Societies had a membership of 250,000 and a turnover of 475,000,000 marks, while the Co-operative Dairies had a membership of 49,000 and a turnover of 118,000,000 marks. These organisations extend their activities into the remotest parts of the country, and it is not without significance that there appears to be a growing tendency to make use of them for political purposes.

To a large extent the conditions of unrest both in town and country are in no sense peculiar to Finland. They are traceable to causes outside Finland, over which neither the Government nor the people of the newly-created Republic have or had any real control. But none the less Finland must face the problems which confront her, as must other countries, with what wisdom and courage she has at her command. Her own peculiar problem is complicated by her close proximity to the centre from which radiate the main disturbing influences in the world to-day. Placed as she is, with one window looking eastwards over the chaos of Russia and another westwards towards the lands which champion the existing world-order, her position is one of equal peril and responsibility, and the way in which she faces the task imposed upon her by her geographical position cannot be a matter of indifference to the rest of the civilised world.

VI

FINANCES AND RESOURCES

Finances.—In any attempt to estimate the financial and economic position of the Finnish Republic to-day it would be misleading to transform Finnish marks into pounds sterling, since there is now no stable rate of exchange between the two currencies. The fluctuations in the Finnish exchange have been less violent than in many of the Central European States, but they have been sufficiently serious to cause grave embarrassment to the Finnish Government, and to hamper materially the establishment of normal trade relations with other countries. In this and succeeding chapters all values stated will,

accordingly, be expressed in Finnish marks, the normal pre-war value of which may be taken, for purposes of calculation, as having been 25 to the £1 sterling. The following table is interesting as showing the fluctuations in the exchange value of the mark since the Armistice :

	Highest.	Lowest.
1919	140	44
1920	180	60
1921	325	105
1922	244	173

Perhaps the most useful classification which can be adopted in tabulating the assets which constitute the wealth of a State is the division into (a) productive and (b) non-productive. We are not for the moment concerned with the taxable capacity of the citizens, upon which the State mainly depends for the means of meeting its annual expenditure, but only with those material properties which are equally susceptible of public and of private ownership.

The summary ¹ of the productive assets of the State is as follows :

	Marks.
State forests, including the land	5,351,614,000
Habitations of the military and civil officials ²	239,533,000
The State saw-mills	11,000,000
The State railways	2,248,893,000
Rapids belonging to the State	345,750,000
Jockis Estate Company	50,000,000
Vessels belonging to the State	37,000,000
	<hr/>
	8,283,790,000

The Finnish National Debt, when this estimate was made, was rather less than 1,300,000,000 marks, and deducting this from the total of the State's productive assets there is a surplus of assets over liabilities in round figures of seven milliards of marks.

The total area of lands belonging to the State is 12,688,202 hectares, or more than 30,000,000 acres, divided as follows :

¹ By a recognised authority, Colonel G. Serlachius, 1920.

² The heading "Habitations of the military and civil officials" covers a reference to a peculiarly Scandinavian institution, considerable areas of land, mostly in the neighbourhood of the larger towns, having in old times been set aside for the support of certain military and civil officials.

	Hectares.
Arable, pasture and burnt lands	102,744
Fertile forest land	5,531,719
Less fertile forest land	2,046,392
Poor forest land	4,551,591
Lakes	455,756
	<hr/>
	12,688,202
	<hr/>

The State is the owner of three sawmills and two fuel-sawing yards from which a considerable revenue—amounting it is stated in 1919 to over 4,000,000 marks—is derived. On this basis it is obvious that Colonel Serlachius's estimate of the capital value of this asset is an extremely moderate one.

There are 2,698 miles of railways in Finland, of which 2,501 are owned by the State, the remainder being privately owned.

In the rapids which are found on so many of her rivers, Finland possesses a potential source of wealth which has only within comparatively recent times been turned to profitable account, and is still only utilised to a small extent. It is estimated that the total available horse-power in the whole country is between two and a half and three millions, but in his calculation Colonel Serlachius has only taken account of the more important rapids owned by the State which are either actually being utilised or are capable of being utilised within a reasonable time. These aggregate a total of 214,000 horse-power, the most valuable being those situated on the Kymmene River and Imatra Waterfall in the south, and the Ulea River in the north.

If now we turn from this brief summary of what may be termed the State Balance Sheet to the Revenue and Expenditure Account, it will be found that over a long series of years expenditure has been met out of revenue. For the year 1922 the estimated revenue amounted to 2,065,660,000 marks and the estimated expenditure to 1,885,300,000.

So far, therefore, as the position of the Finnish State is concerned, it would seem that its internal finances rest on a singularly solid foundation, and that with the maintenance of peace at home and abroad, there is no reason why the young Republic should not look forward to a prolonged period of continually increasing prosperity. This favourable prospect is emphasised by the fact that the Public Debt is mainly internal, the total National Debt at the beginning of 1921 amounting to 1,936,075,449 marks, of which the external debt was only 304,069,387 marks.

Natural Resources.—Finland is the most densely-wooded country in Europe, but it is only within comparatively recent times that the immense potentialities of her forests have been adequately realised, and even to-day the bulk of the population is still engaged in agriculture, notwithstanding the small area under cultivation and the poorness of the soil.

It is estimated that not more than $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the surface of the country is cultivated, while $61\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. consists of forest lands and the remaining 30 per cent. of bog and swamp or water. Yet in the census of 1920 an enumeration of the people according to their trades and occupations gave the following results :

Agriculture and allied industries	65.1%
Industry	14.8%
Transport and commerce	6.8%
Public offices, professions and unclassified occupations	13.3%
	<hr/> 100% <hr/>

It may be taken for granted that the results of the next census will show a larger percentage engaged in industry, but agriculture, as it is the oldest, so it is the principal occupation of the people. When the first settlers entered the country it was probably covered almost entirely by primeval forest and water or swamps, and only by unceasing toil has even the present cultivated area been subdued to the service of man. As always, what has been hardly won is highly valued, and the Finnish peasant is devoted to the patch of land which he and his forbears have won from the wild. Thousands and tens of thousands have been driven to emigrate, and many no doubt have prospered in their new homes, accepting citizenship of their adopted fatherland; but a surprising number of those who have made a competence in the United States, Canada or elsewhere return to end their days in the land of their birth.

It may be that this constantly returning stream of men with enlarged experience and a widened outlook is to no small extent responsible for the remarkable improvement which has taken place in the methods employed to develop the national resources of the country during the last two decades of the nineteenth and the first two decades of the present century. Many of the earlier methods were primitive and uneconomic. The practice of burning the forests to enrich the soil with the wood ash, cultivating the cleared area until it was exhausted,

and then repeating the process elsewhere, has been responsible for the destruction of enormous quantities of timber, but the practice is now stamped out, except, perhaps, in certain remote districts near the Karelian frontier. Indeed it may be doubted whether there is any other country in which scientific methods of farming have of late years made greater progress than in Finland, and this is to be attributed mainly to the enthusiasm with which the farmers and landowners have availed themselves of the benefits of co-operation.

There are, as we have seen, co-operative credit societies, the first of which was established in the present century, which undertake the financial operations of the agricultural community on very favourable terms; there are societies for the purchase of machinery, for the working of peat, for the co-operative sale of dairy produce and eggs; others for providing a telephone service; and still others for providing electric power generated at central stations on one or other of the numerous rapids in which the country abounds. It excites no astonishment in a visitor who knows the country to find a telephone in almost every house in some remote hamlet, and the farmers working the machinery they have purchased or hired from one co-operative society by electric power which they obtain from another co-operative organisation.

The dislocation caused by the war and the fluctuations in the exchange value of the mark make any comparison, in terms of money value, of the annual crops of slight importance; but from official statistics it appears that while in 1880 the annual value of the cereal and root crops was 180,800,000 marks, and that the value had only risen in the three years before the war to an average of 324,500,000 marks, the value placed on the 1917 crop—when the country was in the midst of a political crisis—was as high as 1,940,200,000 marks.

The cereal crop which is best suited to the soil and climate of Finland is oats. Wheat is much the poorest crop, and practically all the wheat used has to be imported. The following table gives the average harvest of various crops for the five years 1911–15:

	Tons.
Oats	371,800
Rye	267,000
Barley	102,600
Wheat	4,800
Blended cereals	13,900
Peas and beans	7,500
Potatoes and other root crops	641,200

It is, however, in the development of the dairy-farming industry that the Finnish farmers have found their most profitable occupation. The stock of cattle in the country shows no sensational increase. In 1880 it was 1,567,800 head, which in 1910 had risen to 2,270,000. But the war and the rebellion brought the number down to 1,872,000 in 1918. There has, however, been a marked improvement in the herds, pedigree bulls having been introduced with considerable success. Finnish butter has, thanks to the scientific methods of preparation adopted, won an excellent reputation, and before the war the export reached 26,400,000 lb., valued at 35,000,000 marks. There is no doubt that the dairy industry promises in the future to bring increased profits to Finnish farmers, provided that nothing occurs to interfere with the peaceful development of the country.

Turning from agriculture to forestry, we find that the fertile forest lands are estimated to cover an area of some 20,000,000 hectares, or about 50,000,000 acres, of which about three-quarters are in the hands of private owners or joint-stock companies, the remaining quarter, as we have seen, forming part of the State domain. The three most valuable trees are fir, pine and birch. For a long time the value of these great forests was not recognised—and indeed much of their present value is due to the rapid using-up of forests in other parts of the world, while simultaneously the demand for supplies of wood has grown by leaps and bounds as new methods of utilising forest products have been discovered.

The forest lands have however always played an important part in the domestic economy of the Finlander. They have supplied him with the material for building his house and for making his furniture and household utensils. They have enabled him to build his boats and to keep himself and his family warm during the long northern winters, and have manured his fields in the days when scientific farming was unknown and means of communication scanty.

It was about the middle of the last century that the saw-mill industry was first established in Finland. Finding the mill-owners ready purchasers, many of the private owners sold their standing timber, and wide areas in the immediately accessible parts of the country were in a few years almost denuded of trees. In 1863 a Forestry Department was established and great strides were made in the measures adopted both to preserve the forests and to utilise the timber cut to the best advantage. The magnificent network of waterways

with which Finland is endowed facilitated the transport of the logs to the mills which were built, mostly in the coastal region, close to some powerful rapids, and no more picturesque scene could greet the eye of the tourist than the immense log-rafts making their way, under the skilled guidance of their hardy crew, from the far interior to the mill, equipped with the latest American machinery, where huge trunks of trees were, by one continuous process, stripped of their bark and converted into paper bags ready to be despatched to the St. Petersburg and Helsingfors grocers. Such a predominant position had the industries dependent on forest products attained before the war, that for the three years 1911 to 1913 of the total exports no less than 72 per cent. were derived from the timber and paper trades.

The war period was one of catastrophic changes. So long as the Russian market was open the mills enjoyed a trade-boom, but, following the Russian Revolutions of 1917 and the Socialist Rebellion of 1918, the timber and paper trades found themselves faced with conditions of unprecedented difficulty. The Russian market was closed to them, and equally so were the markets of the Western Allies. Stocks both of timber and of paper and paper-making material were accumulating, and the leaders of the industry met in consultation. The outcome of their deliberations was the formation of centralised organisations representing the different branches of the industry. In the first place, in the summer of 1918 there were formed the Finnish Paper Mill Association, the Finnish Cellulose Union, the Finnish Pulp Mill Union and the Central Office of the Finnish Paper Industry, the avowed object of which was to safeguard the economic interests of the members in relation to the State, Communes and other public institutions, and to form a connecting-link between all the members of the three Unions and between the Unions themselves.

By an easy transition the Central Union of Wood-working Industries came into existence, to be followed by a still wider Union in which should be gathered together the whole of the important industries of Finland.

When these various Unions in the paper industry were formed the war was still in progress, and it was to Germany and the countries of her Allies that the Unions first sent their commercial ambassadors to open up new markets. Emissaries were also despatched later, as soon as facilities could be obtained, to the Entente countries in Europe and to the United States, with results which cannot but have proved gratifying

to the members of the Unions. Great difficulties were, it is true, encountered owing to the impossibility of obtaining transport; but in spite of many difficulties the export returns for 1919, 1921 and 1922 gave the following results:

	1919.	1921.	1922.
Sawn goods . . .	509,211 ¹	643,000 ¹	843,938 ¹
Paper . . .	46,000	128,241	191,700
Mechanical pulp . . .	64,400	50,360	39,406
Cardboard . . .	15,800	12,543	24,905
Chemical pulp . . .	73,800	122,802	189,077

This represented in 1919 something like 80 per cent. of the total export trade—a clear indication of the important part which forest products play in the economic life of the country.

Notwithstanding her extended coastline and the deservedly high reputation of the Finlanders as sailors, Finland has not established a fishing industry of any great importance, her total exports before the war only ranging from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 marks in value. Nor, so far, have any great resources in mineral wealth been discovered. A promising copper-field is being worked at Mount Outokumpu and there are some indications of the existence of deposits of iron-ore in the extreme north; but the metal industry which has been successfully established depends for its supplies of raw material on Sweden and other countries. There are, however, large and valuable quarries of granite and other stone suitable for building, which have been skilfully employed in constructing many of the buildings in Helsingfors, thus adding largely to the attractions of the capital.

VII

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

We have seen with what facility the different branches of the paper and timber trades organised themselves for the protection of their common interests, and there can be little doubt that the process was greatly facilitated by the fact that in Finland there has always been a marked disposition to organise industry on a large scale. It is the proud boast of Finland that she possesses not only the largest saw-mills, but the largest cotton factory and the largest tobacco factory in Northern Europe, as well as the largest linen-spinning mill. Possibly the fact that so many great industrial enter-

¹ In "standards"; remainder in tons.

prises are concentrated in the hands of comparatively few individuals may to some extent account for the ready acceptance by the factory workers of the towns of the political and economic doctrines which make up the creed of the new Social Democracy.

But there is no doubt that in the establishment and in the guidance of the great enterprises which they control the leaders of Finland's industrial life have shown marked ability and no little daring. It is within the last half-century that the greatest developments have taken place, but not even the numbing influence of Russian rule could prevent the growth of Finnish trade. The fact that, until the opening years of the present century, Russia made little or no attempt to interfere with her fiscal autonomy was an extremely fortunate circumstance for Finland, and not even the erection of a Customs barrier could prevent the Finlanders finding their most profitable market in the great Empire with which their fortunes were so closely linked for more than a century.

The staple industry of Finland, as we have seen, is the working-up of the raw materials derived from her forests, but the courage and organising genius of her manufacturers combined with the skill and industry of the bulk of her industrial population have made possible the establishment of industries of which the raw materials had to be imported from other parts of the world. There is still in existence at Billnas a metallurgical factory, the beginnings of which date back to the seventeenth century, and at Dalsbruk there is another factory of equal antiquity, while the great cotton-factory established at Tammerfors by the Scotsman Finlayson, in the eighteenth century, and the Fiskars cutlery factory founded about the same time, are to-day equipped with the latest plant and need not fear comparison with similar establishments in any part of the world. The Strengberg Tobacco Factory in Jakobstad—the largest in Northern Europe, with branches in all the other Scandinavian countries—was founded in 1760, so that it cannot be said that the industrial development of Finland has not been subjected to the test of time.

Statistics of trade and industry before and during the war have, for reasons which are in no way peculiar to Finland, little value for comparison with post-war conditions which are still in a state of flux. But it will not be unprofitable to glance briefly at the position of Finnish trade and industry up to the outbreak of the war and during its earlier stages.

In the three years 1880-82 the average annual value of the

import and export trade was slightly over 270,400,000 marks. In 1910-12 the average value had risen to 749,300,000 marks, and in 1916, while the Russian market was still absorbing all that the Finnish factories could produce, the exports and imports had reached the very considerable total of 1,473,400,000 marks.

The imports and exports for the past three years have been, in thousands of marks :

	1920.	1921.	1922.
Imports . . .	3,626,500	3,582,600	3,953,900
Exports . . .	2,926,400	3,385,700	4,461,800

Apart from sawn-wood, paper and paper-making material, and from her growing trade in dairy produce, Finland's principal export was hides and leather goods. In addition to manufacturing for her own use much of the machinery employed in her factories, she exported a certain amount of machinery to Russia, her best customer, Great Britain coming next and Germany third. A somewhat different order is disclosed when we examine Finland's purchases from other countries. Here Germany is an easy first, with Russia second and Great Britain a bad third. It is important to remember that Germany not only sold considerable quantities of her own goods to Finland but acted largely as Finland's agent for the purchase of goods from other countries. Wheat bought for Finland from the Argentine was shipped to Hamburg in German bottoms and financed through Hamburg banks, and it was part of the implicit understanding in the world of the higher finance, that Finland came within Germany's "sphere of influence."

It is more than ever dangerous in these days of world-unrest to attempt to forecast the lines on which the political or economic development of any country will proceed ; but it would seem safe to predict that in the future Finland will not only not acquiesce in but will fight strenuously against coming within the "sphere of influence" of any other State, however powerful or however favourably situated geographically that State may be. One of the few propositions which may, indeed, be taken for granted is that Finland will defend her commercial, no less whole-heartedly than her political, independence.

From a purely economic standpoint the omens for Finland appear to be distinctly favourable. It is true that much still remains to be done before the whole of the forests are worked in accordance with the most approved rules for the utilisation and conservation of the world's timber supplies ; but much has

already been accomplished, and the organisation which will ensure that improvement is continuous is in existence.

The railway system has been developed well in advance of immediate requirements, and proposals are under consideration for linking up the Finnish railways as an integral part of a new through route from Western Europe via the Siberian Railway to the Pacific Coast. Telephones are in common use everywhere, and an excellent service is given at a cost appreciably lower than that in force in England, even before the recent increase in rates. Direct steamship communication has been established with the United States and with some of the principal European countries. Joint-stock enterprises are being developed in increasing numbers and on a larger scale. While in 1907 there were only ten joint-stock industrial companies with a capital of 500,000 marks or over, the number had increased to forty in 1917.

To meet the rapidly-increasing demands of trade and industry, the banks have not failed to increase banking facilities and the resources at their command. The Bank of Finland, established in 1811, is a national institution under the control of the Diet, but since the early sixties of the last century a number of private joint-stock banks have been established to meet the needs of the commercial community and have deservedly earned a reputation for sound finance and successful management. In 1862 there was a single private bank with a capital of 3,000,000 marks and deposits of 2,800,000 marks; in 1919 the capital of the private banks was 900,600,000 marks and their deposits amounted to 3,531,100,000 marks.

There would thus appear to be solid grounds for the belief which the majority of Finlanders entertain in a great industrial future for their country. But it would be idle to ignore the existence of factors in the situation which must necessarily give rise to some anxiety in the minds of those who believe that any general advance in moral standards or in material betterment must follow broadly the lines on which our existing social organisation has developed. The Social Democratic party in Finland, as elsewhere, is at one with itself in desiring to substitute for the existing social-political organisation some other organisation under which there shall be neither "capitalists" nor "wage-slaves." But, fortunately for those who do not share their views, they are not in agreement either as to the new organisation of society or as to the methods to be employed to accomplish their objects. In Finland the advocates of a policy of direct action overcame the opposition of

the more moderate revolutionaries and forced them to co-operate in the futile rebellion of 1918. It is doubtful if even the most extreme elements in the Socialist party would be prepared to-day to make another attempt to attain their ends by violence, and it is as certain as anything can be that the more moderate elements—as regards the methods to be employed—would not again be cajoled or bullied into a new revolution by force. Indeed, so long as the Civil Guards—the successors to the White Guards—remain in being, with their hundred thousand volunteers from whom all revolutionary elements are excluded, there is not much likelihood that the existing régime in Finland will be overturned by force.

But this practical immunity from revolution by violence does not exclude the possibility of political and economic trouble from those who are the open advocates of class-warfare. Colonel Serlachius indeed has quite frankly admitted that the future prosperity of the paper industry depends largely on the ability to maintain labour peace—and the same observation applies with equal force to the whole of the industries of the country. In addition, Finland's Constitution is more democratic than that of any other State, so that the contingency that the extremists may, in some sudden gust of popular passion, obtain control of the machinery of Government by means provided by the Constitution is, perhaps, less inconceivable in Finland than in any other country.

But such considerations as these, while they cannot be ignored, only serve to bring out in stronger contrast the calm optimism with which the bulk of the Finnish people are facing the future now that fate has made them masters of their own destiny. With their traditions of centuries of self-government, their high standard of education, their athletic frames—to which their victories in the Olympic games bear indisputable witness—their inborn respect for "law and order," their capacity for organisation and their aptitude for commerce and industry, they may well feel that they are equipped to play no mean part in the century which has witnessed their recognition as a free and independent State.

C. MISCELLANEOUS

DEFENCE

Army.—The Finnish Army was formed in 1918.

Its peace-time ration strength is 26,600 men. It is organised into :

- 3 Divisions.
- 1 Jaeger Brigade.
- 1 Cavalry Brigade.
- Heavy Artillery.
- Technical Troops.

Compulsory service is in force in Finland, and by the new Military Service Act of October 1922 the periods of service are fixed at one year for the infantry and 15 months for other arms.

The armament of the Finnish Army is mainly of German pattern. Only small-arm ammunition is manufactured in the country.

In addition to the Regular Army there is also a Volunteer Force called the Schutz Corps, which numbers some 95,000 active members, 30,000 of whom are Army reservists.

Navy.—A few light cruisers and torpedo boats form the Finnish Navy at present. The coast defences are being organised.

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THE BALTIC PROVINCES

NOTE

As will be apparent from the text, it has been found necessary to treat the three pre-war Russian "Baltic Provinces" of Kurland (Courland), Livonia and Estonia under one heading. It was not until the end of the Great War that Livonia, according to the principles of national "self-determination," became divided in half, the northern portion being absorbed by Estonia, and the southern combining with Kurland and Latgalia¹ to form the present Lettish State of Latvia. See maps facing pp. 100 and 118.—ED.

¹ The north-west portion of the government of Vitebsk.

INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL

NOWHERE in Europe has the Great War produced a more complete revolution than in Estonia, Livonia and Kurland—the so-called Baltic Provinces. For more than seven centuries, that is, throughout their cognisable history, these regions had formed conspicuous examples of the negation of nationality and self-determination. Their record began with conquest, and continued with the fortification of the authority of the original conquerors at every later change. With the advent of the twentieth century this authority was first challenged, then reaffirmed, and finally, after seeming to triumph in the war, for ever overthrown. Three artificial provinces have disappeared, and the national States of the Letts and of the Estonians have at last been born.

The region formerly styled the Baltic Provinces is not marked off by physical barriers from the remainder of nineteenth-century Russia. Striking due east from Stockholm, the traveller finds its northern frontier along the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland to the neighbourhood of Narva. Striking due east from Elsinore, he finds its southern frontier sloping gently from a little above his path to meet the Dvina a little below it. The eastern boundary (if a portion of modern but not ancient Lettland be ignored) runs slightly west of south from Narva through Lake Peipus to the same spot. The rough rectangle thus indicated includes a territory of some sixty thousand square miles, if the Gulf of Riga and its islands be reckoned in. Its length stands to its breadth somewhat as five to three, and the southern half of it contains more land than the northern—a fact of importance for the statistics of the rival races.

There are no mountains, but wide tablelands and low hills ; no great rivers save the Dvina, but many lesser streams ; much sand, bog and forest, but also much fairly fertile soil. The climate is hardly kind. "Kurland weather" has an evil renown even in the gloomy province of East Prussia. A winter which seals every port except Libau for four months, the curt northern spring, summers so torrid that the night-time is the

best for harvest, a dismal, rainy autumn—such is the customary sequence of the year. Nature, it may fairly be conjectured, has impelled the richer classes towards organised and hospitable social life, while she has evoked a dour tenacity in the stronger poor and cowed the weaker.

The racial distribution in the Provinces has been the work less of nature than of man. By the opening of the fourteenth century it was already almost complete. Long before that time the Estonians and the Letts had divided the land between them. Roughly east of Göteborg and of Visby, the wreck-strewn promontory of Domesnes¹ thrusts itself into the Gulf of Riga. The same line, continued east from Domesnes, bisects both the Gulf and the whole area of the Provinces, and coincides with the division, racial, linguistic and now political, between Estonian and Lett. The two races, inheritors of a prehistoric feud, resemble each other only in their sufferings. The Estonians are believed to be Mongols, akin to the Finns of Finland, and to have forced their way up the rivers, driving the Letts before them. The Letts are an Indo-Germanic race, akin to the Lithuanians and to the indigenous inhabitants of Eastern Prussia. Both Estonians and Letts are usually of smaller stature than the Russians, Swedes or Germans, tenacious, blue-eyed and dwellers in the country, but there the resemblance ends. The broad visage of the Estonian has slanting eyes, low forehead, high cheekbones and projecting lower jaw, and his speech, like his appearance, is not of Europe. The Lett is a European, often Scottish in type. The Lett prefers an isolated dwelling; the Estonian a village. The Estonian has preserved through ages of oppression a rich folk-lore and traces of an ancestry martial by land and sea. But his ideas have not the range or subtlety of the Lettish, and he has not yet displayed in literature or commerce the same creative power. Both races have always been small in numbers. After many generations of security and the development of modern towns, they may now claim in all some four million souls. In the fourteenth century the husbandmen, trappers and fishermen who survived the internecine struggles and the foreign invasions can hardly have numbered more than a few hundred thousand of either race.

¹ In modern Swedish Domesnäs; in Lettish Dundagasrags.

A. HISTORY

I

EARLY HISTORY

THE connected history of the Provinces may be said to have begun towards the close of the twelfth century. Before the thirteenth ended, many of its abiding lineaments had been traced. It cannot be doubtful that small isolated and backward races like the Letts and Estonians, occupying a region both attractive and adjacent to several stronger peoples, were doomed to servitude, if not extinction. The Russians, themselves about to fall in 1240 under the Mongol yoke, menaced them from the east, the Swedes and Danes from the west. Yuryev ("Georgetown"),¹ a name which epitomises the cultural struggle between Germans and Russians in the nineteenth century, stands in the eleventh for the Slavonic advance beyond Lake Peipus towards the sea. Early in the thirteenth, the battle-standard of the Danebrog, falling from heaven upon the shore of the Gulf of Finland, consecrated the ambitions of the Danes to rule the Baltic. But although the Danish lordship over Estonia endured until the middle of the fourteenth century, the dominion over the greater portion of the Provinces fell to a yet more formidable Power. Until the end of the Great War, we must remember, Estonia denotes not the whole country peopled by the Estonian race, but only the most northern of three Provinces of which the remaining two commemorate their well-nigh extinct kinsmen the Livs and the Kurs. "Livonia," again, signifies the two southern Provinces, or even all three.

Upon Livonia and the mouth of the Dvina there descended, early in the thirteenth century, an invincible host of Germans who, despite some checks, had mastered the Baltic Provinces by the year 1346. At once adventurers, traders and missionaries, the Teutonic Order drew noble recruits from all Germany, and brought both the ecclesiastical and the secular forces of civilisation to bear upon the task. Favoured by

¹ Later Dorpat.

Pope and Emperor, aided by the extraneous forces which rendered Denmark, Sweden and Russia impotent, the Order beat down the desperate resistance of the Estonians, curbed the ambitions of the new German city of Riga and conquered the whole country. The Knights of the Order became barons; the natives, serfs; non-noble Germans, burghers; and for six centuries this social order survived every political and religious change.

Socially, indeed, the ascendancy of the Germans was complete, but the whole spirit of the age forbade this social fact to find expression in full political unity. The Order in "Livonia" had its own Master, but the Grand Master dwelt in Prussia. Discord came the more easily that the invaders of Livonia were drawn mainly from Westphalia and Northern Germany, those of Prussia from farther south. Two Livonian hierarchies were found in the *Landmarschall* with twenty counts and many knights on the one hand, and on the other four great and almost independent Sees with a privileged knighthood of their own. The climax of this mediæval confusion was reached in the obedience of Riga city to two jarring potentates—her own archbishop and the Master of the Order. All the Estates, including the abbots and the great towns, were represented in occasional Diets, but a strong single authority over the Provinces never came into being while the Order survived.

During the five generations of conquest (c. 1200–c. 1350), moreover, events finally delimiting that conquest had taken place. The zeal of the Teutonic knights impelled them to attempt the subjugation of the heathen Lithuanians and the Christian Russians alike. But in 1242 they suffered severe defeat on the ice of Lake Peipus, and eighteen years later in the neighbourhood of Libau other disasters followed. Russia and Lithuania thus saved themselves, and at the same time decided the future of the Baltic Provinces. Not only were these hemmed in by alien races, but their Western rulers became a garrison which could not be recruited save by sea. To the creation of a true German colony a secure land-route between Kurland and Prussia was indispensable. In Prussia the Knights broke the resistance of the natives, but thereby only inflamed the hostility of the neighbouring tribes, whom they eventually failed to subdue. Soon, therefore, the Baltic Provinces formed an island set in a Slavonic sea, with the German ruling caste numbering perhaps one in twenty of the population and disposing absolutely of the whole. For many centuries

we can obtain only rare and uncertain glimpses of the Letts and Estonians, who, dwelling less than a thousand miles from England, have remained among the least-known races of the world.

The German and his subjects in the Provinces have often been compared to the planter and his slaves. In modern times his reply to such an indictment is vehement and detailed. It is contended that but for the conquest the native races would have destroyed each other. The conquerors enforced Christianity in regions where polygamy and human sacrifices had prevailed, and where man had been wont to scan the paces or the entrails of animals to discover the pleasure of the gods. The Germans founded town after town, Riga, Mitau and Dorpat being the chief, and covered the land with castles. In Danish Estonia also it was Germans who made the prosperity of Revel, Hapsal and other trading towns. An economy in which everything depended upon the forest gave way to the best farming and the most enlightened commerce of the Middle Ages. Further, by a rare colonial policy, the conquerors of the Letts and Estonians preferred to master their dialects rather than to teach them German. The national consciousness of the natives was thus preserved, and drew fresh strength from a boundless hatred of the conquerors.

The Lettish folk-song which bids the German avoid their smoky but rain-swept curtilage and

“Go to the bottom-most place of Hell
Where the Devil makes his fire”

voiced beyond question the feeling of the Estonians also. Whatever might have been the destiny of the Provinces without the Western conquest, it is certain that the Danish and German adventurers complicated and aggravated the difficulty of their international situation.

The fourteenth century, which had seen the Teutonic Order establish a strong dominion over the Baltic Provinces, witnessed also the formation of threatening combinations on their frontiers. Russia still awaited her deliverance from the Mongols, but in 1386 Poland prepared to join with Lithuania, and in 1397 the loose dynastic Union of Kalmar put an end to the mutual strife of the three Scandinavian Kingdoms. For the time being, it was the union of Poland and Lithuania that most concerned the Order. In 1410 its army in Prussia was overthrown at Tannenberg, in 1422 the hostile wedge

between Kurland and Prussia was completed, and in 1466, while West Prussia passed to Poland, East Prussia became a Polish fief. These disasters left the Baltic Provinces more than ever an independent and an isolated Power.

At the same time the lines of their ultimate destiny were beginning to appear. The dominant geographical fact of their situation is that their coast-line forms the doorway between regions far vaster than themselves. In the fourteenth century, as in the nineteenth, Riga and Revel were indispensable to the commerce of the Western world with Russia. Through them salt, wine and fine cloth were borne east and south-east, to be exchanged for furs, wax and, on occasion, grain. Economically, the Provinces controlled and exploited Russia. Tsar Ivan III, who in 1480 flung off the Mongol yoke, formed and bequeathed to his successors the ambition to subdue Novgorod and Pskov, the semi-republican Russian distributing-centres of this Baltic trade, to conquer the lands of the Order and so to reach the sea.

The Russian programme, which was not fulfilled until the eighteenth century, inevitably swayed Eastern Baltic politics from its birth. Russia was soon to be styled "the enemy of all free nations." Her westward advance challenged directly the Teutonic Order, Poland-Lithuania, and Sweden, at that time the Lord of Finland and, with her many landing-places and few communications, nowhere weaker than in her own peninsula. Anti-Russian coalitions were therefore possible, and during two generations the diplomacy of the Master of the Order, Walther von Plettenberg (1494-1535), and his successors staved off a resolute Russian onslaught. Meanwhile however the Reformation had sown new seeds of weakness. As the sixteenth century progressed, Sweden came to stake her national existence on Luther and Poland upon Loyola. The Baltic Provinces, led by Riga, passed through the stages of public debate, iconoclasm, peasant excitement and secularisation to a general though not wholly intolerant adoption of the Lutheran faith. Plettenberg remained true to Rome, and in 1530 he appeared at the Diet of Augsburg and became a Prince of the Empire.

It was certain however that the Provinces would, sooner or later, become the patrimony of their ruler, and that they would be merged in some greater Power.

In 1560 it seemed likely that that Power would be Russia. Ivan the Terrible, finding that his State deliberately blockaded the Order, which further defied him by allying itself with

Lithuania, launched a sudden invasion in 1558. This succeeded beyond expectation. The Provinces, divided between different races, different corporations, different leaders and different policies, were in no position to resist the Russian and Tatar hordes. These devastated the land far and wide and captured both Narva and Dorpat. Both were firmly held, and the Tsar's motive was revealed when the burghers of Revel beheld from their battlements the trading-ships which they were wont to unload for Moscow sailing by to the eastern port. In 1560 the onslaught was renewed, and the State collapsed. The Order was dissolved: Estonia accepted the protection of Sweden; Livonia and Kurland that of Poland. Both Sweden and Poland confirmed the privileges of the ruling caste. The natives continued to live and die like beasts, happy if they could subsist on dusky bread and water. Poland did nothing to improve their lot, but in Sweden, the home of immemorial freedom, they found some sympathy.

King Eric, himself not gentle-handed, styled the barons "oppressors and judges of the peasants in one person," and "the beating with rods and lashing with which the nobles of Livonia maltreat their peasants" was forbidden. Their defence, the more significant because of the massive tenacity with which they always preserved their principles and their power, was that the lash was indispensable, being in fact a gracious mitigation of the death-sentences which conquered aborigines deserved.

For nearly a quarter of a century (1558-82) Ivan the Terrible strove to gain the Provinces by force or fraud. He inflicted indescribable sufferings upon them and more than once seemed certain of success. He might even hope to include Poland among his dominions. At other times, fortune seemed likely to bestow the Provinces upon the King of Poland, or upon a prince from Denmark or from France. But the Tsar's resources were inadequate to a protracted struggle, and when both Sweden and Poland produced outstanding generals the Russians were driven off. Before the death of Ivan in 1584, Estonia had been renounced to Sweden and Livonia and Kurland to Poland, while Russia had submitted to an exclusion from the Baltic which survived the seventeenth century.

II

FROM THE DEATH OF IVAN THE TERRIBLE TO
ALEXANDER I

WITH the return of peace the relics of the peasantry, harnessing themselves to their ploughs, strove to reclaim the devastated fields. Their masters were confronted with the task of securing from Sweden and Poland the privileges which had been theirs under the Order. In Estonia Sweden established an overlordship which differed from the old in being less tolerant of tyranny over the peasants and of survivals of the Roman faith. In Livonia, on the other hand, Poland could at most be brought to grant the Germans equality with Poles and Lithuanians for office, and their religion tolerance beside the Roman. The Jesuits came in and claimed the allegiance of the native races, to whom they preached in their own languages. Thus menaced in both their worldly and spiritual monopoly, many leading Livonians looked for deliverance to the Swedes.

The result was soon apparent, for in 1600 Sweden and Poland were plunged into an interminable dynastic strife. Charles IX, the father of Gustavus Adolphus, invaded Livonia and was joined by some two-thirds of the Livonian gentry. But Riga, loth to give up her favoured situation as one of the greatest Polish ports, resisted all his efforts, the Poles proved superior in the field to a foe whom they despised, and the failure of Charles's enterprise brought the land into the most desperate situation yet known. In 1601 some 40,000 persons are said to have perished of cold and hunger, and the peasants in desperation took to pillage.

Gustavus Adolphus however succeeded where his father had failed. In 1621 he captured Riga from the sea, and in the following campaigns he showed clearly that the balance of military power no longer inclined to the side of Poland. Before his death in 1632 Livonia was in the uncontested possession of the Swedish crown.

The rule of Sweden was characterised by definiteness in purpose and in method alike. On the religious side no parleying with Rome was permissible. So rigid indeed was Swedish Lutheranism that the English in Riga were compelled to journey into Kurland, which remained a Polish duchy, in order to worship lawfully. There must be one nobility for the Empire. Livonian nobles could and did serve in Sweden, and

to Swedes were given in rich measure the Livonian official estates. Soon, although the Diet remained predominantly Livonian, one-half of the Province was in the hands of Swedish nobles. The privileges of the lords were once more confirmed, and the new sovereign did not venture to assail serfdom. He laid great stress however upon education, and the University of Dorpat long bore witness to his zeal. In the light of subsequent events it is curious to recall that Gustavus Adolphus designed Dorpat to illuminate the darkness of the neighbouring districts of Russia.

In 1654 the daughter of the great Gustavus renounced the Swedish crown, which passed to a German prince, her cousin Charles X. He and his son and grandson, Charles XI and Charles XII, resembled each other closely in their tremendous power of will. The result of their handling of the Baltic question was the collapse of the Swedish Empire.

Charles X found himself confronted by a revival of the old problem of Russia. Half a century earlier, Poland had been within an ace of seizing the heritage of the Tsars. Now the position was reversed, and Alexis, the father and forerunner of Peter the Great, threatened to reach the Baltic by conquering Kurland and the region south of it. Charles's counterstroke was to conquer all Poland first. His amazing feats of arms won him the title of the Swedish Napoleon, but in 1656 Livonia had to endure two terrible Russian invasions. Dorpat fell, and remained five years in Russian hands. The Tsar besieged Riga with some 50,000 men, but the little garrison held out until a rumour that Charles was at hand sufficed to put the enemy to flight. The King's career had brought ruin upon Kurland also, and had frustrated the efforts of a notable Duke to make her a commercial and even a colonial Power. His death in 1660 led to a general peace, which, so far as the Baltic Provinces were concerned, remained unbroken for some forty years.

It was Charles XI who, having rescued Sweden from the Danes, prepared her downfall by achieving his own omnipotence. From 1680 onwards he bent all his energies to carrying out, both in Sweden and her provinces overseas, the resumption of the alienated Crown estates. This made the nobles poor, the Crown rich, and the fleet and army strong. Successful elsewhere, it aroused in Livonia an unappeasable hatred of the Swedish rule.

The Livonian nobles, accustomed to self-government, were deeply wounded both by the principles and the methods of the

King. He scrutinised title-deeds, commissioned surveyors, had resort even to old chronicles for evidence as to Crown estates, and rejected or received with marked ill-will the indignant remonstrances of his subjects. To them serfdom appeared as vital as slavery to the "South" in 1860. They were informed at the Diet of 1681 that the King was determined to abolish it on his estates, and that they should do the same, since it "conflicts with Christian love, prevents initial trust between lord and vassal, and takes away all desire for immigration." Eleven years later some four-fifths of the land of Livonia had fallen to the Crown. The consequent disaffection found a focus in von Patkul, a warrior as hot-tempered and unbending as Charles himself, whom he far surpassed in erudition and in knowledge of the world. It was he who dared to present to his volcanic sovereign a manifesto claiming that the nobles, having conquered and converted Livonia and signalled themselves in faithful service to the Crown, possessed an inexpugnable right to rule. But neither rhetoric nor reason could shake the King's determination that no vested interest should obstruct the national defence. Patkul's flight abroad to save his life after trial coincided with a decree which practically abolished the Livonian Constitution (December 1694). The Crown seemed to have triumphed. The resumptions had secured for Livonia an annual sum of more than half a million silver dollars, little less than that achieved in all the remainder of the empire.

The nobles, now mainly tenants under the Crown, were either Swedes or pro-Swedes or tamed opponents. The restored University of Dorpat was staffed with Swedish professors. The old domination of the Provinces by a tax-free German caste had given place to the authority of a Governor-General. Even the long campaign of Sweden to achieve the delimitation of the lands, rights and duties of the peasants seemed to have ended in victory. But the tragedy inaugurated by Patkul under Charles XII showed that the triumph had been too dearly bought.

That tragedy, as all the world knows, was the downfall of the Swedish Empire in a war which desolated the Baltic Provinces for a decade and more. Modern German propaganda, while admitting that the Teutonic Order had been careless of the native races, claims that the misery of the eighteenth century was due not to baronial oppression but to the ravages of war. Although it cannot be denied that agriculture and housing remained mediæval, and that the nobles obstinately

resisted Swedish efforts to secure a respectable *pastorale*, it is claimed that by the end of the seventeenth century the peasants lived in such luxury as to need restraint by law. The Account of Livonia, published in 1701 on the eve of the war, is therefore of special value. The author reveres the Germans, upheld by "a nation so glorious, that hath given monarchs to the greatest part of Europe, . . . ever . . . counted a warlike nation, their very name being derived from 'war'" (*gerra, guerre*). He deplores the policy of Charles XI whereby Livonia "is in a manner desolate," while in Kurland "the gentry are able and very careful to maintain their peasants." But he narrates how, in 1582, when the Polish King assured the Livonian slaves of his own compassion and purposed to commute their floggings, "these miserable people . . . prostrated themselves at the King's feet, and prayed, for Heaven's sake, to leave them by their old custom, for they had found by experience that innovations had always laid a more heavy yoke upon them." And although he believed the peasants to be contented with their slavery, he sums up: "It may be said of these countries as 'twas formerly of Poland, *Est caelum nobilium, paradisus clericorum, aurifodina advenarum, et infernus rusticorum.*"

The Livonian nobles, the architects of this heaven which was also the peasants' hell, revealed their political ideals by commissioning Patkul in 1699 to offer their alliance to Poland. They bargained for the transformation of Livonia into a Protestant aristocratic republic, dominant in Riga also by means of its independent military power. The republic was to form a fief of the Polish Crown, and to be hereditary in the Saxon house, which had lately given a king to Poland. The conception was doubtless influenced by the status of Kurland after the downfall of the Order. There, under the nominal sway of a Duke whose embassies even exercised the right of criminal jurisdiction in Warsaw, the nobles had added the Polish privileges to their own, and had the power of life and death over their peasants. The course of high politics however carried Livonia towards a very different fate.

In 1697 Charles XI died, and, thanks to a popular impulse, his son Charles XII received at the age of fifteen the heritage of an absolutism novel in Sweden. It may well seem questionable whether even absolutism wisely used could have sufficed to defend the position to which the Swedish Empire had now attained. On the east of the Baltic its conquests formed a standing challenge to Russia and Poland; on the

south, to Prussia; and in its own peninsula, to Denmark-Norway. Its commercial system, moreover, injured every Power. But in energy, prestige and military organisation Sweden far surpassed her neighbours, and skilful statesmanship might well have prolonged for decades a structure in which any valid principle of permanence can hardly be descried.

The signal for Sweden's downfall was given by the Livonian exile, Patkul, although the war brought her astounding successes and its author was eventually broken on the wheel. The inflexibility of Charles XI, who on his deathbed refused him pardon, and of Charles XII, who declined to be more clement than his father, was avenged by one of the most active and important exiles in history. A denizen of eight countries in half as many years, he had at last the happiness of winning the Polish King and the Tsar to his project of an anti-Swedish alliance between Denmark, Poland, Saxony and Russia. In 1700 the war began with an abortive attempt to capture Riga. Charles XII however overwhelmed in swift succession the rulers of Denmark, Russia and Poland, while Patkul was disowned as a scoundrel and traitor by his Livonian brethren. But he succeeded in keeping the coalition alive and won the unbounded trust and favour of the Tsar. He shared in the foundation of Petersburg, in the reorganisation of Russia, and in Peter's plans for making the Baltic Provinces not Polish but Russian. It was as a Russian ambassador that, to propitiate the triumphant Swede, the Polish King in 1707 surrendered him to death.

By 1707 however the Baltic Provinces had passed through some of the most terrible chapters even in their history of blood and tears. While Charles pursued one confederate, they were exposed, with a small though gallant garrison, to the savage onrush of the other. Swiftly recovering from his overthrow at Narva, Peter burnt, ravaged and depopulated the towns and districts that fell into his power. In 1703 Petersburg was founded on soil newly wrested from the Swedes, and next year Dorpat and Narva, the two eastern bulwarks of the Provinces, yielded after a gallant defence. Charles need still only have appeared in person to save the situation, but he chose the path that led in 1709 to Poltava. Kingless and faced by three powerful enemies, Sweden could not defend her eastern empire. In 1710, after an eight months' siege, Riga fell, and Revel was soon compelled to follow her example. Gracious deeds are so rare in the history of the Provinces that the attempt of the men of Revel, decimated by plague and

thirst, to send their sovereign a letter of apology and grateful thanks may well be recorded here. Estonia and Livonia, reserved by the allies for Poland, were now in the hands of the Tsar.

Peter was far from insisting upon unconditional surrender. Charles was not dead, but in Turkey, and next year the Turk came near to destroying the Tsar. Russia was still far too weak and inexperienced to confront with confidence the swift vicissitudes of Northern fortune. The ruling caste in the Provinces therefore emerged from a disastrous war with their privileges considerably augmented. Peter confirmed all that Poland had granted in 1561, and even promised a local university for the education of the nobles' sons. The decade which followed witnessed many changes in the political prospect, but the Baltic Provinces remained in the peaceful possession of the Tsar. Among the cessions made to Russia at Nystad in 1721 were Livonia and Estonia with the islands of Dagö and Ösel. The treaty assured to the inhabitants the full enjoyment of the privileges, customs and prerogatives which they had enjoyed under the dominion of Sweden. Their liberty of conscience and practice of the Evangelical religion were also guaranteed, on condition of a like freedom for the Greek faith.

The Swedes, who had endured the ravaging of their own coasts rather than give up hope of regaining the Provinces, were propitiated by important concessions. The bulk of Finland was returned to them, with the Åland islands, which formed the key to Stockholm, and the loss of their granary overseas was softened by permission to import each year, free of toll, Livonian grain to the value of 50,000 roubles.

From Poltava onwards, the fate of the Baltic Provinces depended solely upon Russia. Sweden, Poland and the Empire had had their day, and before new Powers could arise Russia had engulfed the Provinces in her giant mass. An early stage in this process was the acquisition of a predominant influence in Kurland, which had been practically Russian for two generations before its final incorporation in 1795. The prolonged observance by the Tsars of the Treaty of Nystad was remarkable, and no considerable Russian immigration into the Provinces has ever taken place. But inevitably, as Russia developed, they became more and more a fragment of her coastline and their segregation a vain dream. It was therefore of high moment to their history that in the eighteenth century Russia was a poor and backward State, with a costly government,

prone to expensive wars on many fronts. It was no less important that the sceptre could often be seized by adventurers, and that while the personal preferences of the Tsar counted for much, he could maintain himself only by increasing the rights of the nobles to enslave the common people. The autocracy, moreover, required agents, and could not endure rival corporations.

All this coincided admirably with the interest of the Baltic nobles. They readily joined the Crown in curbing the independence of the towns, and they continued to rule the open country in the old despotic way. It was a German traveller who wrote from Riga in 1770 that they drove the peasant to his devotions with the same threats as to the fields, and that his ten- to twenty-mile journey to church, together with the oppression and squalor of his life, could make him dangerous if set free. Accustomed as they were to demand thirty-two quarterings from new-comers, they were far from accepting Peter's great principle that rank should depend solely upon service to the State. They succeeded in securing the registered right of 172 families to form a close corporation of gentility, and these alone might be landed proprietors. The barons had forced the people to be Lutheran, and although the pastor was a freeholder in name, he was usually dominated by his noble patron. Law was German, and they chose the judges from among their own number. Lords of vast estates in which all the taxes were paid by the peasants, with wealth easily won, unrivalled sport and ample leisure—what more could the Baltic oligarchs desire?

Only, it might seem, what the supreme bounty of fortune gave them—a line of Tsars of their own race. It was of no special moment to the Germans of the Provinces that a Livonian serving-maid became consort and successor¹ of Peter, or that for a decade (1731–40) the son of a Kurland groom² governed Russia in the name of Peter's niece. But from 1762 to 1881, from the advent to power of the penniless Anhalt-Zerbst princess who is known to history as Catherine the Great down to the murder of the Liberator Tsar, in blood, in language, in matrimonial alliance and in ideas, the ruling house was German. Whither should the German Tsars turn for the soldiers and ministers whom Russia lacked, more readily than to their subject Germans? Thus to the end of the Romanov dynasty the Baltic caste added to the delights of its domestic heritage incessant and unexampled opportunity

¹ Catherine I (1725–1727).

² Biran.

of rendering lucrative service to the State. From 1710 to 1914, moreover, the Provinces hardly tasted invasion. Germans and natives alike should have lived in rare felicity.

Their collective records, however, contain far more of strife. The Duke of Kurland, indeed, declared in 1774 that neither in the archives of the duchy, nor in the oldest traditions, was there ever mention of a famine. But Livonia and Estonia had been so shattered by the wars and the plague that in 1840 wolves still abounded, and two dozen small towns, with no considerable villages, were all that the three Provinces had then to show. The nobles, moreover, had suffered in education and in character from the war, and the University of Dorpat had not survived the destruction of the town. Hence in the age of enlightened despotism the Baltic Provinces knew more of despotism than of enlightenment. The Russian Government, though it favoured the nobles and accepted without question the German character of their administration, had found their Diets strange and made them rare. In the economic recovery of Riga lay some hope for the future, and the later thirties were conspicuous for a mission which spread Pietism over the land, only to be challenged and for a time expelled as conducing to mutiny in Church and State. An open-minded noble was an unpopular anomaly among his class.

In 1762, after her lunatic husband had returned East Prussia to the Germans, Catherine accepted from his murderers the Russian throne. To the government of the Provinces she brought a mixture of motives which with varying degrees of strength affected also her successors. As absolute autocrat her will must be unquestioned, and she must look to the common people as against a noble caste. But she was no less bound to secure instruments, which in the Baltic Provinces would only be found among the nobles. To be ruler of Russia she must pose as a Russian, subordinating her personal preferences and even her judgment to the need of choosing Russians for high office and of favouring the Russian Church. And, like her precursors the Kings of Sweden, she must feel it anomalous that a conquered territory should in perpetuity flaunt its separatist organisation in the face of a conquering Empire. These conflicting considerations explain much of the policy of the Tsars towards the Provinces until, mainly after 1881, nationalist and economic forces became too strong for Royal control.

Catherine, a clever and ambitious woman who had read

more than all her predecessors for a century, cherished great plans for emancipating the peasants. She naturally turned to the Baltic Provinces as the most advanced portion of her Empire. In 1765 however the Diet refused all concession. Under pressure from the Crown, indeed, they afterwards set some limits to the patriarchal right of punishing vassals and demanding from them payments in kind and in labour, while the peasant's movables were to become his own. These, however, were mere paper promises, and the old tyranny continued. Not until fourteen years later did Catherine return to the attack. In the meantime much that was relevant to the problem had occurred. On the one hand it had been clearly proved that Russia was not ripe for peasant emancipation. The Crown was compelled to strengthen, instead of weakening, the social domination of the lords. On the other hand a widespread peasant revolt in the south-east had maintained itself through more than one campaign. Over foreign Powers Russia was triumphant. The Turk was humbled, and the collapse of Poland meant that Livonia and Estonia were encircled by regions in which Catherine actually ruled or in which her will was law. She was thus both compelled and encouraged to attempt to benefit her people by far-reaching administrative reform.

The outcome was the Organic Law for Local Government of 1775. Russia was divided into governments, each containing some three or four hundred thousand inhabitants and each subdivided into about fifteen districts. Upon every government and district was conferred an orderly and symmetrical administration for justice and affairs. Each social class was endowed with its own district tribunals, from which appeals lay first to the court of the government and thence, if necessary, to the Senate. Charters followed, conferring corporate rights upon the nobles and upon the towns. Local self-government based on the principle of the division of powers was thus bestowed upon Russia.

By a strange irony of fortune, the Law owed much to eminent public servants from the Baltic Provinces, who did not dream of its possible application to their own homes. Such, however, was Catherine's firm resolve. Promises and threats having failed to shake the obstinacy of the Germans, she had recourse to Imperial power. In December 1782 the Governor-General of the Provinces was directed to organise them into the governments of Riga and Revel, each subdivided into such districts as might be found convenient. The pill was gilded by per-

mission to the nobles to regard their fiefs as freehold, and it was left to them to harmonise the new and the old administrations. It can hardly be claimed for them, however, that they made any honest effort either to appreciate the good-will of the Government or to meet its wishes. In 1783 and 1784 the peasantry of Central Livonia, finding their burdens enhanced and their remonstrances disregarded, broke out into a rebellion which was bloodily suppressed.

In 1786-87 the new constitution was forced upon the Provinces. The feelings of the aristocracy were deeply wounded by the necessity of accepting as equals both landed proprietors outside the 172 registered families and others who had, according to the Russian system, gained ennoblement by service to the State. For a decade they suffered, and in 1795 their brethren of Kurland, whose independence could not survive the downfall of Poland, experienced a like fate. Then Catherine died, and her son, soon to be known as Paul the Madman (1796-1801), took a pride in reversing everything that his mother had achieved. The Baltic Provinces reverted in 1797 to their ancient semi-separation from the remainder of the Russian Empire. So conservative was Paul that he rejected a project of the Diet for the limitation of serfdom. The ruling caste, however, modified the old régime by admitting 65 new families to registration.

III

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

ALEXANDER I (1801-1825), who succeeded to his murdered father, was more than tolerant of a semi-separation which was his ideal for Poland and Finland also. He therefore welcomed in the Baltic Provinces reforms which philosophy demanded but for which Russia Proper could not yet be considered ripe. In 1802, the year in which the University of Dorpat was once more established, the Livonian serfs again revolted under the leadership of Poor Conrad, the so-called Lettish Bonaparte. The rebellion was quenched in blood, but the notoriety of abuses helped to overcome conservative obstruction. Favoured by a liberal Tsar, some Liberal nobles and the economic needs of all classes, a measure of emancipation became possible.

It was long, however, before a practicable upward path was discovered. The Peasant Ordinance of 1804 gave Livonia

villeinage in place of serfdom. The homesteads of the peasants became their hereditary possessions subject only to certain labours and contributions, and the peasants themselves, though still fettered to the soil, were transformed into human beings not liable to be mated at the pleasure of their lords. But the disabilities of the landless labourer together with the antiquated system of cultivation were stereotyped, and the new ideas of economic freedom rejected.

Progress could hardly be resumed until Russia's part in the European struggle had been played out. In 1812 Mitau was occupied by the enemy and Riga bombarded, but the Provinces felt merely a breath of the storm which laid waste broad tracts of Russia.

In 1816 and 1817 Estonia and Kurland conceded the personal freedom of the peasants, to be completed in fourteen years, and in 1819 Livonia swung round to the policy of a free peasantry contracting freely with proprietors owning all the land. Such freedom, it need hardly be observed, proved a mere cheat. The peasants were free to work for the local autocrat on his own terms or to quit the neighbourhood if he did not care, or contrive, to detain them. The landlords on the other hand gained freedom to dismiss unprofitable peasants, whose former security against absolute starvation vanished. The barons thus remained as of old practically the owners of the native races.

In the early forties the grievances of the peasants attained a novel publicity by becoming intermingled with religious strife. Accentuated by the failure of the harvests, the misery of the Letts and Estonians drove some to forsake the land and others the Lutheran Church. This provoked a storm which disturbed Europe and which two generations later was not completely calmed. The indictment from the German side is that the Russian priests hurried the peasantry into apostasy by delusive promises of economic succour, and that the Russian State forbade either the dupes or their descendants to quit the Orthodox fold. The truth is difficult to determine. The Russians always claimed to be defending their rights against a hostile propaganda. William Palmer, who paid a contemporary visit to the Russian Church (1840-41), records that the Bishop of Riga had been deprived of his See by his superiors for not discouraging conversion for worldly motives. His successor was a vigorous missionary who printed the Russian Catechism in Lettish and brought in so many converts that the Government could hardly find them priests, while the landlords refused

to sell sites for Orthodox churches. It is certain that a struggle for the religious allegiance of the native races continued until in 1906 the Tsardom suddenly perceived that the dominant issue was that between any faith and none.

At first sight it may appear strange that confessional strife should have been delayed for 130 years from the Russian Conquest. From time immemorial the Greeks had had a foothold in the Provinces. Ivan the Terrible placed the destruction of Russian churches among his motives for the invasion of 1558. Riga possessed in 1840 populous Russian suburbs, where fugitive sectaries had long found shelter from the Tsars. She had become the seat of a Greek bishop and numbered eight Orthodox churches as against six Lutheran and one Reformed. But the guarantee of religious freedom given by Peter conformed closely to the temper of the Russian Church and State and people in dealing with an alien race. "Mild, mournful and non-interfering" are the epithets applied by a Russian to his communion. "Moss-grown, rumbling for ever around and around the same invariable ruts" is an American view of a Church which, unspotted and unchanged, boasts only that through the nine centuries of her existence she has kept the faith. Clerical aggression in and after 1840 had its roots in politics.

So marked a departure from the spirit of Alexander I, indeed, could not be attributed to his son. Nicholas I (1825-1855) was a martinet who strove to govern his vast empire paternally, and who may certainly be acquitted of weak deference towards any views which differed from his own.

Himself the offspring of Germans and influenced by a Prussian wife, he made Germans his counsellors and was incapable of finding in Orthodoxy the ecstasy which his consort professed. It was he who rejected one of two candidates for canonisation, declaring that one new saint was enough, at any rate for the present. But the most masterful of Tsars could no longer defy all public opinion. Nicholas stood firm against the party of progress, and strove to isolate his realm from the contagion of foreign ideas. But he thereby committed himself, in some degree, to the new Nationalists, and to their policy of one Tsar, one speech, one faith. Russian and Orthodox being practically synonymous in Russia Proper, these men demanded that her conquered provinces should not presume to be wiser than herself. They particularly resented the pretensions of the Germans, who at Riga suffered no Russian to acquire citizen rights. If Russians received from Germans "a contempt

which has become raised to the dignity of a national conviction," they repaid it with universal and vigorous dislike. The conversion of peasants whom the Germans had forced into error was therefore a double triumph for Russia. In 1832 the status of the Protestant Churches in Russia had been regulated by a general statute, and it was soon made clear that the Baltic Provinces would not be suffered to shield themselves behind Peter's outworn guarantee.

During the first decade of quasi-religious strife the Livonian Liberals achieved a final triumph in the land question. The Tsar disapproved the exemption of the tenant from being punished by the landlord, but in 1849 he approved the new Agrarian Law. Forced labour thus came to an end, while specified lands were to be bought or hired by peasant communes for their exclusive use. Each Province had its own arrangements, but by the mid-sixties the problem may be said to have been solved. The landlords had succeeded in bringing about a secure peasant proprietorship without ruining themselves or disturbing their political power. At the same time the right of holding estates was thrown open to men of any social class.

The Baltic Provinces may thus claim to have been foremost in the work of Liberation which gave Alexander II (1855-1881) his honourable name. In other respects their history during his reign illustrates the practical limitations upon the Russian autocracy. The Tsar spoke from his heart when he told the delegates of the Baltic nobles that they were rightly proud of their German nationality, and that he would always protect them. But he often struggled in vain against the currents of nationalism in Church and State. In 1874 he at least compelled a truce in the Orthodox battle against the Lutherans, but in 1877 the mediæval organisation of the Baltic towns had to yield to the new and democratic Russian system. Thus menaced, the Germans of the three Provinces drew closer together and strove to safeguard their future by means of education. Newspapers, magazines and societies were established together with institutions for training both German students and German teachers for the native races. Intervention in the religious struggle by Bismarck, the Evangelical Alliance and many German writers had shown them that they had friends outside the Russian Empire.

Friends in Germany, however, became a dubious asset when Alexander III (1881-1894) succeeded to the throne. The new Tsar had been deeply wounded by the ingratitude of

Bismarck at the Berlin Congress (1878), and his Danish consort could never forgive Prussia for the crime of 1864. Alexander was perhaps obstinate rather than strong, but in his reign and the next an unfailing source of moral strength was found in the ecclesiastical statesman Pobyedonostsev, who taught both Tsars that they did not possess the right to diminish their own power. This cultured and disinterested fanatic, a Grand Inquisitor reincarnate, proved an immense support to the policy of paternal force and an unspeakable curse to Russia. Alexander III let it be clearly known that he desired the complete incorporation of the Baltic Provinces. The first step should be the reduction of their Lutheran Church to the level of a sect, tolerated indeed, but strictly circumscribed. To this end the truce imposed by Alexander II was broken, and a struggle began which lasted throughout the reign. To vindicate the rights of the Orthodox Church in regard to indelible conversion and the offspring of mixed marriages, the great majority of the Livonian pastors were subjected to criminal prosecution. Many marriages were declared null and void, and some 30,000 Letts and Estonians received notice that their return to Lutheranism had been contrary to law, and that for the future they must be Greek. Orthodoxy was required of State servants, and Orthodox propaganda subsidised by the State. The prosecution of the pastors was ruthlessly carried out. It is asserted that more than two hundred such cases terminated with suspension, sequestration, fine, imprisonment, exile or Siberia.

The policy of Russification also inevitably attacked the German strongholds of law, education and language. The attack was in no sense the outcome of brutal indifference to the interest of the native races. To be prosperous, the Lett and the Estonian must have another language and a wider fatherland than their own. To make them full citizens of the Russian Empire was to confer a boon which was well worth some preliminary confusion. Their former masters had given them only an occasional opportunity of making themselves almost by stealth into imitation Germans. Now as never before, Russia was thrown open to them. As clerks, the Letts swiftly gained a footing in the Russian business world, while as colonists the Estonians won high praise. At first, however, the establishment in the later eighties of State control over education seemed to have been the signal for a barbarian crusade against a well-established system. Trained teachers who spoke Russian could not be improvised, and illiteracy and even youthful

crime increased. The transformation of Dorpat into the Russian University of Yuriev convulsed the whole German world. It was accompanied by the introduction of the Russian system of justice and police, which owed its origin to the great Europeanising reform-period of Alexander II.

In the earlier portion of the reign of Nicholas II (1894-1917) the pro-native measures appeared to have been successful. Stimulated by freedom and property, the peasants amassed considerable wealth. The Russian railways gave to Riga and Libau immense importance for the export of Siberian and Polish produce and the import of coal and herrings for an area far transcending the limits of the Baltic Provinces. Native journalistic and other literary activity was remarkable, and the rise of the Young Lett and the Young Estonian parties seemed to the Russian Government to attest its own success. The richer Germans held to their posts, but many of the poorer gave place to the native races.

In 1905, however, the Tsardom was forced to realise that its policy and the spirit of the age had ripened an unwelcome harvest. Far from adopting the traditional Tsar-worship of the Russian peasant, many of the Young Letts and Young Estonians had imbibed Social Democracy or were even dreaming of national independence. Their insatiable hatred of the Germans had not given rise to love for Russia. In the Baltic Provinces, the Russian law under which every peasant's son was born a landowner did not prevail. Hence a rural proletariat arose, and the Imperial industrial policy adopted from 1892 onwards drove it to the new factories of Riga, Revel and Libau. There, as among the Russian and German workmen, Karl Marx was the prophet of a new era, to be reached by revolution. Confronted by the prospect of its own downfall as the result of failure in the Far East, the terrified Government made desperate efforts to retrace its steps. In the Baltic Provinces it made common cause with the Germans. The gift of religious toleration to the Empire was swiftly followed by permission to the Germans to teach their own language in their private schools, while further educational concessions were in prospect. The year 1905 came to an end, however, amid terrible convulsions. The origin and aims of the Baltic revolution cannot yet be precisely determined, but it was certainly widespread, destructive and very nearly successful. The Lettish farmers held aloof, and the insurgents did not commonly molest them. Germans, whether proprietors or pastors, were pillaged and often slain. Preceded by a general

strike, the storm spread from the towns into the country and eventually raged against the Imperial Government. Only the timely advent of the Guards saved Riga. In the new year reprisals of equal violence were taken, and the Government has often been reproached with having allowed the outraged barons unlimited revenge.

The triumphant Tsardom did not withhold from its subjects the concessions promised in panic. The press enjoyed unwonted freedom; the Duma came into being; and in the Baltic Provinces the Germans were not prevented from organising themselves into Unions for the furtherance of their culture, wealth and numbers. Though Dorpat (Yuriev) remained Russian, five important public schools were revived or created for their boys. It was only when the first impressions of 1905 had faded that the old policy began to be resumed. Russification still demanded that the Lettish children should be taught in Russian from their first entry into school. The complex electoral law, "as bizarre as St. Basil's church at Moscow," caused only revolutionary Letts and Estonians to represent the Provinces in the first two Dumas. In 1907, however, the Russian franchise was revised in the interests of wealth. The Germans then secured seven seats, while the native races, whose numbers were at least eleven times as great, had only four. In the upper house, the Imperial Council, all five representatives were Germans.

When the Great War came, it found the Baltic Provinces still undigested by Russia. In the three "governments" of Kurland, Estonia and Livonia lived some 2,750,000 souls, of whom all save some half-million belonged to the native races. The Germans may be estimated at less than 200,000, of whom fully three-fourths were townsmen. Viewed superficially, this small fragment of the Russian Empire might seem indistinguishable from the rest. For military purposes it was divided between two larger units; for judicial purposes it formed a fraction of one. Its three-and-twenty "districts" and their component parts were administered by Russian officials. Its towns were in constitution Russian, its sons performed military service according to Russian law. In its courts Russian judges dispensed justice in the Russian tongue. Yet, two centuries after the Russian conquest, the German phalanx still remained unbroken. If barely one inhabitant in five knew German, that was as the Germans had thought fit. The members of the German Church stood to the Russian as nine to one; the private law evolved by the Germans still held

good; the towns preserved their ancient German character. Riga, which a generation earlier had been pronounced more German than Königsberg, and, in spirit, than Bremen and Hamburg, had grown into a city of more than half a million people without losing its German stamp. Revel, with some 130,000 inhabitants, was more German still. In the countryside the division of lands between Germans and natives remained as the Germans had arranged it, and so also did rural local government. For half a century the Germans had averted the Russian county councils (*zemstva*) and maintained a system which gave the landowners as many representatives as the peasants, with the Lutheran priest to safeguard German rule. The provincial Diets, whose functions included taxation and the proposal of new laws, were composed of landlords only. The Germans had proved their power of overwhelming the natives in the central institutions of the Empire. After eight centuries, a statue of Bishop Albert might well have been set in the market-place of Riga with the legend "We took the land and we hold it."

IV

THE GREAT WAR

WHEN the Great War came, the Baltic Provinces were filled with latent strife. No single section either among the Germans or the native races found its own social or political situation satisfactory. The non-noble Germans were either, as compared with their kinsmen in Germany, ignorant, unorganised or poor; or, if they belonged to the professional or mercantile classes, disgusted by the growth of alien competition. The towns were passing into the hands of the native majority, while the natural rivalry between the races was sharpened by antagonism which was revealed and increased in 1905. Vital statistics showed that German births in the Provinces no longer equalled in number German deaths.

How far the nobles were faithful to the Russian Government is a question that has been answered, with complete conviction, in the most contradictory ways. Their eminence in practising the boasted "German faithfulness," it has been claimed, survived all the misdeeds of the Russian nationalists, and had been proved when every other class was in rebellion. On the other hand grave suspicions have been published with



regard to certain Imperial German Orders of which Baltic barons accepted membership, and allegations of treason to the Russian cause during the war are rife. It is obvious that men and women belonging to families with branches in Germany, who read chiefly the literature of Germany and were wont to spend in Germany their months of leisure, must find it difficult to regard Germany as an enemy. It is certain that many of them detested Russia, the Russians and the Tsar. Their feelings towards the professors of Dorpat were such as might arise in English breasts towards a Government which to serve some policy gave Oxford and Cambridge to the Egyptians. But interest still bound them strongly to the existing order. The motto of the Dorpat Junkers had been "All as in the past." A bitter critic holds that the Tsar and baron both personified reaction, and that they would stand and fall together.

Among the Letts and Estonians all classes save the Germanised commercial men had an overflowing sense of grievance against Germans and Russians alike. The farmers, it is true, owned their lands, but they were still struggling, with the help of national banks, against the burdens imposed upon them at the emancipation. Numerically they were but few in comparison with the landless men, who turned to day-labour, rural artisanship, the towns and foreign lands. Among these the dictatorship of the proletariat became an ideal, only to be exorcised by the gift of acres. They were restrained neither by the Church, which was to them an alien institution chiefly administered by aliens, nor by education, for the teachers were revolutionaries, nor by citizenship, since even the Russian *zemstvo* had been kept out of the country by the Germans. The army was to them a contrivance of despotism by which they were torn from their homes in greater numbers than justice warranted and deposited in distant barracks among aliens whose butt they were wont to be. Less than a decade had passed since the Tsar and the barons had united to punish their rebellion with a barbarism greater than their own. They were ripe for revolution, but isolated from any force which could make revolution possible. Besides the agricultural, the industrial and the commercial classes, however, the Baltic Provinces contained a new and small but highly important class of educated Estonians and Letts. These men, editors, composers, professors, lawyers and the like, were clearly destined to gain influence as the power and the habit of communication among their countrymen developed. They could

feel the contempt of the Germans and the distrust of the Russian Government, and they could dream of emancipation from both. Nationalists at heart, they did not, like many Young Letts and Estonians, desire upheaval in the interests of an international class.

Thus when the Great War came it was hailed by all sections as an opportunity of bettering their own condition. The Germans held high posts in the army and navy, and hoped to regain and fortify by military exploits the dominions which they had won by arms. The Letts and Estonians, like the Russian people, aspired to win reform from a grateful central power, and turned with peculiar zest against a German foe. Their enthusiasm, shared by the neighbouring Lithuanians, may have turned the scale in the war; for it convinced the Russian command that they could be trusted to attack. The Germans, it is claimed, knowing that the Russian plan of mobilisation required twenty days for its completion, calculated that they could take Paris in twenty-one. They were confounded by the appearance, after only fourteen days, of a Baltic host whose enthusiasm was not damped even by the appointment of their persecutor Rennenkampf to command. East Prussia cried out for rescue, and therefore Paris stood and the Allied left was not enveloped.

During the first three campaigns the Baltic Provinces were a mere section of Russia and one upon which the burden of warfare fell with ever-increasing weight. Tannenberg, since 1410 a name of inspiration to the foes of the Teutonic Knights, in 1914 witnessed a terrible disaster. In 1915 Kurland was overrun. The retreating Russian armies laid waste the country, and in September the Germans found only one inhabitant in three remaining. Pending the annexation on which they counted, the invaders established German law, installed German officials, created a network of strategic railways and treated the surviving inhabitants, whether Lettish or Baltic German, with unexpected impartiality. To extend the boundaries of Prussia as far as Riga and to fill the vacant hearths of Kurland with German colonists expelled from Russia might well seem from 1915 to 1917 a practical plan.

In those years, however, the idea of an autonomous and even independent Lettish State was ripened by war. The Letts, who on the outbreak of war numbered about 2,500,000, had been hewn into four divisions. A bare quarter of a million remained in Kurland. Nearly as many were enrolled in the Russian army. Over half a million became refugees in Russia,

shepherded as far as possible by Committees at Petrograd and Moscow. The remainder lived on behind the Russian lines, enduring many of the hardships of an alien military occupation. But the attention of all sections centred naturally on the achievements of a new national force—the Lettish army. This was established, after an earlier refusal, in the summer of 1915. The Lettish battalions were filled in part with volunteers and employed in the defence of their country. It is claimed that with a loss of 32,000 men they kept Riga from the Germans until September 1917, and that they twice broke through the German lines. Their valour had influenced both the war and the national consciousness of their race. Being staunch Bolsheviks at a time when Bolshevik signified merely the advanced section of the Social Democratic party, they were destined to influence not a little the course of the Russian Revolution.

The Revolution determined the immediate fate of their country. On the one hand the Letts elected a Provincial Council and proposed that Latvia, including Latgalia,¹ should be autonomous. But the dissolving Russian army, covered by the Lettish volunteers, withdrew from the Dvina front, and on September 2, 1917, the Germans rendered their accustomed thanksgiving for Sedan in conquered Riga. Before the end of the winter the Baltic Provinces lay entire within their grasp. Only the triumph of their enemies in distant fields could compel them to evacuate the country. The year of their domination, however, showed how great a transformation had taken place within the Provinces, and, by reaction, profoundly affected the future. In Riga, of course, they had found only the shell of its former self. The port had been inactive for more than three years; the factories were stripped of their machinery; archives and collections lay safe in Russia. At Riga, as at Dvinsk, the population had shrunk by one-half or even more. At Riga, none the less, there was formed in the first months of the German occupation a secret national organisation which worked for Lettish independence. In those parts of Livonia and Latgalia which remained unoccupied for several months the Lettish National Council was formed at the same time. This secured the adhesion of the Lettish refugees in Russia, while the cause first of autonomy and afterwards of independence was constantly indebted to the Baltic emigrants, notably the exiles of 1905.

¹ I.e. the portion including Dvinsk and the country to about 100 miles north and north-east of that town.

During the spring of 1918, however, the forces opposed to the Lettish movement were such as might well have appalled a more experienced or a less valiant people. The greatest military empire in the world was in firm possession of a region which it had every reason, whether historical, military or economic, to retain. In April 1918 the world was informed that the united Council of State of Estonia, Livonia, Ösel and Riga had unanimously petitioned the German Emperor to accept the Baltic crown, and that he had consented to the practical incorporation of the Provinces in the German Empire. Should his offer of assistance in such a severance from Russia prove unavailing, the probability remained that Russia would reclaim her former vassals. No national Russian party could consent to Baltic independence. The Bolsheviks, who were the more dangerous because a large and vigorous section of the Baltic peoples shared their views, might concede a nominal independence at the price of terror and social revolution. The Allies were bound to respect the vested rights of Russia; they were ill-informed as to the facts of the case; and the chief among them had a strong antipathy to the substitution of a number of petty States for one great Empire or Federation. Yet however slight the chances of success, the Letts, like the Estonians, continued to oppose their will alike to bribes and threats through the dark season of German occupation.

The part played by the Estonians in the war, though hitherto less terrible and less glorious than the Lettish, had been strenuous enough. No less than 15 per cent. of the population had been called to the colours. In 1917, at the first Military Congress at Revel, 171,000 bayonets were represented. Thanks to the spread of education, many Estonians obtained commissions in the army and navy, at a time when the expectation of life of a subaltern in the field was estimated at a fortnight. Every volunteer from an Estonian Students' Association in Petrograd was killed during the first year of the war. In the first two years ninety-three Estonians out of three hundred serving in a single Russian regiment received the St. George's Cross for valour. The formation of an Estonian army was due to the Russian Revolution, which destroyed the old organisation, and to the initiative of Kornilov, then Commander-in-Chief of Petrograd, who perceived the value of the Lettish national force. Once begun, the movement continued spontaneously until the Bolsheviks intervened.

By this time "Estonia" signified the ancient Province of that name together with the section of Livonia inhabited by

members of the Estonian race. In April 1917 it had gained from the Revolution autonomy, democracy and the longed-for breach with the German past. In 1918, however, all such gains seemed to have been destroyed. German troops, invited by their Baltic compatriots, seized the country and restored the old régime. "Feudalism," said the Prime Minister more than a year later, "is still with us in spirit. . . . As soon as the Germans occupied the country back came the oppressions, and the superintendent with his whip is still to be seen at his traditional work on many estates."

In 1918 therefore the Letts and Estonians were exposed to what might well have seemed irresistible pressure to throw in their lot with Germany. Not once, however, did the combination of soldiers, barons and priests secure the acquiescence of anything that could be called a national representative assembly. Meanwhile, from Stockholm, Christiania and Copenhagen the delegates of the deposed Estonian Government continued to claim the independence of their country and to protest against the proceedings of Germany and Russia with regard to it. They cited as a proof of the incessant and immense pressure upon the Estonians the fact that in a single month more than twelve thousand petitions had been sent by the people to the higher authorities of the army of occupation. From the Allies they secured a measure of temporary recognition, with encouragement to expect that the Peace Conference would apply the principle of self-determination to their case. This *de facto* acknowledgment by England, France and Italy greatly encouraged the isolated and oppressed nation to continue its moral resistance to the Germans.

In November 1918 the victory of the Allies was instantly followed by the proclamation of Latvian and Estonian independence. The State Council of Latvia gave proportionate representation to all the Lettish parties and races except the Bolsheviks and Unionist Germans. Of its hundred members 78 were Letts, 8 Germans not favouring union with Germany, 7 Jews (of whom there are many in Kurland and a majority in some of the towns of Latgalia), 5 Russians, 1 Lithuanian and 1 Pole. The Lettish seats were divided equally between the Peasants' Union, the Social Democrats and the Burghers.

The State Council, as a microcosm of national Latvia, made provision for the temporary governance of the country, and, as far as possible, for its future. Its members agreed to authorise one of their number to appoint a Cabinet. This, which was to rule until the convocation of a Constituent

Assembly, must include representatives of the non-Unionist Germans and all other parties comprised in the State Council except the Social Democrats, who held that they could best serve Latvia by abstaining.

Its duty was to guarantee the new-found freedom of the press, of speech, of unions and of meetings, to recall the refugees and to provide for local government and for national defence. It was further to convoke at the earliest possible moment a Constituent Assembly to be elected by citizens of both sexes on the basis of a general, equal, direct, secret and proportional vote. Subject to the ratification of the Constituent Assembly, Latvia was proclaimed a Democratic Republic.

The programme, statesmanlike in its manifest effort to be fair, and in its avoidance of questions which might imperil unity, could not be carried out until the country had been freed by force. When independence was proclaimed the German garrison of Riga, 45,000 strong, far exceeded the strength of the Lettish militia. At least as many more Germans were encamped in the rest of the country. Their gradual withdrawal was followed by a Bolshevist invasion designed to destroy the wall between the Russian and the German Soviet forces, to open the way to Scandinavia and to make the Baltic the sea of universal social revolution.

To this invasion Latvia and Estonia were alike exposed. In Estonia the Provisional Government had the advantage of a more ancient parentage, since it derived its origin from the National Council which had proclaimed itself the supreme power soon after the Russian Revolution. In the autumn of 1917 however the Bolsheviks, Russian, Lettish and Estonian, had established a reign of terror by force of arms. The National Council was suppressed, the elections for the Constituent Assembly cancelled, and the Soviet system introduced. In February 1918 the Estonian militia and regulars expelled the Bolsheviks, and Estonia became by the desire of 70 per cent. of the inhabitants a Democratic Republic independent of Russia or of any other Power. The advent of the Germans flung her into servitude, but the National Council elected in 1917 continued to work in secret during the whole of the German occupation. Hence, although the Premier and Home Secretary quitted German gaols to assume their portfolios, and although the Treasury was empty and the army a shadow, the indispensable national unity had been duly prepared and the necessary programme formulated. The Social Democrats, Labour Party, Radicals and Agrarians formed a solid coalition

and defied the risings of the local Bolsheviks at Revel in December 1918 and in Ösel in the following February. Local government and the army were swiftly created, the latter by the enrolment of volunteers followed by universal service up to the age of thirty-five. Revel schoolboys, armed with obsolete rifles and inspired by the band of the fire-brigade, were the first defenders of the Republic. Only a thousand grown men dared to volunteer.

In December 1918 however there was no organised force which could resist the Bolshevik invasion. The Germans before their withdrawal had stripped the country of munitions, and the invaders by land had the support of warships on the Finnish Gulf. By the end of the year Narva, Dorpat and half Estonia were in Bolshevik hands, and little more than twenty miles separated the Russians from Revel. Their savagery recalled that of the Muscovites under Ivan the Terrible. Pillage, reckless and complete, purposeless torture and mutilation, massacre without discrimination of age or sex—such was the evangelism of the Russians with their following of Letts, Estonians and Chinese. Cruelty and cowardice went together. The hastily-levied army, aided by a few Finns with a score of old guns and by the British gift of rifles, machine-guns and captured Russian destroyers, began the new year by putting the Bolsheviks to shameful flight. Outnumbered, armed in part with rifles fished up from the sea, lacking boots for the infantry, the Estonians made skilful use of armoured trains, and destroyed the *moral* of their opponents by every kind of raid. On January 19, 1919, some 18,000 Bolsheviks were driven from Narva by a few hundred men. After a fortnight's fighting the eastern frontier was secure, and at the end of a month Estonia was purged of the enemy.

V

INDEPENDENCE

(a) *Estonia*

A FORTNIGHT later, however (February 1919), the Estonians and their Finnish auxiliaries had to encounter the full weight of the Bolshevik revenge. A force which grew to thirty-five regiments, six of which were Lettish, was hurled against the Estonian eastern and southern fronts. The Narva line held firm, and in the south the Bolsheviks, though they made some

progress, could never reach the Verro-Valka railway. In May a force of Russian refugees, with assistance from the sea, broke through the Bolsheviks near Narva, while in the south the Estonians destroyed the enemy front, delivered Riga and captured Pskov. The boldness of the Estonians appears the more admirable when the menace of their own Bolsheviks is borne in mind. Four of the regiments brought against them were Estonian. The army felt itself surrounded by spies, and its members could often procure food only by posing as Bolsheviks. More than a year later a member of the Constituent Assembly declared that life was worth living only in Russia, and that they should not be afraid to spill blood and annihilate the bourgeoisie. To a hundred mutinous trade-unionists in August 1919 the Government replied that if the way to Paradise lay across the Russian frontier, they might take it—and compelled them to act up to their professions.

In delivering themselves from the Bolsheviks, the Estonians had also helped to deliver Latvia. The State Council formed at Riga fled in January 1919 to Libau, while the main bulk of Latvia became a Soviet republic federated with Soviet Russia. Had Estonia collapsed, Latvia could hardly have recovered, and the position of Lithuania would have become desperate. But Estonia drew to herself the main weight of the attack, recruited Lettish forces and invaded Latvia, while von der Göltz with a combination of Baltic Germans and German regulars helped to drive the Bolsheviks as far as Latgalia. A Latvian civil war followed, for the Baltic Germans were determined to retain their ancient power, and Germany still hoped to control the Baltic Provinces. In June, however, the Letts and Estonians defeated the Germans near Wenden, and in July the Government, aided by a Commission of the Allies, returned to Riga. Three months later a new German onslaught was launched from Kurland by Colonel Bermond. It failed; Kurland was delivered from the Germans and Latgalia from the Bolsheviks, and at last in May 1920 the Estonian Constituent Assembly could meet.

The special troubles of Latvia had thrown her political evolution a full year behind that of Estonia. But Estonia had not waited for her own Constituent Assembly to be elected before she demanded from the Peace Conference at Paris that her recognition as a Power existing, perhaps temporarily, *de facto* should be amplified into a *de jure* recognition of her permanent right to independence. It implies no depreciation of the admirable achievements of the Estonians, nor of the prin-

ciple of self-determination, to hold that this demand was premature. The difficulty of organising a world in which small States multiply unchecked was certain to render stricter the examination of new claims by the surviving Great Powers. Before the year was out Estonia and Latvia were pressing their claims in concert with Lithuania and the Ukrain, Azerbaijan, the Northern Caucasus, Georgia and Kuban—all republics formed on the principle of the right of nationalities to self-determination.

In face of seeming chaos France, which still hoped for a Russia that could check Germany and pay her coupons, opposed compliance. Britain, which unfortunately knew the Letts chiefly through two startling crimes in London, and the Estonians scarcely at all, could hardly demand haste. America, which included many thousands of both races, firmly opposed recognition. The law and its application seemed clear. Recognition, to be valid, must be merely the formal admission that a fully-organised State exists, and will in all reasonable likelihood maintain its independence. The recognition of Finland gave the Estonians no true precedent. Finland was a country well qualified by size, strength and institutions to take its place among the secondary States of Europe. Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century it had been an autonomous Grand Duchy, connected with Russia only by the Romanov dynasty. The invasion by the Tsardom of Finnish liberties had aroused fervent protests in the West. Estonia, on the other hand, had been for two centuries a portion of two Russian Provinces. In March 1919 she was a community with perhaps the population of Manchester and incomparably less commercial credit. She had claimed independence for about two years, during which she had suffered one complete and one partial conquest. She had been saved from the Bolsheviks by foreign aid, and confessed that alone she could not continue the struggle. She possessed an army indeed, but no munition-works, no navy, no courts of justice, no determined code of laws, and no settled constitution. Some 40 per cent. of the crimes committed went unpunished for lack of police. To have admitted so inchoate an organism to a permanent place in the Family of Nations would have been an abuse of recognition and a challenge to the Russian people.

The Estonians, though inevitably and increasingly disappointed, threw themselves with superb energy and judgment into the work of national construction. Early in April 1919 the Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage

and proportional representation. Despite a Bolshevik boycott, nearly 80 per cent. of the electors voted. The Social Revolutionaries, led by several young Intelligents, polled only some 4 per cent. of the votes; the Social Democrats, under Mr. Martna, journeyman painter, publicist and Foreign Secretary, 37 per cent.; Labour, including commercial and government employees and some Intelligents, 25 per cent.; Radicals, the party of the small landowners and bourgeoisie, 21 per cent.; Agrarians, 4 per cent.; the Lutheran Christian Union, 4 per cent.; Germans and Russians 3 and 1 per cent. The bias of the State was thus strongly towards the Left, with Labour holding the balance between the more and the less advanced sections. Mr. Rei, lawyer and artillery officer, a Social Democrat who had served as Minister of Labour, became President, while the Labour leader Mr. Strandman, advocate and Minister of Agriculture, became Premier and Minister of War. On May 19 the Assembly unanimously declared Estonia a democratic, autonomous and independent Republic. Some ten days later the Estonian Delegation reaffirmed to the Peace Conference their demand for recognition and for admission to the League of Nations. They emphasised the sincere desire of their country to live in amity with Russia and to guarantee to her every possible facility for access to the sea. At the same time they denied the right of any Russian body to take any decision affecting the rights of the Estonian people.

By the close of June 1919 Estonia had made two further important steps towards the restoration of peace. She had brought to a triumphant conclusion her campaign in Latvia, which had become a war of Estonians against the Germans, if not against Germany. The fall of Riga was imminent when General Gough, representing the Allies, stepped in and arranged by the armistice of July 3 that the Germans should quit the country. A fortnight earlier the Estonian General Laidoner, an eminent soldier who had returned from Russia in December 1918, laid down the chief command of the Russian auxiliaries, on the ground that they were now strong enough to stand alone and that Estonia did not wish to interfere in Russia. Although still at war with the Bolsheviks, Estonia might well feel that the danger to herself from their arms was less than that which might swiftly follow the triumph of their Russian foes. Her leaders had good reason to believe themselves better able to estimate the situation in Russia than the Western Powers, which had always either exaggerated or undervalued

the forces of the Tsars. Bolshevism, they argued, meant Russian weakness for many years, and only from Russian weakness could they hope for independence. The argument of weak States, equally familiar and exasperating to the Allies during the Great War, now prevailed. Either of the opposing forces could destroy them: one, if provoked, would do so; the other would be restrained by humanity: they must therefore avoid giving unnecessary provocation to the more brutal side. Mobilisation, moreover, compelled the country to devour a third of its live-stock in a year, and to divert its energy from the pressing needs of reconstruction. Seven months of war had brought nearly 5,500 casualties on the field. From the moment of the rescue of Latvia, peace with the Bolsheviks was in sight.

While she remained a firm though open-eyed auxiliary of the Allies, Estonia continued to press them for recognition. In July France replied that she remained "disposed in principle" thereto, but that the uncertainty of the position in Russia prevented the final settlement of the question. In August Estonian headquarters reported that the troops were asking more and more insistently why they were fighting in Russia, dancing in a kind of insensate quadrille, side by side with the enemies of their independence. A few days later the Government of North-west Russia and the German Empire recognised Estonian independence, without creating any illusions as to the good-will of either Power. Early in September Sweden came into line with the Allies, and in October Poland conceded full recognition. Meanwhile the Soviet Government, threatened on many sides, was pressing Estonia for peace. During September negotiations were carried on with the Bolsheviks and with the other Baltic States, which actually regarded valiant little Estonia as their "elder brother." It was made clear that while all desired to cease fighting, the nature of Bolshevism was such that they could not contemplate more than a suspension of hostilities; that Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania would act together, and that they would communicate at every step with the Allies. In accordance with this decision, the Allies were informed on September 23 that the delay of recognition had sapped the vigour of the Estonian army, and the imposition of an armistice had given the Germans time to prepare a fresh offensive on the Baltic; that the Russian army of the north-west was demoralised; that Estonia had received no war material since May, and that her financial difficulties remained unrelieved by a loan. She

must negotiate, but in no event would she fail to act as a barrier against Bolshevik propaganda.

In October, while the Letts were assailed by the Germans under Bermondts, the Estonians, in deference to British opinion, continued to fight vigorously against the Bolsheviks. The collapse of their Russian Allies, however, placed them once more in the forefront, and the year closed with desperate Bolshevik attacks upon Narva. The Letts meanwhile were triumphant over all their enemies. There seemed neither need nor motive for Estonia fight on. Britain had declared that she would supply the opponents of the Bolsheviks only in case of a fresh outbreak; the remaining Baltic States, including Poland, consented to an Estonian peace; the Soviet Government offered full recognition; and on February 2, 1920, the Peace of Dorpat was signed.

Its terms were marked by salutary moderation. The ethnological map produced by the Estonians would have brought their frontiers to the outskirts of Petrograd. They accepted without difficulty a strategical frontier running 10 kilometres east of the Narova River with a slender neutralised zone. They held many financial obligations of the former Russian Government. They compromised such claims for 15,000,000 roubles in gold, together with exemptions from their share of Russian debt. Should any other ex-Russian State secure better terms, Estonia was to share them. Their repeated promises to refrain from exploiting their position as the doorway into Russia were strictly carried out. In addition to a most-favoured-nation clause and a reciprocal agreement that goods in transit should not be taxed, it was laid down that "in the free harbours to be opened in the port of Tallinn [Revel] and in other ports of Estonia, sites are reserved for Russia for the transfer and storage of goods from or to Russia, and the size of these sites corresponds with that of the port and of the importance of the commerce in question; moreover the dues paid for them must not exceed the transit rates paid by Estonian subjects." Russia further conceded to Estonia the right to make and exploit a direct railway to Moscow and to exploit 2,700,000 acres of forest lands, while Estonia allowed Russia to derive electric power from the falls of the Narova, the terms in each case to be settled by special negotiation.

A foreigner has the right to marvel at the frankness with which the Peace was discussed by its authors. In the Constituent Assembly Mr. Poska, perhaps the most outstanding figure in the diplomacy of revolutionary Estonia, declared

that the Bolsheviks had been driven to offer terms because the internal life of Russia was completely disorganised, and that if they retained their power they would continue, perhaps for several decades, to need peace. Every other Russian party, even the Social Revolutionists, demanded a Great Russia one and indivisible. Now that peace had come, Bolshevism, a theory which had long existed, was not dangerous to Estonia. The Soviet Government, it is true, had declared that she would soon proclaim herself a Soviet Republic; but "Being warned by Lenin himself," he said, "we will certainly take every useful measure to prevent the accomplishment of his dream." At the same time his colleague, Mr. Pusta, stated that the Soviet Government could inspire very little confidence, however solemn its promises might be.

In February 1920, as the compliment of full Italian recognition emphasised, Estonia thus attained to peace with foreign Powers. Towards peace at home much had already been accomplished. The greatest tasks before the Constituent Assembly had been to draw up a Constitution and to settle the question of the land. The provisional Organic Law, adopted early in June 1919, was brief, clear, radical and to all appearances eminently practical and sagacious. "Ethnical minorities," that is, Germans, Russians, Swedes and Letts, might write in their own language to the central Government, but the organs of local government must communicate with the State in Estonian. The fullest civic equality was proclaimed, as also universal free education in the mother-tongue, and, save in a state of siege, the fullest rights of man. "To this end the law grants to all citizens the right to receive a certain quantity of land, which they can exploit, and on which they can establish their dwelling. It assures them the possibility of working, the protection of maternity, and of work and State help for children, the aged, those who cannot work and those in distress." The supreme power, which belongs to the people, was to be exercised by the Constituent Assembly or delegated by it to the usual organs of State. But between its sessions three thousand voters could initiate legislation, and twenty members could convoke the Constituent Assembly. The Government was appointed for a year, whilst the cultural interests of the ethnical minorities were also protected.

Such a Constitution, which a few thousand cranks or idlers could throw out of gear, would be obviously unsuited to a large or ancient State. In a nascent Norway, however, in a great family where labourer and Intelligent can dine together, and

Lutheran and Greek clergy join in the funeral rites of a statesman dear to all, what could be better designed to keep every man and woman active in civic life? The concession to every Estonian of a native right to land had a doubtful precedent in Russia, but with the development of intensive agriculture and Co-operation might perhaps prove not wholly visionary. For the moment, however, it was no doubt the wisest way of approaching the most difficult and most important problem of the State—Agrarian Reform.

Of the Agrarian Reform Bill which was now passed, the following are the main features: All minerals and, with certain exceptions, all estates exceeding 810 acres were declared the property of the Republic. Real estate comprised not only acres but the buildings, live-stock, and implements maintained upon the land. Everything in the nature of leases, easements and contracts which could hamper the State in its main purpose was simply swept away. Redemption dues still unpaid to the German barons were transferred to the Republic. Compensation, save to the Church and feudal owners, was to be paid for this expropriation, land being taken at 16 $\frac{3}{4}$ years' purchase of its net profit as formerly assessed. Having thus acquired the land, the State proposed to control the use of it through local bodies, special governmental institutions and an agrarian bank. The State would assist small farmers with long loans and would itself undertake or order the necessary large-scale improvements. The expropriated manor-houses and their parks were to be used for public purposes only.

The Committee which drew up the Bill estimated that 2,700,000 acres of land would pass under this Bill from the great proprietors to small-holders, and that this was precisely the amount necessary to still the pangs of land hunger for the moment.

In October 1919 the third reading was, after vehement discussion, carried by 63 votes against 9; and the Agrarian Law was finally promulgated. The extent and the amount of compensation for the expropriation of lands were simply relegated to a special law. So too was the organisation of small-holdings, which were to be hereditary. Neighbouring lands were to be reserved for the use of towns. The State abandoned its claim to direct agriculture, and the doctrinaire proposal to nationalise every manor-house likewise vanished. On the whole it would appear that the theorists had discovered the immense difficulty inherent in land questions and had perhaps remembered that with all their political faults the

barons had contrived to make each acre yield appreciably more food than the smaller farmers. It had been necessary to allot lands for a full half-year before the project became law. More than 280,000 acres had already changed hands; nearly twice that amount was to follow in the spring; and in four years it was hoped that allotment would be complete. Until then the former landholders were to act as custodians of what were now national estates.

Before Christmas 1919 the draft of the Estonian Constitution was laid before the Constituent Assembly. The President might refer back a new law to the Assembly once, and dissolve the Assembly at his discretion. In time of peace he acted as the Commander-in-Chief of an army based on universal service, giving place in war to the Generalissimo and Council. For the Judicature, immense powers were designed. The Supreme Court could try the President and all the other high officers of State. It must watch over the execution of Constitutional laws and the preservation of the original texts of statutes and of treaties with foreign Powers. The promulgation of laws formed one of its functions, as also the hearing of appeals against an independent controlling body which surveyed the Government institutions and the economic activity of enterprises inspected by the State.

(b) *Latvia*

The year 1920 witnessed a Latvian armistice with Germany in July, and, next month, a definite peace with Russia. The Bolsheviks formally renounced every historic claim against Latvia and undertook to make every possible restitution of her material. To assist reconstruction the Lettish peasant was to be allowed to cut Russian timber along the frontier, while goods destined for one State were to pass through the other duty-free. The Latvians professed to find satisfaction and security in the ratification of the treaty by the Central Executive Committee, since this body, they said, spoke for the immense majority of the Russian peasants.

The success of Estonia and Latvia in freeing their domains from hostile forces, and the failure of all attempts to displace the Bolshevik power in Russia, at last brought about their promotion. In January 1921 both States were recognised *de jure* by the Supreme Council of the Allies and in September both were enrolled as members of the League of Nations. Thenceforward every year of orderly self-government and

reasonable policy that they could show must gain for them a greater weight of European opinion against submersion or partition by foreign Powers.

Latvia, though more populous than Estonia and before the war of greater consequence, had somewhat lagged behind her northern sister on the road towards reconstruction. That her settlement came late is indeed far less remarkable than that it came at all. Little trained in self-government and lacking the racial and religious uniformity of the Estonians, the Letts had experienced some of the most terrible dispersions and devastations of the whole war. Two-thirds of them had been driven from their homesteads. Their menfolk had been slaughtered in six campaigns. No sooner had the Russians finished the systematic destruction of their manufactories than the Germans began the scientific pillage of their farms, and when the official German forces were withdrawn, Bermond's ruffians proved even more mischievous than their predecessors. Russia alone, it was computed, had caused Latvia more than £193,000,000 of loss. Population had fallen by 28 per cent.; industrial output, by 82·5 per cent. Many children were absolutely untaught. Latvia began her independent career in ruins.

Exhausted by her struggles first for survival and then for independence, she was confronted with most urgent and difficult problems in home and in foreign policy alike. At home, she must legalise a Government and organise a Constitution in the face of the disaffection of her Germans, her Bolsheviks and perhaps of her numerous Poles and Jews. Abroad, she beheld three great States each of which might well begrudge her independence. Germany would not easily renounce the hope of Riga; Poland, mistress for centuries of Kurland and Livonia, had not the reputation of forgoing historic claims; Russia, whether Bolshevik or not, could not readily tolerate the loss of her Baltic coast-line. Yet for the moment the most difficult problem of foreign policy concerned the relations with Estonia, and arose from the persistent Estonian occupation of the border town of Valka.¹

Valka, a railway centre reduced by the war from 20,000 to some 10,000 inhabitants, was claimed by both States on grounds of history, population and indispensability. Two commissions were appointed in vain, and direct negotiation failed. To avert war, Great Britain consented to arbitrate. Colonel Tallents, finding it impossible to assign the whole of Valka to

¹ Valka in Latvian; Valga in Estonian; Valk in Russian; Walk in German.

either State, decreed that it should be divided, and the consequent separation of the two sides of the main street by a barbed wire frontier showed how difficult his task had been. The Latvian frontier against Lithuania was likewise peaceably arranged, and the way was thus made clear for a firm *entente* between the three new Baltic nations. Conferences, in which Finland also shared, began to pave the way for uniformity and union.

Meanwhile the Constituent Assembly, which declared Latvia independent on May 27, 1920, was grappling with the question of the land. Between September 1920 and May 1922 the several chapters of an Agrarian Statute were promulgated by which, as in Estonia, a new peasant republic was set up. The Social Democrats, who formed by far the largest party in the Assembly, were not likely to be tender towards prescriptive rights to land. It was in any case anomalous that a few thousand persons should own the whole, while a third of the race must emigrate. When the barons offered one-third of their estates to Germany in order that two or three million German colonists might eventually dispossess the Letts, they sealed the doom of their order. In Latvia as in Estonia, Labour held that "to overthrow the beast, we must break his back. Let us give the land to him who tills it, to him who, centuries ago, was despoiled by force."

In Latvia therefore a Land Department was set up, with local committees everywhere, and a sweeping transfer of great estates to small-holders was decreed. Under the old régime, one hereditary domain had comprised more than 170,000 acres. Now 124 acres became an exceptional maximum for one proprietor, the lawful holding of arable being normally less than 55 acres, or for horticulture not quite 25. A mass of rules for rounding off and exchanging holdings, for augmenting those of less than 38 acres, for compensating the expropriated classes, for providing allotments, protecting beauty-spots, safeguarding the growth of towns, enforcing good cultivation and securing mineral rights to the State—all these bear witness to a carefully elaborated scheme. The terms of compensation by the State are left in the main to be determined by a special law. The distribution of the lands should be completed in 1924.

The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia was voted by the Constituent Assembly on February 15, 1922, and came into force on November 7 following. As the latest expression of pure democracy it may well interest the modern world. Just

as in Estonia, the sovereign people, by adult suffrage and proportional representation, elects for three years a Parliament of one hundred men and women. The members are paid, and enjoy in a high degree immunity from legal process. They may refuse to give evidence on matters which have come officially to their knowledge, and, unless caught red-handed, they may not be arrested or interrogated without Parliamentary consent. They may, however, be sued in respect of wilful misstatements or libels, even if these are uttered in their official capacity.

Parliament elects the President by ballot for three years. He must take a solemn oath to observe the Constitution, and he may not hold his office for more than six years in succession. He may propose a dissolution of Parliament, upon which the people then decide by referendum. Should they reject the proposal, he must resign. It is for him to nominate a President of the Council, who in his turn appoints the several Ministers. All the Cabinet, whether members or not, are responsible to Parliament.

The delaying and revising powers of the President over legislation are slight, but either he or one-third of the members or one-tenth of the electors can demand a referendum upon any project of legislation. It is significant, however, that among the matters which are withheld from the vote of the people are the budget, loans, taxes, railway rates, military service, war and peace, and treaties with foreign Powers. As a further security against tyranny by the democracy itself, the judges, confirmed in office by Parliament, may be dismissed only by their colleagues. The Treasury, moreover, is an independent board of officials placed on the same secure footing as the judges.

Latvia differs from Estonia in that almost a quarter of its people owe spiritual allegiance to Rome. In July 1922, therefore, the Government concluded a concordat with the Holy See. According to this agreement, the Catholic religion gained the fullest possible recognition, with exemption from military and jury service for its ecclesiastics, and State protection for the religious character of its schools. Freedom from taxation was extended even to the parsonages, and the Archbishop of Riga has the right to take part in the trial of ecclesiastics charged with crime. Rome, on the other hand, promised that the nomination of the Archbishop should not take place until the Government had been consulted, and the Archbishop-designate must swear to the President that he and his clergy



will respect the Constitution. The training of a Lettish clergy in Latvia and in Rome was provided for.

The history of three years of uneasy peace warrants no confident prediction with regard to the future of Estonia and Latvia. In marked contrast with the futile speculations of the West, their statesmen early concluded that Bolshevism would be stable, and, towards themselves at least, non-aggressive by way of arms. The difference between probability and certainty, however, is wide enough to cause them many anxious moments, since in the main it is by supplying Russia that they live. The arrest of their "agitators" by the Bolsheviks, the propaganda within their frontiers, the irruption of innumerable Jews, fearing what might follow the death of Lenin—all these must be disturbing to new-born States with standing armies of no more than 15,000 and 20,000 men.

In Latvia, moreover, political parties number some twenty and parliamentary government is not easy, while in both countries the depreciation of the currency and the difficulty of balancing the budget are disquieting if inevitable facts. Given peace, however, there is nothing in their situation that energy and talent may not overcome. Their wonderful tenacity, the vigour of their reconstructive work, their economic progress since 1919, above all, the character of the leaders whom they have already produced—such appear to form the most convincing grounds for hope.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

A.D.

- 1346. Baltic Provinces finally mastered by Teutonic Orders.
- 1410. Teutonic Orders routed by Lithuanians at Tannenberg.
- 1466. Poland annexes West Prussia. East Prussia becomes a Polish fief.
- 1558-60. Russian invasions result in dissolution of Teutonic Orders. Estonia a Swedish, Livonia and Kurland a Polish protectorate.
- 1584. This arrangement confirmed, Russia being thereby excluded from the Baltic.
- 1621. Riga captured by Gustavus Adolphus. Dorpat University founded by him.
- 1632. Gustavus Adolphus dies. Livonia already under Swedish Crown.
- 1680. Charles XI of Sweden inaugurates his policy of the resumption of Crown lands.
- 1699. Von Patkul commissioned by Livonian nobles to offer their allegiance to Poland.
- 1700. Sweden goes to war with Denmark, Poland, Saxony and Russia, who are kept together by von Patkul.
- 1710. Riga and Revel captured by Russians, who at Nystad in 1721 confirm Swedish system. Russia thenceforward controls fate of Baltic Provinces.
- 1775. Promulgation of the Organic Law for Local Government by Catherine the Great.
- 1796-1801. Paul the Madman reverses Catherine's system. Baltic Provinces again to some extent separated from Russia.
- 1802. Re-establishment of Dorpat University. "Poor" Conrad's rebellion.
- 1804. Peasant Ordinance substitutes villeinage for serfdom in Livonia.
- 1816-9. A purely illusory emancipation of the peasants gives the landowners the opportunity to dismiss unprofitable tenants.
- 1840. Struggle for religious supremacy between Lutheran and Orthodox churches.
- 1849. Agrarian law admitting peasant proprietorship on a communal basis.
- 1914-18. Great War; Baltic Provinces overrun by contending armies. Proclamation of Latvian and Estonian independence, November 1918.
- 1919. Struggle with Germans and Bolsheviks.
- 1920. Estonia signs treaty of Dorpat with Russia (February); Constituent Assemblies meet (May); Estonian Organic and Land Laws passed (June-October); Latvia makes peace with Germany (July) and Russia (August).
- 1921. *De Jure* recognition by Allies (January).
- 1922. Latvian Constitution voted (February); Concordat with Holy See (July).

B. ECONOMICS

VI

THE RESOURCES OF LATVIA AND ESTONIA

A SURVEY of the resources of the Baltic Provinces and their utilisation by mankind may best be made from the strictly contemporary point of view. With the overthrow of the Russian and German Empires, the artificial divisions of the Letts and the Estonians have vanished. In place of three provinces, of which the midmost, Livonia, comprised both races, we have now, by a simple process of linguistic delimitation, two strictly national States. To the north, the Estonian Republic, comprising the homes of the Estonian race in the former provinces of Estonia and Livonia, together with the islands and a strip beyond the Narova River, rules over some 17,500 square miles and perhaps 1,500,000 people. To the south, Latvia or Lettland has added to Lettish Livonia and Kurland the region of Latgalia, the three north-western districts in the Government of Vitebsk. She has thus acquired the town of Dvinsk, which in population ranks after Riga and Revel only, and has attained an area of some 25,000 square miles with more than 2,500,000 inhabitants.

Estonia and Latvia thus form collectively a region roughly resembling in shape a Holland magnified to more than thrice its size but with only some two-thirds of its population. A closer comparison may be made with Denmark, for in the eastern region as in the western, the main industry is agriculture, one great city dwarfs the rest, most of the leading towns are sea-ports, and the Lutheran faith prevails. Like Denmark, its Baltic counterpart lies at the mercy of a neighbouring race which neither its own sons nor the adjacent kindred States can hope to hold in check. But Denmark, although no longer herself the tollhouse-keeper on a thronged highway of commerce, nourishes four-fifths as many people on about two-fifths the area of soil.

A brief comparison with Holland and Denmark reveals the

relatively backward character of what was long esteemed the most enlightened region of Russia. A glance at the eastern hemisphere perceives Estonia and Latvia as the tiny outlet of a zone stretching half-way across Asia. Their riparian importance seems destined by nature always to transcend the importance of every other part of their endowment. But the history of seven centuries is enough to show how fluctuating in volume and in direction the current of their transit trade may be. In early days the main stream of Russian traffic ran north and south along the Dnieper; more lately, east and west towards Moscow and Siberia. Riga, the Hansa League, Sweden and Russia are among the Powers which have successively shaped the commerce of the region to suit their private ends. The broken walls and shattered churches of Visby¹ hardly surpass the annals of Dorpat in eloquence on the mutability of trade. Riga, at the mouth of a central and considerable waterway, must always be important, but the fate of every other Estonian or Latvian city seems to hang upon politics and chance.

To understand the present, and, so far as possible, to predict the future of this Baltic region, it will be well to regard first its material endowment by nature and by man, then the character and potentialities of its inhabitants, and finally their place in the political system of the world. No one who contemplates the task will be tempted to underrate its difficulty. For years to come, many of the available statistics must relate to social and economic arrangements which have been rendered obsolete by the war. By the beginning of 1916, more than 700,000 Letts had been transported a thousand miles to the east, or even beyond the Ural Mountains. Such a *hejra* cannot leave the life of a small nation entirely unbroken. In 1920 much Lettish soil remained untilled, the silence of most Lettish factories was unbroken, and the Lettish ports were still being painfully disencumbered of the ruins left by war. Again, modern democratic Estonia is resolved to grant to her German citizens full cultural autonomy. But when more than half the soil of pre-war Estonia was held by some two hundred families, while three-fifths of the agricultural population had none, it would be idle to anticipate the complete and permanent reinstatement of the old agrarian order. The decline of Petrograd may half ruin Revel; a Polish Danzig must draw away trade from Libau; a Russia economically disorganised or reorganised on new lines would shatter the basis of the former

¹ In Gotland.

Baltic trade. In a hundred ways the present survey may be changed from Economics to History.

Man, however, although he can be compelled to change a higher for a lower way of living, and to expatriate some of his offspring, rarely forsakes a settled country altogether. The soil does not in a moment lose its fertility nor the sea its fish. Of the eight chief harbours of Estonia and Latvia, only one, the obscure Port Baltic,¹ owes its origin to the will of a modern ruler. The others have gone through an evolution ancient enough to be termed natural, and they might be pruned of their modern luxuriance without their identity becoming lost. They reap the harvest of the Baltic, from which pre-war Russia could count on more than 400,000 tons of fish, while Estonia draws further supplies from Lake Peipus, an inland sea more than eighty miles in length, with a breadth, throughout the northern half, of more than twenty. The smaller lakes and streams, which abound throughout both countries, and the Dvina, ranked among the great Russian rivers, add to the opulence of the fisheries, while for four months of the year nature, though sealing the store-house, solves the problems of preservation and of distribution alike.

Throughout Estonia and Latvia the settlement of man is hindered hardly anywhere by lack of water, but in many places by its too great abundance. North-east Estonia and Eastern Latvia are covered with the swamps from which few regions in either country are free. It may safely be stated that streams, lakes, marshes and forests reduce by more than one-half the area available for cultivation. A thousand square miles between Lake Peipus and the coast contain three "sixth-rate towns"; a thousand east of Dorpat, only one. About one-fourth of the Estonians and Latvians live in seven towns, of which in Western Europe only one would be accounted great. The country must clearly be ranked as undeveloped.

This economic feebleness is more clearly seen when we consider the means of communication. From the railway point of view, indeed, Estonia and Latvia are well equipped, especially in comparison with the countries by which they are surrounded. Trunk lines run north-east and north-west from Dvinsk. Four lesser tracks converge on Libau and three on Revel. Windau, like Pernau and Hapsal, is a terminus; Mitau a centre; Riga an important centre; while a network of local lines radiates outward from the frontier town of Valka. In all, some 900 miles of track, mainly single, serve 40,000 square miles of land

¹ Just west of Revel.

and 4,000,000 people. To these the Germans have added more than 760 miles of strategic railway lines in Kurland, while projects for further development abound, notably a line across the island of Ösel from north-east to south-west, and a direct route from Revel to Moscow. But the railway system is far in advance of the other transport facilities. The Dvina, it is true, is an important waterway, connecting Riga even with Warsaw, the Volga and the Black Sea. The Kurland Aa, on which Mitau stands, is navigable for a hundred miles, and the Windau for nearly fifty. Two steamer-routes cross Lake Peipus, and the several ports are linked by way of the Baltic Sea. But canals, save that of the Dvina itself, are lacking, and the description "navigable" hardly ever extends beyond passenger steamers of no great size. Roads, save in the south-west, are notably few. North and east of Riga, only some half-dozen rank as first class, and the second class leave most of the small townships untouched. The region, indeed, though well provided as compared with Russia, is infected with the Russian principle that, since for a great part of the year frost and snow provide highways everywhere, during the remainder man may well content himself with little.

A region in which railways predominate over roads is plainly one in which long-distance traffic is of more importance than short. The development of the ports and the creation of the existing transport system have been due far less to the needs of Estonia and Latvia than to the needs of Russia. This may be verified by a scrutiny of the activities of the sea-ports which predominate in the economic life of the region, and especially of Riga, Revel and Libau, which predominate among the ports.

In Riga, for example, before the war timber to the value of some £2,500,000 was wont to change hands in the year. The logs were floated down the rivers from far beyond the boundaries of Latvia, for Latvia contains only some 200 miles of the main course of the Dvina, whose basin comprises over 5,000 miles, one-twentieth of all the Russian waterways in Europe available for transport of this kind. The old export trade of Riga in butter had largely passed to Windau, as that of Revel to Petrograd, not through any change in local industry, but through an acceleration of railway transport from Siberia. Eggs, on the other hand, were collected from European Russia and exported from Riga to the number of over 5,000,000 daily through the eight months of open navigation, with a value of more than £4,000,000 a year. The cold-storage for both

eggs and butter was created not by Baltic enterprise or even Russian, but by British, and the network of long-distance communications was devised or furthered by the central government.

The rise in the export trade of Libau and Windau and the decline of that of Revel tell the same tale. Local products have not greatly varied in volume, but while distant provinces were enabled to send timber, grain and eggs to Libau, and butter to Windau, Revel ceased to receive consignments such as linseed on the old scale, and became largely an importing and naval station. In 1902 the opening of the railway raised the exports of Windau from £200,000 to £2,500,000. In 1910 they reached £9,000,000, thanks to the construction of an elevator and a refrigerator. In 1912 they rose to £13,000,000, the harbour having been deepened to 28 feet. In fifteen years the Russian Government spent £350,000 on the port.

A consideration of the commodities imported likewise shows that the services and profits of the Baltic ports depended mainly on the non-Baltic Russian demand. Libau and Riga received coal from overseas to supply a region which in the view of the Russian Government could more profitably be brought into dependence on the Donets basin, distant nearly a thousand miles overland. Their million barrels of herrings were almost entirely destined for long-distance trade. Windau and Riga were foremost in importing the industrial and agricultural machinery, of which only a small fraction of the 70,000 tons served local needs. Revel brought in coal and cotton for Moscow.

Although, both in exports and imports, the activity of the Baltic ports has depended chiefly upon regions outside Estonia and Latvia, the local industry and agriculture have been far from inconsiderable. Livonia was termed of old "the Sicily of the North," and the amplitude of its crops charmed many visitors from other lands. Its flax and linseed were long esteemed the finest in Europe, and its rye, the main harvest, unsurpassed. Thanks to the moist soil and scorching sun the corn, which first appears in May, is reaped in July, its heavy-laden ears drooping from gigantic stalks like bunches of grapes upon a vine. The grain is normally despatched from Libau, Pernau, Revel, Riga and Windau as early as possible in the cereal year. Hemp was grown before the war in the Baltic Provinces upon some 1,125 acres, the product of which was estimated at a little more than 164 tons. Although the organisation of the export trade at Königsberg had put an end to

the old supremacy of Riga in hemp, more than 20,000 tons left the port in 1912. Flax surpassed hemp more than a hundredfold in area and in quantity. Dorpat ranked as a principal market and every port shipped its quota for foreign lands. The other commodity universally exported was wood, whether as deals, battens, boards, pit-props, sleepers, match-splints, joiner's work or timber. Fruit was also grown and a certain quantity of wool and horses exported, as well as bristles from Revel and hides and skins from Riga, Libau and other ports. In several departments of agriculture, notably in co-operative cattle-breeding, the Baltic Provinces have led the Russian Empire.

In mineral wealth, on the other hand, they have lagged far behind. They possess, it is true, the raw material for cement; peat abounds; and it is hoped that the shale of Estonia may be brought to yield abundant supplies of oil. Coal, mineral waters and other possibilities are spoken of. The Dvina and the falls of the Narova River have been utilised for power, and it is estimated that Latvia could draw from her waters energy equal to about 2,740,000 tons of coal; but at present the weakness of the Baltic region from an industrial point of view consists in its dependence upon external fuel. This does not affect the peasant industries, which of necessity mainly supplied the needs of the rural population before the advent of railways, and which still survive. Of these pottery, felt goods, woodwork, linen, leather and carpets are the most notable. But the chief of the 730 factories with nearly 130,000 hands which existed in the Baltic Provinces in 1912 were compelled to approach the ports or suffer loss from the enhanced price of coal. Riga, with five cotton-mills, the German Provodnik rubber-works, shipbuilding works, foundries, pulp-mills, china factories, and even a gramophone factory, easily stood first. Revel with numerous factories gives the first place to two British enterprises, a cotton-mill and a ropeyard, followed by a chemical works of Russian and Baltic-German institution, and paper-factories, one of which is Estonian. In Revel highly important extensions of the commercial firms and of shipbuilding are expected, and there has recently been a great development of her banks. Important isolated establishments, such as the wood-pulp factory near Pernau, also exist.

An indication of the resources and progress of the region is afforded by the successive loans raised by the towns under the careful control of the Imperial Government. As early as 1882 Riga was authorised to borrow £40,000 at 5½ per cent.,

followed in 1891 by Libau with £70,000 at 5 per cent. In 1894 Riga added £200,000 at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and in the next ten years £773,000 more at the same rate, while Revel similarly raised some £73,000. Dvinsk borrowed £22,000 in 1902, and Dorpat £19,000 in 1903; Riga £200,000 at 5 per cent. in 1907, and £850,000 in 1910; Windau £70,000 in 1908. The list was completed, in the years 1910 to 1912, by £40,000 for Mitau, £35,000 for Revel, and about £62,000 for Narva. At the beginning of 1913 the amount outstanding for all eight municipalities was only some £2,237,000, of which more than five-sixths was due from Riga. Despite the phenomenal progress of their port, the 25,000 inhabitants of Windau still approached their railway-station by a bridge of boats, through financial inability to complete an iron structure.

The economic future of Estonia and Latvia must depend not only on their material resources and past achievements, which we have briefly considered, nor on their international situation, which remains to be discussed. More important than all else is the inborn talent and energy of their peoples and their choice of national ideals. It is idle to suppose that the world can fully know for many years either what the Letts and Estonians are capable of becoming or what they wish to be. For seven centuries they have been compelled to live their true life under the shelter of a conventional routine, and the soul of a people cannot in a moment find its expression in institutions. To the Estonian, whose racial character was framed in Asia, is attributed a wealth of folklore, a feeling for poetry and a spiritual adventurousness hardly to be paralleled in Europe. His struggle for national independence has disclosed a courage and tenacity, a directness and a dispassionate realism, which are powerfully reminiscent of Japan. For the time being at least he will bend this powerful individuality to the quest for wealth, and important results may reasonably be looked for in the economic sphere, although this is probably not destined to contain his greatest contribution to civilisation. The Lett has a different origin, a different stamp, and may be credited with different ideals. But beyond all doubt sixty years of freedom after a servitude ten times as long has transformed both races. The Estonians point with just pride to their national theatre at Revel built by the sons of the rebels who in 1858 were lashed to death in the Russian market hard by. Agriculture has been the first industry, and in Estonia and Latvia there has been no such glaring contrast between the yield of the nobles' holdings and the peasants' as in the remainder

of the Russian Empire. The Letts, whom a friendly German described in 1840 as pernicious, disgusting, timid, suspicious and deceitful, have amply justified his surmise that with independence their thwarted nature and dormant intelligence might produce great results. Like the more lethargic Estonians, they have given rise to a solid and successful farming class. In commerce and in literate pursuits the Lett has proved himself highly gifted. Industrially, it is perhaps too early to decide upon his powers. But it would appear that the Baltic region is hardly one in which industrial capital is likely either to spring up in great abundance or to be readily attracted from outside. Co-operative enterprises both in agriculture and industry would appear to offer the most favourable prospects.

Subject to the limitations already indicated, the following statistical information may throw light upon the natural resources, the material development, the industry and the commerce of Estonia and Latvia.

It is estimated that the forest land of Estonia comprises some 300,000 acres belonging to the State and some 1,700,000 in the hands of private persons. The Ministry of Commerce will allow about one-eighty-fifth part of the whole to be felled yearly. This should employ some 16,000 hands, whose labour would provide, from the forests and from woods in the hands of farmers, about 300,000 standards of firewood, 100,000 standards of timber for home consumption, and 200,000 for export. Moreover, by the Treaty of Dorpat of February 1920, Soviet Russia has undertaken to concede to Estonia the exploitation of 2,700,000 acres of forest in the northern Governments. By the end of July 1920 6,000 fellers were already at work, and since then the number has largely increased.

The statistics of Latvian forestry are deficient, since the conditions in the newly-acquired region of Latgalia are not yet known. A further modification in these as in other Baltic figures may result from the ambiguous position of the district of Valka, portions of which are included by both Estonia and Latvia. But it may be safely said that the State forests comprise over 1,100,000 acres, of which nearly three-quarters are suitable for exploitation. Non-State forests swell the area to some 5,000,000 acres, or nearly one-third of the whole country. The export before the war amounted to some £2,400,000.

In 1916 a little more than 1,807,000 acres of land were under cultivation in Estonia. Of this area, 24·7 per cent. was devoted to oats, 23 per cent. to annual herbs (clover, vetch, etc.), 19·8

per cent. to winter rye, 16·4 per cent. to barley, 8·8 per cent. to potatoes and 3·9 per cent. to linseed.

A normal harvest would yield upwards of 160,000 tons of oats, 150,000 tons of winter rye, 110,000 tons of barley, while more than 660,000 tons of potatoes might be counted on for food, distillation and export. Cattle-rearing and dairy work are well advanced, and show the influence of the agricultural associations, which number about 1,000. Although Estonia could feed her population, she has found it profitable to import more than 320,000 tons of cereals from Russia year by year. She can export her own produce of about 16,000 tons of flax, and also of paper and cellulose, nearly 10,000 tons of linseed and at least as much butter and cheese and over 8,000,000 gallons of pure spirit. Cement should furnish upwards of 300,000 barrels, potatoes and potato-flour at least 10,000 tons and timber eventually 200,000 standards.

Latvia likewise ranks as an agricultural country. Before the war, although the movement of population towards the towns was strongly marked, more than 56 per cent. of her population could be said to live by agricultural labour—thrice as many as by industry, and ten times as many as by commerce and transport. In 1913 she could claim to produce 365,000 tons of cereals, besides 395,000 tons of potatoes and 205,000 tons of oats and beans. She exported, at pre-war prices, dairy produce to the value of some £5,800,000, meat £1,800,000, and flax £1,400,000.

The following figures give some idea of the magnitude and distribution of the live-stock. In Estonia: horses, 180,000; cattle, 520,000; sheep, 630,000; pigs, 304,000. In Latvia, prior to the ruin wrought by war: horses, 331,000; cattle, 1,000,000; sheep, 1,048,000; pigs, 534,000.

Among the modern economic institutions co-operative organisations for credit and distribution have played a conspicuous part. At the beginning of the year 1917 Estonia possessed 99 societies for mutual credit, with more than 42,000 shareholders and a net profit of some £35,000. Her co-operative societies showed a profit of nearly £40,000. The number of her co-operative milk societies reached 138, and monopolised the dairy industry. Two central societies of Rural Economy expend some £22,000 yearly.

Latvia possessed some three years earlier 223 Control Societies (comprising 5,220 farmers); 192 Agricultural Societies, with 17,590 heads of families as members; 9 Unions of Agricultural Societies, with an aggregate capital of nearly

£600,000, or £40,000 more than the 192; 151 Co-operative Food Societies, with 21,780 members and some £340,000 capital; 149 Societies for the Use of Machinery, with 12,250 members; and 95 Co-operative Dairies, with 1,634 members and a capital of about £32 per head of the membership.

Closely connected with the economic life of Estonia and Latvia is education, culminating in the University, the institution famous under its Swedish and German style of Dorpt and Dorpat, renamed and reorganised by the Russians as Yuriev and again by the Estonians as Tartu. The scale of the new foundation displays the veneration of a small nation for learning, while the arrangement of the faculties is in part dictated by economic needs. To Jurisprudence eight teachers are assigned; to the Philosophy of History, in which Language is included, twenty-nine; to Mathematics and Natural Science, thirty-two; to Veterinary Surgery, twenty; to Agriculture, eleven; and to Medicine, forty-nine. The total staff of the University amounts to over 300 persons. In Russian times, when over 400 were employed, the number of students rose from 1,812 in the year 1890 to over 2,500. But neither the Germans nor the Russians encouraged the presence either of the native races or of the poor. Estonian Tartu must in many respects establish fresh traditions.

Latvia inaugurated a new national University at Riga on September 28, 1919. At the beginning of 1920 the students numbered 1,258, of whom 93 were foreigners. There were already 126 teachers, of whom Architecture claimed nine; Engineering, fourteen; Mechanics, eighteen; Chemistry, fourteen; Physics and Mathematics, twelve; Agriculture, thirteen; Veterinary Surgery, one; Medicine, seven; Economics and Jurisprudence, fourteen; Philology and Philosophy, twenty; and Theology, four.

The light which these figures throw upon the ideals of the new States is increased by the record of innovations. Estonia, possessing only one artistic collection of any importance, has developed a national theatre and may establish a Ministry of Music. Latvia, which is far richer in materials and traditions, has already, like Estonia, established a national conservatorium for music as well as a Government school of acting with a course for foreign students. The Anglo-Saxon critic of economic statistics will do well to recollect that national wealth has different meanings in different lands, and that small States doomed to interminable winter evenings have ways of working, spending and living other than his own.

The future, however, depends mainly upon factors which only time can fully reveal. Certain are the racial cohesiveness of both Letts and Estonians, their capacity for education and their character. Certain also are the fertility of their soil, the development of their dwellings and communications and the inalienable advantages of their waterways for transporting most cheaply to its insatiable markets the vast inland stores of wood. Certain, above all, is their situation as the main doorway into Russia. It would also appear that Estonia and Latvia have laid aside the pre-historic feuds between their peoples, and that the racial sympathy of the former with Finland and of the latter with Lithuania involves their mutual concord in no danger. Four outside Powers have, however, historic claims upon them, which are hardly to be dismissed as unsupported by economic needs. It is only a century and a quarter since Southern Latvia ceased to be Polish, and Poland still lacks ports. The interest of Lithuania in Latvia is far stronger. It is based not only upon cousinship, which causes Lithuanians to be often spoken of in Riga as Letts, but also upon the fact that in Samogitia¹ Lithuania barely touches the sea. Her practical acquisition of Memel from Prussia may in fact endanger her future. Germany has been for generations deeply interested in the Baltic Germans and cannot easily regard Riga as a Lettish city. And is Russia, two hundred years after Peter, to accept the Neva as her sole independent outlet towards the West? The problem of the Baltic Provinces is not yet safely solved.

¹ I.e. the western part of the present Lithuania.

C. MISCELLANEOUS

DEFENCE

LATVIA

Army.—The peace establishment and organisation of the Latvian Army have not yet been finally determined. This Army only came into being, under war conditions, in the autumn of 1919.

At present the Army consists of :

- 4 Divisions.
- 1 Cavalry Regiment.
- Technical Troops.

The periods of service, provisionally in force, are as follows :

1. Active—2 years in the Army ; 3 years in the Navy.
2. Reserve—18 years in the Army ; 12 years in the Navy.
3. Landsturm—from 40 to 50 years of age.

The peace-time ration strength of the Army is about 20,000 men.

The armament is of various types and nationalities, both of guns and of small arms.

Navy.—The Navy is in process of formation.

ESTONIA

All males are liable to Military Service on attaining the age of 20. Certain exceptions are allowed, such as Members of Parliament, Clergy, etc.

The periods of service are :—

Infantry—18 months ; other arms—2 years.

On completion of their Colour Service, all soldiers pass into the reserve, which is divided into two categories.

(a) Age 22 to 36 ; (b) Age 37 to 40.

The Army is organised into :—

- 3 Divisions.
- 1 Technical Brigade.
- 1 Cavalry Regiment.
- 3 Field Artillery Regiments.
- 2 Fortress Artillery Groups.

The peace time ration-strength of the Army is 16,000.

The armament includes patterns of British, German, French, and Russian types of weapons. There are no munition factories in Estonia.

The “ Navy ” consists of one vessel (the *Virsaitis*), with 5 officers and 63 other ratings ; besides a few small vessels which can be called on in case of necessity.

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LITHUANIA

INTRODUCTORY

BETWEEN the Vistula and the Dvina lies a great plain. In the winter the snow lies deep upon it and in summer the fields are a riot of wild-flowers. Waves of green wheat and strips of blue-flowering flax sweep up to the dark barrier of fir-forest beyond. Swift, shallow rivers water it, and a multitude of lakes, fringed with reeds and haunted by wild duck, lie dotted about it.

Who are these blue-eyed, fair-haired people, whose wooden two-wheeled farm-carts, heaped high with farm produce, you will meet upon the road in the white nights of the northern summer, trotting silently towards the distant market? Who are these fresh-faced women, with clean white handkerchiefs about their heads, flocking to church on a Sunday morning? Unlike their neighbours, the Letts, who live in solitary farms, they congregate in little villages, where the wooden houses have each a little garden, bright with red peonies and yellow sunflowers, whilst often a wooden cross of curious design stands high before the doorway. Talk Russian or Polish or German to them and they will smile and turn away in silence at the sound of a tongue that they do not understand. Who are these people and whence did they come?

A. HISTORY

I

EARLY HISTORY TO THE UNION WITH POLAND, 1569

THE Lithuanians belong to the Indo-European family of nations. Their language approaches more nearly to Sanskrit than any other living tongue. Their physical characteristics, fair hair, blue eyes and fresh complexion are evidence of their origin; which also shows itself—if we are to believe Max Müller's observation that "most of the terms connected with the chase and warfare differ in each of the Aryan dialects, whilst words connected with more peaceful occupations belong generally to the common heirloom of the Aryan language"—in their markedly peace-loving disposition.

From time immemorial they have inhabited their forest-clad plain. Tacitus mentions their excellent methods of agriculture, exaggerating their degree of skill no doubt in order to rouse the Romans to improve their own; and Ptolemy, a geographer of Alexandria, in the second century, speaks of a Lithuanian tribe, the Sudaves, as inhabiting the Baltic coast.

The migrations of the peoples left little trace upon them. They remained buried in their forest fastnesses, inhabiting the dry land between the many lakes that dot the country. This isolated life gave them physical endurance and a civilisation organised in small local bodies and helped, no doubt, to strengthen the innate conservatism of the race. They had no contact with the outer world, save by the waterway which led from Scandinavia to Byzantium along the Dvina, not far from their borders, and the trade-route from Prussia to Italy which passed by Caruntum near Vienna. This seclusion was, however, violently interrupted by their neighbours, who found in the paganism of Lithuania a cloak for their territorial greed.

In A.D. 983 Vladimir the Grand, of Kiev, invaded the territory of the Jotvingians, a Lithuanian tribe inhabiting the country between Kovno and Drogichin. From that time onwards the history of Lithuania is that of her reactions to her neighbours' ambitions. In 997 Bishop Adalbert of Prague

was murdered by the Borussi (inhabitants of Prussia and a branch of the Lithuanian nation) whilst he was trying to convert them to Christianity. Nearly twenty years later Boleslas IV, King of Poland, subjected some of the Jotvingians and forced them to be baptised ; but a successful revolt freed them again in 1161. Repeated attempts at invasion and conversion met with little success. The Lithuanians preferred to be left alone.

In 1230, however, at the time when the Inquisition was being established in the South, Conrad, Duke of Mazovia (the country between Lithuania and Great Poland), invited the Teutonic Orders to subject these rude pagans, and the knights consented, on condition that they, like Bermondt in 1919, should retain the land which they had won. The Borussi were the first to fall before the Bearers of the Cross, and by 1283, half a century after the Mongols had invaded Russia, the Bearers of the Sword had subdued the Latgalians, the Semigalians and the Kurs, who became their serfs and formed the Lettish branch of the Lithuanian nation.

The Lithuanians proper, that is the Augstaitians, Jotvingians, Dakians, Samogitians and Sudavians, saw the fate of their neighbours and realised the necessity of consolidating their forces in order to maintain their independence. The various communes under their priests and officers began to co-operate, and the organisation of the State gradually came to conform more and more to the military exigencies of self-defence, until in 1248 complete unity was achieved under Mindaugas, who overcame his three rivals within the country and was even strong enough to invade Ruthenian territory and to establish his capital at Naugarduthas (Novogrodek).

The Lithuanians were now compact and strong in a military sense ; but division into castes, which grew with the greatness of the country, was the price of independence. With responsibility came privilege ; but privilege grew until responsibility was forgotten.

Throughout history the great mass of the people seem to have taken little thought for politics, and the period that follows the unification of Lithuania under Mindaugas is remarkable chiefly for the outstanding figures of the Grand Dukes. But although they are surrounded by a haze of legendary glory, the extent of their achievements leaves little doubt of their outstanding merit both as soldiers and as administrators.

Gediminas (1315-1341) found the country already pacified

by his predecessor Vytenis, who had not only vindicated the right of the rulers of Lithuania to the grand-ducal status but had made, under the influence of the Vatican, an alliance with Poland. He was a man of remarkable energy and overran a series of Russian principalities, Vitebsk,¹ Minsk, Polesia with Pinsk, Brest, and a considerable part of Volhynia and Podlachia. Novgorod the Great, Pskov, Smolensk, Chernigov, East Ruthenia and Kiev fell under his influence. He is supposed to have founded Vilna under the influence of a dream, which came to him once when he had strayed so far from Troki, his residence, in pursuit of an aurochs, that he had to pass the night where he had slain the animal. The city stands on the hill overlooking the valley where he slept.

Algirdas, his son, consolidated these conquests and established his rule firmly in the districts which Gediminas had only temporarily overrun. His greatest claim to fame is the liberation of Podolia from the horrors of the Tatar invasion. He was ably seconded by his brother Keistutis, a romantic and chivalrous figure who is the hero of many a Lithuanian legend for the unflinching and successful resistance which he offered to the Teutonic Orders. The Tatars, the Poles and the Teutons alike recoiled before the might of the Lithuanian arms. The Grand Duchy stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

The bounds of the Lithuanian Empire reached their farthest point under Keistutis's son Vytautas (1392-1430), whose relations with Poland will be described in the following pages. He not only annexed definitely Smolensk and Podolia, but even subjected lands lying on the Upper Oka, between Smolensk and Moscow. The Dukedom thus contained not only Lithuania Proper (that is, the territory which in the nineteenth century formed the Russian governments of Kovno, Vilna, Grodno and Suvalki), and the larger part of White Russia and the Ukraine, but also five of the governments of recent Great Russia (Smolensk, Kursk, Kaluga, Tul and Ryazan).

The reasons for this expansion are curious. The pressure of the Slavs and the Teutonic Knights upon Lithuania merely served to strengthen and consolidate the State. In Ruthenia, on the other hand, the incessant pressure of the Poles and the Great Russians, and afterwards the Tatar invasions, led to internal dissensions and disintegration, so that the country readily accepted the strong arm and tolerant rule of the Lithuanian Grand Dukes.

¹ The city of this name was built by the Russians in order to keep a hold over the Lithuanian tribes on whose borders it stood.

The conquered provinces were administered with great tolerance. This was no doubt partly due to the looseness inherent in any widely-extended organisation where inter-communication is a matter of great difficulty. Great land-owners naturally preferred to spend their time at home on their own estates and did not cumber themselves with the management of their foreign demesnes so long as the appointed tribute was duly paid. Local customs and languages were therefore left intact, and the task of government was in most cases entrusted to the nobles of the occupied territory. The Grand Dukes were men of common sense and were quick to take advantage of all that was best in the neighbouring civilisations. Gediminas, for instance, had introduced German artisans into the country. The culture of the conquered territories, being on a somewhat higher plane than the pagan civilisation of the conquerors, came to have a great influence upon them. In particular the Grand Duchesses, who were mostly White Russians, brought with them the Greek rites, which spread rapidly, in marked contrast to the Roman Catholic faith which, propagated by the sword, met with uncompromising hostility.

But the seeds of decay lay in the very greatness of the undertaking. The wealth of the nobility was increased by the revenue of their foreign demesnes ; and privileges had to be bestowed upon them in order to induce them to undertake the burdens of service abroad.

There they fell under the spell of the culture that is only to be found amongst a leisured and privileged aristocracy, and the rift between noble and peasant, which had begun with the inequalities of rank and wealth that are the essence of a military organisation, was widened by the difference in customs and language that now grew up between them.

Yet the empire which had been built up by the genius of the Lithuanians was strong enough to stay the march of the Teutonic Orders, and to stem the onrush of the Tatars ; and it is to Vytautas the Great and his warriors that Europe owes her preservation from the conquering hordes of Tamerlane.

In 1382 Jagello (Jogaila), son of Algirdas, had treacherously captured and murdered his uncle Keistutis and kept Vytautas, his son, in prison. The latter was however enabled to escape in 1384 by the devotion of one of his wife's servants, and proceeded to ally himself with the Teutonic Orders in order to recover his patrimony. In 1385 Jagello married Hedwige,

the young Queen of Poland. By the act of settlement at Kreva he undertook as a condition of his marriage to become a Christian himself and to convert Lithuania, at the same time promising to incorporate it with Poland. The next year he became King of Poland (1386) and was crowned as Ladislaus V. In 1392 however he was forced to recognise his cousin Vytautas as Grand Duke of Lithuania and to give him back the realms of Keistutis. The two countries were however allied, being counted as one *de jure*, though *de facto* the energy of Vytautas made them two separate States.

From the time when the Grand Duke routed the Teutonic Orders at Grünwald and Tannenberg (1410) Poland had no more fear of great wars. Lithuania however was in a less favourable position. She was exposed to active pressure from the Muscovites, who found a large part of the population, the White Russians and Ruthenians, in sympathy with them owing to their community of religion and language. Vytautas, fearing a split between his Roman Catholic and Orthodox subjects, made every effort to reconcile the two creeds, but without success.

The Poles took advantage of their immunity from danger to further their schemes for absorbing Lithuania. To secure the personal union was easy: it was only necessary to elect the Grand Dukes of Lithuania Kings of Poland. But the balance between the Polish nobles and the Grand Dukes was held by the Lithuanian aristocracy, and their power was constantly increased at the expense of that of the Grand Dukes as their support was sought by one side or the other.

The process was begun by Jagello in 1387, when, in order to attach the Lithuanian nobility to him, he accorded them the same rights as the Polish nobles, and was furthered by Vytautas, who had to pamper them in order to win their support against Jagello.

In 1401 the latter, hard pressed by the Tatars under Tamerlane after his defeat on the Vorksla (1399), and feeling that his crown was in danger owing to the death of Hedwige and his failure to incorporate Lithuania in his kingdom, made the Union of Vilna with Vytautas, by which Jagello was recognised as sovereign of both countries, whilst Vytautas was recognised as Grand Duke of Lithuania for life. Further Tatar invasions took place in the beginning of the fifteenth century; but the Lithuanians made a magnificent stand, and it is largely due to Vytautas that Europe was not overrun by the Mongol hordes. Soon afterwards (1413) the Poles

replaced the Union of Vilna by the more stringent one of Horodlo, since their fears had been aroused by the direct relations into which the Emperor Sigismond had entered with Vytautas. The consent of the Lithuanian nobility was secured by fresh grants of privilege.

But until 1569 the union of the two countries was only intermittent, and the period was chiefly remarkable for the growth of the power of the nobles. Vytautas was to have received the crown of Lithuania from the Emperor Sigismond; but the Poles intercepted it on its journey (1429). Within a year Vytautas died, and the Lithuanians broke the union by electing Svidrigailo as Grand Duke in succession to Vytautas without consulting the Poles; but he was soon (1432) deposed by the nobility, who thought that he had neglected them, and they were prevailed upon by the Poles to choose in his place Sigismond, Keistutis's son, who ratified the union with Jagello once again. In 1432 the Grand Duke Sigismond accorded the rights of the Polish aristocracy to the Russian nobles in the Lithuanian dependencies as a bribe for their support. In 1440 the Lithuanians elected Casimir, Jagello's son, who reigned without his father's recognition until 1457, four years after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, when he was chosen King of Poland. In 1447 Casimir overwhelmed the Lithuanian nobles with privileges, which transferred the allegiance of half the population from himself to the great landowners, thus making himself entirely dependent upon them for his finances, since the peasants no longer paid dues to him but to their feudal lords. Five years later many of the Lithuanian nobles sent back the blasons which they had received at Horodlo in token of their privileges, as a sign of protest against Polish interference in Lithuania.

In 1492 the Lithuanians chose Alexander, Casimir's son, as their Grand Duke; and soon afterwards, in obedience to the demands of the Lithuanians, the Poles elected his brother Albrecht as their King. Under pressure from the Tatars and the Turks, the two countries in 1499 made another union; and in 1501 Alexander became King of Poland. History repeated itself in the case of Sigismond and Sigismond Augustus, who became both Dukes of Lithuania and Kings of Poland; and under the last-named Lithuania was forced finally to surrender her independence.

The "Lithuanian Statute," codified for the first time in 1530, shows us the existence of a "Council of Seigneurs" and a Grand Duke with limited powers. At the end of the fifteenth

century, however, a "Seim" or National Assembly had been created, whose powers, at first confined to the question of the union with Poland and the elections of the Grand Duke, were, under the pressure of the Tatar wars at the beginning of the sixteenth century, considerably enlarged. Sigismond I in 1511 allowed the representation of the lower nobility in this assembly. In the second codification of the Lithuanian Statute (1566) their privileges were assimilated to those of the corresponding class in Poland. This codification shows that the political systems of the two countries had become practically identical. Latin and Polish replaced Russian as the language of the Court, and Vilna began to develop as a Polonising influence. One part of the nobility wished for union with Poland in order to extend their influence; another hoped by the same means to lighten their share of the burden of the wars with Moscow. In March 1569 an Assembly for this purpose was convoked at Lublin; but the Lithuanians refused to surrender their independence and withdrew. The Poles thereupon collected an army with a view to enforcing their wishes. The Lithuanians, hard-pressed by the Muscovites and weakened by Poland's annexation of the Little Russian Provinces in May and June, had to yield and sign the Union; but only after tearful appeals, made upon bended knee before the King of Poland, had proved unavailing. This was on July 1, 1569. The two countries shared a King and two Chambers, but Lithuania kept a separate administration and her name. Her officials were to be chosen from her own people, and she kept her own laws and finances and her own army. But, although the Union was in theory one of equals with equals, the Poles held the predominance, since they had the majority in the Chambers. The form of the Union was embodied in the third codification of the Lithuanian Statute in 1588.

The complete collapse that followed is a striking example of the disastrous effects of internal dissension.

II

POLISH UNION AND RUSSIAN YOKE, 1569-1914

THE effect of the Union of Lublin was to chain Lithuania to the fortunes of Poland. The results made themselves felt immediately. On the death of Sigismond Augustus the Jagello dynasty became extinct and, since the Kings of

POLAND AND LITHUANIA THE UNION OF LUBLIN 1569

English Miles

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Poland could no longer threaten to leave Poland and retire to Lithuania, their position was so much weakened in face of the Polish nobility that the monarchy became elective, and the State became the prey of a greedy aristocracy. The love of liberty was transformed into a passion for licence. The Chamber could be dissolved by a single dissentient vote. The Royal prerogative was continually reduced, while the governing class at election times weakened itself by internal strife and the country by intrigues with the neighbouring Powers.

The Reformation movement, which began in Germany in 1517, to some extent counteracted the growth of Polish influences by creating a Lithuanian literature. In his desire to get into direct touch with the people Albrecht, Elector of Brandenburg, had printed at Königsberg in 1547 the first Lithuanian book, a catechism by Mazvydis-Vaitkunas. Bretkunas, pastor of Königsberg (1535–1602), added to this by translating the Old Testament and by publishing books of homilies. The movement spread to Lithuania Proper, and the Jesuits, to combat the Reform after the Union, were forced to work through the native language of the country. Melchior Giedraitis (1609), Dauksa and Sirvydas (1564–1631) are the chief among the Catholic writers of Greater Lithuania, whilst among the Protestants Prince J. Radziwill is the most prominent.

The Reform movement was beaten, and the lower nobility began to devote themselves entirely to the pursuit of their own interests. The high nobility in the sixteenth century began to use Polish and French as their normal language and deserted their mother-tongue, the cult of which passed again to Little Lithuania, that is, the part of ethnological Lithuania under the domination of Prussia, where a new vigour was imparted to it by the skilful pen of Duonélaitis (1714–1780). Only the sons of the nobility derived any benefit from the schools, and, although at the beginning of the nineteenth century various patrons of Lithuanian literature were found amongst the middle and lower nobility, in general it is true to say that the most marked effect of the Union was the Polonisation of the nobility, which succeeded the Ruthenisation of the preceding period and finally divided them from the people of Lithuania and from the national movement.

The nobles were all-powerful. The bourgeoisie was disfranchised and forbidden to hold land. The third Estate in the towns was denied all possibility of development. In 1776, four years after the First Partition, and in the very year in which the American Colonies declared their independence, all

municipalities were suppressed. In the country the greed of the landowners, whose income depended largely upon the export of corn, reduced the peasants to servitude by depriving them of their holdings. The supply of almost every essential requirement was made into a monopoly controlled by the landlord and in many cases farmed out by him to a Jew. The evils of this class-division were aggravated by the enormous increase of the political power of the lower nobility.

Gradually Lithuania lost what independence it had retained. In 1775, three years after the First Partition of Poland, a Permanent Council under Russian influence was created with supreme powers over the two countries. In the same year, at the bidding of Catherine II, the Council of Education was started to replace the Order of Jesuits, which had been suppressed. In spite of the considerable benefits which it conferred, its policy of polonisation was detrimental to the cause of Lithuanian freedom. Stanislas Poniatowski's eleventh-hour attempt to preserve the Polish State by consolidating the country in the form of an hereditary monarchy, and the Constitution of May 3, 1791, which unified several branches of the administration of the two countries, put an end to Lithuanian independence. The lessons of the First Partition had come too late. Nothing could bolster up the crumbling masonry of the "United Republic" against the pressure of its ambitious neighbours.

In 1772 some of Lithuania's White Russian dependencies had been taken by Russia. In 1793 and 1795, in spite of the heroic resistance of Kosciusko, came the Second and Third Partitions of Poland. Lithuania Proper passed under the domination of the Tsars—who took over the State lands—whilst Little Lithuania remained as before under the Prussian heel. Such were the fruits of the union.

The preceding chapters will have shown that the part played by Lithuania in the formation of Europe was by no means a negligible one. She had held her own between the opposing civilisations of the East and West. She had checked the Teutons in their march eastward and had set a bound to the ambitions of the Russian Princes. Above all, when the Tatars under Tamerlane threatened to engulf the whole of Europe, she had stood like a rock against them, and it was upon her that the waves of their invasion broke.

She had formed a State; but it had waned under the influence of the Western civilisation which had absorbed it. The Slavs were to be harder task-masters; and under them she

was to be forced to rely upon a national movement based upon her literature and art. But the tyranny of the East was to pass away too, and Lithuania was ultimately to resume her part as the mediator between the two great currents of European culture.

The period of the Russian yoke falls into two divisions. The first, to the liberation of the peasants in 1861, is marked by great political activity on the part of the nobles, who thought that they could serve their own interests by developing the national movement; the second, from 1861 to 1914, by the entry of the peasants as a political factor.

Under Alexander I a committee was appointed at the request of the Lithuanian nobility to consider the possibility of restoring the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but the scheme came to nothing owing to the war of 1812. The University of Vilna was also actively supported by them and the growth of a national literature encouraged, though often, as in the case of the poet Adam Mickiewicz, it was written in Polish. In 1831 the educated classes in Lithuania participated in the Polish insurrection and were mercilessly punished for it; but the peasants, feeling that the Polish landowner and the Russian official were equally hard task-masters, took little part in the rising.

In 1861 the Russian Government, by way of averting a revolutionary movement, liberated the peasants and gave them the right to hold up to 60 morgen¹ of land. Consequently in 1863 the same indifference was shown, and only those peasants who were under the thumb of the priests could be induced to take any share in the revolt. It was suppressed with merciless severity by Muraviev, the Governor, who, declaring that in forty years no trace of Lithuania or the Lithuanians would remain, at once set about his evil work of organising the "North-west Territories."

To Muraviev Russian meant Orthodox and Catholic Polish. Lithuanian and Polish Catholics were not distinguished. Three classes were recognised in the population—nobles, bourgeois and peasants. At the head of the administration stood the Governor, having under him district commissioners in charge of the police and of the civil administration. Three different legal systems were in force at one and the same time; in Suwalki, which remained part of Congress Poland, the Code Napoléon; in the courts the Russian law; and in the communes

¹ 1 morgen = about 2 acres.

a law of precedent based upon the Lithuanian Statute. Russification was vigorously carried on, and only Orthodox officials were appointed. By the Ukase of May 22, 1864, Catholics were excluded from holding any post in the North-west Territories which would bring them into close contact with the people; and in 1894 a secret circular was issued ordaining that Russians, i.e. Orthodox subjects, alone should be employed in any State employment, even that of railway porter.

The hand of the Russian Tsar fell heavily upon the land of Lithuania. After the revolts much private property was confiscated. Most of the ecclesiastical and monasterial endowments shared its fate; they were given to Orthodox parishes or colonists, retained by the State or bestowed as "majorats."¹ On December 23, 1863 Catholic nobles were forbidden to buy land in the North-west Territory; private estates alone could be rented, and they only for a period of twelve years. In 1894 this decree was extended to Protestant and Orthodox subjects who had married non-Orthodox wives. By a decree of 1868, a year after the passing of the Great Reform Bill in England, peasants who wished to buy land were forced to obtain a certificate of patriotism and permission to purchase from the Governor-General. These were only granted to Orthodox subjects. Jews were forbidden to hold land. Everywhere agriculture decayed.

Education under the Russian régime was a scandal. The University of Vilna was suppressed; so were the parish schools. When gymnasia were first founded, only sons of Russian officials were admitted; and afterwards, when this regulation was relaxed, the few Lithuanians who passed through them were forced to emigrate to Russia to find a career, since all State or professional employment was barred to them in their own country. Primary schools were few and far between. In practice the Lithuanian language was banished from the churches and the schools, and even from the official correspondence of the communes. All associations and societies were forbidden until 1905; and, if two or three children were found being taught together by one mistress, she was punished with the utmost severity. The only schoolmasters were the mothers, and a few travelling women-teachers paid for by the nobles or the richer peasants. Yet in 1897 only two of the races in European Russia, the Germans and the Letts, had

¹ I.e. property in land granted by the Tsars as a reward for distinguished services to the Russian State. These lands, however, belonged originally to the Lithuanian State or to private Lithuanians.

fewer illiterates than the Lithuanians. "The poor have no need of learning," said Delanov. The Russians saw to it that all Lithuanians were poor. Nor did the Church escape. Some Catholic places of worship were actually blown up with dynamite.

But the greatest of all the evils of the Russian régime was the prohibition, initiated by Muraviev in 1864, of Lithuanian written in Latin characters. People were even searched as they came out of church and severely punished if they were found to be in possession of a Lithuanian prayer-book thus printed. But gradually a revival came about. Year by year more books were printed and smuggled across the borders into Lithuania, and in 1883 Dr. Basanavicius started the newspaper *Ausra* (*The Dawn*) there. This was followed by clerical and democratic papers, evidencing the birth of a political consciousness, and societies were formed in the country to distribute them in the face of the opposition of the Russian and German Governments. Prince Sviatopolk-Mirski, Military Governor of Vilna and afterwards Minister of the Interior, was the first official to point out the uselessness of any attempt to enforce the interdict. "We should legalise the use of Latin characters, since no force can stop the ever-increasing propagation of Lithuanian books." But not until 1904, when she was hard pressed by the war with Japan, did Russia accept his advice.

The revolution of 1905 gave the Lithuanians their first real chance of reclaiming their independence; and after the appearance of the Imperial Ukase of October 22, conceding the rights of free speech and assembly, a congress consisting of representatives from each commune was organised at Vilna by Dr. Basanavicius. Resolutions were passed demanding the creation of an autonomous Lithuania, with a "Seim" or National Assembly, and Vilna for its capital, such State to include Suvalki in its territory; calling upon the people to make the Russian administration impossible by passive resistance, and insisting upon the use of the Lithuanian language in the schools and in the administration. Freze, the Governor-General, granted such demands as he could (the use of Lithuanian in the schools and in inter-communal correspondence side by side with Russian), but told the Lithuanians that their other demands would have to be considered and sanctioned by the Duma.

Gradually they were given more opportunities of using their own language, in spite of the opposition of the subordinate Russian officials and the difficulty of finding qualified teachers.

Year by year the national movement grew wider, and more and more men were educated until they were capable of becoming leaders. Societies, land-banks and co-operative groups were founded all over the country, and the national literature began to grow with astonishing rapidity. Then in 1914 came the war.

III

GERMAN INFLUENCE IN THE GREAT WAR

AFTER the Russians were driven from East Prussia they retired through Lithuania, burning, plundering and requisitioning as they went. They took with them all the men of military age that they could and left their families, women and young children, unsupported and often homeless. It may be assumed therefore that the German troops, who in 1914 and the early part of 1915 occupied about one-half of Lithuania, were at first received with a sense of relief, or at any rate with the feeling that nothing could be worse than what had passed. This dream, however, was soon shattered by the behaviour of the German military authorities, who seem to have regarded Lithuania simply as a preserve for their commissariat and the inhabitants as a convenient supply of inexpensive labour. Further, when in September 1915 they occupied Vilna, and the Military Governor issued a declaration speaking of Vilna as the "Pearl of the Polish Kingdom," it became clear that they were going to support the Poles as against the Lithuanians, in order to consolidate their own position in Poland.

A Lithuanian plenipotentiary committee was at once created to emphasise the Lithuanian claim. But the policy of the German military party aimed at that time at the annexation of the country, and the activities of the committee were restricted in every possible way. The occupation was a terrible one. Bands of escaped Russian prisoners terrorised the outlying villages. The forced labour battalions engulfed many of the inhabitants and exposed them to unendurable hardships. The treatment of the population was never beneficial and often brutal. Requisitions were extortionate and unevenly distributed. Organisation was impossible owing to the restrictions on travelling, whilst all correspondence in Lithuanian was prohibited. Only one Lithuanian paper, and that edited by the German Military Command in the East, was allowed, and the schools were turned into German propaganda bureaux. Polish soldiers were imported from Posen to help in the local administration, and to carry on Polonisation under German

auspices. They were largely responsible for the absurd results of the census of 1916, which the Poles now proudly produce as "compiled by the Germans, whom no one can suspect of pro-Polish feelings!" The educated Lithuanians, however, were never consulted in any way. Gaigalat, a member of the Reichstag, writing in November 1916 to the Chancellor, speaks of the "deep hatred" which had been aroused by these proceedings.

Meanwhile the Catholic Centre in the Reichstag, as well as the Left parties, began to view Lithuania's claim to self-determination with sympathy. Not so the military party. On September 18, 1917 met the second Conference of Vilna, to which, in spite of the fact that the Germans had refused to allow a free election, every commune sent either a representative or a written statement of its views. The principal points in its resolution were the affirmation of Lithuanian independence, the election and recognition of a committee of twenty members as the *Taryba* or competent Representative Council of the nation (a status which was confirmed later in the year at Copenhagen and Lausanne by the representatives of the Lithuanians in foreign countries), and the addition of six deputies to the twenty of which the original *Taryba* was composed as representatives of the minority peoples of the country—a privilege which was soon afterwards utilised by the Jews and the White Russians, but not by the Poles.

After long negotiations, during which the Lithuanian policy was handled with great skill by Dr. Smetonas, a preliminary agreement for Lithuanian independence was drawn up. It entailed lasting conventions with Germany for tariff, currency, transport and military matters, and it was violently opposed on nationalist grounds by some of the members of the *Taryba*. After a great deal of evasion on the part of the Germans the Kaiser, on February 16, 1918 issued a decree confirming the terms of the preliminary agreement, which had insisted upon the community of interests between the two countries, and making Lithuania responsible for some part of the German war-debt. A comparison of the terms of this agreement with the declaration made by the Lithuanian organisations and press in Vilna to the Russians in 1914 affirming that "the history of Lithuania is one everlasting bloody struggle against the domination of the Teutons" is an illuminating commentary on the difficulty of pursuing a sincere and consistent foreign policy in the case of a small State.

From this time onwards the *Taryba* progressively extended its functions, in spite of the opposition of the German military

party, who, finding it impossible to steer a course directly opposed to the policy of the majority in the Reichstag, started the idea of a union, not only personal but real, with Saxony. About this time the militarists were growing rapidly stronger in Germany, and the Taryba, in spite of violent opposition from the members of the Left, decided to checkmate them by inviting the Duke of Urach, a Württemberg descendant of Mindaugas, who combined the great virtue of being a Catholic with the advantage of being unrelated to any member of the reigning German house, and who was understood to hold soundly democratic views, to accept the Lithuanian throne in the form of a limited monarchy. The majority in the Reichstag approved; but the military party tried to discredit the scheme by having an inspired article published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which argued that as the Taryba had not been approved by the German Government as the constitutional authority of the Lithuanian nation and was in no way representative of the people, its offer had no validity. The Germans continued to shilly-shally, and Ludendorff is understood to have offered Vilna to the Poles on condition that they gave up the "Austro-Polish" solution of the Polish problem.

On October 5, 1918 Prince Max of Baden became the German Chancellor, and on October 20 in an audience he admitted Lithuania's right to independence. On November 9 Herr Zimmerle, the German Commissioner, arrived at Vilna to settle the details with the Taryba. But the German revolution was by now in full swing, and on November 11 the first Lithuanian Cabinet was formed independently, under the energetic leadership of Professor Waldemaras.

IV

RECENT HISTORY

THE territorial claims advanced by the Lithuanian delegates at the Paris Peace Conference were as follows:

(1) The Government of Kovno; (2) the Government of Vilna excepting Disna and Vileika; (3) the Government of Suvalki excepting the western part of the district of Augustów; (4) the Government of Grodno to the Ukrainian frontier, excepting the three southern districts of Brest-Litovsk, Kobrin and Bielsk; (5) the Kurische Haff and the Memel district; (6) the Illukst district (near Dvinsk) as far north as the Dvina; (7) the northern part of the district of Novogrodek in the Government of Minsk.

The extent of these Lithuanian territories would have been about 46,000 square miles, with 5,500,000 inhabitants, of which 3,100 square miles with 400,000 inhabitants were formerly in East Prussia, whilst about 8,000 square miles in the south of the Grodno Government would have had a predominantly White Russian population. But these claims have been sadly curtailed; and at present, owing to Polish aggression, barely the first three of the above represent the Lithuania of to-day. The territory actually administered by the Lithuanian Government would appear now to include only about 22,000 square miles with about 1,700,000 inhabitants (v. p. 155).

It came about, shortly, in this wise:

During 1918 and 1919 Lithuania was partly occupied and overrun both by the Germans and the Bolsheviks. The Germans, who had offered to help the Letts if the latter agreed to give them a portion of their territory, met with an abrupt refusal, and were driven out of Riga. Under the command of General Bermond, a nondescript force of Germans fell back on Lithuania and occupied the central portion, whence they were not finally expelled until December 1919.

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks had advanced into Lithuania in a south-westerly direction through the recently-freed "Baltic Provinces," and were held up by a combined force of Letts, Poles and Lithuanians. These succeeded not only in arresting their advance, but in driving them right back to the Dvina. But the Poles, instead of working whole-heartedly with their allies of old, took advantage of the main Lithuanian force being engaged with the Germans, and themselves seized and occupied Vilna, together with country well to the north and north-west of that city. By so doing they naturally incurred the bitter hatred of the Lithuanians.

Vilna is at once the historical capital of Lithuania and the cradle of her learning. The mixed population that inhabits the district would unquestionably prefer the tolerant rule of the Lithuanians to the harassing maladministration of the Poles, were they given an opportunity freely to express their choice. Strategically the city is important, since it lies upon the main railway-line from Grodno to Dvinsk. Neither Poles nor Lithuanians dared compromise; indeed the unhappy city must be almost unique in the variety of administrations with which it has been afflicted since the end of the war.

When in May 1920 the victorious Bolshevik armies advanced again and swept on towards Warsaw, the Poles, instead of handing over Vilna to the Lithuanians, whose neutrality

was recognised by the Bolsheviks, deliberately stayed there, although they knew that they could not defend it, until the Bolsheviks were actually on the outskirts of the town and all possibility of a Lithuanian occupation was gone. In the meantime the Lithuanians, who had agreed with the Bolsheviks that if the latter would evacuate Vilna they, the Lithuanians, would remain neutral, negotiated, and finally signed (July 12), an extraordinarily favourable peace-treaty with them. By this the Lithuanians were to receive territories stretching south to the Sviezluč and the southern reaches of the Niemen and east to Molodechno, besides a number of valuable political and economic concessions. It was subsequently ratified by both parties, and on the strength of it the Lithuanian Government moved its seat from Kovno to Vilna. The treaty was, however, largely nullified by the terms of the Treaty of Riga (September 1920) between the Poles and Russians, whereby Poland seized a strip of purely Russian territory running as far north as Disna on the Dvina, thus effectually cutting off Lithuania from direct contact with Russia.

In August 1920, after the Poles had swept back the Russian hosts from Warsaw, they began a series of conflicts with the Lithuanians in the Seiny-Suvalki area. An attempt at compromise was made by the Conference at Kalvarija; but, before the ink was dry upon the Convention, the Poles had treacherously disregarded it and immobilised the main body of the Lithuanian army by seizing the Olita-Orani railway. Then followed in October the Zeligowski¹ adventure, a scandalous *coup de force*, not officially recognised by the Polish Government but unofficially aided and abetted by it, whereby some so-called White Russians seized the city of Vilna. The Lithuanian Government² had fortunately returned in safety to its old capital at Kovno in the nick of time. Its successors, under the name of the Government of Central Lithuania, have remained in Vilna ever since, and have so far signalled their reign by maladministration of an almost mediæval character. Indeed, if any further proof were needed of the unpopularity of Polish domination, the elaborate precautions and practical coercion that were directed to the consummation of the farcical elections of January 8, 1922 would be sufficient evidence to any thinking man.

The question of Vilna was in 1921 submitted to the League

¹ This general's services have recently been rewarded with high honours by the Polish Government.

² A committee of 7 members representing the National Assembly.

of Nations, and M. Hymans produced a scheme ; this could not, however, be accepted by Lithuania, as it subordinated her entirely to her more powerful neighbour. The Polish attitude at the negotiations is typified by the fact that they refused to accept the proposal even as a basis of discussion. On the other hand Lithuania cannot contemplate with equanimity the prospect of absorption by Poland. The latter will apparently accept nothing less, and pursues a policy of continuous obstruction in furtherance of her aims.

The final act (at all events for the present) in the drama of Polish-Lithuanian hostility has been the handing over of the Vilna and other districts by the Conference of Ambassadors to Poland (March 14, 1923), a decision which was met by vehement protests on the part of Lithuania to the League of Nations (so far without avail). The Council of Ambassadors laid down the demarcation line running roughly from Dvinsk, Giedraiciai, Merkinė to the Niemen half way between Seinys and Grodno, and thence to Vistytis, as the frontier between Poland and Lithuania. The Lithuanians protested vigorously on the ground that they had not been consulted in the matter, and theoretically refused to recognise it, although in practice they have observed it scrupulously. Therefore, although it is perhaps an exaggeration to speak of a *de facto* state of war, yet there has never been a definitive treaty of peace between the two countries, nor are there any diplomatic relations between them.

Although the new boundaries are not yet (August 1923) completely determined, it is obvious that this decision has involved a large acquisition of Lithuanian territory by Poland, whereby she has secured not only Vilna but Grodno, in addition to many thousand square miles of country, most of the estates in which are occupied and cultivated by Lithuanians, but are largely owned by Polish landlords. So much for "self-determination."

The Conference at the same time confirmed the Riga agreement, so that Lithuania is now completely cut off from Russia.

As regards the frontier with Latvia, that was settled in September 1920 by Professor S. Y. Simpson's award, broadly on the lines of the old Kurland-Kovno boundary, which gave Lithuania an outlet to the sea at Polangen, whilst it deprived her of the railway-junction of Kalkūnys (south of Dvinsk).

The problem of Memel has at last been solved for the time being. This port, which is the natural outlet for the Lithuanian hinterland, was recognised by the Allies at the time of the

Treaty of Versailles as Lithuanian; but owing to Franco-Polish opposition it was never handed over to that country. It was administered by the local German authorities under the supervision of a French force under General Odry. Thus it became a pawn in the Lithuanian-Polish dispute. A rising of the Lithuanian inhabitants in January 1923 only served to emphasise the unfortunate dilatoriness of post-war diplomacy, which in four years had failed utterly to find a solution of the problem.

The Conference of Ambassadors was stirred into tardy action by the rising, and on February 17, 1923 recognised Lithuanian sovereignty over Memel and district on the conditions of local autonomy and equal rights for the different sections of the local population¹—Memel to be made a free port. It is hardly necessary to add that the Lithuanian Government was not altogether pleased with the decision—but finally accepted it. Negotiations are still proceeding (August 1923) with a view to the conclusion of a Convention defining the relations between the Lithuanian Republic and the attached territory. In the circumstances, they are hardly likely to have a satisfactory or permanent result.

Meanwhile, how has the State of Lithuania herself fared in the distracted Europe in the midst of which she was regenerated?

Within her own borders she has evolved a Constitution and a National Assembly, both of which work well. The Land Law has also been passed and has served to strengthen the foundations of the State.

It should be remembered that previously 30 per cent. of the land was owned by non-working owners, and 12 per cent. by owners of more than 1,000 *dessiatins*.¹ Although the town population amounted only to 14 per cent. of the total population, 20 per cent. of the whole were either landless or holders of not more than 6 *dessiatins*. (The actual number of landless men was about 100,000.) The population consists almost entirely of peasants. The bourgeois are few in number and have most of them spent the greater part of their lives abroad, in search of a career or in exile for their political opinions. The large landowners are almost all Polish in sympathy (and many of them in race as well), or are the descendants of Russian subjects who were rewarded with *majorats*² by the Tsars,

¹ Dessiatin = 2·7 acres.

² See footnote, p. 148.

gifts which the Lithuanians regard as invalid, since they deny the Tsar's title to the land. Consequently these large land-owners have always been unpopular and objects of dislike to the true-bred Lithuanian. Further, since a very large part of the land is forest, and as such forms one of the country's chief natural resources, it was supposed that it could be most properly exploited by the State. Vague promises of gifts of land had also been made to the peasants, and in particular to the soldiers in 1919 when, as a temporary expedient, very severe restrictions as to the dismissal of labourers had been imposed upon the landlords.

The law of August 28, 1920 therefore provided that all forests of more than 25 dessiatins, all peat-moors, lakes, rivers, mineral rights and springs, except where such properties were held by communities or by holders of not more than 70 dessiatins, as well as all estates conferred by the Tsars, should be considered as confiscated to the State *in toto*, with their inventories and without compensation. If it be said that these provisions are drastic, it must be remembered that no Government could have existed which failed to satisfy the land-hunger of the peasants, and that all parties, from extreme Right to extreme Left, were agreed as to the necessity of it. Indeed no other Baltic State can boast so moderate a measure of agricultural reform.

The minorities in the State have been left unmolested and have been allowed to share the responsibilities of government. The reform of the judicial system has been taken in hand and there is talk of establishing trial by jury. Economically the position has been so much strengthened that the Budget shows a surplus of revenue over expenditure, whilst the very considerable excess of exports over imports has made it possible to issue successfully a new and stable currency based partly upon gold and partly upon dollars. This alone would be a sufficient justification for the experiment of independence.

On the whole, Lithuania has prospered. She has been recognised by all the Great Powers. She has defended herself with success against her neighbours and, in spite of the crippling demands of self-defence, has gone far upon the road towards the establishment of an ordered and independent State. The productive powers of her people, their capacity for resisting foreign influences and perhaps in some degree that faculty, so marked in her early history, of producing a strain of really great men, have all contributed to this result. Such efforts are their own reward. But it should be no small consolation

to Englishmen to think that it has been due partly to British inspiration and guidance, and very largely to their efforts in the war and in championing Lithuanian independence against France and Poland, that several million peasants in Lithuania have been enabled to pursue their way in peace and dwell in unity among themselves.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

A. D.

- 983. Vladimir the Great, of Kiev, invades Jotvingians.
- 1230. Conrad of Masovia invites the Teutonic Orders to subject Lithuania.
- 1248. Unity achieved under Mindaugas.
- 1315-41. Gediminas Grand Duke.
- 1385. Jagello, Grand Duke of Lithuania, marries Hedwige. Act of Kreva.
- 1386. Jagello becomes King of Poland.
- 1392-1430. Vytautas the Great. Zenith of Lithuanian Empire and defeat of
Tatars.
- 1399. Jagello routed by the Tatars on the Vorksla.
- 1401. Union of Vilna. First federation of Lithuania with Poland.
- 1410. Vytautas routs the Teutonic Orders at Grünwald and Tannenberg.
- 1530. First codification of the Lithuanian Statute.
- 1547. First Lithuanian book published by Mazvydis-Vaitkunas.
- 1569. July 1. Union of Lublin.
- 1772. First partition of Poland.
- 1774. Creation of Permanent Council.
- 1791. Constitution of May 1 in Poland. Two States unified.
- 1793. Second partition of Poland.
- 1794. Kosciuszko's revolt.
- 1795. Third partition of Poland. Lithuania definitely under the Tsars.
- 1830. Polish revolt. Few Lithuanians join.
- 1861. Emancipation of peasants.
- 1883. First Lithuanian paper, *Auszra*, started by Dr. Basanavicius at Tilsit.
- 1905. Revolution in Russia. First Conference of Vilna.
- 1914-15. Germans occupy Lithuania.
- 1917. September 18. Second Conference of Vilna. Lithuanian Taryba recog-
nised by nation as competent authority.
- 1918. November 11. First Lithuanian Cabinet under Professor Waldemaras.
- 1919. Fighting with Germans and Bolsheviks.
- 1920. Elections for Constituent Assembly (April); first meeting of Constituent
Assembly (May). Polish treachery.
- 1922. Vilna territory annexed by Warsaw Seim (April) at request of deputa-
tion of Vilna Seim elected in January; recognition *de jure* by U.S.A.
July 28; recognition *de jure* by Allies, December 20.
- 1923. Rising of Lithuanians in Memel (January); Lithuanian sovereignty
acknowledged. Vilna handed to Poland.

B. ECONOMICS¹

V

THE RESOURCES OF LITHUANIA

Pre-War Lithuania.—The principality of Lithuania before the war consisted of the three Lithuanian Governments of Grodno, Vilna and Kovno, and the three “White Russian” Governments of Minsk, Vitebsk and Mohilev,² the whole covering an area of 118,000 square miles—more than double the area of the present Lithuania—and having a population of some 13,000,000 with about 112 to the square mile. The proportion of the various races forming this population is a matter of dispute. The last Russian census was taken in 1897, and its figures were severely criticised at the time; Polish statisticians tend to call all Catholics Poles. Before the war the largest Polish element was found in Vilna (over a quarter of the inhabitants); Mohilev had the fewest Poles; there were over 2,000,000 Lithuanians in the Province of Kovno; the Letts were in the majority in the north-west of Vitebsk; the White Russians (or White Ruthenians) had a numerical preponderance in Minsk, Grodno and Mohilev; the largest Jewish element was found in Grodno. The Jews were said to form about 14 per cent. of the population of Lithuania and White Russia.

In the above six Governments in 1912, 16 per cent. of the area was uncultivated or not distinguished by any special cultivation, which is not surprising if the region of the Pripet Marshes be taken into consideration, together with the three river-systems of the Niemen, Dvina and Dnieper, and the large number of lakes. The general distribution of the remainder of the land was as follows: 31·6 per cent. arable land; 16·4 meadows, pasturage; 32·4 forests; 3·6 gardens, etc.

With regard to the arable land the principal cereal under cultivation was rye; oats came next, equal to about half of the land grown under rye, and barley about half of that again. Wheat was little grown except in Kovno. Buckwheat and millet were cultivated on a small scale, principally in Vilna

¹ There are very few post-war statistics available.—ED.

² A portion of the Government of Suvalki is also claimed as having then been included in Lithuania.

and Grodno. Potatoes covered about the same area as the land under barley. Other crops were pulse, flax and hemp, tobacco. Market gardening was on the increase; fruit-growing was universal but could hardly be classed as an industry except in Kovno. Poultry-farming was popular everywhere. Bee-keeping was carried on, though seldom by modern methods. Of live-stock in 1912, there were per 100 inhabitants 14·4 horses, 30·6 cattle, 19·6 pigs, 23·6 sheep.

Before the war methods of cultivation in Lithuania were on the whole antiquated. The soil was only superficially tilled; artificial manure was insufficiently employed; and the land was not well drained. The seed used was often poor. On the other hand, a slow but steady improvement was said to be taking place. The three-field system was disappearing, though it persisted in places particularly in Grodno. The general improvement was shown in increased production, and was the more encouraging as it took place during a period when agriculture was suffering from the effects of emigration. For continued success it will be necessary to spend large sums of money on drainage and to offer the peasants better facilities for obtaining credit. Some idea of the yield of the land may be obtained by making a comparison with that of Posnania,¹ where a much higher development of agriculture is found; for instance, in 1912 the yield of rye per hectare in Posnania was double that of Lithuania and White Russia and that of oats was three times as much. It should be noted that the yield from small property was much inferior to that from large. In Kovno and Vilna about 48 per cent. of the land belonged to private owners, 40 to 45 per cent. was *nadyel* land (i.e. land transferred to the peasants on a deferred-purchase system in accordance with the ukase of 1861), 5 to 10 per cent. State land. In Grodno about 36 per cent. consisted of private estates, 46 per cent. of *nadyel* land, and 11 per cent. of State land. Of private estates in all three Governments 74 to 84 per cent. belonged to nobles, about 10 per cent. to peasants, 14 per cent. to townspeople and merchants in Grodno, but only 4 to 6 per cent. to those in Kovno and Vilna.

The 2,750,000 acres of forest-land in Lithuania belonging to the State brought in a handsome revenue, but the private forests (about 3,800,000 acres) are said to have been wastefully managed and to have suffered from unauthorised encroachments by the peasants. Forests cover about one-sixth of Kovno, and rather more than a quarter of Vilna and Grodno.

¹ Late Posen.

Agriculture was by far the most important industry of Lithuania and White Russia; and according to the census of 1897, 73·4 per cent. of the population were engaged in it; the proportion, however, was certainly diminishing previous to the war. Many Lithuanian peasants spent some time every year in Poland or Germany, though owing to the shortage of labour and increase of wages in Lithuania itself this practice was becoming less common. There was also a considerable amount of overseas emigration.

Lithuania and White Russia were far behind the Kingdom of Poland in the matter of industrial development. There was but a slight concentration of capital; of the total of 1,424 works (with more than 16 to 20 workmen or employing machine power) in 1912, only four had more than 1,000 workmen, and 100 more than 100 workmen. The chief food-producing industry was distilling from grain and potatoes. The production of spirit in 1912-13 amounted to over 1,000,000 hectolitres at 40 per cent. Potatoes were also used for making starch. The textile industry was relatively sufficiently developed; woollen factories were the chief, but there were also flax, hemp and jute factories. Brewing, flour-milling, and more especially tanning deserve mention. The metal industries were very poorly represented. Though there were some saw-mills, much of the timber from the forests was floated out of the country in logs. The value of the production of the chief industries in 1908 was said to amount to nearly 264,000,000 francs (£10,500,000). The most surprising feature of Lithuanian industry was the small use made of local products.

In Lithuania the needs of mortgage credit were met by joint stock land banks. Societies of mutual credit were little developed and had only a small capital, whereas the State savings banks collected considerable sums. There were also commercial banks, but they were of little importance. On the whole there were sufficient facilities for obtaining mortgage credit, and commercial and industrial credit in the case of large undertakings; but a larger number of institutions for granting credit on a small scale on easier terms was desirable.

Present Lithuania.—At present the dominant fact is that what few factories existed before the war have been in most cases stripped of their machinery or gutted during the war. Industry on the old lines is slowly reviving, but it will take time and money before it is in full swing.

The export of flax and the import of finished products reach large proportions; but the spinning industry is hardly at all



now developed. Nor are iron-works much to the fore, except at Kovno. Leather, on the other hand, is doing well, especially at Shavli. Of railways there are over 1,200 miles in the country, besides 950 miles of motor roads. Live-stock and bees are increasing.

The estimated value of State property in 1919 was :

State forests (890,000 acres)	£47,445,000
Confiscated lands	7,371,000
State lands (not including lakes)	8,840,000
Lakes, open spaces in towns and buildings	10,000,000
	<hr/>
	£73,656,000

The present currency is in marks ("ostmarks"), which originated during the German occupation. In spite of all difficulties, a stable currency has been established, and the Budget (1922) now balances. In 1921 the expenditure totalled about 886,000,000 marks, as against a revenue of 672,000,000 marks. In the same year imports amounted to about 877,000,000 and exports to about 631,000,000 marks.

As far as the future of Lithuania is concerned, the country seems likely to remain dependent on agriculture. As regards manufactures, such local products as timber, hides, wool, etc., should allow of a greater development. Improved communications would bring more trade; and if the proposed ship-canal between the Black Sea and the Baltic were constructed, no doubt Lithuania would benefit. The bend of the Niemen above Kovno should also give great possibilities for developing water-power. It is improbable that the immediate development of the country would attract capital from abroad without guarantees from the British or other Governments, and, so far as can be ascertained, there are as yet but few foreign interests, properly so-called, in any sphere of the country's commerce. The people are, however, sturdy and hard-working; and, given peace at home and a likelihood of freedom from Polish domination, it is probable that the country will develop favourably along its present lines.

C. MISCELLANEOUS

DEFENCE

Army.—The Lithuanian Army is organised in :

4 Divisions of Infantry,
1 Regiment of Cavalry,
Technical Troops,

and has a ration strength of 13,000 men.

The Army has been on a war-footing, with higher establishments, since its formation at the end of 1918. The peace time organisation has not therefore been completed as yet.

Terms of service are :

Active—2 years and 8 months.

Reserve—1st Line, 10 years.

2nd Line, up to 45 years of age.

Armament is of various types and nationalities.

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THE CAUCASUS

INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL

“And at day-dawn they looked eastward, and midway between the sea and the sky they saw white snow-peaks hanging, glittering sharp and bright above the clouds. And they knew that they were come to Caucasus at the end of all the earth: Caucasus the highest of all mountains, the father of the rivers of the East. On his peak is chained the Titan, while a vulture tears his heart; and at his feet are piled dark forests round the magic Colchian land.”—KINGSLEY'S *Heroes*: The Argonauts.

THE Caucasus Range stretches for a distance of 650 miles in a south-easterly direction from the Taman Peninsula to the neighbourhood of Baku. It may be divided into three sectors. The western sector, 230 miles in length from Taman to Pitsunda, forms the difficult coast, rising in places to 7,000 feet, of Circassia and Abkhazia. The main wall begins east of Pitsunda, on the Black Sea, and extends eastward for 200 miles, with but a few hazardous passes, with no gap under 10,000 feet, and attaining nearly 19,000 and 17,000 feet respectively at the peaks of Elbrus and Shkara. Immediately east of Kazbek (16,000 feet) lies the important pass of Daryal, giving good access from the northern to the southern slopes. From the region of Kazbek south-east for 250 miles the bleak hills of Daghestan stretching to the Caspian form the third sector. Innumerable streams, fed by the great glaciers, run north and south of the chain. To the north, the Kuban falling into the Black Sea, and the Kuma and Terek into the Caspian, traverse the salt steppe which once was covered by the waters that united the two seas. To the south, the Ingur and the Rion flow through the fertile Mingrelian Plain to the Black Sea, and the Kur, mingling its waters with the Araxes (Aras) coming from the Armenian Plateau, ends in a swampy delta which finds the Caspian in Aghach Bay south of the Apsheron Peninsula. Between the upper waters of the Rion and Kur the Caucasus throws out the Suram Range, an arm to link with the Armenian system, while, between the Kur and the Aras, Karabagh, a formidable bastion of that system, reaches to within 150 miles of Southern Daghestan. And between the two mountain-masses and their lesser arms nestle the two cuplike depressions of the Rion and Kur Valleys.

The influence on history of this formidable range of the Caucasus has been profound. To the Ancients the Caucasus represented the confines of geographical knowledge; all that lay beyond was mystery and darkness, "the Land of Gog and Magog." The Caucasus protected Southern Asia like a wall. It divided the Eastern World into two: to the north was the land of the Nomads, while to the south the peoples of the Mesopotamian river-valleys and of the Mediterranean coast-lands developed their civilisations, for centuries undisturbed. And when during the first millennium B.C. the Aryan tribes broke in upon the Mediterranean and Semitic races, the Caucasus, as a rampart along the bridge between the Euxine and the Caspian, deflected their course. The Aryans were compelled, by a great circular movement, to sweep down on Iran and India by the steppes to the east of the Caspian, and to enter Asia Minor by Scythia, Thrace and the Bosphorus. A thousand years later a fresh wave of nomads, Teutonic, Slavonic and Turki, found the Caucasus obstructing their road into Persia and Roman Asia, and rode on across Scythia into the Balkans and Western Europe. And after another thousand years Seljuk Turks and Mongols, by breaking into the Perso-Arab Empire on its north-eastern frontier, at last took the wall by a great flank march.

There were two gaps in the mountain-wall which gave possible access to the south to an invader from the north. The first was the deep gorge through the central mountains, the Daryal—Dar-i-Alan, the "Alan road," the Iberian Gates of the Ancients; the second was the swampy littoral of the Caspian, which constituted a passage-way between the mountains and the sea, and which at one point—the Derbend of the Persians, the Bab-al-Abwab of the Arabs, the Caspian Gates of the Romans—narrowed to two miles. These two points every energetic ruler of Iran or Armenia was careful to control. Hence the valley of the Kur constituted a frontier march to the kings of South-west Asia, and its history is mainly a history of war, of incursions by the northern peoples and of counter-attacks against them, or of mutual rivalry for control on the part of the rulers of Iran and Asia Minor.

As the Caucasus was the strategic focus of the struggle between the settled folk of Southern Asia and the nomads of the northern plain, so the Armenian Plateau was the subject of perennial conflict between the rulers of Asia Minor and of Persia. From Lake Gökcha (Sevan) to the Taurus the Armenian passes command all the roads into Persia, Meso-

potamia, Syria and Egypt, and from the Anti-Taurus to the upper waters of the Halys and the Lycus they give access to all Western Asia Minor, the wealthiest lands of the lords of Constantinople. Thus, both for reasons of trade and of war, neither the rulers of Iran nor of Asia Minor have dared to allow their rival to establish control of the Armenian Plateau. The history of Armenia and the adjacent lands is therefore mainly a record of a tedious and always indecisive struggle for control between their neighbours of the West and of the East. Rome and Parthia, Byzantium and Persia, Byzantium and the Eastern Khalifat, Seljuk and Mongol, Osmanli and Persian, have in turn fought for the control and have wasted their manhood and their wealth in the struggle. In all these wars the valleys of the Rion and the Kur have constituted a route by which the western and eastern combatants have endeavoured alternately to outflank the other.

If these age-long wars were exhausting to the contending Empires, they were disastrous to the peoples inhabiting the disputed lands. They have had a radical effect on the development of the two suffering races, Armenians and Georgians. The history of these two races may be divided into three phases : firstly, the long periods when they were under the political influence, but not under the direct domination, of their eastern, western or northern neighbours ; secondly, the shorter period when they were under the actual rule of a foreign race, and formed an integral part either of the Arab, the Byzantine, the Mongol, the Turkish, the Persian or the Russian Empires ; and thirdly, the brief periods when political upheavals affecting one or all of their neighbours have allowed them to establish their complete independence.

And if Armenian and Georgian history is mainly a record of treachery, violence and cruelty, it is well to remember that both races were involved in a struggle in which they had no interest, and in which each combatant came as an invader. Also it must be remembered that perpetual warfare prevents the development of all culture, and produces as the dominant types, not the progressive statesman, the enlightened scholar, the prosperous merchant, and the industrious peasant, but the ambitious soldier of fortune, the time-serving politician who must always apprehend a change of masters, the merchant who has no security for his trade and must bribe for his safety, and the peasant driven desperate by oppression, who finds brigandage or service in foreign armies more remunerative than sowing for the invader to reap or burn.

A. HISTORY

SECTION I—GEORGIA AND THE CAUCASUS

I

A GLANCE AT CAUCASIAN HISTORY UP TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

THE earliest inhabitants of Transcaucasia appear to have been a semi-troglodytic race of neither Semitic, Aryan nor Turanian stock. It is reasonable to suppose that the tribes were linguistically and physically connected with, and under the occasional political influence of, the Hittites, whose sway extended over Western and Central Asia Minor, and who then (*c.* 1100 B.C.) represented the most cultured portion of the races of that portion of the globe.

Several centuries before the Christian era the influx of Aryan tribes from the west and of Semitic peoples from the valleys of Mesopotamia had assimilated these early tribes; and Transcaucasia passed with the rest of Western Asia under the domination of the Persian King of Kings. From henceforward its history was fated to be a succession of invasions and counter-invasions which left it little peace and little time for normal development.

Persian control and cultural influence lasted for some 300 years, until the victories of Alexander of Macedon removed the overlord and eventually left a somewhat legendary King Pharnavaz trying to organise an independent kingdom in what is now Georgia—but in vain. The country next fell under the sway of Mithridates King of Pontus; and the defeat of the latter by Pompey in 65 B.C. brought Transcaucasia into direct relations with the Roman world and with the Greeks, who through their traders had founded colonies in the rich West Georgian lands of Colchis and Phasis as early as the seventh century B.C. Commerce of East and West gradually began to open up the country; but its development was delayed by the

perpetual wars between the Eastern Roman and Persian Empires which for so many years ravaged the fair lands of Asia Minor.

The first important period in Caucasian history is the latter half of the fifth century, when a powerful local king, Vakhtang Gurgaslan (434-467), finally established the supremacy of the new Christian religion, and removed his capital from Mtskheta to its present site at Tiflis. A hundred years later Western Georgia¹ became a Roman province under Justinian; and in 622 the severe defeat of the Persians by the Emperor Heraclius bred hopes of a long period of tranquillity.

But in vain. Only fifteen years later an invasion of Arabs from the south overran the country, and the Moslem conquerors penetrated even into the mountain-ranges of the Caucasus itself. They failed, however, to establish themselves west of the Suram ridge, and under the rule of their own Bagratid Kings the Georgians to the west and south-west flourished amazingly. The next invasion was that of the Seljuks in 1072; but the First Crusade attracted these unwelcome visitors away to defend the south-west, and a Golden Age of comparative prosperity ensued for Georgia, lasting for 120 years and more. Of the monarchs who reigned during that era none is more celebrated than the wonderful Queen Tamara, of whom legend has made an almost celestial figure of beauty, wisdom and virtue. And indeed she appears to have been a woman remarkable for her moderation, humanity and personal culture. At her death in 1212 Georgia was predominant in the Caucasus, her authority extending from the Black Sea almost to the Caspian, and from the main range of the Caucasus to the Araxes and the Upper Chorokh.

Her successors were not so fortunate. Eight years after her death a vast horde of Mongols appeared from the south-east, where, after pursuing the fugitive Shah Ala-ud-Din to the Caspian, they had devastated all Northern Persia. In the following year they advanced on Tiflis and cut to pieces a Georgian army which had rapidly been collected by King Giorgi Lasha. In 1223 they reappeared, ravaged Southern Georgia and moved on into Russia by the gap of Derbend. On this Queen Rusudan, daughter of Tamara, took advantage of the recent Persian disaster and attacked the Persians. She was however heavily defeated by Shah Jelal-ud-Din, who advanced to Tiflis and sacked it. Five years afterwards the

¹ The name of Jorzan, a tribe in the Upper Kur Valley, appears first to have been applied by the Arabs to the whole country. The name Georgia is in no way derived from the Greek.

Mongols came back and occupied the country; and had it not been for the tact of one of the nobles (Avak Mkhargrdzelidze by name) in securing the patronage of the great Khan Ogotai, the land would have been overwhelmed in the general ruin of Central Asia and Persia. By 1247 the whole of Georgia had passed definitely under the control of the Mongols. The latter however left the administration in the hands of the natives, contenting themselves merely with taking heavy tribute from the country, commandeering whatever happened to suit their fancy, and compulsorily enrolling in their forces large numbers of the young men, many of whom were by no means averse from a life of fighting and opportunities for plunder and distinction.

During the middle third of the fourteenth century conditions in Georgia steadily improved; but at the end of that century she again received a heavy set-back through the invasion of Timur Leng (Tamerlane), who ravaged the country during the last decade, and through the appearance of the Black Death, which swept away thousands of the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Osmanli had appeared on the scene, and the old struggle for the Armenian Plateau began again, this time between the Persians and the followers of Othman. The seizure of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 cut off the Caucasians from all contact with Western civilisation, and the Georgians were for a time hard set to maintain their religion and their existence against attacks by the Moslem nations on either side of them. None of these combatants however permanently held Central Transcaucasia, and the Georgian princes of Mingrelia, Imeretia, Karthalinia and Kakhetia, by opportunist diplomacy and careful treachery, succeeded in maintaining a limited independence. But the difficulties incurred by alternately conciliating and defying the Sultan or the Shah required that the different parts of the country should be sufficiently independent of the others to be able to pursue an exclusive policy in accordance with local conditions and with their comparative propinquity to Persian or Turk. Thus the former Kingdom of Georgia was divided into seven or eight mutually independent districts, all owing allegiance in varying degrees to one of the two Mussulman Empires, and all loosely united by common ties of religion and language.

It would be wearisome to record at length the details of the sordid history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and it will be sufficient to indicate the broader division of the principalities and the respective positions of the two

Mussulman States towards the close of the seventeenth century.

Persia at that time exercised a comparatively effective suzerainty over the Mussulman Khans of Eastern Transcaucasia, and controlled on her northern frontier Derbend, and on her western the fortresses of Ganja and Erivan, respectively commanding the routes into North-west Persia by the valleys of the Kur, the Arpa Chai, and the Araxes. The King of Karthalinia and Somkhetia, a descendant of Giorgi, son of Alexander, the last King of all Georgia, was the vassal and nominee of the Persian Shah, and was under the obligation to profess an official devotion to the tenets of Islam. The King of Kakhetia, a descendant of Alexander's son Dmitri, was also a vassal of the Shah, but—owing to the remoteness of his possessions and to the proximity to the mountains of his chief towns, Telav and Signakh—was less pliant and often defiant. In the region south of Daryal the family of Bibelur, Kabards by extraction, and *eristavs*¹ of Ksan and the Araghva, were virtually independent of both the Kings of Karthalinia and of Kakhetia. To the west, in the upper valleys of the Rion and the Ingur, the Svanetians remained almost isolated from the Georgians of the south, and virtually independent under the Dadians—the Georgian family of Ghelovani—until the end of the seventeenth century, and later the Kabardan family of Dadish Kilian. To the south-east of Svanetia the district of Radsha, under *eristavs* of the family of Chkeidze, were nominal dependents of the Dadians of Mingrelia. To the north-west the Abkhazians maintained complete independence, under princes of the family of Sharvashidze, claiming descent from members of the family of the Shirvan-Shah exiled to Abhazia during the reign of David the Restorer. In South-western Georgia Turkish influence was predominant.

During the sixteenth century the Turks had occupied the valley of the Chorokh; Ahkaltsikh had fallen into their hands in 1545; Ardahan and Ardanuch in 1550; two years later they had built a fortress at Kars, to command any Persian advance from Erivan up the valley of the Arpa Chai. The Georgian mountain-tribes of the Chorokh region, Lazes and Ajars, became completely Muhammadanised, and the Georgian family of Jaquel, *Atabegs* of Akhaltsikh, acquired the position of hereditary Pashas of the fortress of Akhaltsikh. The Turks never established themselves beyond the Ajar hills; and for this Sir John Chardin gives as a reason that the staple diet of

¹ Nobles.

the lowlanders—pork and wine—was unsuitable to the soldiers of the Khalif and unfavourable to the propagation of Islam. However this may be, Guria, the lowland strip between the Ajar hills and the Rion, was tributary to the Turks, and the Guriels, of the Svanetian family of Varvanidze, whose seat was Ozurgeti, generally brought a contingent into the field to support the Pasha of Akhaltsikh. The Dadians of Mingrelia, of the family of Chikhovan, and the Kings of Imeretia, descendants of David Narin, with their seat at Kutais, were subject to the Turks in approximately the same degree as the rulers of Karthalinia and Kakhetia were to the Persians, and in such a position were alternately the allies and the victims of the Sultan.

To sum up—at the end of the seventeenth century the Persians ruled South-eastern Transcaucasia and dominated Karthalinia and Kakhetia; the Turks held the valley of the Chorokh and virtually controlled Guria, Mingrelia and Imeretia. The northern districts of the Araghva, Svanetia and Abkhazia were in practice independent. Finally, the mountain tribes—the Cherkesses, Kabards, Ossets, Chechens, and Lesghians—recognised no authority, but alternately raided the territories of, or allied themselves with, one or other of the three Bagratid Kings in Georgia.

II

SOCIAL ORGANISATION, MANNERS AND CUSTOMS

It will have been noticed that the above historical sketch deals chiefly with Georgia—that somewhat vague but fertile territory lying south of the Caucasian Range and watered by the Rion to the west and the upper stream of the Kur and its tributaries to the east—whilst little or no space has been devoted to the inhabitants of the mountains themselves. The reason is fairly apparent, for we may say that these mountain tribes, at all events during the period with which we have been dealing, have had no history worth recording. Living as they did in their rough mountain fastnesses, cut off from each other not only by the difficulties of their surroundings but by the immense variety of different languages that they spoke, the only matter of interest in their communications with the outer world lay in the spheres of commerce and religion; and on these we shall touch in the process of description.

The mountain tribes of the Caucasus may be classified for practical purposes in two main groups, those of the Western

and Eastern Highlands respectively. This classification does not correspond to any definite linguistic or ethnological division. But the geographical division through the Daryal Pass, and the historical causes which have associated the western tribes with the Black Sea region and the eastern tribes with the Caspian and Kur Valley, may justify a classification in other respects arbitrary. The western tribes, popularly called Cherkesses,¹ or Circassians, occupied the triangle between Taman, the sources of the Kuban and the Terek and the upper reaches of the Kodor. Generically they were divided into the Adigé, occupying the Black Sea Coast from Anapa to Gagri and the hinterland to the Kuban; the Kabardans, settled on the highlands lying along the upper courses of the Kuban and the Baksan Rivers, and along the left bank of the Terek; and the Abkhazes, divided into the Abazekhs and the Abkhaz, who inhabited the coast from Gagri to Sukhum, and the hinterland as far as the sources of the Kodor. The inaccessible nature of the country, with its dangerous coast, its impenetrable forests and marshes, and its impassable mountains, cut by more than sixty streams falling into the Black Sea, made all communications difficult, and tended to isolate small communities from their neighbours. Here existed a number of tribes speaking different and progressively varying dialects, who were mutually hostile or allied in the waging of perpetual feuds, and whose culture developed with little incentive to change, no occasion for innovation, and rare influence from without.

The coastal valleys formed the natural settlements and the mountains the natural frontiers. The chief tribes of the Adigé were the Chegaki (sailors) of the coast between Anapa and Sunjuk, the Natu Khajis (villages of Natu), who occupied the territory north-eastwards to the left bank of the Kuban; and the Chapsughs (breeders of horses), stretching, with some smaller tribes, as far as Gagri. Lesser tribes occupied the northern slopes of the Caucasus as far as the Kuban.

The social organisation of all the Cherkess tribes was on an elaborate feudal basis; a system had developed which rigidly divided the people into five classes: the princes (*pcheh* or *pchi*), who exercised tribal regal power; the nobles (*work*), who formed a few powerful families of almost equal rank with the *pcheh*; the freedmen, who had bought their liberty, and whose descendants could by merit acquire the rights of nobles; the serfs, who could own cattle and land of their own, who

¹ A suggested derivation of the name is from the Turkish *cher* (road) and *kesmek* (cut), signifying brigands (Chantre iv, 111).

had the right to change masters, and who were protected against arbitrary sale ; and the slaves, who were for the most part prisoners of war. Very definite laws regulated the rights and duties of the various castes, and intermarriage was forbidden. On the other hand the princes exercised little real authority ; leadership in war was not an hereditary right, but leaders were elected from the families of the princes and nobles by a popular assembly of the four highest classes ; while judges were nominated by popular vote, with powers only for a single day.

The social organisation of the Cherkesses was in many respects anarchical, for not only was every tribe independent, but every noble's household within each tribe. Nevertheless the general conduct of the people was subject to a series of established customs, based on primitive conceptions of chivalry, respect for age, hospitality and blood-vengeance. The sons of nobles were educated in a long and difficult course of knightly training by cadet members of other noble families, who stood in the joint relation to them of tutor and blood-brother. The women had few rights, but the rights of protection by their fathers and husbands were very clearly defined.

The eastern tribes occupied the country between the Daryal and the Caspian littoral, and from the right bank of the Terek to the hills overlooking the valleys of the Alazan and the Kur. On the north, inhabiting the highlands of the Terek, the Sunja and the Argun, were the various tribes of Chechens, and the lesser related tribes of the Ingushes, the Kists, the Itskheris and the Galgais. Segregated in unapproachable villages (*auls*) in the depths of primæval beech-forests, the Chechens had a culture which was far less developed than that of the Cherkesses. They had no class system, and lived together in small anarchical communities.

South-east of the Chechens were the powerful Lesghian tribes, scattered over Daghestan ("The Mountain Country"), which formed an elevated table-land through which innumerable rivers had cut channels to a depth frequently of thousands of feet, the whole being backed and ribbed south and west by mountain chains with several peaks over 13,000 feet in height. The principal Lesghian tribes were the Kubachins and Darghis on the north-east, bordering the Chechen country, the Kazi-Kumukhs of the central plateau, the Kurins and Tabasserans of the south-east, overlooking the Tatar lowlands of Shirvan, and the Avars, Andis and Didos on the west, bordering on Kakhetia.

Of these the Kubachins,¹ skilled armourers, the Kurins and the Tabasserans—the two latter tribes probably descendants of Persian colonists—were the most peaceable, industrious and civilised, while the Avars were the most warlike. All the Daghestanli tribes were organised on a patriarchal and extremely democratic basis—the chiefs being elective and controlled by councils of elders. To quote Hanway—"as they live under a kind of republican government, the distinction paid to him (the chief) is not very considerable."²

Distinct, racially and politically, from the other mountain tribes were the Ossets, who, divided into four main tribes—Digurins, Tagaurs, Kutatins and Alaghirs—were settled over the southern slopes of the Central Caucasus and in the valley of the Upper Araghva. Their social organisation, with its divisions into classes of nobles and serfs, corresponded in many respects to that of the western tribes.

The mountaineers possessed the accepted characteristics of all semi-civilised peoples: on the one hand reckless courage, extreme generosity, hospitality, loyalty, respect for the aged and love of animals; on the other hand a sensibility to offence and a childish vindictiveness which was expressed in perpetual and blood-thirsty vendettas, extreme personal vanity, a disinclination to submit to discipline or to undertake regular work, cruelty, callousness and violence.

All travellers unite in praising the hospitality of the mountaineers. "They fulfil the duties of hospitality with the most scrupulous attention, and both the host and his guest style one another *conacco*,³ which is synonymous with *hospes* in Latin. On the departure of the latter, his host escorts him to another lodging, protects him, and, if necessary, risks his own life in defence of his guest. Though it has been observed that robbery is so general in this country that it may be considered as a regular profession, they nevertheless manifest the utmost fidelity to their *conacci* or guests.⁴ Of the Ingushes Klaproth says, "At entertainments the host always waits upon his guests, and eats only what the latter throw him."⁵

The chief occupation and interest of the tribes lay in perpetual raids against their neighbours, or against the inhabitants

¹ Chantre, basing himself on Kubachin legends, suggests that this community was of Greek origin, the descendants of a colony of armourers settled by the Persian kings at Derbend (Chantre, iv, 228).

² Hanway, i. 373.

³ The Italianised form of "kunakh."

⁴ Klaproth, p. 336, Dubois de Montpereux, i, 88, both quoting Interiano.

⁵ Klaproth, p. 349.

of the lowlands to the north and south. Spring and autumn were their favourite periods, and much ingenuity was exercised in spying out the land. Fighting was only resorted to in extreme cases; and on the whole we may look upon these raids as merely low-class robbery resorted to for the purpose of obtaining cattle, supplies and slaves, which were either absorbed by the raiders themselves or bartered with other tribes or merchants from other countries.

Some interesting descriptions of their daily life in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries are in existence. By these we learn that in the west their houses were all built of straw or wood. No towers or houses of stone existed, for that would show that the owner was in fear and did not know how to protect himself. They lived mostly on meat, millet, water and mead, and wore long silk or linen tunics with wide trousers tucked into long boots, the whole covered with a cloak of felt, and crowned by a conical cap. They wore long moustaches and shaved their heads, and their arrows, leather work and embroidery were of very fine execution. The eastern tribes, on the other hand, lived in stone fortified villages; their food consisted of barley bread, roots and a little meat, and their weapons included not only guns and spears but wooden shields as well. The Lesghians appear to have been much better off than most of the other tribes, but the Ossets and other Daghestanlis lived often in a condition of great poverty and hardship.

In the history of the religion of the various tribes can be traced the effects of the influence of neighbouring civilisations. The primitive paganism of the tribes, tree, idol and animal worship, survived as a living force until the end of the eighteenth century. On the foundation of this paganism were grafted the various faiths of the different races, who successively invaded or traded with the mountain regions. The Persians introduced fire-worship; the early Georgian Kings propagated Christianity among the Abkhazians, Ossets and Lesghians. Even during the period of Arab hegemony in the Caucasus many districts were Christian which are now fanatically Muhammadan.

The Arabs were successful in converting large portions of Daghestan to Islam, and their influence survives, not only in religious practices but in the writing and the methods of gardening and irrigation used by the eastern tribes.¹

During the Middle Ages Christianity was spread by the Bagratids among the Kabardans and Chechens, and in the

¹ Chantre, iv, 218.

Western Caucasus among the Cherkesses by Byzantine, Russian and Latin influence. It was not until the sixteenth century, when Turkish influence was strong in the Caucasus, and when the Russians were approaching from the north, that religion, as a political force, became a serious issue.

The relations between the Turks and the Cherkesses, Kabardans and Abkhazians were confined to the exchange of merchandise for slaves and raw materials. Such relations were mutually beneficial, for while the Turks obtained from the Caucasus brave recruits for their Janissary Corps and beautiful wives for their harîms, the young men of the mountains grasped eagerly at the opportunity of a brilliant military career in foreign lands, and the young women forwent with little misgiving the hard domesticity of the mountain huts for the lives of luxurious ease which lay beyond the slave-markets of Trebizond, Akhaltsikh or Constantinople. Militarily the Turks made no attempt to force their hegemony on the mountain tribes, while the latter for their part would have been quick to resent any encroachment on their independence. If Islam spread among the mountaineers, Cherkesses, Kabardans and Abkhazians, it was rather the result of casual but continuous contact with the Mussulman merchants and sailors than of any deliberate policy of proselytisation on the part of the Turks. And it was an easy faith, in the practice of which were mingled many old pagan superstitions and forgotten rites of Zoroastrian and Christian, and which lay as lightly on the mountaineers as had Christianity during the period of Bagratid influence. Klaproth, commenting on the propagation of the Muhammadan faith among the Kabardans during the latter half of the eighteenth century, remarks that "the Porte had endeavoured to spread the religion of Mohammed by means of ecclesiastical emissaries. . . . Their [the Kabardans'] *mullahs* or priests are generally freedmen of the princes or *usden* who go to the Tatars of Tabasseran or to Ender, where they learn to read and write a little, assume the title of *Effendi*, and return to their native country to instruct the people in the Mohammedan faith, and to detach them more and more from the connection with Russia." ¹

In Daghestan Islam had been maintained and consolidated, since the days of the Arabs, by constant contact with the Persians and Tatars of Shirvan. The Daghestanli were for the most part Sunni and, at times, vented their fanaticism on the Shiah townsmen of Derbend and Shemakha.

¹ Klaproth, p. 317.

As regards the manners and customs of the Georgians and of those who dwelt in the more level country south of the Caucasus Range we have somewhat contradictory reports. Marco Polo (A.D. 1275) informs us that "Of Georgiana and the kings thereof . . . the people are very handsome, capital archers and most valiant soldiers. They have a fashion of wearing their hair cropped like Churchmen. . . . The country produces the best goshawks in the world"; while Josaphat Barbaro, writing about 1450, tells us frankly that "They are a beastly people. . . . And the Genowaies that practise in those pties use for a proverbe to saie: Thou art a Mongrello,¹ when they are disposed to saie thou art a foole." It seems clear, however, that feudalism under a reigning monarch developed early under Persian influence, and was the normal form of government for many centuries. At the head of the State was a King, whose functions were to command the army in time of war, to maintain internal order and to administer justice. Immediately below the King were three classes of *thavads* or princes, who with the titles of *didebul* (great), *mtivar* (chief) and *eristav* (ἄριστος), held great landed estates, and who were, during the weakness of the monarchy, virtually independent. Their titles were originally administrative, but had soon become hereditary, as the titles duke, marquis, and count in Western Europe. Dependent on the *thavads* were the *aznaurs* (Armenian, "noble") or gentlemen, who followed them in the field and, in their youth, rendered personal service as esquires. Equal in social status to the second and third classes of *aznaur* were the *mokalaki* (from *kalaka* "town") or merchants of Tiflis and Gori, who were organised in guilds. These *mokalaki* were mainly Armenian immigrants and, in Mingrelia, Jews. The *msakhurs* formed an intermediate class between the gentry and the two grades of serfs. They appear to have been drawn originally from the more intelligent serfs, and were the upper servants in the noble houses. Many of them gained official posts under the Crown and at court, and the chief of the *msakhurs* was third among the high dignitaries of the State. There were two classes of peasants, the *kmas* and the *monas*. The *kma* was the prosperous serf, who though attached to the soil and to the estate of his master had acquired property and had the chance to buy his liberty. The *kma* probably comprised the artisan class, the outdoor servants of an estate, such as falconers, gardeners and gamekeepers, and the non-commissioned officers

¹ I.e., Mingrelian.

of the army. The monas were the slaves without property who performed unskilled labour, working in the fields, vineyards and forests of their lords, repairing the roads, and constructing buildings. Further, they were under obligation to supply guides and escorts to their lords on a journey and in time of war to follow his banner. In return they occupied a plot of land, proper to themselves—a proportion of the produce of which they were compelled to pay to their masters,—and they could rely on the protection of the seignorial castle in the event of invasion. The lords administered local justice and had power of life and death; further, they were at liberty to sell or exchange their serfs, while the latter, if the land were sold, passed with it.

After the end of the fifteenth century, when intercourse with Persia and Turkey became easy, this seignorial privilege, which had its parallel in every country in Europe, was abased by the wholesale exportation of serfs, male and female, to the slave-markets of Tabriz, Akhaltsikh and Trebizond. This iniquitous commerce was particularly brisk in Mingrelia and Guria, and Chardin, in the latter half of the seventeenth century, estimated that the peasantry were sold into Turkey at the rate of 12,000 a year. “*La Mingrélie*,” he states, “*est aujourd’hui fort peu peuplée . . . la cause de cette diminution vient de ses guerres avec ses voisins, et de la quantité de gens de tout sexe que les gentilshommes ont vendue ces dernières années.*” He goes on to tell of an impecunious but enterprising nobleman who had recently sold twelve priests and his own wife to a Turkish sea-captain at Trebizond.

It must be explained, however, that this sale of Christian souls to the Infidels was strongly condemned by the heads of the Georgian Church, who imposed severe penalties when it was within their power, and remitted the sins of the penitent who should redeem a Christian from slavery in Turkey.

In addition to the feudal dues from the Royal estates, the Kings levied a number of general taxes, and of special dues on certain neighbourhoods, some of which must have seriously interfered with the prosperity of their subjects. Such were taxes on wine, flocks, beasts of burden, ploughs, married men, furnaces and falcons. But in addition to the impositions of their own kings and feudal lords, the long-suffering Georgian peasantry were subject to the indiscriminate levies of invading armies of Mongols, Persians and Turks. In 1724 the Turks imposed a poll-tax on the whole male population and levied on cattle, horses and agricultural products; in 1736 the Per-

sians imposed such an onerous tax on cattle and trees that, five years later, the army of Nadir Shah was beset by famine. But the Persian exactions continued, until in 1747 the King of Karthalinia effected a kind of general strike by withdrawing all the working population into the hills and strong places. Lastly, in consequence of the wars, the people were frequently subjected to a special tax, enduring over a period of years, the proceeds of which were spent in the repair of churches and castles and in the redemption of slaves.

In two respects the Church in Georgia bears an important relation to the political history of the country. Firstly, Christianity, both in Zoroastrian and Mussulman days, represented the influence of Byzantium and the West as opposed to that of Persia and the East. And the prosperity and power of the Church fluctuated according to the respective strength of Christendom and Islam. Secondly, Georgia did not experience the struggle between Church and State which was taking place in other parts of Christendom. This fact must be attributed directly to the menace of Islam. The influence of the Church with the peasantry was too valuable to the King, and the armed protection of the King was too important to the Church, to allow of either of them attempting to weaken or dispense with the other. The revival of the Georgian monarchy saw the reappearance of a Catholicos at Mtskheta, and the rich endowment of churches and monasteries. While Henry II in England was wrangling with Thomas à Becket, the Georgian Kings were showering favours and privileges on their clergy. The Catholicos and his bishops held wide lands and owned great numbers of slaves; many nobles were the vassals of Mtskheta. Besides this, the clergy were free from all taxation, being liable only to contribute in a national emergency.

During the great days of the Bagratid monarchy the Church flourished and grew rich, under the protection of and in alliance with the Crown. But rarely do we note traces of that friction between the two dominant bodies in the State which was disturbing the politics of Western Christendom. The Catholicos, indeed, was recognised virtually as the equal of the King, and his feudal levies were commanded by an independent General, nominated by himself.

The two powers seem to have been interdependent; the King nominated a new Catholicos; the Catholicos presided over the Assembly of lords and bishops at the coronation of a new King. Together the King and the Church monopolised the greater part of the wealth of the country. Hundreds of

churches and monasteries sprang up, constructed at great cost by architects, stonemasons and woodcarvers imported from Byzantium. The churches were full of gorgeous vestments, of rare illuminated holy books, of miraculous relics presented by noble devotees returned from the Holy Land, of costly gold and silver vessels. At the boards of the Catholicos and of his bishops holy men and their lay guests feasted to their full on the first fruits of the land. And the Church was chosen by the cadets of the aristocracy as a career more lucrative and more pleasing than service at the Court, or in the trains of the great *didebuls*.

With the fall of the national monarchy and the predominance of the Mussulman powers began the decline of the Georgian Church. The Turkish capture of Constantinople severed all connection with the Greeks, who had so profoundly influenced every aspect of Georgian religious life, its doctrines, its rites and its architecture. Finally when the Georgian Kingdom split, the Church split too. The influence and efficiency of the clergy speedily declined. All the European travellers in Georgia during the seventeenth century unite in condemning their ignorance, their drunkenness, their immorality and their levity. The bishops were hardly to be distinguished from the ordinary feudal proprietors, and their seats were bought and sold by, or conferred as rewards upon, the relatives of the different ruling princes. The aristocracy, demoralised by the humiliating political conditions which often compelled them to embrace Islam, and forced them to send their sons in hostage to be educated by the Mullahs of Isfahan, or to give their daughters into Persian or Turkish harîms, had assumed a cynical indifference towards their religion. They combined Mussulman polygamy with Christian drunkenness, and interested themselves in either religion only to the extent of celebrating, with admirable impartiality, the feast-days of both.

Only among the peasantry and the artisan class did any true religious sentiment survive, and this for the most part took the form of national feeling against the Persians. For the rest, the peasants clung to a number of superstitions dignified with the name of Christianity. But the churches were in ruins and for the most part unfrequented. Chardin has something cynical to say about their condition: "Les Géorgiens . . . ont une coutume assez étrange de bâtir la plupart des églises sur le haut des montagnes. . . . On les voit et on les salue en cet éloignement, de trois ou quatre lieues ; mais on n'y va jamais ; et l'on peut bien assurer que la plupart

ne s'ouvrent pas une fois en dix ans. Je n'ai jamais pu découvrir le motif de cette extravagance. . . . Je crois, pour moi, qu'ils les édifient en des lieux inaccessibles pour éviter de les orner et de les entretenir."

In their buildings the Georgians closely followed the architectural principles of the Byzantines and the Persians. The ruins of three very fine early examples (Ouplos, Darbasse and Vardzia)¹ still exist, and in the seventeenth century we have accounts of some great palaces built precisely like those of Persia. The houses of the lesser gentry were rough, two-storied, timber barns, roofed with clay or wooden tiles, frequently burnt down during the incessant civil wars, and easily rebuilt. The large living-room usually accommodated a number of domestic animals. "Les maisons," to quote Chardin, "sont fort incommodes et fort sales; elles n'ont ni cheminées ni fenêtres, le feu s'y fait au milieu, le jour y entre par la porte." The peasants lived more miserably still. Their huts were for the most part troglodytic, and all that was to be seen of them by a traveller riding past were the rough roofings of timber and earth, on which vegetables were flourishing and where the women lazed in the evening. A distinctive feature of Georgian houses of the better class were wide balconies, running the length of the building and furnished with divans, where the master and his guests would eat and drink and lounge away the afternoon and, during the hot season, sleep. Castles, consisting of a keep or donjon, surrounded by stables and other buildings, the whole protected by a wall and ditch, were scattered about the country, and formed the strongholds and treasuries, but infrequently the residences, of the princes. They afforded a refuge to the countryside in time of war.

The towns of Georgia were insignificant, wretched collections of mud-and-timber houses, built so close together that "il est souvent plus facile de cheminer sur les toits que par les rues." Tiflis, the stronghold of Persian political influence, and hence the centre of Transcaucasian politics, alone might claim to be a city. As the chief market-town of the Kur Valley, it brought farmers and merchants from all over the Caucasus, to buy and sell wine and silk and wool and cotton, horses and cattle and arms, while its famous mineral springs attracted wealthy invalids from Tabriz and Isfahan. Its bazaars and caravan-serais, "bâties de pierres et bien entretenues," were always crowded and busy—"on y voit autant de sortes d'étrangers

¹ Situated respectively near Gori, Kutais and Akhaltsikh.

qu'en aucun lieu du monde." And it supported fourteen churches—"beaucoup en un pays où il y a très peu de dévotion."

A few lines on the subject of costume may be of interest.

Certain mural paintings show the early Bagratids in all the glory of Byzantine coronets and sceptres, long purple tunics, broad jewelled belts and red leather boots. In the thirteenth century Byzantine influence becomes less marked, and a mixture of native innovations and fashions borrowed from Persia are to be observed. The men wear the long oriental moustaches, and the women have their eyebrows painted in one line, after the Persian manner. At this period the "bashlik" or hood of goats' hair or cloth, so common in the Caucasus, first appears in the costumes of both men and women. Josaphat Barbaro, who was travelling in Georgia about 1470, gives a realistic picture of contemporary fashions. "They have very fylthie apparill," he says. "They go with their heads rounded and shaven, leaving only a little heare, after the maner of our abbotts that have great revenewes, and they suffer their mostacchi to grow a quarter of a yard longer than their beardes. On their heads they wear a littell cappe, of divers colors, with a creste on the top. On their backes they were certain garments meetly lenge,¹ but they be straite and open behind downe to the buttocks; for otherwise they could not gett to horsebacke; wherein I do not blame them, for I see the Frenchmen use the like. On their feete and legges they were bootes or busgynes, made with their soles of such a sorte, that when they stand, the heele and the toe touche the grounde, but the plante of the foote standeth so high that yow may easelie thrust yor fyst underne the without hurting of it, whereof it followeth that when they go afoote they go with paine."

Pictures of the sixteenth century display the Georgian princes in the rich stuffs, the long hanging robes, jewelled headdresses and aigrettes in vogue at the Persian court, while a picture of the following century shows a Mingrelian princess in the silk trousers of the Turkish harîms. The trousseaux of Royal ladies in these times, judging from the lists which have come down to us, were magnificent, costly and voluminous, and illustrate the great wealth of even the smaller Georgian Kings during times of prosperity.

The dresses of the poorer gentry were naturally less elaborate, those of the peasantry being miserable in the extreme. Charadin in the seventeenth century notes the same peculiarity with

¹ The forerunner of the modern long, tight-fitting, high-necked "cherkesska."

regard to shaving the head and the same kind of caps as Barbaro had observed in the fifteenth. Of the gentry Chardin says that "ils sont si gueux et si misérables, que pour ne point gâter à la pluie leur calotte ou leur bonnet ils le mettent dans la poche lorsqu'il pleut et vont ainsi tête nue." He adds that every man carried a length of rope "pour attacher les personnes et le bétail qu'ils enlèvent à leurs voisins"; a knife and a stone with which to sharpen it, a gun and three leather pouches, containing respectively salt, pepper, and needles and thread.

He adds that the poor peasantry go nearly naked, with simply a piece of felt to cover them. "Ils mettent le feutre," he says, "en passant la tête dedans, et ils le tournent comme ils veulent du côté que vient le vent ou la pluie; car il ne couvre qu'un côté du corps, et ne descend que jusqu'aux genoux."

Most of the mediæval travellers agree in describing the Georgian gentry as ignorant and idle, dissolute and venal, gluttonous and drunken. The history of these days is one long enumeration of murders, assassinations, mutilations, robberies, abductions and treacheries, and it is easy to believe the worst which the travellers have to say of their Georgian hosts. Nevertheless, condemnation of the manners of mediæval and eighteenth-century Georgia should be tempered by the consideration that the vices and crimes recorded are comparative. The condition of the serfs of Georgia was no worse than that of the serfs of Russia or of Continental Europe; the lives of the princes no more extravagant and no more immoral than those of the courtiers of Louis XIV or of Charles II. Further, local conditions both of climate and of politics tended to vitiate the characters of the Georgian gentry. A lowland climate and a land of plenty, and a diet composed chiefly of millet and pork, made them lazy and luxury-loving; an abundance of wine made them drunkards; their privileges made them extravagant. Again, difficult political conditions, which required the conciliation of a powerful neighbour, or the betrayal of a weak or unwary ally, produced a type of man who was opportunist, unscrupulous, venal and without ideals. Lastly, frequent contact with the degenerate civilisations of Islam and with the minor ruffians of Persian and Turkish history accelerated a general decline of morals and a lapse into a sensual and undignified mode of life.

Chardin gives the following analysis of the character of the Georgians, with which the observations of previous and contemporary travellers are in general agreement: "Les Géorgiens

ont naturellement beaucoup d'esprit ; l'on en feroit des gens savants et des grands maîtres, si on les élevoit dans les sciences et dans les arts ; mais l'éducation qu'on leur donne étant fort méchante, et n'ayant que de mauvais exemples, ils deviennent très ignorans et très vicieux. Ils sont fourbes, fripons, perfides, traîtres, ingrats, superbes. . . . Outre ces vices de l'esprit, ils ont ceux de la sensualité les plus sales, l'ivrognerie et la luxure. Ils se plongent d'autant plus avant dans ces saletés, qu'elles sont communes et nullement déshonnêtes en Géorgie. . . . Pour le reste, les Géorgiens ont de la civilité et de l'humanité, et de plus ils sont graves et modérés."

The life of the Georgian gentleman was passed entirely in hunting, in war and in the satisfaction of personal feuds ; from the age of four years he was brought up to horsemanship and the use of arms ; every man was a past-master with the bow and lance. They hunted the jackal and the fox with hounds, but their favourite pastime was hawking, their principal game being cranes, herons and pheasants. After the chase the company would give themselves up to feasting and drinking. A main item of diet was *gom*, a kind of porridge made with millet, which formed almost the sole nourishment of the peasants, and was a much-appreciated course at the tables of the gentry. They had little fish except tunny and salt-fish imported from Trebizond and Kaffa, but ate many varieties of meat, the most abundant of which was pork, then venison, beef, mutton and hare.

At any great feast it was a point of honour to become intoxicated, and he who failed in this respect was considered to be a poor fellow. The lower classes, however, were often miserably fed, and the standard of their living was a very low one.

Georgian was a literary language, at least from the time of Pharnavaz, who is said to have introduced the Georgian alphabet, derived, like the Armenian, through the Pahvli and Zend, from the Aramæan. The earliest extant examples of Georgian writing are copies of the Bible, lives of the Saints and other sacred works.

The Mongol and later Mussulman wars effectually checked the natural development of Georgian intellectual life, and to the separation from the philosophical and educational influences of Western Europe must be attributed much of the illiteracy, coarseness and lack of idealism of the Georgian aristocracy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. What little literary culture there was in the country was the preserve of

the monasteries and, more particularly, of the small colonies of Italian Capuchin monks. With the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, a literary revival began, due partly to renewed facilities for communication with Western Europe. In 1712 King Vakhtang VI set up a printing-press in Tiflis and began the collection and publication of mediæval Georgian poems and romances, while under his direction *The Georgian Chronicle* was edited and published. Vakhtang in fact initiated a patriotic literary renaissance, which was a counterpart to the contemporary political reaction against the Mussulman overlords of Georgia.

It was however in poetry and in romanticism that the Georgian mind found its highest expression, and it is in the descriptions of colour, of nature, and of the emotions of the senses that Georgian writers have achieved the most beautiful passages in their language. The lyrical compositions of the great Georgian poets show us the best side of the national character—a love of the dance and of music and song and pleasant company, a delight in bright colours and rich stuffs, a kindliness for horses and wild creatures, an enthusiasm for fresh air and for the chase, an easy though sincere sentimentalism and a gay fatalistic philosophy of life—all are reflected in the literary masterpieces of the land. The most renowned of these mediæval romancers were Shaveli (all of whose works have been lost), Shakhrukhzade, Rustaveli, Khoneli, and Tmokveli. Of these Rustaveli is the best-remembered, and his masterpiece, *The Man in the Panther's Skin*, a lyrical romance of 1,600 quatrains, has survived complete.

Rustaveli died, according to legend, in the same year as Tamara; with her passed the form, with him much of the spirit, of the Great Age of Georgia. But through all the dark centuries of the Mongol and Mussulman wars his poem survived. It lived as the expression of the national philosophy of the Georgians; it was repeated and quoted in camp and in the hour of battle; recited on many a shady balcony during the hot afternoons of seven hundred years; its vulgarised quatrains were bawled by drunken voices across many princely dining-boards; every young bride was required to know it by heart before her marriage; and to this day peasants may be heard singing broken snatches of it as they follow the plough or garner in the corn.

III

THE COMING OF THE RUSSIANS

AT the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Tsars of Moscow had finally thrown off the yoke of the Golden Horde and established a nucleus of the Russian State, they found themselves confronted on the west by an aggressive Poland, dominating many hundreds of miles of Russian land, on the north-west by a Sweden which controlled all the Baltic coast, on the south by a Turkey which choked any development towards the Black Sea. Each of these three Powers in turn aspired to dominate Russian politics; the first two supported their pretenders to the Russian Crown, the third periodically sent the Crim Khans to burn Moscow, Kursk or Orel, and ravage all the broad lands around. In such circumstances did the Muscovite Tsars evolve the vast strategic plan the ultimate object of which was to be the control of their own gates—of the Baltic and the Black Seas. And the history of Russian expansion has been the history of the development of this plan, of the great agricultural lords of Muscovy directing the march of their peasant soldiers towards the river-mouths, that they might sell their grain and hides and minerals without the warranty of Swede or Pole or Turk.

On the vast southern front of the Russian State the expansion assumed the form of a struggle with the Ottoman Porte for the control of the Black Sea, which may be divided into two phases: the wars to acquire the Crimea and the mouths of the Don, Dnieper and Dniester; and the wars to secure the western and eastern flanks and the fortress commanding the entrance to the inland sea—the Balkans, the Caucasus and Constantinople.

The first bands of Cossacks, the forerunners of the Russians, appeared in the steppes to the north of the Caucasus in the beginning of the 16th century. They settled along the northern banks of the Sunja, and along the Lower Terek, founding Tarku and Andreyevo. These received the names of Grebentsi (*greben*, "a ridge") and Terek Cossacks. They mixed much with the adjoining Kabardan and Chechen tribes, and acquired many of their customs and methods of agriculture. "The Cossacks of that day," says Baddeley, "were probably at most the equals in civilisation of the Chechens and Kumiks, and certainly the inferior of the Adighé, to whom belonged

the Kabardian princes and people." It was not until the beginning of the eighteenth century that the Grebentsi and Terek Cossacks felt the effective power of the Tsar, but in 1712 Peter the Great's celebrated admiral, Apraxin, received their official submission, and five years later they furnished a contingent for the ill-fated Khivan expedition of Bekovich-Cherkasski.

The gradual approach of Russia to the Northern Caucasus was of considerable interest to the Georgian princes. They saw in allegiance to the Tsar an alternative to the humiliating necessity of perennially seeking the patronage or protection of either of the two Mussulman Powers, and the more patriotic looked forward to the possibility of liberating and reuniting their country with the support of the great Orthodox Tsar. As early as 1586 King Alexander of Kakhetia had applied for Russian help against the Shamkhal of Tarku. A Russian expedition under the Boyar Khvorostin was cut to pieces by the Shamkhal (1594), but Tsar Feodor Ivanovich nevertheless assumed, somewhat prematurely, the title of "Lord of the Iberian Land, of the Tsars of Georgia, of Kabarda, of the Cherkess and Mountain Princes." The Shamkhal destroyed another Russian force in 1599, and the brief *rapprochement* between Russia and Georgia was terminated by the death of two of the principals to a dual marriage which had been intended to unite the families of Tsar Boris Godunov and of the Karthalinian Bagratids.

Throughout the seventeenth century intrigues continued without any definite results between the Russians and the Georgian princes. The heroic King Taimuraz of Kakhetia spent a long and arduous life in a struggle against the Persians and in vain journeyings both to Constantinople and to Moscow, to solicit foreign assistance. The Russians sent a mission on one occasion to Kutais (1653), and a few years later (1664) intervened at Isfahan in favour of a Georgian King who had, as a matter of fact, already been assassinated. But throughout the seventeenth century they had not the power, had they the will, to try conclusions with Persia or Turkey in Transcaucasia.

In 1722 Peter the Great, having pursued a chequered career of conquest against the Swedes on the Baltic and the Turks on the Black Sea, directed his attention to Persia and the Caspian. In Persia the last of the Safavid Shahs were confronted with civil war and a desperate Afghan invasion, and Peter took advantage of the anarchy by making an attack on Russian property at Shemakha the excuse for invading the

THE CAUCASUS

to the end of the
17th CENTURY

Approximate frontier of Arab Empire
7th to 10th Centuries

Approximate frontier of Georgian
Kingdom 11th to 15th Centuries

Conquests

Approximate course of
Principal Roads



English Miles
0 50 100

North-western Provinces of the Shah. The objects of his campaign were essentially maritime—i.e. the control of the Caspian littoral—and he confined his operations to the coast without interesting himself in Georgian affairs.

In the late summer of 1722 Peter sailed with a flotilla from Astrakhan, supported by about 30,000 regular troops and 70,000 Cossacks, who moved along the coast. He occupied Tarku, the Shamkhal's capital, unopposed, and after defeating the Utsmi of Karakaitagh received the submission of Derbend. In the autumn Peter returned to Moscow, but in the following year General Matushkin occupied the Khanates of Baku and Shirvan (capital Shemakha) and Resht, with all the Persian littoral of Gilan and Mazanderan. At the same time the Turks, acting in alliance with the Russians, occupied Tiflis, Erivan, Tabriz and Hamadan.

Hostilities dragged on until 1732. Peter was then dead, and the military power of Persia was revived under Nadir Shah, who had inflicted several defeats on the invading Turks. Further, the Russians were suffering severe casualties from malaria along the unhealthy southern coast of the Caspian. Accordingly in 1732, by the Treaty of Resht, the Empress Anne restored to Persia all territories south of the Kur. Three years later, war with Turkey on the Danube being inevitable, the Russians consented to retire to the Terek, leaving Baku and Derbend to Nadir Shah (Treaty of Ganja, 1735). This surrender was occasioned by the fear of a Turko-Persian coalition against them in Transcaucasia, and with the object of allowing Nadir to establish himself in Georgia to the disadvantage of the Turks.

For nearly a quarter of a century the affairs of Europe occupied the whole military strength of Russia, and the defence of Russian interests in the Caucasus was left to the plucky Cossack settlers along the Terek.

In 1763 the Treaty of Versailles achieved a temporary settlement of the affairs of Western Europe, and left Austria, Prussia and Russia free to pursue their schemes in the East. The Russian Empress, Catherine II, immediately began to develop the expansionist policy of Peter the Great, on her western frontier by the partition of Poland and on her southern frontiers by an attempted dismemberment of Turkey.

On the eastern side of the Black Sea the Russians, in preparation for a war with the Turks, began to strengthen the Cossack Line, and in 1765 built Mozdok, a proceeding which incurred the hostility of the Kabards.

The situation in Transcaucasia had, since the Treaty of Ganja, been modified in favour of the Turks. The death of Nadir Shah (1747) flung Persia again into anarchy, and while the Turks entered all Western Georgia and reoccupied Kutais and Shorapan, the Karthalinian King Taimuraz and his son Irakli made themselves independent in Tiflis and seized the Mussulman towns of Erivan and Ganja. Taimuraz however was no less hostile to the Turks than to the Persians, and in 1760 he undertook a visit to Russia, where he died.

When the first Russo-Turkish War broke out in 1768, the Turkish troops on the Kuban coast attacked the Cossack Line, while their Kabardan allies sacked Kisliar, on the Caspian. On the other hand Todleben, the celebrated captor of Berlin (in 1760), crossing the Daryal with 400 men and four guns, entered Tiflis (1769). In conjunction with Georgian forces he then ousted the Turks from Kutais and Bagdat and laid siege to the Turkish fort at Poti. But here mutual differences between the Kings of Imeretia and Karthalinia and the Russian General made further operations impossible, and the Russians retired to the Line. By the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) both Turks and Russians were to leave Imeretia and Mingrelia independent.

During the period of fifteen years which elapsed before Russo-Turkish hostilities were renewed the Russians were engaged in strengthening and extending the Cossack Line, and in consolidating their influence in the Northern Caucasus by expelling the natives and encouraging the settlement of Cossack families. The fortresses of Ekaterinograd, Giorgievsk and Stavropol were founded, and a line of forts and Cossack villages united Mozdok with the Sea of Azov.

By the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji the Russians had expelled the Turks from the Crimea, and in 1784 they definitely annexed that peninsula. Nevertheless the Turks still controlled the whole eastern coast of the Black Sea, and held fortified posts at Anapa, Sukhum-Kale, Anaklia, Poti and elsewhere. These posts were a continual menace to the Russians, for their possession enabled the Turks to communicate with, to arm and to incite the mountain tribes.

The aggressive policy of Russia in the Northern Caucasus had already begun to disturb the minds of all the tribal chiefs, and, mutually hostile as they had always been, they gradually began to tend to combination, and, for lack of common ideals of national patriotism, Islam became the organ of their union. The brutal massacre of the Nogai Tatars at Yeisk in 1784, a

sequel to the annexation of the Crimea, at last roused the tribes to common action. The remnants of the Nogais and the Cherkesses attacked the Russians in the Western Caucasus. But next year a sinister development occurred farther to the east. A prophet, Sheikh Mansur,¹ suddenly appeared at Aldi in Chechnia, preaching a Ghazavat or Holy War against the Christians. A Russian force took and burnt Aldi, but Sheikh Mansur later attacked in the forests and practically annihilated it. The news of his success brought him thousands of followers from Kabarda, Chechnia, Daghestan and the Kumik steppe, and he proceeded to attack Kisliar and other Russian forts. He was, however, defeated at Tatarub in Kabarda, and his heterogeneous force scattered. Sheikh Mansur then fled to the Western Caucasus, where he was welcomed by the Cherkesses.

In 1787 hostilities between Russia and Turkey were renewed, and the Russians sent three columns against the Cherkesses, which succeeded in breaking up their bands. Sheikh Mansur took refuge with the Turks at Anapa, against which stronghold the Russians made two unsuccessful attacks (1788 and 1789). As a result of these failures the Turks took the offensive, and the Seraskier Batal Pasha, landing in the Kuban, advanced against the weak and demoralised Russians with a force of 40,000 men. He was however defeated by the comparatively insignificant corps of Generals Hermann and Rosen, and next year (1790) the Russians stormed Anapa. Here Sheikh Mansur was at last trapped, and sent to end his days in the monastery of Soloviets on the White Sea. A year later the Treaty of Jassy terminated the war, and restored to Turkey her losses in the Kuban.

Meanwhile the Russians had become involved in heavy liabilities in Transcaucasia. In 1783 Irakli II—whose dominions included all Karthalinia and Kakhetia—fearing the revival of Persian aggression against Georgia, concluded with Catherine's representative the Act of Gori (July 24) by which he recognised the suzerainty of Russia, conditional on the support of Russian troops. Count Paul Potemkin, a cousin of the Empress's favourite, who had recently been appointed first Viceroy of the Caucasus, immediately proceeded to consolidate the alliance by the construction of a military road across the Daryal Pass, and a fort at the northern embouchure,

¹ The origin of this remarkable man is obscure. He is supposed to have been an Italian renegade from Montferrat, the son of a notary. See Baddeley, pp. 47-9 and note.

which received the name of Vladikavkaz—"Conqueror of the Caucasus."

In the late autumn a garrison of two Russian battalions with four guns arrived at Tiflis. "The day was cold and gloomy, and the shivering Georgians remarked that their new friends had brought their climate with them; but they had brought something else, it was thought—or at least hoped—permanent protection, that is against the Tatars and Persians—and the sorely-tried inhabitants of Tiflis rejoiced accordingly."¹ On January 25, 1784 Catherine's Proclamation of suzerainty over Georgia was published, but the Russian troops were soon afterwards withdrawn, and King Irakli was left to his own resources.

In 1795 the new Persian Shah, Agha Muhammad Khan, prepared to re-establish Persian influence in the whole of Transcaucasia. He laid siege to the Georgian fortresses of Erivan, Shusha and Ganja, defeated a Georgian army in the field, and delivered up Tiflis to a six days' sack. The gallant old Irakli, deserted by all his sons, fled to Ananur, where he organised a small army and next year recaptured Tiflis. The Russians now intervened and occupied all the country as far as the Araxes, but the accession of the Emperor Paul caused a reversal of policy, and they suddenly retired to the Terek. The Persians again prepared to invade Georgia, but the murder of Agha Muhammad (1797) delayed operations. The new King of Georgia, Giorgi XIII, appealed for Russian protection, while his brother, Alexander, who pretended to the throne, joined the Persians. The latter, in conjunction with a Lesghian horde under Omar, Khan of the Avars, invaded Georgia, but the arrival of a Russian force caused them to retire, while Omar was defeated at the junction of the Jora and the Alazan.

The danger was past, but Giorgi, who lay dying of dropsy at Tiflis, sent an embassy to St. Petersburg to beg the Emperor Paul to accept the Georgian Crown. On December 18, 1800 the Emperor's manifesto in compliance was published.

In 1803 Prince Tsitsianov, a Georgian by extraction, came to Tiflis to organise the Russian administration. He proved a most vigorous and capable man, and during his brief régime he did much to establish the power of Russia in Transcaucasia. "He found his unhappy country, untaught by the bitter past, still a prey to internal dissensions. . . . Convinced, therefore, that the safety and future well-being of the Khartvel race depended on the reunion of its component parts under Russian

¹ Baddeley, p. 21.

rule, he exerted himself whole-heartedly for the extension of that rule.”¹

During the following ten years Russian power was consolidated and extended in the Caucasus by a number of brilliant officers, who successfully overcame the enormous difficulties involved in the organisation of the devastated Georgian Provinces, in the subjugation of mountain-tribes, and in resistance to the greatly superior military forces of Persia and Turkey. At this time Russia was engaged in a series of foreign wars which required the concentration of all her strength in Europe, with the result that the armed forces at the disposal of the authorities in the Caucasus were always ridiculously inadequate. “One hardly knows which to wonder at most,” comments Baddeley, “the heroic tenacity of the Muscovite troops under such leaders as Kotliarevski, Portniagin and others, or the hopeless incompetence of the various Mussulman Powers, great and small, who, with everything in their favour, not only failed to throw back the northern invaders to the line of the Terek and the Kuban, but, beaten time after time by vastly inferior forces, lost ground in every direction.”

To summarise the Russian operations during the years 1803 to 1813: in 1803 the Dadian of Mingrelia² was induced by Tsitsianov to surrender his sovereignty to Russia; in 1804 Imeretia was proclaimed a Russian Province, although it was not finally annexed until 1810; in the same year the turbulent Jaro-Bielokanis submitted, and the petty Lesghian sultanates of Elis and Samukh were annexed; the Russians also occupied the Tatar Khanates of Ganja, Shusha and Nukha. But in 1806 Tsitsianov was assassinated during an unsuccessful attempt to take Baku; and in 1812 a Persian victory at Sultanbuda, and Georgian risings at Tiflis, Telav and Signakh seriously threatened Russian rule in the Caucasus at the moment when Napoleon was marching on Moscow. In the same year however the repulse of an Osset advance on Tiflis, the final defeat of the Georgian pretender Alexander in Daghestan, and a great victory won by Kotliarevski over a superior Persian force at Aslanduz on the Araxes restored the situation. In 1813 the discomfiture of the Persians was completed by Kotliarevski's occupation of Lenkoran, the capital of the Khanate of Talish and by the defeat of the Khan of Erivan. Finally, through the intervention of Sir Gore Ouseley, the British Minister at Tehran, the Treaty of Gulistan was concluded between Persia and

¹ Baddeley, p. 63.

² Svanetia was only formally incorporated in the Russian Empire in 1833.

Russia. Persia ceded the Khanates of Karabagh (Shusha), Ganja (renamed by the Russians Elisavetopol), Sheki (Nukha), Shirvan (Shemakha), Derbend, Kuba and Baku, together with Lenkoran and part of the Khanate of Talish. Further, Persia relinquished all claims over Georgia, Mingrelia, Imeretia and Abkhazia.

During the same year the Russians subdued the Khevsars, capturing their stronghold, Shatil.

A campaign with varying fortunes had been waged against Turkey from 1807 to 1812, in the course of which the Russians had taken Anaklia and Anapa (1807), Poti (1808) and Akhalkalaki (1811), while they received the submission of Guria and Abkhazia with Sukhum Kale in 1810. In 1812 however the Emperor Alexander I, anxious for Turkish neutrality during the war with Napoleon, concluded the Treaty of Bucharest, by which Anapa, Poti and Akhalkalaki were restored to the Turks.

In 1825 Abbas Mirza, the able and ambitious son of Fath' Ali Shah, made one more attempt to recover the possessions of Persia in Transcaucasia. He was angry at the arrogant and uncompromising attitude of the Russian Viceroy Yermolov with regard to certain outstanding details of the Treaty of Gulistan, and further was confident that risings among the mountain-tribes and the discontents among the Tatar begs in the newly-annexed Khanates would seriously jeopardise the Russian position. The campaign opened well for the Persians. The distinguished Yermolov acted with strange irresolution, and he lacked regular reserves; a small Russian force capitulated at Akh-Kara-Chai; Ganja and Lenkoran fell; and Baku, Shusha and Gumri (Aleksandropol) were blockaded. However, with the arrival of Paskievich (1826) in the Caucasus and the virtual dismissal of Yermolov the situation changed. The Persians were defeated at Shamkhor and Akstafa; and Paskievich laid siege to Erivan and occupied Nakhichevan. A Persian attack on Echmiadzin was repulsed; and while Erivan capitulated, a small Russian force seized Tabriz, the provincial capital of Abbas Mirza. The Russians then advanced to Urmia and Ardebil, and Abbas Mirza sued for peace. The Treaty of Turkmanchai (1827) gave the Khanates of Erivan, Nakhichevan and Southern Talish to Russia, and finally confirmed the exclusion of Persia from Transcaucasia.

In the following year a Russo-Turkish war broke out, and the Russians after two campaigns succeeded in occupying Anapa, Guria with Poti, and the Pashalik of Akhaltsikh with

the towns of Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalaki and Khertvis; and advanced as far as Erzerum and Baiburt. By the Treaty of Adrianople (1828) Russia remained in possession of Anapa, and all Guria and the Pashalik of Akhaltsikh.

Thus, in three-quarters of a century of war the Russian frontiers had been advanced from the Kuban and the Terek to the Chorokh and the Araxes, and she came into the possession of a territory whose economic possibilities had yet to be realised and whose strategic position gave to her the opportunity of dominating the policies both of Persia and of Turkey.

IV

THE MOUNTAIN WAR (1816-1864)

DURING the thirty years in which the conquest of Transcaucasia was in process, the Russians were engaged simultaneously in organising the vast territories in the North Caucasus which had come under their rule through the gradual settlement of Cossack bands, the expulsion of the native nomad tribes, and the exclusion of the Turks. Until the middle of the eighteenth century the Cossacks of the Terek had been virtually independent and associated freely with the native tribes, with whom they came into conflict in mutual raids, but with whom their relations were no more hostile than were those of the tribes with each other. But as the power of the central authority increased, the dividing line between the Cossacks and the Caucasian tribes became more distinct. On the one hand the Cossacks were organised into *voiskos* or military divisions, and in 1816 forfeited the right of electing their own *atamans*. On the other hand the native tribes, who had fraternised with the free Cossack communities, regarded with suspicion that Muscovite Government which had treated with such harshness the Lowland Tatars and which seemed determined to check the raiding expeditions which had been their occupation for centuries.

Further, the Turkish wars and the constant propaganda of Mussulman mullahs tended to accentuate their distrust and to arouse their fanaticism. The continued independence and hostility of the mountaineers were intolerable to the Russian Government. On the one hand the raids of the mountaineers caused considerable harm to the prosperity of the colonists;

on the other the military power of the tribes was a constant menace to the difficult line of communications with Transcaucasia, a menace the more dangerous when considered in conjunction with the friendly relations between the mountaineers and the Turks, and the latter's naval control of the Black Sea. In 1816 therefore, when Yermolov became Viceroy of the Caucasus, Russia's military obligations in Europe and in Persia being for the moment eased, it was decided to undertake the reduction of the mountain tribes.

The operations, which extended along the whole length of the Cossack Line, a length of over 450 miles, were divided into three groups. On the right flank, the Cherkesses and Abkhazians were to be attacked; on the centre, the Kabards and Ossets; on the left flank the Chechens and the tribes of Daghestan. Of these three groups, the task allotted to the troops on the left flank was the most difficult. The western tribes though brave were not numerous; their strength had been sapped by a plague originally introduced by Turkish sailors, while the central tribes, Kabards and Ossets, had already received some severe lessons and gave little further trouble. The Chechen tribes, however, were numerous and capable guerrilla fighters, while the thick forests covering their hills made difficult any general advance. Daghestan presented still more formidable obstacles. The area inhabited by the troublesome tribes consisted, as we have seen, of a narrow strip of littoral along the Caspian coast and an elevated table-land, through which a large number of streams had cut channels of a great depth, the whole rising south and west to lofty mountain chains, with several peaks of over 13,000 feet in height. The Lesghians, further, were the most numerous—at the beginning of the war they are estimated to have numbered nearly 2,000,000—and the most highly organised of all the tribes. And when threatened by superior forces, they would retire into their *auls* or fortified villages, situated on the most inaccessible parts of the mountains. These villages were so placed that the artillery of those days could seldom be brought to bear with effect on them, and their capture was only possible by storm—"a formidable business when every individual house has its garrison of desperate men, and still more desperate women. . . . The houses were of stone, two stories high; . . . they were disposed, as far as possible, amphitheatre-wise, so as to enfilade one another, the streets being tortuous and barely wide enough for two horsemen to ride abreast; straddled, too, in places by a house furnished

with a wooden bar or portcullis, making passage impossible until the defenders posted there had been ousted or killed.”¹

In 1818-20 Yermolov commenced operations against the Chechens by the construction of the forts of Grozni (“Threatening”) and Vnezapnaia (“Fort Surprise”), while the Armenian General Madatov reduced the Lesghian Khanates of Sheki (with Nukha), Kiuri (with Akhti), Tabasseran, Kara-Kaitagh, Kazi-Kumukh, Khuntzakh (the capital of the Avar), and Akusha (the capital of the Dargo) Khans. In 1822 the central part of the Line was advanced into the Kabardan country, and the tribesmen, ravaged by a fourteen-years’ plague, were reduced with cruel severity. Two years later the Chechens were attacked, but succeeded in inflicting several small defeats on the Russians.

The tribes were thoroughly roused by the brutal methods of the Russians, who had marched over their hills, burning auls, carrying off flocks, destroying crops and levelling trees, and there now arose at Ghimri in Avar Daghestan two preachers, Kazi² Mullah and Sheikh Shamil, who initiated a movement, Muridism, which at first advocated religious reform, temperance and the cessation of blood-feuds, but soon developed into a fierce agitation, at once religious and political, against the Russians. A common danger had at last united the warring tribes, and the leaders of the movement appealed to that fanatical religious feeling which alone could bind together peoples lacking common national traditions and ideals. Shamil was the more remarkable, although Kazi Mullah, until his death, overshadowed him as Imam, or secular head of the Murids. Desperately brave, a devoted husband and father, Shamil was at the same time cruel, treacherous, and jealous of the success of his subordinate chiefs. He frequently showed himself not only a skilful partisan-leader but a clever strategist, while his success in uniting the tribes was due as much to his administrative and organising ability as to his personal magnetism and power of rousing the religious fervour of the mass of the mountaineers by rhetoric and by a clever assumption of religious sanctity. In the latter respect he has been compared to Muhammad, for he showed a deep knowledge of psychology and an understanding of dramatic effect in the mysterious ceremonies, personal flagellations and supposed communings with the Prophet by which he imposed on the credulity and ignorance of his followers. But as his courage, organising ability and cunning laid the foundations of his

¹ Baddeley, ch. xxxii.

² Properly Ghazi.

success, so his cruelty, tyranny, injustice, jealousy and nepotism encompassed his downfall. He alone was responsible for the resistance against the best troops and generals of Russia during more than twenty-five years, but he too by his exactions and merciless discipline destroyed the *moral* of the mountaineers and the prestige of the Murids, and brought about the development of that state of mind which eventually made the tribes whom he had led in victory and defeat ready to desert him and to submit to Russian rule.

The history of the Russian war against the mountaineers is largely one of raids and counter-raids, of cruel destruction of crops and villages, of massacres and desperate sieges. In outline it may be divided into three phases: (1) 1829-39—including the campaigns of the first and second Imams, Kazi Mullah (1825-32) and Hamzad Beg (1832-4), the election of Shamil as third Imam and the apparent extinction of his power after the Russian capture of his stronghold Akhulgo (1839): (2) 1840-49—covering the period of Shamil's greatest victories, when his authority extended from the Caspian to the Daryal and from Elisú to the walls of Grozni; and (3) 1850-59—when Shamil's popularity was gradually waning, and when the Russians were encroaching into the hitherto impassable mountains by a plan of campaign directed rather against nature than against Shamil, which comprehended the systematic levelling of forests and building of roads and bridges.

Space fails us wherein to describe the operations and the desperate fighting that took place during the first two of these periods. But an account of an eye-witness of the destruction of the great aul of Germenchug may be taken as showing the typical and magnificent courage of the mountaineers and the difficulties with which the Russians had to contend. "When the aul was in flames," says the narrator, "the Russian commander proposed to grant quarter to the survivors. The defenders listened to the proposal, conferred together for some minutes, and then a half-naked Chechen, black with smoke, came out and made a short speech, followed by a volley from all the loopholes. What he said was to this effect: 'We want no quarter; the only grace we ask of the Russians is to let our families know that we died as we lived, refusing submission to a foreign yoke.' Orders were now given to fire the houses from all sides. The sun had set and the picture of destruction and ruin was lighted only by the red glow of the flames. The Chechens, firmly resolved to die, set up their death-song, loud at first, but sinking lower and lower as their

numbers diminished under the influence of fire and smoke." "With hearts like stones," concludes the narrator, "the victors sought the refuge of their tents; and maybe more than one in the depth of his being asked himself, why must such things be? Is there no room for all on this earth, without distinction of speech or faith?"¹

During the third period (1850-59) the Russians confined themselves to the reduction of the Murids by slower but very efficacious means. In the south they built forts to protect the native States from all invasions; on the north they gradually advanced through Chechnia, and pursued a persistent policy of destroying the forests and of removing the mountain population to the northern steppe. At the same time Shamil's influence was waning. His tyranny bore heavily upon the villagers who, further, were weary of the constant warfare of a nature very different from their traditional raids; and his jealousy and nepotism alienated his lieutenants, the most famous of whom, Haji Murad, deserted to the Russians in 1851, as the result of a plot formed by Shamil against his life.

Simultaneously with the campaign against the eastern tribes the Russians had been engaged in long and tedious hostilities with the Cherkesses and Abkhazians. But the fighting in the Western Caucasus at no time attained to the intensity of that in Daghestan.

The Crimean War, which broke out in 1853, failed even to revive the fortunes of Shamil. The gross incompetence of the Turkish commanders in Armenia gave him little opportunity for co-operation, and he confined himself to two inconsiderable raids into Kakhetia. On the west the British fleet bombarded the Cossack posts along the coast, which afforded some relief to the Cherkesses, who still maintained a guerrilla war there.

In the autumn of 1855 a Turkish army of 20,000 men, under Omar Pasha, landed at Sukhum Kale, and after defeating a small Russian force on the Ingur advanced on Kutais. But the autumn rains made further operations by the badly-equipped Turkish army impossible, while the Mingrelians—much to the disgust of Laurence Oliphant, who was accompanying Omar—received the Turks with marked lack of enthusiasm. Omar reached Sugdidi, but was compelled to retire into winter quarters at Sukhum, whence his troops were withdrawn on the conclusion of the war.

At that time anti-Russian feeling was strong in England,

¹ Baddeley, pp. 373-4.

and a number of fantastic propositions for the dismemberment of the Muscovite Empire were being published. So influential a man as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe advocated the creation of an independent Circassia at the time of the Treaty of Paris, and in 1862 a number of enthusiastic public meetings at Dundee, Preston and elsewhere welcomed Cherkess deputies, who had come to England to petition the intervention of the Queen. But these efforts were of no avail. The Kars and Ingur campaigns had convinced responsible British statesmen that it was too late to attempt to retard the Russian absorption of the Caucasus, and the Treaty of Paris, by ignoring "the Circassian Question," gave the sanction of Europe to the Russian position in those regions.

In 1859 Shamil, deserted by his followers, and surrounded by Russian forts, was driven from his last stronghold, Veden. Accompanied only by a hundred faithful *murtazeks*, he fled to the mountainous aul of Gunib in Southern Daghestan, where he subsequently surrendered.¹ The war-weary mountaineers had everywhere laid down their arms; the Russian conquest of the Eastern Caucasus was complete.

Five years later, in 1864, the last resistance of the Cherkesses and Abkhazians was crushed. Nearly 500,000 of these unfortunate people, together with 100,000 Chechens, emigrated subsequently to Turkey, where the greater number died of disease and starvation.² They left their mountain homes a desert, but their place was gradually filled by Bohemian and Cossack immigrants.

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 there was some unrest amongst the remnants of the western tribes, but Turkish attempts to raise a general insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers were ineffectual. As a result of the war, the Russians, by the Treaty of Berlin (1878), obtained almost the last remaining areas inhabited by the Caucasian races, Batum and the Ajar hills.

¹ After exile at Kaluga and Kiev, he died on a pilgrimage, at Medina, in 1871.

² Some thousand Cherkesses—Chapsughis, Ulikhs, Kabardans and Abkhazians—are settled in the vilayet of Sivas, others in that of Bitlis. The Chechens, after causing much trouble in the vilayets of Kars and Erzerum, finally scattered about the region of Bitlis, Van and Mush, while others settled in the vilayet of Diarbekr.

THE CAUCASUS

18TH & 19TH CENTURIES


Successive Frontiers shewing
the Russian Advance

Approximate Territorial divisions of the
Georgian Principalities & Mountain Tribes

Persian Khanates

Russian Frontiers after 1878

With acknowledgement to G.F. Baddeley's
"Russian Conquest of the Caucasus."



V

NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION, 1811-1917

THE tendencies and results, good and bad, of the Russian system are demonstrated in the history of Russian rule in the Caucasus. The Russians at the beginning of the nineteenth century assumed control of a country whose condition was possibly more anarchical than that of any other part of Asia, whose population was being gradually exterminated by war, plague and famine, whose political organisation and culture had almost collapsed into utter ruin and whose economic possibilities had been completely neglected.

Firstly they gave to the Transcaucasus a military security which it had never before enjoyed. For a hundred years no hostile army approached Tiflis. Consequently it may be claimed that the Russian régime not only gave to the Georgians and Armenians the possibility of developing national prosperity in peace, but preserved those peoples from the virtual extinction which has been the fate of the Armenians and other Christian races whose country lies beyond the Russian borders.

Secondly, Russian rule tended to improve the condition of the individual. The aristocracy, who during the period of Persian hegemony had led lives of idle luxury and undignified subservience to their Mussulman lords, found careers, which were at least healthier and wider, in service in the Russian Army and Civil Service. The peasants, whose lot still left much to be desired, gained on the one hand by the abolition of serfdom within the Russian Empire (1864), on the other by the increased prosperity which followed the development of communications, the establishment of schools and the introduction of modern methods of agriculture. And there developed a prosperous middle-class, for the most part Armenian and Russian, whose political rôle in the Caucasus became increasingly important.

Lastly, the peace imposed by Russian arms permitted the development of the economic resources of the country, with its subsequent general increase of prosperity and population.

But the inherent shortcomings of Russian rule were productive of grave troubles. The administrative policy was one of centralisation. Until 1882 the Caucasus was ruled by a Viceroy nominated by the Tsar and possessing supreme civil

power, which gave him in effect the position of an autocratic monarch during the period of his viceroyalty. From 1882 to 1905 the administration was yet further centralised by the substitution for the Viceroy of a Governor-General, directly controlled by a Caucasian Committee at St. Petersburg. A civil Governor subordinate to the Viceroy or Governor-General ruled each Province, with the exception of those of Daghestan, Sukhum, Batum and Kars, where the Governor was a military officer. The Provinces were divided into districts, governed by officials bearing the title *nachalnik*, and the districts were divided into communes (*volost*), where the chief authority was a native elder (*volostnoi starshina*) elected by the community and assisted by a headman of each village (*starosh*). With regard to the law, small cases were tried by local magistrates; those involving more than 2,000 roubles by Russian judges in the district courts.

It will thus be seen that while the Russian administrative machine provided for a degree of local autonomy, the natives had no influence on the conduct of Caucasian or even of provincial affairs. But this system was suitable enough to the mass of the peasantry who, under native rule, had lain in still deeper servitude. The Tatar peasantry, particularly, after the termination of the national struggle for independence, reconciled themselves to Russian rule. The Georgian aristocracy, still inspired by some glimmerings of sentimental patriotism, and resenting at once the supremacy of the Russian bureaucracy, the decline of their own feudal powers, and the steady growth of an Armenian bourgeoisie, alone of all the elements in the Transcaucasus continued to foster a vivid resentment against the existing régime. The Russian policy of Russification, the chief incidents of which were the subjecting of the Georgian Autocephalous Church to the Holy Synod (1811) and the abolition of the autonomy of Svanetia (1833) and of Mingrelia (1867), roused them more than once to sporadic revolt. Thus risings, partly nationalist and partly agrarian in character, in which members of the nobility led the peasant bands, took place at different dates—in Imeretia (1821), in Guria (1822) and in Mingrelia (1857).

During the same period, and parallel with the political discontent, the patriotic literary revival, initiated during the previous century by Vakhtang VI and Prince Vakhusht, was developed, and a school arose of aristocratic journalists and poets, chief of whom were Alexander and Ilia Chavchavadze, Giorgi Eristavi (a Decabrist), Grigor Orbelian and Ivané

Machabeli, who founded a daily paper. The style of this school was for the most part romantically patriotic, and it appealed primarily to the large and impoverished aristocratic class; but of all its disciples Ilia Chavchavadze alone had a following among the people. In general, the Russian Government had little to fear from the patriotic movement of the nobles; the majority of them served faithfully, some with distinction, in the Georgian regiments which played an important part in the Caucasian Campaign of 1877-8. Finally, the incorporation, in 1884, of the hitherto distinct Georgian army in the general military organisation of the Russian Empire marked the disappearance of the last remnant of the independence of the Georgian kingdom.

With the economic development of Transcaucasia the subversive social doctrines already spreading among the workmen of European Russia reached the Caucasus, and the Tiflis administration was confronted with a movement more real and more dangerous than the sentimental romanticism of the native princes. In 1870 European capital began to exploit Baku, and in the same year operations were begun at the great manganese deposits of Chiaturi. The construction of a railway line from Poti to Tiflis had been begun in 1867, and in 1883 this line was continued to Baku. In 1884 foreign capital, chiefly that of the Rothschilds, began to build a port at Batum. During the following thirty years the industrialisation of the Caucasus proceeded. Baku became one of the greatest petroleum centres of the world; further deposits of oil were exploited at Maikop and Grozni; another railway soon linked these towns with the Black Sea, the Caspian and Baku, and Russian, Armenian and foreign companies hastened to undertake the working of the rich manganese and copper deposits and the export of the silk, cotton, timber and wine of the country.

This sudden development soon produced the most complicated problems; antagonisms social and racial were presented in an acute form. The oil-towns were the foci of these antagonisms and the scene of the more sanguinary events of 1904-6, but the conditions there reacted on, and were reproduced in a lesser degree in, Georgia. Foreign capitalism was more than usually aggressive, as it believed itself to be operating in a new country where it was in a position to exploit cheap and inexhaustible supplies of uneducated native labour; and a sudden transition from feudalism to industrialism had created a labouring class the more dangerous because it could

receive without assimilating all the latest doctrines of the semi-emancipated workers of Western Europe. And the great mass of casual labour—Gurians, Imeretians and Mingrelians—which flocked back to the villages every few months from the copper and manganese mines or the docks and oilcase factories at Batum, carried with them into the countryside the ill-comprehended doctrines of Marx and Engels which some agitator had muttered into their bucolic ears a few days before.

Thus it was not long before a branch of the Russian Social Democratic Party had been formed in Georgia, with local centres at Tiflis, Kutais, Poti and Batum. It was founded by Russians, but a number of able young Georgians were soon at its head. But they were journalists, artisans and lawyers who had replaced the former aristocrats of Chavchavadze's school as the leaders of Georgian opinion. Such were S. Gibladze, "the pioneer of Georgian Socialism," Ninishvili, "the Georgian Gorki," and G. Tsereteli, the founder of the Socialist paper *Kvali*. The Social Democratic movement which professed to despise the Nationalist thought of Chavchavadze and based its theories on the class struggle, began to gain strength about the same time as the Imperial Government was initiating fresh anti-national measures, such as the forced emigration of the Ajars to Turkey (1880) and the enforcement of conscription in the Caucasus (1887). These measures doubtless drove many adherents into the Socialist ranks. In 1896 the railwaymen formed a first trade-union, an example to be followed soon by the printers, iron-workers and other trades. In the same year Georgian Social Democracy received a brilliant recruit in Noah Jordania, who returned hot from the study of Marxism at Geneva to attack Ilia Chavchavadze in a series of articles in *Kvali*. Agitation was now gathering force, and in 1900 Prince Galitsin's Military Law, imposing liability to service in the remoter parts of the Empire, provoked a series of ugly strikes, as a result of which Jordania was arrested, and *Kvali* was suppressed, only to be revived by Irakli, son of Giorgi Tsereteli.

Towards the end of 1904 the revolutionary disturbances which had begun in European Russia spread to the Caucasus. The most blood-thirsty manifestations during the period 1904-6 took place at Baku and in the Armeno-Tatar regions, but the disaffection in Georgia was serious. In Tiflis bombs were thrown and officers were assassinated, while the Cossacks on more than one occasion inflicted cruel casualties on the crowd. Strikes took place along the Transcaucasian Railway,

and at Batum there was trouble between the Gurian and Mingrelian workmen and the Ajars, whom the authorities proposed to employ as "blacklegs." Finally, there was a serious Armeno-Tatar outbreak at Tiflis (December 1905), and for a time the city was threatened by Tatar bands who had advanced from the Borchalu district. On the countryside the troubles assumed still more serious proportions. The Guriel¹ and Prince Eristavi were murdered on their estates, and many landowners were forced to take to flight. The railway-line was cut at various points and troop-trains were wrecked. At Ozurgeti the "Gurian Republic" was proclaimed. For several months the Government lost all control of the country between Kutais and Batum. At last, in the first months of 1906, the reaction having triumphed in Russia, a powerful force of Cossacks under the Tatar General Alikhanov marched through Mingrelia, Imeretia and Guria, and suppressed the insurrection after some difficult fighting.

The revolutionary movement as a whole had failed, but its suppression indicated but the end of a phase in the struggle, and, for the Caucasus, it had not been without its meagre results. The Viceroyalty was revived, and the Caucasus was accorded twenty-nine seats in the Duma.² The Socialists did not—as in Russia proper—boycott the elections to the first Duma, to which were elected their most prominent representatives, Jordania, Irakli Tsereteli and G. Makharadze.

The tribes of the Northern Caucasus were naturally little affected by the revolutionary movement in Russia. But the old free spirit still survived in the mountain auls in spite of the bitter suffering and ruin of Shamil's wars. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 had come too soon to rouse an active response among the exhausted tribes, but in the last decade of the nineteenth century the governmental policy of expropriating the mountaineers from the most fertile districts in favour of Cossack immigrants began to revive the warlike spirit. In 1898 a serious outbreak occurred among the Chechens, and four years later the Ossets rose. The disturbances of 1904-6 occasioned a recrudescence of the old raiding habits of the mountaineers. Trains were wrecked along the railway from Vladikavkaz to Baku, and bands of Ingush Chechens threatened the environs of Vladikavkaz and Grozni. But with the reaction in Russia, order was restored in the mountains. The tribesmen in reality retained little of their former strength. The best

¹ Chief Prince of Guria.

² Reduced to nineteen at the elections for the Third Duma.

of their youths had been drawn to the oil-wells at Maikop, Grozni and Baku, and those who remained were no match for disciplined troops armed with rifles and machine-guns. After the Young Turkish Revolution of 1908 an effort was made by the many Caucasians in Turkey to revivify the hostility to the Russian Government, and an "Association of Political Émigrés from the Caucasus in Turkey" was formed at Constantinople, to be replaced later by a "Committee of the Caucasus." The movement was no doubt encouraged by the Young Turkish Government as a part of their general Pan-Turanian—Pan-Islamic policy, but it had little strength or significance.

The War and the Revolution (1914–17).—On the outbreak of the European War the Young Turks made an attempt to detach from Russia some of the Caucasian national groups. The attempt was to a great extent abortive. The Social Democratic leaders of opinion in the Caucasus were in theory loyal to the Empire. A Georgian, a certain Leo Kerezelidze, did indeed form a "Committee for the Liberation of Georgia" at Constantinople, which proceeded to sign a secret treaty with Turkey, but it was entirely unrepresentative of any Georgian political group. Among the Muhammadan mountain-tribes the Turks found a limited degree of support. The Ajars rose in an unsuccessful attempt to support Enver's Sarikamish offensive (December 1914), and at the end of 1915 a Delegation, including the Georgian Machabeli, the Tatar Selim Beg Bebutov and two Turkish officers, Issa Pasha, a Lesghian, and Ali Fuad Pasha, a Circassian, proceeded to Berlin, to present a Memorandum demanding the assistance of the Central Powers in the formation of a quadruple Caucasian Confederation.

The outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March 1917 was welcomed with enthusiasm in the Transcaucasus. The Social Democrats, who represented the mass of public opinion, were theoretically anti-nationalist, and supported the conception of a Federated Russian Republic. Indeed the most prominent of them were interested rather in Russian than in Transcaucasian politics. A "Special Transcaucasian Committee" representing the four principal nationalities replaced the Viceroy, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, at Tiflis, but the real power reposed in the newly-formed Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, dominated by the Social Democrats.

As the disintegration of the central power in Russia proceeded, disunion developed in the Caucasus. The Social

Democrats, Georgians, Armenians and Tatars, in spite of their internationalist ideals, soon became involved in the real and bitter racial antagonisms of the uneducated mass of the Christian and Mussulman peasantry. And the situation was further complicated, on the one hand by the intrigues of the Mussulman parties with the Turkish Command and by the effects of the propaganda of Turkish agents; on the other by the anti-Mussulman violence of the Armenian Dashnakists and by the reflex on Tatar-Armenian relations of the reciprocal atrocities committed by Mussulmans and Christians in the war-area of Turkish Armenia.

It was in the Northern Caucasus that a separatist movement first assumed definite form in the proclamation of the autonomous "Union of the Peoples of the Northern Caucasus" at Vladikavkaz in May 1917. But in Transcaucasia separatist tendencies were soon afterwards manifested in the demand for the reunion of all Armenian and Georgian contingents on the Polish front, and their concentration in the Caucasus.

The Bolshevik *coup d'état* at Petrograd in October 1917 marked the opening of the next phase of the Revolution. In the Northern Caucasus the conservative leaders of the North Caucasus Union naturally repudiated the Soviet Government, and associated themselves with the "South-eastern Union" formed by Messrs. Miliukov, Guchkov and Kharlamov, Gen. Alexeiev, and the Hetman of the Don Cossacks, Gen. Kalédin. The South-eastern Union made a desperate effort to reconcile the growing differences of the Cossacks and the mountaineers—differences which had already resulted in fighting—by engaging the former to cede certain disputed districts. The result was the defection of the Terek Cossacks who, in conjunction with Bolshevik troops returning from the Turkish front, attacked the mountaineers. On December 2, the independence of the "Union of the Mountaineers" was proclaimed, and a Provisional Government, at the head of which was a wealthy Chechen landowner, Colonel Tapa Chermoiev, was formed pending the convocation of a Russian Constituent Assembly. An organisation of local tribal autonomy was established, and the seat of the central authority was fixed at Vladikavkaz.

At the beginning of 1918, however, Bolshevik and Cossack forces advanced along the railway-line from Mineralnala Vody to Beslan, and the mountaineers, who lacked munitions, were forced, after some severe fighting, to withdraw from Vladikavkaz and Grozni, and to remove their capital first to Nazran and later to Temir-Khan-Shura.

In the Transcaucasus a Social Democratic "Commissariat" had superseded the "Caucasian Committee" at Tiflis. This body, which represented all nationalities (three Georgians, three Armenians, three Tatars and two Russians) was presided over by the Georgian Gegéchkori. It drew its authority from a "Transcaucasian Seim" composed of the Caucasian members of the recently elected All-Russian Constituent Assembly, with the further addition of two members for each original one, the various parties increasing their membership in proportion to the last election figures. Further, the Commissariat and Seim worked in conjunction with the various Workmen's, Soldiers' and Municipal Councils, and with Georgian, Armenian and Tatar "National Committees."

In spite, however, of this inevitable organisation on nationalist lines, the Commissariat still endeavoured to maintain the co-operation of the different races and the principle of unity with Russia; and at the Georgian National Congress in November 1917 the Georgian Social Democratic leaders Jordania and Chenkeli emphasised these principles.

VI

RECENT HISTORY

As in Russia, the most urgent necessity for Georgia was the conclusion of an early peace. The Turkish commander on the Turko-Caucasian front, Ferik Mehmed Vehib Pasha, proposed a cessation of hostilities at the beginning of December, in accordance with the action of the German General Staff on the Polish front, and on December 14 General Prjevalski, who still held nominal command of the Russo-Caucasian troops, signed an armistice at Erzinjan. During the following month the anarchy behind the Russian lines increased. Turkish agents were active in the Muhammadan districts of Transcaucasia, encouraging the Tatars and Ajars to attack the disorganised bodies of Russian troops who were making their way home through Transcaucasia. Armenian bands were attacking Turkish villages in the Russian area, and were preparing a desperate resistance to the Turkish advance.

In mid-January 1918 the Ottoman Government made a further *démarche*, addressing itself now to the "Independent Transcaucasian Government," which it invited to participate in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. It was a development of the Turkish policy, revealed at the outbreak of war, of constructing

a buffer-State in the Caucasus. But the Social Democrats were still loyal to their ideal of a Federal Russia, and demanded a respite "in order to combine their action with the opinions and views of other autonomous Governments in Russia."¹ They then communicated with the Ukrainian Rada at Kiev and with the South-eastern Union at Ekaterinodar. Meanwhile the Turkish Command emphasised the urgency of a settlement by a general advance, under pretext of protecting the Mussulman population behind the Russian lines from the attacks of the Armenians.

In the middle of February Turkish troops reoccupied Erzinjan (February 12), Baiburt (February 14) and Trebizond (February 24). Nevertheless, when the Seim met on February 23, all parties, including even the Tatars, maintained their attitude of co-operation with the non-Bolshevist parties in Russia, and of refusal to participate with the Bolsheviks in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. On March 1 they agreed on the four heads of a peace settlement which provided for the restoration of the frontiers of 1914 and the creation of an autonomous Armenia "within the frame of the Turkish State."

Next day the Tiflis Government received a telegram from the Bolshevik Commissary Karakhan, announcing the retrocession to Turkey of the districts of Batum, Ardahan and Kars. The Transcaucasian Government protested that any treaty "signed without its consent" was "void of international importance," and repeated its willingness to discuss a settlement on the basis of the proposals of March 1. But the Turkish Government replied that the cession of the territories in question had been completed, while the Transcaucasus, according to the statements of its own Government, was a part of Russia, and insisted on the immediate evacuation of the ceded districts. The Turkish Command immediately undertook a double offensive against Erzerum and Batum. Armenian troops and volunteers, under General Nazarbekian and the partisan leaders Antranik and Murad, offered a desperate resistance. But the Georgian troops, under General Odichelidze, unwilling to exhaust their strength in the defence of the Turkish Armenian districts, withdrew. On March 11 the Turks entered Erzerum; during the following month they reoccupied the remaining districts of Turkish Armenia, and approached Kars by Olti and Sarikamish. At the same time the Mussulmans rose in the Province of Kars. All communications were cut, and the

¹ Doc. & Mat., Nos. 15-25.

insurgents seized Ardahan and Merdenik, while the panic-stricken Christian population fled towards Batum or Akhaltsikh.

Further, there was serious friction between the Georgian and Armenian commanders, the former hesitating to co-operate seriously in the defence of the Kars line. Nevertheless, when the Seim met on March 11 the Armenian and Georgian groups still worked together. Jordania opposed the Brest concessions. The Tatars, however, had already committed themselves definitely to a Turkish orientation, and it was evident that they were no longer willing to co-operate in the maintenance of Transcaucasian unity. A week later occurred the Mussavetist attempt to overthrow the Soviet at Baku, and with the departure of the Mussavetist leaders for Elisavetpol the Transcaucasian Seim lost the last semblance of control over the Eastern districts.

During the latter part of March and the beginning of April a Transcaucasian Delegation under the presidency of Mr. Chenkeli was negotiating at Trebizond with the Turkish plenipotentiary Khalil Bey. Chenkeli, more conscious at Trebizond than the Government at Tiflis of the desperate situation, at last agreed to recognise the Brest Treaty. The Turks thereupon pressed for a declaration of Transcaucasian independence, and on April 13 delivered a forty-eight hours' ultimatum. The Seim was still unwilling to yield, and the Delegation was recalled to Tiflis. On April 14 the Turks entered Batum after a feeble resistance. They then advanced to Notanebi and Ozurgeti. On April 27 they occupied Kars. The situation was desperate. The Government of Gegéchkori resigned, and Chenkeli, who had advocated the concessions, succeeded, and proclaimed the Independence of Transcaucasia.

But the Turks immediately advanced fresh demands. They now had plans far more ambitious than the restoration of the territories lost in 1878. They were in communication with the Tatar National Committee of Elisavetpol, and with a delegation from the Union of Mountaineers which had come to Trebizond. And they conceived an advance on Baku and the extension of their power over all Azerbaijan, Daghestan and North-west Persia. They therefore demanded the surrender of the Alexandropol-Julfa railway-line, "so as to prevent a British concentration in Azerbaijan,"¹ and began an attack on the Armenians at Alexandropol. On May 15 Alexandropol fell, and the Turks subsequently occupied Elisavetpol (June 1) and Tabriz (June 15).

¹ *New Europe*, December 28, 1918.

The Georgian Social Democratic Republic (May 1918-20).—While the Turks and the Tatars were attacking the Armenians in the region of Alexandropol, Erivan and Kara Bagh, the Transcaucasian Government continued at Batum negotiations for a definite peace with Turkey. The interests of the Armenians and Georgians were now widely divergent, for whilst the very existence of the former was threatened by a Turkish control of the Eastern Caucasus, the latter, from their geographical position, were able to regard the Turkish menace with fewer misgivings, and were only anxious to save themselves from becoming involved in further hostilities. Thus, while the Armenian National Committee at Erivan directed an exclusive policy, the Transcaucasian Government at Tiflis tended more definitely each week to represent Georgian interests alone.

But Khalil Bey, at Batum, showed no intention of allowing the Georgians to assume a neutral attitude towards the Armeno-Turkish war. He demanded the right "to bring military help" to prevent the formation of bands in Transcaucasian territory; control of the railways and of Russian ships in Transcaucasian ports; free passage for Turkish troops and military stores through Transcaucasian territory; and immediate demobilisation of all the armed forces at the disposal of the Transcaucasian Government. Further, he patronised Mussulman delegations from the districts of Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki, who petitioned for annexation to Turkey. Meanwhile the Bolshevik dictator at Baku, Shaumian, an Armenian, was organising a Red Army of Russian and Armenian workmen, with the professed intention of marching on Tiflis and destroying "that nest of Menshevist reaction." And in the maritime region Bolshevik ships of the Black Sea Fleet bombarded Sukhum and other watering-places, while a Bolshevik force marched along the coast and occupied Sochi, Gagri and Sukhum.

In this situation the Transcaucasian Government commenced to negotiate for German intervention through the medium of the German representative at Batum, General v. Lossow. The German Government at this time had differences with the Porte on questions of general military policy, and was anxious to check Turkish aggression in the Caucasus, in order to secure the transference of Turkish troops to the Syrian front. During April the Germans had occupied Odessa, Nikolaev and Sevastopol, and had seized the bulk of the Black Sea Fleet. Accordingly they were soon in a position to intervene effectively. On May 25 3,000 German troops under General Kress v. Kressenstein landed at Poti, and German

pickets appeared on all the frontiers of Georgia. On the same day the Transcaucasian Seim voted its own dissolution, and in the evening Jordania announced the declaration of the Independence of the Georgian Republic. Three days later an agreement was concluded at Poti between v. Lossow and Chenkeli, by which the railways and all naval tonnage were ceded to Germany for the duration of the war. By a later agreement, signed at Batum, the Georgian Government guaranteed to Turkey the free transit of petroleum by the pipe-line from Baku to Batum.

The apologia of the Georgian Social Democrats for the German Agreement is set forth in a memorandum to the International Socialist Bureau: "We tried to unite the Transcaucasian peoples to defend the whole of the country. But our attempt was broken by the national hatred of the Armenians and Tatars, which was rending Transcaucasia. . . . We remained alone, in a ring of fire, surrounded by enemies on all sides. The Turks marched on us from west and south, the Bolsheviks menaced from the north, and the Tatars from the east. . . . Germany alone was able to tear us away from the noose of the Turkish agreement on the condition that we handed over to her the control of our railway system. . . . No other means remained to deliver us from the Turkish occupation. Our sovereignty as to the railways was, anyhow, destroyed by our defeat. And we signed the Treaty with the Germans, gave them our railways, received their regiments, on the sole condition—which they fulfilled—to defend us from Turkey and not to interfere with our internal affairs. However," they add, "during the darkest days, when German help was most needed, we did not renounce the right of pitilessly criticising German Imperialism."

The German occupation undoubtedly saved Georgia from anarchy, while the diplomatic support of the German mission allowed the Tiflis Government to pursue a policy, in relation particularly to Armenia, which was scarcely consonant with its "pitiless criticism of German Imperialism." During the spring a military force had been organised at Tiflis round the nucleus of a body of armed workmen, and was styled "The National Guard." This body, after wavering for some time between Bolshevism and a Chauvinistic form of Nationalism, was finally persuaded by its leaders to devote itself to the defence and other interests of the Georgian Republic. The first campaign of the young army was the invasion and occupation of the Armenian part of the Borchalu district,

Akhalkalaki, and the circuit of Phambak in the government of Alexandropol, on the pretext that Armenia was "unable to build a viable State." When the Erivan Government protested to v. Kressenstein, he replied that "Germany as an ally had engaged itself to support the Georgian claims."¹

On the north the revival of the Volunteer Army, during the late summer of 1918, enabled the National Guard to drive the Bolsheviks from Sukhum, Gagri and Sochi, and to occupy the mountain districts of the Abkhazians and Ossets, with all the western and central passes of the Caucasus, including the Mamison and Daryal, controlling respectively the Ossetian and Georgian Military Roads.

The conclusion of the armistice in November 1918 greatly modified the situation in Transcaucasia. While the Germans and Turks withdrew respectively from Georgia and Azerbaijan, the British assumed control of Batum and Baku and the line of the Transcaucasian Railway, while the Armenians proceeded to occupy Alexandropol, Kars, Ardahan and Ardanuch.

Three distinct influences must be considered in relation to the situation: (1) the mutual relations of the three national Republics; (2) The attitude of the Russian counter-revolutionary Government at Ekaterinodar; and (3) the policy of the Entente Powers.

(1) Although circumstances now favoured the Armenians, they were so exhausted by the struggle of the preceding year that the Turks at Erzerum and the Tatars at Baku still remained a real menace to their safety. Nevertheless on their Georgian frontier they undertook an offensive against Akhalkalaki and Shulaveri, with the object of regaining the territories occupied by the Georgians during the summer. The Armenians gained some initial successes, but an armistice was imposed by the Allied authorities and the ultimate allocation of the disputed territories was left to the decision of the Peace Conference at Paris. In Tiflis the Armenian offensive and the hostile attitude of the Volunteer Army on the northern frontier proved the occasion of a cruel persecution of the considerable Russian and Armenian element. During January 1919 numbers of Russians and Armenians were assaulted in the streets, and the military capacity of the National Guard was demonstrated in the systematic looting of houses in the Armenian quarter.

During the following months however the Georgian Government made a genuine effort to reconcile national differences

¹ *New Russia*, ii, 23, July 8, 1920.

and to bring about a degree of co-operation between the national Governments. Various proposals were made for the convocation of a conference of the Transcaucasian States, but the hostility between Baku and Erivan continued to obstruct the conclusion of any common political agreement. However, the signature of the Railway and Postal Convention between the three Governments in the autumn of 1919 was hailed as the first step towards the establishment of a Transcaucasian Confederation.

(2) The counter-revolutionary leaders at Ekaterinodar bore almost as much animosity against the Georgian Socialists as against the Bolsheviks. On the other hand the Georgian Socialists did not hesitate to stigmatise the "Tsarist Generals" as reactionaries—although Mr. Gegéchkori had, in an interview with General Alexeiev, stated that "within our borders the struggle against Bolshevism is implacable"—and they further asserted a series of claims as to the possession or "self-determination" of the Sochi district. Finally, in March 1919, Denikin prepared to make an end of the Caucasian nationalist movement. On the Black Sea coast he occupied Sochi, and the Georgians retired behind the Bzib. At the same time a Russian force occupied Temir-Khan-Shura and brought to an end the "Republic of the Mountaineers."

(3) The policy of the Allies in the Caucasus had been governed by the broader consideration of the Russian Revolutionary question as a whole. While supporting the Russian counter-revolutionaries they had at the same time acquiesced in, or encouraged, the formation of autonomous governments among the border peoples. These, in principle, they were unwilling to recognise as independent, although there was a strong influence in the direction of Allied—particularly of British—policy, which favoured the erection and consistent support of a belt of independent border States. Denikin's attack on the Caucasian Republics provoked a protest from the British Black Sea Command. A small British force was landed at Gagri, between the Volunteer troops at Sochi and the Georgians near Pitsunda, and Denikin, who was dependent on British support in the campaign against the Bolsheviks, was constrained to stop his offensive.

A result of Denikin's offensive was a further effort of the Georgian Government to organise a Transcaucasian alliance—if not a confederation. On July 16, 1919 a Military Convention was signed between Georgia and Azerbaijan, with the object of combined defensive action against the Volunteer Army. But

Erivan, careful of offence to the Allies, and fearing a Turko-Tatar rather than a Russian attack, held aloof.

In the autumn of 1919 the combination against Denikin developed into a formidable rising of the Daghestanli Khans, which was certainly subsidised and abetted by the Azerbaijan Government. Levies were raised to the number of about 30,000, including 1,000 Turkish *askars*, and organised by fugitive Turkish officers and Tatars, ex-officers of the Imperial Army. In conjunction with Bolshevik elements from Astrakhan the insurgents attacked Derbend and Petrovsk, and threatened other towns. Denikin, at a critical moment, was therefore forced to withdraw two Cossack divisions with armoured cars from the front in Central Russia, but he was successful after a few weeks' campaign in subduing the Khans.

In August the British evacuated all points in Transcaucasia except Batum. A first consequence of this action was a closer Turko-Tatar *rapprochement*, and a desire on the part of the Armenian Government, manifested in a Treaty of Arbitration (November 13), to arrive at a closer understanding with Georgia.

At the beginning of 1920 the collapse of the Volunteer Army and the advance of the Bolsheviks into the Kuban caused the Georgian Government to make one last attempt to achieve some form of co-operation among the Transcaucasian States. The Prime Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan were induced to meet and discuss the vexed Zangezur question. But the Tatars were attracted by the prospect of a military alliance with the Turkish Nationalist Government against the Armenians, and concentrated their troops in the Zangezur region. On April 27 the Bolsheviks seized Baku.

The relations of the Tiflis Government with Moscow had, until Denikin's collapse, been normal. Chicherin had, in fact, proposed a Georgian attack on Denikin at the beginning of January. But Gegéchkori had professed disinterestedness in the Russian Civil War, and had refused to permit Georgia to become involved in "a military adventure which would be far beyond her strength." Further negotiations had then taken place, and peace had been agreed upon in principle. But the Bolshevik Staff was notoriously independent of Moscow, and Georgia might expect an immediate attack. During April indeed the Bolsheviks occupied the Gagri district in spite of Georgian protests and raided the Gori district from the north. On May 1 there was a Bolshevik outbreak at Tiflis.

The Polish War however, induced the Bolsheviks to suspend all aggression in the East. Consequently a Treaty was signed

at Moscow (June 12) by which the Soviet Government recognised the independence of Georgia, and disclaimed all interest in the internal affairs of that country. Georgia was to receive Batum, should it be evacuated by the British, and a neutral zone was established on each side of the Caucasian Mountains. But the cynical attitude of the Bolsheviks towards the Treaty, which they regarded as merely of a temporary nature, was indicated by the correspondence of Chicherin with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in which he approved the latter's proposal to decide by plébiscite the future of Batum and other regions.

While the Moscow negotiations were in progress the Supreme Council had decided on the evacuation of Batum, and at the beginning of July 1920 the Franco-British troops were withdrawn. The Georgians had already occupied Artvin (May 6), and on July 9 the control of Batum was formally transferred to them by the British High Commissioner, Colonel Stokes.

The evacuation of Batum by the Allies was significant of their intention to abstain from all active intervention in Transcaucasia. Georgia and Armenia were left to their own resources. The situation in the two countries became extremely critical during the autumn of 1920. The people were demoralised by the long period of political crises. In Georgia economic life was disorganised by the unfavourable rate of exchange with Europe, by the impossibility of resuming normal relations with the Northern Caucasus and Azerbaijan, and by the uncertainty of the supply of oil-fuel from Baku. In Armenia the peasants were disheartened by the delay in the solution of the Turkish Armenian question, and the productive capacity of the country was strained to an extreme limit by the necessity of supporting hundreds of thousands of refugees. Thousands of deaths from malnutrition and exposure were occurring, and cholera and typhus were ravaging the crowded villages.

It was patent to all observers that both countries must succumb to a vigorous attack. Their continued independence depended on the preoccupation of the Bolsheviks in other quarters.

In November the conclusion of the Polish War and the unexpected collapse of the White Army in the Crimea precipitated the crisis. The Bolsheviks were now free to despatch troops to the Transcaucasus. At the same time the fall of Venizelos and the political changes in Greece permitted the Turks to withdraw troops from the Smyrna front for despatch to Erzerum. In the middle of September they commenced operations in the regions of Kars and Igdir, and in November the movement

developed formidable proportions. The demoralised Armenians lacked munitions, uniforms and food, and further, they could hope for no help from the Allies. Kars fell, almost without a shot, and the inhabitants of Erivan only avoided a Turkish occupation by the establishment of a Soviet and recognition of the authority of the Moscow Government.

The Georgians were in a precarious position. Sporadic Bolshevik outbreaks occurred at Tiflis and Batum, and further, the Georgians appear to have been disheartened by the attitude of the British Government, who during the negotiations at Genoa with the Soviet Government appeared to ignore the interests of the Caucasian Governments, and failed to make any suggestion that they should be recognised by the Soviet Government or even to stipulate for their immunity from immediate attack. When the Armenians were attacked the Georgian Government hesitated to make any effort to assist them, and confined themselves, after the Turks had taken Kars and Alexandropol, to occupying the Armenian towns of Ardahan and Ardanuch, officially as a friendly and protective measure.

In the middle of February the Bolsheviks commenced an attack on Georgia. Armenian troops moved on Shulaveri, while a strong force of Bolshevik cavalry advanced up the valley of the Kur towards Tiflis, and detachments crossed the Mamison and Daryal Passes. At the same time another Bolshevik force advanced from Gagri towards Sukhum. The Armenian thrust was repulsed, but the force moving along the Kur was supported by a Bolshevik rising of Russian and Armenian elements in Tiflis, and the Georgian defence was disorganised by the defection of part of the National Guard. In the last week of February Tiflis fell, and the Georgian Government withdrew to Kutais. At the beginning of March the Bolsheviks occupied Mtskheta and Gori.

Meanwhile the Nationalist Turks occupied Ardahan, Ardanuch and Artvin by agreement with the Georgians, and on March 9 entered Batum.

The Turko-Georgian understanding did not, however, modify the situation. A Georgian rally on the Suram ridge had been expected. But while the Bolshevik Black Sea force took Sukhum and Poti, the Kur army entered Kutais, and the Government of Jordania fled on board an Italian warship at Batum. On March 17 the Bolsheviks approached that town. The Georgian Government troops then deserted to the Bolsheviks, and attacked the small Turkish detachment, which was forced to withdraw.

The Bolsheviks subsequently established Soviets at Batum and Tiflis under the leaders of Georgian Bolshevism, and a Treaty was signed between Angora and Moscow, which confirmed the Turkish occupation of Ardahan, Artvin and Kars, and guaranteed to the Turks free goods transit to Batum.

Following the Kars Conference (October–November 1921), which regulated the relations of the Angora Government and the Caucasian Bolshevik Governments, confirmed the Turks in the possession of Kars and Ardahan, and established a special régime for the Batum Provinces, the Soviet Government abolished by decree the independence of the three Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia, and established one federal union under Russian control, with a political capital at Baku—the centre of Bolshevik influence—and an economic capital at Tiflis. It should be added that the representatives of the four exiled Caucasian Governments (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan) have also “concluded an alliance and established an understanding” by an agreement signed in Paris on June 10, 1921, providing for co-ordination of foreign policy, compulsory arbitration in disputes, and a Customs Union.

In general the situation indicates the development of a further phase of the Russian Revolution—the failure of the separatist movement of the border races and the reconstruction of the Russian Imperial unit through the agency of the Bolshevik military machine. Such a consummation in the Caucasus was, perhaps, inevitable. For the history of the last four years has demonstrated the political instability and military weakness of the national States. And from the standpoint of Russian Imperial policy the re-establishment of control over the Caucasus was a strategic and economic necessity.

Thus for reasons political, economic and moral, it is unquestionable that the future of the Transcaucasian peoples must lie in intimate union with Russia. The actual form of association between Russia and the Transcaucasians, as also the other border races, still remains to be evolved. But it is to be hoped that a liberal autonomy will allow to Georgians, Tatars, Armenians and Mountaineers alike the opportunity for prosperous economic development, and for the preservation of their individual characteristics. In an age of standardisation the distinctive cultures of ancient races are at once a source of advantage to civilisation and of delight to the individual.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

B.C.	
11th to 6th Cent.	Period of Semitic predominance in South-east Asia Minor, and of Aryan invasions. The Caucasians are driven gradually eastward into the basins of the Kur and Aras. The Cimmerians (later the Alans) probably displace the Kabards and Cherkesses from the steppe north of the Caucasus.
6th to 4th Cent.	Persians predominant in Transcaucasia. Development of a feudal system in Iberia. ¹ Writing said to have been introduced by King Pharnavaz.
4th to 2nd Cent.	Iberians, ¹ Colchians and Albanians ¹ virtually independent. Period of much Hellenic commercial activity in the Euxine.
112-64 . . .	The kingdom of the Pontine Arsacids.
64	Roman suzerainty established over the Albanians, Iberians, and Colchians.
A.D.	
1st to 7th Cent.	Period of Roman and Persian struggle for the control of Armenia and Transcaucasia. The kingdoms of Lazica, Iberia and Aghovania subject alternately to Rome and Persia. The barbarian tribes, Alans, Huns, Khazars and others constantly invade the lowlands by the Caspian Gates. The Persians try to establish a defensive line from Derbend to Daryal, to which the Romans occasionally make financial contributions. Christianity introduced into Georgia (4th to 5th centuries) and the Greek Emperors found many churches in the western regions (Pitsunda, Nakalevi, etc.).
628	Conclusion of last Græco-Persian War.
637	The Arabs, under Habib, take Erzerum.
639	Stephanos nominated King of Iberia by the Emperor Heraclius.
639-51	The Arabs capture Nakhichevan, Dovin, Derbend and Tiflis. Stephanos driven East of the Suram Mountains. The Dido and other Lesghian tribes conquered.
651-733	Wars between the Arabs and Khazars. Finally Mervan the Obstinate re-establishes the former defensive line Derbend-Daryal. The Lesghians and Alans are subdued and converted to Islam.
8th to early 9th Cent.	Period of great Arab commercial activity and general prosperity in Transcaucasia.
9th Cent. . . .	Gradual decay of the Arab administrative machine. Independent Shahs spring up in Daghestan and Shirvan. The Beni-Jafar Emirs of Tiflis. Orbelians in Kakhetia.
10th Cent. . . .	Rise of the Armenian Bagratids. The kingdoms of Lori and Aghovank.

¹ See p. 229.

	A.D.	
985 . . .		Bagrat III elected King of Abkhazia.
994 . . .		He succeeds to the kingdom of Tao.
1001 . . .		David, Kuropalat of Basian, leaves his estates to the Byzantine Emperor.
1008 to 1050 . . .		Bagrat III inherits the Karthalinian crown. Period of hostilities between the Georgians and Greeks, the latter gradually absorbing the Armenian principalities. Struggle between the Georgian kings and the feudal houses, chief of whom are the Kakhetian Orbelians. Period of church building.
1048 . . .		The Seljuk Turks defeat a Græco-Georgian army.
1071 . . .		The Greeks severely defeated at Melasgird.
1072-89 . . .		The Turks constantly invade Georgia; capture Tiflis (1088).
1092-1125 . . .		David the Restorer, during the period of the Crusades, drives out the Turks; subdues the Orbelians (1105); recaptures Tiflis (1122); founds Gori and Ghelathi.
Dmitri I, 1125-54 . . .		Period of warfare against the Mussulmans.
Giorgi II, 1154-84 . . .		Georgian frontiers extended to Kars, Ani, Dovin and Ganja. The Emirs of East Caucasia and the Mountain-princes dependent on the Georgian kings. Much prosperity, church-building and Greek culture among the aristocracy. Age of Rustaveli and the great bards.
Thamara, 1184-1212.		
Giorgi IV, Lasha, 1212-20.		Period of Khvarasmian and Mongol Wars. Mongol hegemony established, and Georgian kings nominated by the Il-Khans. Georgia and Mingrelia for a time independent kingdoms, but eventually united under Giorgi the Brilliant. The invasions of the Mountaineers and of the Ottoman Turks. The Black Death (1366) and the campaigns of Timur greatly weaken the country and shake the power of the Monarchy and the Church.
Queen Rusudan, 1220-47.		
David IV, Narin, 1234-93.		
David V, Lasha, 1244-69.		
Dmitri II, 1271-89, And others.		
Vakhtang II, 1293-1318		
Giorgi V, the Brilliant, 1318-46.		
David VII, 1346-60.		
Bagrat V, 1360-95.		
Giorgi VII, 1395-1407.		
Alexander I, 1407-42. 1442-1722 . . .		Georgia is divided into a number of kingdoms and principalities, i.e. Karthalinia and Kakhetia under Persian influence; Akhaltsikh, Guria, Mingrelia and Imeretia under Turkish influence; Ksan and the Araghva, Svanetia, Abkhazia, Radsha and Ossetia virtually independent.
16th Cent. . . .		First Cossack settlements.
1586-96 . . .		Russian operations against Shamkhal of Tarku.
1619-64 . . .		Intrigues of Taimuraz of Kakhetia with the Russians.
1722 . . .		Peter the Great's campaign in the Caucasus.
1735 . . .		Kisliar founded.
1748-97 . . .		Revival of Georgian kingdom under Irakli II.
1769. . . .		Todleben's campaign in Transcaucasia.
1774		Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji.
To 1779		Russian organisation of Northern Caucasus. Stavropol and other forts founded.
1783		The Act of Gori. Daryal road and Vladikavkaz begun.

A.D.	
1785	The Ghazavat of Sheikh Mansur.
1790	The Russians storm Anapa.
1791	Treaty of Jassy.
1795-6	Persian invasion of Georgia. Agha Muhammad sacks Tiflis.
1796	Russians occupy country as far as the Aras, but later withdraw.
1799	The Avars invade Kakhetia.
1800	Giorgi XII surrenders the Georgian crown to Tsar Paul.
1803-6	Viceroyalty of Tsitsianov.
1803	Mingrelia proclaimed a Russian Province.
1807	Russians capture Anaklia, Anapa and Poti from the Turks.
1810	Imeretia, Elisú and Samukh annexed. Guria and Abkhazia seek Russian protection. Jaro-Bielokanis subdued.
1811	Russians capture Akhalkalaki. Georgian Church subordinated to Russian Synod.
1812	Treaty of Bucharest restores losses to the Turks. Persian victory at Sultan-buda. Risings at Tiflis, Telav and Signakh. Russian victory at Aslanduz.
1813	Treaty of Gulistan. Russians subdue the Khevsurs.
1818-20	Yermolov builds Grozni and Vnezapnaia. Madatov reduces the Lesghian Khanates.
1821	Rising in Imeretia.
1822	The Kabardans subdued. Rising in Guria.
1825	Appearance of Kazi-Mullah and Shamil.
1825-7	Russo-Persian War and Treaty of Turkmanchai.
1827-8	Russo-Turkish War. Russians acquire Anapa, Poti and the Pashalik of Akhaltsikh by the Treaty of Adrianople.
1829-32	Russian campaigns against the Murids. Death of Kazi-Mullah, the first Imam.
1834	Death of Hamzad Beg, the second Imam.
1837	Shamil proclaimed third Imam.
1839	Russians take Akhulgo. "The Murid sect has fallen."
1843	Revival of Muridism. Shamil lays siege to Temir Khan Shura.
1844	Daniel, Sultan of Elisú, joins Shamil.
1845	Vorontsov defeated at Dargo in Chechnia, with a loss of nearly 4,000 men.
1846	Shamil's unsuccessful attempt to invade Kabarda and establish communication with the Western tribes.
1851	Haji Murad surrenders to the Russians. Decline of Shamil's power.
1853-5	The Crimean War. Failure of the Allies to co-operate with Shamil. The Kars and Ingur campaigns.
1857	Agrarian rising in Mingrelia.
1859	Shamil surrenders at Gunib.
1862	Cherkess deputies visit England.
1864	Final submission of the Western tribes. Wholesale emigration, with disastrous results to Turkey. Autonomy of Abkhazia abolished.
1870	Autonomy of Mingrelia abolished. Poti-Tiflis railway begun. Chiaturi manganese mines developed.
1871	Death of Shamil at Medina.
1874	Georgian National Army abolished.
1877-8	Russo-Turkish War. Insurrections in Circassia and Daghestan easily repressed. The Russians acquire Batum, Ardahan and Kars by the Treaty of Berlin.

	A.D.	
1880	.	Emigration of the Ajars to the Brusa district.
1883	.	Tiflis-Baku railway begun.
1884	.	Rothschild activity at Batum. Caucasian Viceroyalty abolished. Marxist movement of Ghibladze and Ninishvili begins to replace Romantic movement of Chavchavadze.
1887	.	Conscription applies to the Caucasus. I. Tsereteli founds <i>Kvili</i> .
1896	.	Union of Raliwaymen founded. Return of N. Jordania from Geneva.
1898	.	Revolt in Chechnia.
1900	.	Galitsin's Military Law. Outbreak of strikes and arrest of Jordania and others. I. Tsereteli founds <i>Kvireli</i> in succession to <i>Kvili</i> .
1902	.	Insurrection in Ossetia.
1905	.	Revolutionary outbreaks at Tiflis and elsewhere. The "Gurian Republic."
1906	.	Severe repression in Mingrelia, Imeretia and Guria by Alikhanov.
1908	.	Foundation of "Association of Circassian Émigrés in Turkey."
1914	.	Outbreak of the Great War. Activities of Kerezeliidze.
1915-16	.	Caucasian Delegation in Berlin, Vienna and Switzerland.
1917.	March	Revolution in Petrograd. "Special Caucasian Committee" nominated.—May. Fall of the Cadets. First Congress of the Mountaineers at Vladikavkaz.—Sept. Second Congress at Vladikavkaz.—Nov. The Bolshevik <i>coup</i> at Petrograd. Commissariat and Seim organised at Tiflis.—Relations of the Mountaineers with the South-east Union.—Dec. 2. "Union of the Mountaineers" proclaimed.—3. Georgian National Congress. Jordania's "All-Russian platform."
1918.	Jan.	Invitation to the "Independent Transcaucasian Republic" to attend the Brest negotiations. "Combined action with autonomous Governments of Russia."—Feb. 23. Meeting of Transcaucasian Seim.—March 2–April 13. Negotiations between the Turks and the Transcaucasian Commissariat at Trebizond. Colonel Chermoeiev asks assistance from Tiflis against the Bolsheviks, and later attends the negotiations at Trebizond. Georgian Delegation recalled. Jordania: "We shall not sign." Bolsheviks occupy Black Sea coast and Abkhazia.—April 14. Turks take Batum.—27–28. Turks take Kars; advance to Notanebi and Ozurgeti. Resignation of Gegéchkori. Declaration of Transcaucasian independence.—May 1. Negotiations continued at Batum. Turks recognise "Republic of the Mountaineers." Germans take Sevastopol.—15. Turks take Alexandropol.—25. German troops landed at Poti.—28. Declaration of Georgian independence.—June. The National Guard occupy Sukhum, Gagri and Sochi.—August. Osset rising at Dushet.—Sept. Georgian aggression in Borchalu region. Gegéchkori meets Alexeiev at Ekaterinodar.—Nov. Anglo-Turkish Armistice. British occupy Batum and Transcaucasian Railway. Georgian proposals for a Transcaucasian Conference.

—*Dec.* Armeno-Georgian hostilities, in which the Allied representatives intervene.

1919. *Feb.* Second proposal for Transcaucasian Conference. Muslim rising in Akhaltsikh region.—*March.* Denikin takes Sochi and occupies Temir Khan Shura. British interference.—*July* 16. Treaty of Alliance between Azerbaijan and Georgia.—*August.* British evacuate Transcaucasia except Batum.—*Nov.* 13. Armeno-Georgian Arbitration Treaty.
1920. *Jan.* 2 Chicherin suggests a Georgian attack on Denikin.—*Jan.* 12. Supreme Council recognises *de facto* independence of Georgia.—*April* 25–*May* 2. Bolsheviks threaten Sukhum and Gori, and seize the Poili bridge over the Kur. Bolshevik outbreak at Tiflis *May* 11. Georgians occupy Artvin.—*June* 12. Russo-Georgian Treaty. Kirov sent to Tiflis.—*June* 9. Allies “transfer” Batum to Georgia.—*Dec.* Turko-Bolshevist attack on Armenia. Georgians occupy Ardahan and Ardanuch.
1921. *Jan.* Allies recognise *de jure* independence of Georgia.—*End of Feb.*–*March.* Bolshevik attack on Georgia. Occupation of Tiflis, Mtskheth and Gori. Turks enter Ardaghan, Ardanuch, Artvin and Batum. Bolsheviks advance by Sukhum to Poti; occupy Kutais. Drive the Turks out of Batum, and proclaim a Soviet Republic in Tiflis and Batum. *March* 16. Treaty signed at Moscow cedes Artvin and Ardahan to Turkey, with right of free transit to Batum.

SECTION II—CAUCASIAN AZERBAIJAN

"That country is cold, with abundance of snow and rain; . . . its inhabitants are dull and uncommunicative; they are remarkable for their heavy beards; their tongue is not beautiful."

al-Mukadassi, A.D. 985.

"The Tatars . . . have a dignity of bearing and a charm of manner which endear them to all who come in contact with them. . . . They are extraordinarily backward in their development and as ignorant and barbarous as any race in Asia."

LUIGI VILLARI, 1906.

VII

GENERAL HISTORY TO 1917¹

THE territories inhabited by a majority of the so-called Turks or Tatars of Azerbaijan comprise the ex-Russian Governments of Baku and Elisavetpol, and parts of the Governments of Daghestan, Tiflis, Zakatali and Erivan. In general, the Tatars of Azerbaijan form a compact mass in the lower valleys of the Kur and Aras and along the Caspian from Derbend to Lenkoran. In the eastern parts of the Government of Tiflis they are mingled with Georgians, in that of Zakatali with Georgians and Lesghians, and in Daghestan with Lesghians. In the region of the Baku oil-fields there is a large alien minority of Russians, Armenians, Poles and other nationalities, whose advent dates only from 1870. In the southern coastal region of Talish there are a number of Persians (Tats) mixed with the Tatars. And in the hilly regions of Zangezur and Kara Bagh, comprising the south-eastern part of the Government of Erivan and the south-western part of the Government of Elisavetpol, Tatar, Armenian, Kurdish and gipsy elements are intermingled. It is in this region that the racial and religious feud between Tatar and Armenian has assumed the most acute form. For whereas the Armenian peasants occupy and cultivate the hill-country, the nomad Tatars, whilst pasturing their flocks and herds on the steppes of Kara Bagh, Mil and Mughan during the winter, are accustomed to drive them up into the hilly

¹ See maps facing pp. 192, 204.

country for the summer months. Hence have arisen serious economic differences between Armenian farmer and Tatar herdsman which have been embittered by the respective claims of the political leaders of the two races.

The settlement of Turkish-speaking peoples in the Eastern Transcaucasus is of comparatively recent date. In the time of Herodotus the lower valleys of the Kur and Aras were inhabited by tribes of Caucasian affinities, while an Aryo-Persian tribe, the Caspii, held the Talish littoral. In the first century A.D., Strabo describes the Albanians¹ as the inhabitants of the Eastern Transcaucasus. The Albanians were ethnically Caucasians and were related to the neighbouring tribes to the west, Iberians and Colchians. The Caspii had been absorbed by the Albanians, but a Persian element continued to exist as a result of the frequent invasion of the country by the Persians, whose soldiers settled as colonists in not inconsiderable numbers.

From the seventh century B.C. there was a constant infiltration of elements from the Northern Steppe, the later invading tribes being certainly of Turki stock. Evidence however is too scanty to identify distinctly Turkish nomadic elements at this time. During the following seven centuries the nomadic incursions continued. The Persians endeavoured, with little success, to establish a defensive line at Derbend. When the Arabs conquered the Caucasus they likewise tried to establish this line, but it was not until the middle of the eighth century A.D. that they succeeded in breaking the military power of the Khazars, and in forming a strong defensive line against nomadic incursions from Derbend to Daryal. By that date the Turkish element was undoubtedly predominant in the plains of the lower reaches of the Kur and Aras, and the Caucasian or Albanian element had either been absorbed or driven westward and southward.

The Arabs effectively imposed the Islamic culture and religion on this amenable barbarian population, and thenceforward the Eastern Transcaucasus remained a region in which Mussulman institutions were acknowledged and established.

In the eleventh century the Turkish population of Shirvan, Aran and Mughan was further strengthened and augmented by the invasions and settlement of the Seljuks. To the habits of a nomad invader the grassy plains of the Kur and Aras were particularly favourable. The raiding bands of horsemen would place their camps in the plain of Mughan, and from such

¹ Not of course the ancestors of the inhabitants of European Albania.

a convenient centre set out to ravage Georgia, Armenia and North-western Persia.

Two centuries later the Mongols followed the Seljuk Turks, and the Plain of Mughan became the permanent winter-camp, the hills of KaraBagh the summer-camp, of the Persian Il-Khans.

Thus during twenty-one centuries of nomadic invasions the original Caucasian inhabitants of the Caspian littoral and the plains of the lower valleys of the Kur and Aras were gradually expelled or absorbed, and a Turko-Mongoloid, or Tatar, population became settled there as a result, firstly of the incursions of the Khazars from the north through the Gap of Derbend, secondly of the arrival of new Turkish elements from Khurasan and Central Asia in the tenth century, and thirdly of the invasions of the Mongols during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The Arabs were the first Imperial race to secure permanent control of the Kur and Aras Valleys, and to fortify and hold for any length of time the gap which gives access from the Steppe to the Transcaucasian lowlands. Further, they were the first race to bring under one control the western and eastern coasts of the Caspian and to develop to any great extent the maritime commerce of that sea. As a result of this military security and of political and economic organisation the prosperity of Eastern Transcaucasia developed, and Shirvan, Aran and Mughan soon became wealthy and important provinces of the Arab Empire.

In the Plains of Mughan and Kara Bagh the ruins of Arab towns and traces of canals, roads and caravanserais are plentiful. The great swampy plain stretching between the Aras and the Caspian was dotted with populous villages and rich in corn.

At Berda'a, the capital of Aran, roads converged from Kermanshah by Tabriz and Dabil, chief town of Muslim Armenia, from Rai by Ardebil and the towns of the Mughan Plain, from Tiflis on the north-western frontier, and from Shemakha.

In the extreme north-east, on the furthestmost borders of Islam, lay Derbend, the Bab-el-Abwab or "Gate of Gates" of the Arab geographers, "the port for all the commerce of the Caspian Sea," whither the Khazars brought "honey and wax from the borders of Rus," and also furs and cereals. Derbend was a centre of the textile trade whence, says Ibn Haukal, "they send linen clothes to all parts of Aran and Azerbaijan. Here they also weave tapestry, or carpets, and cultivate saffron."

In the middle of the eleventh century the Arab Empire hereabouts collapsed, and for the next three and a half centuries

Transcaucasia was subject to the inroads and subsequent settlements of the nomadic tribes from the Central Asian Steppe, who were ravaging all the lands from the Baltic to the Red Sea.

During the period of Mongol domination (1236–1498) and later under the Safavi dynasty of Persia (1498–1736) Eastern Transcaucasia, semi-independent under Mussulman Khans, regained something of its former prosperity; but this prosperity was centred in Shirvan rather than in Aran or in Mughan. Derbend rose to importance as the point of junction between the territories of the Northern and Southern Mongols, and its population traded across the Caspian with Central Asia and Northern Persia, in furs, fustians, silk and rice. In this trade both Genoese and Venetians took a hand. Baku, to which the early Arab geographers give only brief references, was already the centre of a considerable trade in oil.

Up to the middle of the eighteenth century peasant and artisan remained in a low state of cultural development subject to the exactions and petty tyranny of the begs or local landowners, and to the oppressive rule of their native khans. These khans were, for the most part, cruel and ignorant soldiers, who spent their uncertain revenues in the maintenance of extravagant little courts where they endeavoured to mimic the luxuries and vices of Isfahan. All the education and knowledge in the khanates were the preserve of the Mussulman theocracy, who fulfilled at the same time the offices of priest, schoolmaster and magistrate.

The eighteenth century witnessed the organisation of Russia, under Peter the Great and his successors, into an aggressive military State and the simultaneous decline of the Muhammadan Powers which bordered her southern frontiers. Territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Turkey and Persia and the eventual control of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea became an integral part of Russian Imperial policy. Eventually, as the result of more than a century of aggression against Persia, the Russians succeeded in gaining control of the Caspian, and in establishing themselves in all the territories north of the Aras, previously subject to Persia.

By the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) Russia acquired the khanates of Derbend, Baku, Shirvan (Shemakha), Sheki (Nukha), Ganja (now Elisavetpol) and Lenkoran.

By the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1827) they further received possession of the Khanates of Erivan and Nakhichevan and the southern part of Talish.

Under Russian rule the Tatars prospered. The Imperial Government, inefficient and obscurantist in many things, at least reduced disorder to a minimum, and provided railways, roads, telegraphs and all those material amenities which the ardent nationalist is so inclined to ignore. The Tatar peasant settled down to peaceful agriculture, silk and vine-growing and gardening in the valley of the Kur, and to stock-breeding on the Southern Steppes. And when in 1873 Baku suddenly became a great industrial city, tens of thousands of Tatars flocked thither to gain a living in the oil-fields.

The land-owning class, at first recalcitrant, soon became reconciled to Russian rule, and the wealthy *begs*, with their oriental code of morals and their devotion to sport and military exercises, found much in common with the Russian officers into whose ranks they were gradually absorbed. The development of Baku produced a Tatar middle-class of oil-magnates, managers, engineers, lawyers and business men who, while maintaining a sentimental attachment to Islam and Turan, were proud to mix with the Russian bourgeoisie.

Local politics, particularly in Eastern Transcaucasia, were in the elementary stages of religion and petty nationalism. The Russian domination might be resented, but the object of the antagonism of all Tatars of whatever class was the Christian Armenian. The enmity of Tatar and Armenian was ancient. For centuries the Tatar *begs* in the south-eastern khanates had treated their Armenian serfs with abominable brutality—brutality of which, it must be admitted, the Tatar peasant was equally the victim. The Armenians had filled a notable rôle as partisans in the Russian wars against Persia and the Khans, and after the Treaties of Gulistan and Turkmanchai large numbers of the Armenian serfs of Tatar *begs* were freed.

For the first half-century of the Russian régime the Armenians were the favoured race against the Muslims. With envy and contempt the Tatars watched the Armenians, more astute and industrious than themselves, absorb all the trade in the country, consolidate themselves as the minor strata of the Russian bureaucracy, and establish themselves as an important factor in the industrial life of Baku. Furthermore, a regular infiltration of Armenian peasantry from Turkey into Transcaucasia alarmed Tatar landowners and peasants alike. But in the last decade of the nineteenth century the Imperial Government, anxious at the growing social unrest of the Empire and believing the Armenian anti-Turkish revolutionary clubs at Tiflis to be connected with Russian seditious organisations, reversed its policy

of favouring the Armenians, and Prince Galitsin, the Governor-General of the Caucasus, initiated a policy of oppression towards them which could not but be grateful to the Tatars. Finally, during the revolutionary troubles of 1903-6 in Russia, the Tatar-Armenian feud culminated in a sanguinary racial war. In the summer of 1903 there were strikes among the Russian and Armenian workmen at Baku and along the Transcaucasian Railway which, though economic in character, were political in tendency.

The Russian bureaucracy, lacking adequate military support from home, not unnaturally inclined towards the time-honoured policy of "divide and rule," by encouraging the Tatars against the Armenians, whose Committee at Baku, though essentially national, was in alliance with the revolutionary elements. In February 1905 the first serious fighting between Tatars and Armenians broke out at Baku. Prince Nakashidze, the Governor, a Georgian noble, made no attempt to protect the Armenians, and, according to a foreign eye-witness,¹ was to be seen "driving about the town openly encouraging the Tatars and slapping them on the back." Further outbreaks, when the Tatars generally took the offensive, occurred during the summer and autumn at Erivan, Nakhichevan, Elisavetpol, Shusha, Tiflis, and again at Baku, in the course of which many hundreds of Armenians and Tatars were killed.

Towards the end of 1905 however the Imperial Government became alarmed at the growing insurgence of the Tatars, and Prince Vorontsov-Dashkov, newly appointed Viceroy, adopted a more friendly attitude towards the Armenians. As the authority of the Imperial Government was restored, actual disturbances became less frequent, but during the period of anarchy racial passions had been aroused which were not to be easily mollified. From 1906 onwards there was great activity, both political and economic, among Georgians and Armenians. Political clubs of varying shades of opinion, but all violently nationalist, were numerous, and terrorist outrages were comparatively frequent. The Tatars had been slow to organise themselves, but gradually an association which professed to represent Tatar interests, known as the "Mussavet" (Union) Club, was formed at Baku. It was supported by the wealthy landowners, the industrial magnates and the bourgeois "intellectuals" of Baku, and its aims were at first ostensibly cultural, comprising the foundation of the Mussulman Philanthropic Society of Baku—generously endowed by the octo-

¹ L. Villari, *Fire and Sword in the Caucasus*, p. 195.

genarian oil-king Taghaiev—and the organisation of hospitals, homes for Tatars in distress, and summer-schools. The original political aims of the Mussavet were co-operation with the Tatars of Kazan and the Crimea, and the peaceful cultural development of the Tatar peoples within the Russian Empire. In the Duma it adhered to the left wing of the Cadets.

But political developments, both within and without the Russian Empire, impelled the Mussavet leaders to take up an attitude at once more individualistic and more nationalistic. While the growing tension in Russian politics tended to accentuate the differences between opposing groups, the Persian and Turkish Revolutions, representing attempts to invigorate the Islamic and Turanian ideas, could not fail to appeal to the imagination of many Tatars.

At the end of 1914, on the eve of war with Russia, the Young Turks negotiated with the Ottoman Armenians, and with certain Georgians and Tatars, with regard to the possible establishment of independent States in the Caucasus, subject to Ottoman suzerainty; but the scheme was abandoned owing to the hostility of the Armenians, who threw in their lot with the Allies. Even among the Tatars there appears to have been little active sympathy for the Turks, and while Mussulmans in general were not liable to conscription, many Tatars, particularly the landed gentry, voluntarily served in the Russian army.

VIII

THE REVOLUTION AND THE REPUBLIC

IN March 1917, when the revolution took place, the Tatars behaved with moderation; the masses took part in revolutionary demonstrations, but with little show of enthusiasm. At the first "Congress of Mussulmans" held at Baku in April, the Mussavet expressed the intention of acting in unison with the Tatars of Kazan, the Crimea and Turkistan, and contented themselves with following the idealist trend of other groups by nominating a "Muhammadan Committee of the Caucasus" to formulate the details of a democratic programme of reform. Representatives of the Mussavet attended the "All-Russian Mussulman Congress" which met at Moscow in May, and one of their number, Muhammad Beg Jafarov, sat on the "Committee of Four" which Kerenski had set up at Tiflis to administer the internal affairs of Trans-

caucasia. But when a Second Congress met at Baku in the middle of June the situation had changed, and strongly-worded resolutions were adopted on the subject of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism. The Third Congress, which met at Baku at the end of August, was more violent still.

In November the Bolshevik *coup d'état* precipitated the complete collapse of the Russian administrative system. Chaos immediately broke out in Transcaucasia. At Tiflis the "Committee of Four" was quickly succeeded by a "Commissariat of Fourteen," deriving its authority from a Transcaucasian Seim,¹ composed in proportion of Georgians, Russians, Tatars and Armenians. At Baku, an industrial centre and hence a stronghold of Bolshevism, a Soviet was established; in the country districts round Shemakha and Elisavetpol the peasants robbed and murdered the local begs; and in areas where the population was mixed a bitter racial war broke out. The Mussavetists were now openly pro-Turkish, and as the dissolution of the Russian forces proceeded and the Turks moved eastwards they became more daring. In January 1918 Tatar bands commenced to harass columns of Russian soldiers returning home; and a large force of Russians was cut to pieces at Shamkhor.

When in the middle of March the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, ceding Batum, Kars and Ardahan to Turkey, were announced in the Transcaucasian Seim, the Tatar deputies applauded and loudly advocated acknowledgment of the Treaty. On March 17 the Mussavet, emboldened by the Turkish reoccupation of Erzerum, organised a rising against the Soviet at Baku. But Stepan Shaumian, the able Armenian Commissary whom Lenin had sent to organise the proletariat of "the oil-city," proved equal to the occasion. The six gunboats of the Caspian Flotilla demolished the Muhammadan quarter and laid in ruins the headquarters of the Philanthropic Society. After three days' fighting the Tatars were subdued, having lost more than 2,000 killed; and their leaders fled to Elisavetpol, where they organised troops to co-operate with the Turks. The Turkish occupation of Alexandropol, on May 15, decided the Transcaucasian Seim to declare its dissolution, and the Georgians, Armenians and Tatars respectively proclaimed their independence at Tiflis, Erivan and Elisavetpol. The Tatars proclaimed the southern part of Daghestan and the Governments of Baku and Elisavetpol the "Republic of Azerbaijan," adopting the name of the neighbouring Persian

¹ Chamber.

province in order to appeal to the sentiment of its Tatar population.

On June 3 a Treaty was signed at Batum between the representatives of the three new Republics and Turkey, confirming Turkey's advantages under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and allowing to the Central Powers the use of the Transcaucasian Railway. Thereupon the Turkish Command, in spite of German opposition, began to move troops along the railway to the Tatar camp at Elisavetpol. By the end of June a combined Turko-Tatar army, under Nuri Pasha, numbering about 13,000 men, was concentrated there, ready to march on Baku. Meanwhile Shaumian, with the assistance of a young artillery colonel named Petrov, was organising a Red Army out of the Armenian and Russian workers at Baku, and was negotiating for the co-operation of the anti-Bolshevist Colonel Bicherakov, commanding the remnant of the Russian troops in Persia. Shaumian feared a counter-revolutionary *coup d'état* if Bicherakov were allowed to land at Baku, while the latter doubted the good faith of the Red Commissars. Eventually the two parties compromised, and Bicherakov was allowed to land at Alyat, where the Transcaucasian Railway runs east from Elisavetpol to the coast and turns due north to Baku. Bicherakov moved west along the railway with a force of some 1,500 Cossacks, strengthened by a British armoured car squadron from Persia. His plan was to save the important bridge across the Kur at Evlakh, but when he reached Kurd Amir he heard that the Red Army had already lost it.

Petrov's Armenians and Russians were little better than a mob, undisciplined, demoralised and starving; they were short of ammunition and water, and cholera had broken out. Bicherakov therefore, unable to stem the Turkish advance, fell back slowly on Baku, fighting desultory rearguard actions. In the last weeks of July the Turks were close to Baku, and Bicherakov, distrusting the Commissars, retired north of the town to Balajari Station, and from there withdrew by Derbend to Petrovsk and the Northern Caucasus.¹ On July 30 the Turks made an abortive attack on Baku. The same day Shaumian and Petrov retired, and their place was taken by a "Directorate of Five." These latter, faced with the prospect

¹ "Bicherakov was right to consider the town as already in the hands of the Turks, and this would compel his immediate withdrawal, so he accordingly acted in the light of this assumption"; but, "had the partisan detachment . . . remained in position and joined hands with us a few days later, Baku would never have fallen" (*Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 199).

of an immediate Turkish occupation, agreed to the disembarkation of a small British force, under Brigadier-General Dunsterville, which for some months had been concentrating in Northern Persia with the object of intervening against the Turks in Transcaucasia.

During the first week in August three British battalions,¹ a battery of R.F.A. and a battery of armoured cars were landed, and General Dunsterville and his staff made desperate efforts to organise the defence. Numerically the forces in Baku were adequate, and should have been capable of inflicting defeat on Nuri's small army. But the Red troops, Russian and Armenian, were utterly demoralised: their "one idea was to retire and rest from those parts of the front occupied by us." The Directorate was always obstructing the British officers and quarrelling with the Committee of the Caspian Flotilla, with the Armenian National Council or with the deposed Commissars, who continued to exercise considerable influence. The few Russian general officers still in nominal command of the troops were virtually prisoners and without authority. When, on August 26, the Turks made a fresh attack on Baku, the brunt of the fighting fell on the British troops, while the Baku levies showed little inclination to offer a serious resistance. As a result of this action Dunsterville determined that no more lives should be risked "in a cause which seemed beyond all hope," and prepared to withdraw the troops under his command to Enzeli. The evacuation was successfully carried out, in the face of a Turkish attack, on the night of September 14, and at dawn of the following day armed bands of Tatars and Kurds began to pour into Baku. A savage massacre of Armenians continued during the following three days, and it is estimated that over 20,000 inhabitants perished, while hundreds of Russian, Armenian and Jewish women were abducted.

On the 17th a degree of order was restored, and Nuri and Khalil Pashas, accompanied by the Mussavetist leaders, established themselves in the town. The capture of Baku was a remarkable triumph for the Turks. For the first time the wild dreams of the Young Turk idealists seemed capable of attainment. Russia was sunk in anarchy, and the road lay open to Daghestan and the Terek, Transcaspia and Northern Persia. A Mussavet Government of ardent Pan-Turanians was established at Baku, including Khan Khoiski, Hassan Aghaiev (both murdered at Tiflis in June 1920) and General

¹ These battalions were 7th North Staffordshires, 9th Royal Warwicks, 9th Worcesters.

Mekhmendarov. A Turkish force moved along the railway to Derbend, to establish communication with the discontented Mussulman elements in Daghestan, and in the first week of November occupied Petrovsk.

Immediately upon the conclusion of an Armistice with Turkey, October 30, 1918, Major-General W. M. Thomson, commanding the British troops in Northern Persia, began to enforce the evacuation of Transcaucasia by the Turkish and German troops. A Mussavetist delegation proceeded to British H.Q. at Enzeli, when it was agreed that the *de facto* Government at Baku should continue to function. On November 17 a British detachment, supported by Bicherakov's men and by the Caspian Flotilla, landed at Baku without opposition, and General Thomson made a statement to the effect that the occupying force had come "to replace the Ottoman troops" and that they "had no intention of interfering in interior affairs"; and some weeks later (December 28) he made a further statement that the Allied Command gave its full support to the Government of Khan Khoiski as "l'unique pouvoir légal local dans les limites de l'Azerbaïdjan." Meanwhile a Peace Delegation had left for Paris under the Presidency of Mr. Topchibashev, to place before the Supreme Council a demand for recognition of independence, and a number of extravagant territorial claims, including Batum and Kars.

The situation at Baku was complicated by the attitude of the Russians towards the Tatar Government. Immediately after the Armistice both the British ships on the Caspian and the Russian flotilla were brought into dock at Baku for repairs. The crews of the latter professed strong Bolshevik tendencies, and finally a part of them attempted to break out of port to join the Bolsheviks at Astrakhan, in consequence of which the British authorities assumed control of the flotilla (March 1, 1919). On the other hand Bicherakov and his partisans remained in Baku during December, constituting an element inimical to the Tatars, while General Prjevalski, formerly Russian Chief of Staff on the Caucasian Front, began to collect recruits on behalf of General Denikin. These movements naturally alarmed the Tatar Government, and the British authorities induced Prjevalski to withdraw from Azerbaijan territory. But the Tatars became further alarmed when, during March, Denikin attacked the Georgians at Sochi on the Black Sea, and also occupied Temir Khan Shura, the capital of the short-lived "Mussulman Republic of the Mountaineers of Daghestan."

The situation was critical. Internally the Government was faced with the problems of repairing the serious damage caused at Baku, Shemakha, and other places during the recent fighting, of combating epidemics of cholera and typhus, and with a threatened deadlock in the petroleum industry. This industry, upon which depended the whole economic life of Baku, was in a perilous condition, owing to the fact that its largest market, the Volga Basin, was closed to it. The pipe-line from Baku to Batum was unable to receive more than an insignificant proportion of the output, and the local directors, unable to dispose of their surplus, and fearful to restrict production by declaring a lock-out, were compelled to borrow money from the Government to provide wages.

Meanwhile the pro-Turkish "Ittihad" party was urging co-operation with the discontented elements in Anatolia and an attack on the Armenians. During the whole of 1919 desultory hostilities were in progress between Tatar and Armenian troops in the disputed zones of Kara Bagh and Zangezur. Yet another disruptive element, the "Gummet" or Bolshevik party, was advocating the establishment of a Soviet Republic and an alliance with the Bolsheviks. British intervention temporarily prevented a Russian attack, but the threat of invasion had strengthened the hands of the less moderate Tatars. On April 14 the Cabinet of Khan Khoiski gave place to that of Nazim Beg Usubekov, who to a great extent relied on the support of the Ittihad. On April 25 a Transcaucasian Conference met at Tiflis, with the ostensible object of settling outstanding disputes, but apparently also to concert measures of defence against General Denikin, for on June 27 was announced the conclusion of a defensive military alliance between the Tatar and Georgian Governments.

Meanwhile an Italian "Mission Extraordinaire" under H.R.H. the Duke of Savoy arrived in Baku (May 16), followed by a Military Mission under Colonel Gabba—a significant development of the pro-Turkish policy of the Italian Government.

The withdrawal of the British from Baku in August, together with the British surrender of control of the Caspian Flotilla to General Denikin, was the occasion for a further trend towards co-operation with the Mussulman revolutionary elements. In October 1919 an offensive and defensive military alliance—a condition of which was the training of the Azerbaijan army by Turkish officers—was signed at Constantinople by the Tatar Kerimov and Jevad Pasha, representing Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

During the winter of 1919–20 it was obvious that a serious

crisis was approaching. On the one hand the military successes of the Bolsheviks were inflaming the seditious elements in Baku, while there remained a danger of invasion by fugitive "Whites" or aggressive "Reds"; on the other hand the Mussulman extremists, angry at the Turkish Treaty, were anxious to attack the Armenians. The question of the petroleum surplus finally precipitated a crisis. Four million tons of petroleum products awaited export from Baku, and the oil-magnates, in order to avert economic catastrophe, decided to compromise with their principal customers the rulers of the Volga Basin. On April 27 the "Right" politicians retired to Elisavetpol, whilst Narimanov, the leader of the Gummet, proclaimed a Soviet Republic and invited the Bolsheviks at Petrovsk to occupy Baku. A Russian armoured train then entered the town, followed by a Russian infantry force. The Bolsheviks announced official non-intervention in the affairs of the "Mussulman Republic of Soviet Azerbaijan," and for the first few weeks the Ittihadist Tatars exultantly contemplated the prospect of a Russo-Mussulman alliance against the Armenians and the Allies. Hostilities indeed broke out in the Zangezur region between the Armenians and Soviet troops, and the Georgians were attacked at Poili. But the Tatars were soon disillusioned. In June the Soviet Government, preoccupied in the West, granted treaties of peace to Georgia and Armenia, while no attempt was made to give material assistance to Mustafa Kemal. At the same time the Soviet authorities in Azerbaijan showed little consideration for Tatar independence, and proceeded to repress with brutal severity Mussavetist risings which broke out at Elisavetpol and Shamkhor. "The Bolshevik game was obvious when, instead of the promised brother-Moslems, Baku was occupied by purely Russian troops, who at once announced that they had come to restore Great Russia."¹

The future of the Tatars of Azerbaijan, together with that of the other races of the Caucasus, must remain in doubt, pending the solution of the great questions involved in the Russian Civil War.

But whatever may be the fate of the Armenians and Georgians, it would appear that the Tatars can scarcely avoid reincorporation in the Russian State. Strategically Baku and Azerbaijan must always be at the mercy of the rulers of the Caspian, while economically Baku forms an integral part of the Russian State. It would seem that the future of the Tatars of Azerbaijan lies

¹ Statement of the Azerbaijan Delegation in the *Temps*, July 5, 1920.

in co-operation with the other Turko-Tatar races of the Russian Empire rather than in an insignificant independence or in a precarious alliance with the Ottoman Turks. In conjunction with the 15,000,000 Turko-Tatars of Turkistan, the Volga Basin and the Crimea, the Tatars of Azerbaijan should have an important influence on the political and social development of Russia. A wide measure of autonomy within the Russian State should secure to the Tatars sufficient political independence and freedom for individual national expression. If there be any future for Pan-Turanianism it will be found in a peaceful cultural and educational development, and not in an extravagant aggressive movement.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

A.D.		
639-651	The Arabs conquer Transcaucasia.
7th-11th Cent.	.	The Arabs rule in Shirvan, Aran and Mughan. Bay-lakan, Berda'a and Derbend centres of trade with the Russians, Khazars, Turkistan and North-west Persia. Ibn Haukal, Masudi, etc., writers.
1040-60	Seljuk Turks overrun Transcaucasia.
12th-13th Cent.	.	Georgia predominant in Transcaucasia. The Mussulman provinces ruled by local Khans and Emirs. El-Idrisi and Yakuti writers.
1236	Mongols conquered Eastern Transcaucasia.
Later part of 13th Cent.	Development of Genoese trade. Rubruck, Polo, etc., writers. Also Abu'l Fida.
1345	The Black Death ravages the Mongols.
1395	Timur Leng traverses Transcaucasia.
1407-78	Ak and Kara Kuyunli Turks predominant in Armenia and Persian Azerbaijan. Narratives of Contarini, Barbaro, Zeno, etc.
1499	Ismail Safi of Ardebil seizes Baku, Shemakha and Tabriz and re-establishes a native dynasty in Persia.
16th Cent. . .	.	Turko-Persian Wars. A. Jenkinson in Persia.
17th Cent. . .	.	Decline of Persia. Khans of East Transcaucasia semi-independent. Abu'l Ghazi, Krushinski and Chardin writers.
18th Cent. . .	.	Afghan wars in Persia.
1722-3	Russians take Derbend and Baku.
1732	Treaty of Resht.
1735	Treaty of Ganja. Nadir Shah regains the Khanates.
1748-95	Irakli II of Georgia occupies and holds Ganja, Shusha and Erivan.
1796	Zubov's campaign in Kara Bagh.
1803-13	Russo-Persian War. Treaty of Gulistan confirms Russian annexation of Shirvan, Kara Bagh and Sheki.
1824-7	Russo-Persian Campaign. By Treaty of Turkmanchai Russia acquires Erivan, Nakhichevan and Talish.
1873-1900 . .	.	Rise of Baku oil-industry.
1903-6	Revolutionary outbreaks and Tatar-Armenian racial war. Formation of the "Mussavet" and foundation of "the Mussulman Philanthropic Society."
1908-9	Young Turk Revolution and Persian Constitutional struggle.
1914.	<i>August</i>	Outbreak of the World War.— <i>Nov.</i> Caucasus Campaign opens.
1917.	<i>March</i>	Outbreak of the Russian Revolution.— <i>April</i> 21. Tatars hold Congress at Baku.— <i>May</i> 1. All-Russian Mussulman Congress at Moscow.— <i>June</i> 15. Second Tatar Congress at Baku.— <i>August</i> 25. Third Tatar Congress at Baku.— <i>Nov.</i> Bolshevik <i>coup</i> at Petrograd. Transcaucasia administered by a Commissariat of Fourteen, deriving authority from a Seim.

1918. *Jan.* Brest-Litovsk negotiations begin. Tatars massacre Russian troops at Shamkhor and elsewhere. Mussavet intrigues against Soviet at Baku.—*March* 17. Mussavetist rising at Baku suppressed by Bolsheviks. Tatar leaders at Elisavetpol.—*May* 15. Turks occupy Alexandropol.—28. Break-up of the Transcaucasian Seim. Khan Khoiski proclaims Tatar independence at Elisavetpol.—*June* 3. Treaty of Batum.—14. Turks occupy Tabriz.—25. First Turko-Tatar attack on Baku. Fall of Shaumian.—*August* 11—*Sept.* 15. British force at Baku.—*Sept.* 17. Khan Khoiski and Nuri Pasha enter Baku.—27. Turks occupy Derbend.—*Oct.* 20. Anglo-Turkish Armistice.—*Nov.* 17. Brigadier-General Thomson occupies Baku.—*Dec.* 7. Parliament of Azerbaijan opens. 25. Government of Khan Khoiski recognised by British as holding local power. Generals Prjevalski and Bicherakov appear in Baku.
1919. *March* 1 British take charge of Caspian Flotilla. Denikin attacks Sochi and occupies Temir Khan Shura. *April* 14. Resignation of Khan Khoiski. Nasib Beg Usubekov forms Cabinet.—*May.* Italian representatives at Baku.—*June* 27. Georgio-Azerbaijan Military Convention.—*August.* British evacuate Transcaucasia except Batum.—*October.* Turko-Tatar Secret Agreement signed at Constantinople.
1920. *Jan.* 12 *De facto* independence of Azerbaijan recognised by Supreme Council.—*April* 27. Bolsheviks reoccupy Baku.

B. ECONOMICS

IX

THE RESOURCES OF GEORGIA, THE CAUCASUS AND AZERBAIJAN

Climatic Conditions.—The general characteristics of the geography of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia have already been indicated.¹ To the west are the Euxine, to the east the Caspian depressions. To the north the solid wall of the Caucasian Range, stretching for 650 miles west-north-west to east-south-east, separates the northern steppe from the southern river-valleys. The comparatively low range of the Suram Mountains running from north to south connects the Caucasus with the Pontic or Armenian system and separates the head-waters of the Rion and the Kur. And to the south-east an advanced bastion of the Armenian Mountains dominates the middle reaches of the Kur Valley.

Transcaucasia may be divided into three climatic areas. In the west the protection of the great Caucasian Range and of the lesser systems in the east and south has produced in the basin of the Rion a climate which is subtropical. The summers are oppressively hot, and the winters are mild and with little fall of snow. The heavy rains, the annual fall of which averages 60 to 80 inches, combined with the multitude of streams which find their way to the marshy Mingrelian coast, produce an atmosphere of extreme humidity. Hence, whilst the soil is fertile and sub-tropical, and fruits and vegetation flourish, the health of the inhabitants suffers, and malaria, with its consequent enervation of physique and *moral*, is prevalent. To the east, in the Kur Valley, the Suram Range breaks the force of rain-clouds drifting over from the Black Sea, while the parching winds of Central Asia blow across the Caspian and raise in the Baku region the most violent sand- and dust-storms. Kakhetia and Karthalinia are adequately

¹ Vide pp. 169–171.

watered by the streams falling south and west from the Central Caucasus and Daghestan; but the annual rainfall is low in comparison to that of the Mingrelian Plain, and at Baku registers an average of only 13 inches. The destructive measures of invaders and subsequent desiccation have further contributed to the aridity of the eastern region, and the grassy plains which once supported thousands of Mongol ponies have now degenerated in many parts into desert land. But as it is less fertile, so the Kur Valley is more healthy than that of the Rion. The atmosphere is dry, and if the summers are as hot they are not as humid as those of Mingrelia. In the winter extremes of cold are experienced, and snow lies in many parts of the Kur Valley. The third, or south-eastern, area, including Russian Armenia and Kara Bagh, suffers the violent contrasts of heat and cold of the Armenian Plateau. At Erivan and Alexandropol snow lies until April, while the short summers scorch all vegetation. The Araxes Valley suffers in a lesser degree from the same conditions.

Communications.—The chief commercial route in Transcaucasia is the Transcaucasian Railway. The main line runs north from Batum along the Black Sea coast to Nikolaevsk, whence it turns inland, crosses the Rion and at Samtredi joins a line coming from Poti. Thence it runs east-south-east to Gori and Tiflis, traversing the Suram by a tunnel. It follows the course of the Kur until it crosses the Poili bridge, and then runs south-east by Elisavetpol to Alyat on the Caspian Sea, where it turns north to Baku. The total length is 563 miles. The Railway Company further owns a pipe-line following the same route, which is capable of conveying 1,600,000 tons of oil per annum from Baku to Batum. From Tiflis another line runs south by Karakilissa to Alexandropol, whence it branches west to Kars and south-east to Erivan and Julfa. During the war, the Russians continued the Kars line to Sarikamish, whence a light railway connected it with Erzerum. Another light railway connects Julfa with Tabriz. Branch lines also connect the Transcaucasian line with Kutais and the Tkhvibuli coal-fields, with the Chiaturi manganese area, and with the popular health-resort at Borjom.

Until the collapse of Shamil Transcaucasia was almost without land communication with the North Caucasus, except by the Daryal Pass. The principal commercial communications between Transcaucasia and Russia still continue to be marine, on the Black Sea from Poti and Batum to the South Russian ports, on the Caspian from Baku to Astrakhan.

The Russians have been careful however to develop communications over the Caucasus of extreme military and political importance. A railway from Baku follows the historical passage-way by Derbend and connects with the Vladikavkaz-Rostov line and the main Russian system by Petrovsk, Grozni and Beslan. There is no other railway communication with Transcaucasia, but Russian strategic control has been ensured by four military roads. The main artery, the Georgian Military Road, 382 miles in length, leads from Mozdok via Vladikavkaz and the Daryal to Dushet, Tiflis and Erivan. On the west the Ossetian Military Road runs from Ardon, 20 miles north-west of Vladikavkaz, across the main range of the Caucasus by the Mamison Pass, and reaches Kutais by Oni. Along the formerly impassable Black Sea coast a metalled road now runs from Anapa via Novo-Rossiisk and Sochi to Sukhum and Kutais. On the east a metalled road from Petrovsk traverses Daghestan by Temir Khan Shura and the Vantliashet Pass and leads by Telav to Tiflis. The existence of these four roads is of supreme political importance. The Caucasus is no longer an insuperable military barrier, and the construction of the Black Sea and Ossetian roads has opened two new routes of invasion into Georgia. Other important roads are the lateral road west to east, Kutais—Tiflis—Elisavetpol—Shemakha—Baku; also, Tiflis—Kars, Akhaltsikh—Batum, and Akhal-kalaki—Ardahan—Ardanuch—Artvin—Batum. Batum has no direct main road connection with Poti or Sukhum.

The Rion is navigable for 83 miles from its mouth at Poti; the Kur for 390 miles.

Timber Resources.—The Caucasian area is remarkable for the extent and wealth of its forests, the survival of which has been due as much to the sparsity, and consequently considerable needs of the population, as to inaccessibility and impracticability of transport. In the south-eastern regions much deforestation has taken place, and many of the mountain-sides of Russian Armenia, formerly thickly wooded, are now bare of trees. Similarly, since the Russian conquest, the beech-forests of Chechnia have been greatly thinned. Dense forests of beech, oak and conifers still cover the northern slopes of the Caucasus along the banks of the Kuban and the Terek and their tributaries, while there are extensive forests round Lake Gökcha, east of Elisavetpol, and in Talish.

But it is along the Black Sea coast, on the south-western slopes of the Caucasus and in Georgia, where the many streams and shelter from the winds of the steppe are favourable to

growth, that the greatest wealth of timber is to be found. It is estimated that nearly 7,000,000 acres, or 38 per cent. of the total extent of the Georgian Republic, are covered with trees. "According to the climate and configuration of the soil the predominant species of tree vary in the different forest districts. In the subtropical zone of the Black Sea shore we find a luxuriant vegetation of leaf-trees and bushes from orange, lemon, pear, peach and apple-trees to beeches, walnut and box-trees. In the Sukhum district the abundance of chestnut-trees is particularly remarkable. From the shore eastward into the Provinces of Kutais and Tiflis beeches and hornbeams form the characteristic outline of the landscape up to an altitude of about 4,000 feet above sea-level, after which they gradually become interspersed, until entirely replaced by coniferous species. Oaks are found chiefly above the 5,500 feet level and form rich forests in Kakhethi; elms, chestnut and lime-trees grow well everywhere up to about 5,000 feet. While the softwood, aspen, elder and ash-trees are mostly confined to the moderate altitudes, the birch is found up to the limit of tree-vegetation, i.e. about 8,000 feet.

"The coniferous trees of the Georgian forests, as elsewhere, generally occupy the upper parts of the mountains, beginning above 4,000 feet. They consist of a number of high-stemmed species, several being peculiar to the Caucasus. The most abundant of them are the red and silver firs, pine, larch, yew and maple, the latter growing to enormous heights, particularly in Kakhethi. . . . Firs and Caucasian yew-trees form enormous forests in the districts of Gori and Akhaltsikh. In the lowlands of Eastern Georgia, as in the Shiraki Plain or Lower Kakhethi, the vegetation changes entirely; the high-stemmed trees disappear, and prickly juniper-trees and pistachio-bushes form the chief characteristic of the landscape."¹

Less than half the area of Transcaucasian forests is susceptible of exploitation, the remaining acreage being at present inaccessible for practical purposes. Until the Revolution the forests were in part the property of the Russian State, in part of the Imperial Family and other landowners. The forests were exploited to a certain extent for local needs. The Italian firm of Sbrajavacca had a concession to cut the forests of Svanetia and Radsha, and floated timber down the Rion to saw-mills on the Black Sea Coast. Export had, however, declined before the war, owing to unfavourable prices.

After the Revolution the forests were declared to be the

¹ *Russo-British Chamber of Commerce Journal*, May 1920.

property of the Georgian Government, who have recently exploited the timber of the Kutais and Poti districts for the manufacture of railway sleepers.

Vegetable and Animal Products.—The Caucasus is essentially an agricultural and pastoral country, and it is estimated that from 75 per cent. to 80 per cent. of the population are engaged in animal and vegetable production. In the mountain-regions, Kabarda, Chechnia, Svanetia, Ossetia, Daghestan and Kara Bagh, the people are virtually self-supporting as regards cereals, but produce little for export. Their surplus production is mainly in animals. In Kabarda and in the Jevad and Gökcha districts of Azerbaijan fine horses are bred, and, in the Mughan, camels. The production of wool, sold for the most part to carpet-weavers, is the main source of living to the mountain and nomad tribes, and in the Borchalu district (south of Tiflis) the Tatars make excellent cheese which is exported to Russia as "Gruyère." The production of wax and honey further forms a secondary occupation of many of the villagers, both of the hills and the plain. In Daghestan and in the Kur Delta there are thriving fisheries. The catch of "puzanka," a small species of herring, off the coast of Daghestan and the mouth of the Terek, averages 40,000 tons a year; while along the Kur the catch of sturgeon gives an annual production of over 300 tons of caviare. Large herds of swine flourish in many parts of Transcaucasia, particularly in the lowlands of Mingrelia and Guria.

The chief cereals grown in Transcaucasia are: wheat, which covers approximately 475,000 acres in the Government of Baku, 670,000 acres in the Government of Elisavetpol and 680,000 acres in the Government of Tiflis; maize, which occupies about 470,000 acres in the Government of Kutais, and 180,000 acres in the Government of Sukhum; and rye, which covers about 133,000 acres over Transcaucasia, more than half being grown in the Government of Elisavetpol. Hay occupies about 500,000 acres in the Black Sea and Elisavetpol districts. Rice is grown chiefly in Azerbaijan and Talish, and cotton covers about 200,000 acres over different parts of the country. Cotton has recently tended to supersede rice, especially in the eastern regions, Baku, Elisavetpol and Erivan, where, in 1913, it already covered about 200,000 acres. It is possible that a considerable crop of cotton may in the near future be cultivated in the Mughan Steppe, the irrigation of which the Russian Government had successfully undertaken before the outbreak of war.

Millet, oats, flax and hemp are also grown in limited quantities in Transcaucasia.

Tobacco has been grown with great success in the sheltered subtropical parts of the Black Sea littoral and in the neighbourhoods of Tiflis, Kutais and Zakatali. Of the total Russian output of high quality "Turkish" tobacco in 1915, it is estimated that 33 per cent. came from Transcaucasia. Of this the heaviest crops and the richest quality was grown round Sukhum and Sochi. The tobacco of Batum and Ozurgeti was little inferior.

Wine is made throughout Transcaucasia, and vine-culture is a secondary occupation of many of the peasants. The wines of the Alazan, of Elisavetpol and of Echmiadzin are celebrated in Russia, and much is exported to that country, but for the most part the vintners cater for the very generous local consumption.

Mulberry-trees flourish on the southern slopes of the Caucasus; about 5,000 tons of silk a year are produced, and are mostly consumed by local industry. In Azerbaijan silk has, like rice, suffered from the recent preference accorded to cotton. Other products are: tea, round Ozurgeti and Chavka; plums, the most luscious of which come from Sochi and Sukhum; oranges from Chavka; olives from Artvin and Sukhum; lemons, apples, liquorice-root, the sun-flower—from which a substitute for linseed oil is obtained—attar of roses, *ramie* fibre, and inconsiderable quantities, consumed locally, of potatoes, lentils, beans, haricots and peas.

Minerals.—It is only in recent years that the discovery of the existence of a belt of oil-bearing rock (*vide* Petroleum, below), extending from the Northern Caucasus to Southern Persia, has attracted the attention of European capital to the mineral potentialities of the Middle East—particularly of the Caucasus and Persia. The effects of this discovery have already been considerable, and it is probable that the coming half-century will witness, on the one hand the transformation of the Middle East from a backward agricultural to an important industrial region; on the other the concentration of political interest on the area between the Kuban and Terek and the Persian Gulf.

The mineral resources of the Caucasus have never been adequately prospected. The Russian Government left the exploration and exploitation of possible mineral deposits to individual enterprise. Thus, with the exception of the very interesting book of Mr. D. Ghambashidze,¹ no reference-books

¹ D. Ghambashidze, *Mineral Resources of Georgia and Caucasia*.

exist on the subject, and in Mr. Ghambashidze's book the existence of many important deposits is only broadly indicated.

Metals.—*Manganese* is the only metal which has been adequately worked in Georgia, and the growth of this industry has, by creating a community of miners, had an important effect on the industrialisation and subsequent growth of the Socialist movement in the country.

The principal manganese deposit covers an extent of about 100 square miles along both banks of the river Kvirili, in the Government of Kutais, the centre of the mining region being at the town of Chiaturi. The mines were at first worked by a large number of small native firms who, from lack of expert knowledge and capital, employed very unscientific methods, with the result that there was much waste. Later, however, foreign firms, chiefly German, began to purchase holdings and to organise the industry, and towards the end of the last decade of the nineteenth century Georgian manganese rivalled that of Brazil and India. Great Britain was at first the principal purchaser, but Germany and other Continental countries later absorbed the bulk of the output. The industry reached the height of its prosperity in 1906, when a decrease in demand, unusually high sea-freights, and foreign competition caused a depression which lasted until 1911. In that year a revival of prosperity took place, but with the closing of the Dardanelles at the end of 1914 the industry suffered a severe blow. At the end of 1918 work at the mines had practically ceased, and heavy stocks of ore were lying at Chiaturi and Poti.

Further deposits of manganese exist at Khvartata (Batum), Saifalu (Elisavetpol), Samtredi and Novo-Senaki (Kutais).

Outcrops of *copper* occur in many parts of the Caucasus, and its mining has been in progress from the remotest times. There are three main areas which are known to contain rich deposits: (1) south of Tiflis, and east and west of the Tiflis-Kars Railway; (2) in the Chorokh Valley; and (3) in the Zangezur region.

(1) The Kedabeg group, comprising the mines of Kedabeg, Kelakent and Kara-bulag, situated north-east of Gökcha in the Government of Elisavetpol, have been worked by the American firm of Siemens Brothers, whose production of copper in 1913 amounted to 1,272 metric tons. The Allahverdi, Akhtala and Shambru mines, in the Lialvar Hills, south of Tiflis, are worked by the French Cie Métallurgique et Industrielle du Caucase, their production in 1913 amounting to 4,760 metric tons. Native firms also work mines in the Phambak Hills,

and at Delijan, Kazakh, Sagali, Saifalu, and elsewhere in the Government of Elisavetpol.

(2) In the Chorokh Basin, the whole length of which is believed to contain rich deposits of ore, the British Caucasus Copper Co. has worked the Dzanzul mine, south of Borchka. In 1912 the production from this mine was 40,000 tons of ore and 3,000 tons of copper, but in the following year the output was disappointing. In the same region Siemens Brothers had begun operations at the Khvartshana mine.

(3) In the Zangezur region difficulties of transport have prevented adequate exploitation, but work has been undertaken by native firms, notably at Synik, Barabatum and Katar. Other considerable deposits are believed to exist in the Rion Valley round Telav and Zakatali, in the Sukhum district and along the Ossetian Military Road.

Iron has been little exploited in the Caucasus, but deposits have been prospected at Khamuli in Kutais, Chachak in Tiflis, on the banks of the Bzib near Sukhum, at Veden in Chechnia, in the Maikop district, and near Lenkoran.

There are deposits of *lead* and *zinc* ore at Sadon, near Vladikavkaz, in the neighbourhoods of Sukhum and Gori, in the Government of Elisavetpol, near Mozdok and Artvin, and elsewhere, but little exploitation has been undertaken. Deposits of *mercury*, *molybdenum*, *antimony*, *iron pyrites*, *cobalt* and *nickel*, and also small quantities of *gold* and *silver* exist, and would probably repay exploitation.

Non-Metals.—*Coal* is exploited in the Caucasus only at the mines of Tkhvibuli in the Government of Kutais, where the annual production for 1911–15 averaged about 5,000 tons. Much of it however was of poor quality. Rich deposits have been prospected at Tkvertcheli, in the Government of Sukhum, and another field has been located near Olti in the Government of Kars.

Deposits of *baryta* have been worked in the Government of Kutais; *asbestos* is produced at Shorapan and elsewhere in Kutais; *sulphur* abounds in the Government of Erivan; *salt* is produced in considerable quantities in the Governments of Baku, Erivan, Kars, and Daghestan; there are *bitumen*-beds on the Black Sea coast; *emery* is found at Kara-Bulakh; fine *lithographic stone* is obtainable at Amlivi, near Tiflis, and *pumice-stone* near Kars; *mica* and *graphite* also exist.

Mineral Springs.—The Caucasus is celebrated for its mineral springs, and before the Revolution many thousands of Russians, and even invalids from Western Europe, visited the health-

giving waters. In the Northern Caucasus Essentuki, Piatigorsk, Kislovodsk and Zhelesnovodsk were the favourite resorts. In Transcaucasia Borjom, in the Government of Tiflis, an appanage of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, was the most popular resort, and its waters, rich in carbonic acid and comparable with those of Vichy, were exported to Russia, Western Europe and America—in 1913 to the amount of 9,000,000 bottles.

At Abas-Tuman, 40 miles from Borjom, and at Tiflis are hot baths, efficacious for the cure of skin diseases, nervous diseases, rheumatism, etc. Some of the springs contain the same qualities as Cauterets and Barèges in France, and Baden in Austria, while the climate of Abas-Tuman attracts consumptive patients.

Tskhalkubo, near Kutais, possesses warm springs whose radio properties are declared to be equal to those of Teplitz-Schönau in Bohemia. For this resort is prophesied an important future as soon as the nature of the waters is more widely known, and ordered conditions make it accessible to the timid invalids of Western Europe and America.

Petroleum (1) The Baku Fields.—The Baku area has hitherto been the most productive source of Caucasian oil. The older oil-fields lie in the Apsheron Peninsula—Balakhani, Sabunchi, Romani, Bibi-Ebyat and Zabrat—while there is a more recently discovered field at Surakhani. The outlying district of Benagadi and Holy and Cheleken Islands in the Caspian, are also worked by the Baku firms. The Baku fields had been exploited since ancient times, and from 1813 some attempt had been made by the Russians to develop their potentialities. An onerous concession system, however, discouraged private enterprise, and when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, a universal demand for crude-oil was created, the fields still remained almost untouched, and Russia became dependent on oil imported from America. In 1872 the concession system was at last abolished, and State participation in the profits was ensured by the imposition of an excise duty. Later, the nascent industry was further assisted by the imposition of a duty on oil imported into Russia.

In 1873 the Swedish Nobel Brothers commenced to bore in the Apsheron fields, and in the following years many foreign groups, principal of which were the French Rothschilds, obtained concessions. In 1908 the prosperity of the Baku fields reached its zenith, and in that year the Caucasian oil-fields together produced 22 per cent. of the world's output. Between 1908 and 1911, however, there took place a serious decrease, the output falling from nearly 7,500,000 metric tons in 1908 to just over 5,000,000 metric tons in 1911.

But in 1914, while the production of the older wells was still decreasing, the newly exploited field of Benagadi was giving a steadily increasing output; and it is unquestionable that the oil-deposits of the South-eastern Caucasus are by no means exhausted, and many rich areas remain to be prospected and exploited.

(2) The Grozni Fields.—The petroliferous area round Grozni had been worked for some years to supply local needs when, in 1893, the European Petrol Company, a British concern, commenced scientific exploitation. The oil-bearing area, at present developed, covers an area of about 2,500 acres, while new areas in the neighbourhood have been prospected for a radius of about 30 miles. The whole district is believed to be extremely rich in petroleum products, and experts consider that its output may eventually rival that of Baku. The Kazbek Syndicate and the Anglo-Terek Co., both British concerns, also own important holdings.

(3) The Maikop Fields, originally exploited by British capital in 1908, have proved disappointing. The output has steadily declined since 1912, and little oil has been available for export, the bulk being consumed locally.

Other petroliferous areas are known to exist in the regions of Shemakha, Jevad, Lenkoran, Telav and Ozurgeti.

Export and Import Trade.—The bulk of the trade of Transcaucasia was, before the war, carried on with other parts of the Russian Empire, by Batum and Poti to the South Russian ports, and by Baku to Astrakhan and Central Asia. Further Transcaucasia enjoyed the benefits of a growing transit trade between the Mediterranean countries and Russia on the one hand, and Persia and Central Asia on the other.

The Transcaucasus exported into Russia the whole of the copper produced and a proportion of the manganese, together with the bulk of the production of tobacco, tea, raw silk and cocoons, wine, wool and fruit. In return Russia exported into the Transcaucasus machinery and other metal goods and cereals, supplying one-fifth of the consumption of grain in the Transcaucasus. This last item is significant, for it implies the partial dependence of the Transcaucasus, itself an agricultural country, on Russia for food-supply.¹

On the other hand the Transcaucasus exported to Europe,

¹ "Somme toute, la balance de l'industrie rurale accusait, en Géorgie, avant la guerre, plutôt des déficits que des excédents; le manque de blé n'était pas compensé par un surplus des autres branches de l'agriculture" (V. Vohtinsky, *La Démocratie Géorgienne*).

by Batum and Poti, the bulk of the manganese output and large quantities of petroleum products, together with small quantities of silk and cocoons, timber, tobacco, wool and fruit. In return, the western countries sent machinery and tin plates (for oil cases and cans), textiles, stationery, china and glass, leather goods, fancy goods, etc.

The United States supplied the bulk of the machinery, the European countries the sundry imports. Until the end of the last century Great Britain controlled about 40 per cent. of the foreign trade of the Caucasus, but in recent years has been superseded by Germany, owing, to a great extent, to the more accommodating methods of German importers and to the superior knowledge and linguistic abilities of their travellers. In 1910 the share of Britain in the foreign trade of Caucasia had declined to 17 per cent.

The exports of petroleum products from Transcaucasia to Europe were steadily declining before the outbreak of war. The progressive development of American oil-fields, on the one hand, the revolutionary troubles in the Caucasus on the other, had tended to dislocate the trade with Europe, while the development of Russian industry and communications had created an increased demand from Russia. In 1913, out of 6,000,000 tons of petroleum products exported from the Caucasian fields, Russia consumed 5,000,000 tons, i.e. five-sixths of the output.

The outbreak of war and the subsequent disorders in Russia interrupted the entire economic life of the Caucasus ; the closing of the Dardanelles prevented all communication with the Mediterranean, and the disorganisation of the Russian railways hindered the maintenance of regular relations with Russia. At the end of 1914 work ceased at the Chiaturi manganese-mines and at the copper-mines in the Chorokh Basin, while at Groni production was reduced owing to the difficulty of transport and to lack of storage accommodation. Baku continued to supply the requirements of the armies and of the interior of Russia, but towards the end of 1917 work there practically ceased.

The advent of the Germans in the summer of 1918 tended to relieve the situation, for, while they had not time to restore the production of the Baku fields, they hastened to export the large supplies of tobacco accumulated at Sukhum and of manganese at Poti.

During the period of independence from the summer of 1918 to the end of 1920 the economics of the Transcaucasus were in an extremely parlous condition. For Georgia, Armenia and

Azerbaijan were suffering in a lesser degree from the same economic causes and effects which were then operating in Russia. The war and virtual isolation during four years from the commercial centres of the world had disorganised the whole structure of trade; the railways were in disrepair; factories and machinery were ruined; the peasants were working with worn-out tools, and they lacked the most common necessities of their occupations and of everyday life. On the other hand, at a time of universal shortage, and with the opening of markets, which were equally in need but at the same time more approachable and more secure, there was little inducement to European capital to resume relations with the Transcaucasus. The export of petroleum by the pipe-line from Baku to Batum recommenced at the end of 1918, and some attempt was made to revive the tobacco and manganese industries in Georgia. But the three Transcaucasian Governments were hampered by the heavy expense involved in the repair of damaged property, in the relief of refugees, in the maintenance of the excessive numbers of officials—whose appearance seems inevitably to follow the establishment of a Socialist régime—and in the pursuit of militant foreign policies whereby to emphasise their national revindications. Economic isolation from Russia further increased the difficulties of the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan. On the one hand Denikin's blockade of the northern frontier prevented the transport of the necessary annual supply of grain from the North Caucasus; on the other, the closing of the Volga Basin prevented communication with the greatest market for Caucasian oil. As the Bolsheviks advanced in Southern Russia, the situation of Georgia grew worse. In 1917 the Georgian Government had been successful in negotiating an exchange of Sukhum tobacco for Ukrainian sugar, while they had revived the interest of some foreign importing groups. The Italians, indeed, sent a Commercial Mission to Tiflis. But with the successes of the Bolsheviks, the Georgian rouble fell, and foreign firms became even more chary of undertaking trade in Georgia. The capture of Baku and the occupation of the South-eastern Caucasus by the Bolsheviks was in reality a recognition of the principle—even by the conservative and nationalistic oil-magnates of Baku—of the economic dependence of the Caucasus on Russia. But if Baku depended on the Volga Basin for its market and on the Northern Caucasus for its food, Georgia depended on Baku for its fuel. Thus, without foreign military support and material assistance, it became inevitable that Georgia should submit to economic incorporation in Russia.

Labour Conditions : Recent Socialist Legislation.—Previous to the Revolution the economic conditions of the working classes in the Caucasus had left much to be desired. During the first decade of the present century the organisation of unions and their subsequent action had caused the employers, particularly foreign, to concede a number of amelioratory measures, such as the construction of model houses, schools, public libraries, baths and hospitals. The conditions of living on the petroleum fields was less satisfactory than those of the mining-regions, and it was at Baku that the labouring classes were most unsettled. In the summer of 1914 some very significant strikes took place. The demands of the men included better housing, improvement of sanitary conditions of dwellings, a month's holiday each year on full pay, the abolition of overtime and piece-work, etc., etc. It was difficult to foresee to what results the strikes would have led had they continued. At the beginning of war, however, the strikes suddenly came to an end by the men resuming work.

On the outbreak of the Russian Revolution Baku proved to be one of the centres of industrial extremism, and when the Bolsheviks seized power in the autumn of 1917 a Soviet administration was established in the oil-fields which endured until the middle of 1918. With the Turkish occupation the conservative oil-magnates were restored to power, and, basing their policy on the principles of Turan and Islam, they were successful in obtaining the support of the Tatar workmen against their Armenian and Russian fellows. The differences between the Mussulman and Christian elements continued to divide the proletariat of the oil-fields, and the hostility of the Armenian and Russian workmen towards the Tatar Government was one of the factors favourable to the re-establishment of a Russian Bolshevik régime.

In Georgia, where the industrial element was weaker, the tendency towards extremism was less marked. The Social Democrats indeed had to base their policy on the support of the peasants who, secure in the possession of their land, evinced little sympathy for any other principles of social evolution. A series of regulations establishing workmen's committees to participate in the management of concerns, regulating wages in accordance with the cost of living, guaranteeing security of employment and imposing State arbitration in the case of disputes, were the only modifications of the former industrial organisation which the Social Democratic Government introduced. This moderation in industrial legislation, combined

with the repression of national minorities, tended to form among the Russian and Armenian workmen in Tiflis and Batum a Bolshevik minority.

The only result of the Revolution which appears likely to be permanent are the measures which expropriated the landowners and gave possession of the land to the peasants.


This agrarian revolution was effected by a decree of the Transcaucasian Commissariat (December 16, 1917) which alienated from the original landowners all property over a certain fixed average (about 19 acres of land under intensive culture, vines, tobacco, cotton, etc.; about 41 acres of land under cereals; about 109 acres of pasturage) and appointed local commissions to supervise the division of the land confiscated among those holding less than the scheduled acreage, and among the majority who had hitherto been employed on the land only as paid labourers. In Georgia this agrarian revolution was carried out almost without bloodshed, for whilst many of the largest landowners were Russian Grand Dukes and officers absent from the Caucasus or impotent to protest, the native aristocracy wisely gave their approval to the measure.

In the Tatar districts the change was by no means recognised, and in many parts the begs, supported by the influence of the mullahs, succeeded in maintaining their position.

Conclusion.—The economic and social future of the Caucasus is necessarily involved in that of Russia, and the Soviet system of government is being introduced into the Caucasus, in conformity with that of Russia. It is consequently impossible to give here any present financial or commercial details of permanent value. Two points are, however, evident. Firstly, if the industries of the Caucasus—petroleum and manganese—are to be revived, and if its natural resources—copper, timber, water-power and agriculture—are to be developed, such modifications must of necessity be introduced into the social and industrial organisation as will afford to foreign capital some confidence of security of tenure and of amicable relations with labour. Lastly, the development of relations between the Soviet bureaucracy and the peasantry—who in the Caucasus, as in Russia, form the overwhelming majority of the population—must be considered. The peasantry certainly would not hesitate to resist any attempt to modify the terms of their tenure of the land, and the Bolsheviks will scarcely be prepared to risk an issue with them. It remains to be seen whether the efficiency of the young Jewish agri-

cultural experts, fresh from Communist propaganda schools and technical colleges, will prove more acceptable to the peasant than the rough good-nature and understanding of many—and the selfish exactions of some—of his former landlords. The peasant wants no master, the technical expert even less than the baron. And in the next few years there will probably develop in the Caucasus—as in Russia—a healthy passive opposition to the Bolshevist administration, if not a counter-revolution or regenerative movement of the peasant against the urban bureaucrat.

THE CAUCASUS 1923



C. MISCELLANEOUS

DEFENCE

Georgia and Azerbaijan have no troops of their own ; all troops in Transcaucasia are at the disposal of Soviet Russia.

There is a Special Caucasus Army at present in Transcaucasia (H.Q., Tiflis), composed of 1 Independent Cavalry Brigade (H.Q. uncertain), strength estimated at 1,000 sabres, and 3 Divisions (H.Q. Kutais, Baku or Lenkoran, Erivan or Alexandropol), each Division estimated at 4,700 rifles.

The above information is given for what it may be worth but, as formations are constantly changing, this Special Caucasus Army cannot be considered as of a definite composition. It merely corresponds to one of the 9 Military Districts into which Russia is at present divided.

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MAPS

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(A) signifies Azerbaijan, (B) Baltic Provinces, (C) Caucasus, (E) Estonia, (F) Finland, (G) Georgia, (La) Latvia, (Li) Lithuania.

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